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REVOLUTIONARY PORTUGAL
(1910-1936)

By the same Author

EIGHT CENTURIES OF PORTUGUESE MONARCHY

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The author of this volume shows in an able and lucid manner the causes that go back much farther into the past. He reviews the entire history of monarchical Portugal in an unbiased and bold manner which does him credit . . .
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Our author writes with evident knowledge of Portugal, and whether one agrees with or differs from him certainly his "political study" is of value to the understanding of the affairs in the Peninsular kingdom. Out of the past it throws its lights upon the future — *Daily Chronicle*

As a plain unvarnished account of a nation . . . deserves study — *Truth*

. The politician, the historian and the man-in-the-street will find profit in these pages, and though they may not always agree with the estimates they will find that the author states his case sagely and without over-emphasis — *Manchester Courier*.

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The author writes as a patriot, but with some power of seeing the other side in a complex situation. It is noteworthy that he dates the collapse of the late dynasty from the British claim over the parts of Mashonaland—claims which affected the Portuguese rights and which Lord Salisbury enforced with an ultimatum — *Yorkshire Post*

The author has very wisely compressed into the first two chapters the history of the earlier centuries. The period from the end of the seventeenth century has been treated fully and with due appreciation of the relationship to existing conditions. He speaks with conviction and knowledge. we admire and agree with his outspoken censure — *Daily Mirror*

REVOLUTIONARY
PORTUGAL
(1910–1936)

BY

V DE BRAGANÇA-CUNHA

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PREFACE

Não tornes por detraz; pois he fraqueza
Desistir-se da cousa começada
(*The Lusads*, Canto I, Stanza 40).

Turn thou not back, for it is weakness, still,
A matter once engaged in to forsake
(Translation by J J Aubertin)

ENGLAND has hitherto lacked any satisfactory account of Portuguese Republicanism as a whole. Ushered in by a new philosophy, the Portuguese Revolution of October, 1910, found its supporters in Europe not only among men whose passions it flattered, but even among those who thought, and reasoned, and reflected. It was announced as a movement of political regeneration under republican auspices that would give the moribund nation a fresh lease of life. Those, however, who read the present through the illusion-dispelling history of the past, would have found few grounds for such sanguine anticipation.

"This is not the time to cast the horoscope of Portugal. Whatever her future politics, she will have to seek salvation in her own best traditions." These were my words when, a few months after the Revolution, I attempted in a sketch of Portuguese nationality to bring out the broad lines of the life of the nation. The book was extensively reviewed both in England and America, and received some importance from the exceptional situation of the moment. Since, however, the *Eight Centuries of Portuguese Monarchy* was given to the English-speaking world, it is impossible to look back on the political history of the country without feelings of pain and disappointment.

"A great revolution," wrote Tocqueville, "may sometimes lay the foundation of a country's freedom, yet a succession of revolutions makes it in any country of freedom regulated by law, an impossibility,"—words which, for some years, have had their echo in my mind and to some extent determined the publication of this work.

V. de B. C.

Paris, 1937.

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REVOLUTIONARY PORTUGAL

(1910-1936)

I

A HINT FROM THE PAST

PORTUGAL—one of the youngest of European States—detached itself, towards the end of the eleventh century, from the Kingdom of Leon. It took rank as an independent State after the battle of Aljubarrota gained over the Spaniards and French, where brave English archers, led by English Squires, renewed the recent glories of Crecy and Poitiers.

“After that the Omnipotent ordained
That the contending Kings should now be wed
With the two English ladies of high rank
Princesses fair, renowned and full of grace ”¹

Once the rivalry of the two nations that had either as friends or enemies seen so much of each other, was terminated at the famous meeting at the Ponte de Mouro, by the marriage of the two daughters of John of Gaunt with the rival kings, Portugal was the theatre of most remarkable events that have profoundly influenced the history of mankind. The figures of Princes of Royal descent of the mingled blood of Plantagenet Valois and the house of Hainault—Henry the Navigator, Ferdinand the Saint, Pedro the Great Regent and John the Constable—still stand clear in the light of history over the wreck of the past

¹ *Lusads*, Canto IV, 47 Translation by J J Aubertin

"If in our days we should wish to form some faint idea of the austere and judicious manner in which the princes were educated," wrote Ferdinand Denis, "it would be in the pages of the *Leal Conselheiro*, the book composed by the heir to the throne, that we should seek for these minute particulars, and where alone we could find them. We should then see that Dom João I was sufficiently enlightened to despise the superstitions circulated by the followers of astrology, and that, helped by the admirable princess whom he elevated to the throne, he had gathered in Portugal all the elements of intellectual development which was to be manifested so splendidly."¹ Indeed, on reading the *Leal Conselheiro* of Dom Duarte—undoubtedly a great work of moral philosophy—we revel in the contemplation of the best epoch in the history of Portugal. Oliveira Martins, an historian and an interesting one, perhaps, on account of the pessimistic discontent which runs through his well-known *Historia de Portugal*, would have liked to see the Portugal of his days converted into the Portugal of the days of King John the First and his sons. He produced the *Filhos de D. João I* and the *Vida de Nun' Alvares*, the hero of Aljubarrota, who won the surname of "Holy Constable," whom the Catholic Church has beatified; and we can look on these enthusiastic chronicles of Portuguese history as his last messages of some hope and good cheer. Admirable the way in which he, an ardent advocate once of socialism, yet too easily-influenced a victim of mysticism—mysticism, religious and political, one finds in the works of the monks of Alcobaça, represented by the *Monarchia Lusitana*—can make the dry bones of history live again!

"The Renaissance in Europe," said a Portuguese writer, "owes it all to the Renaissance of Portugal of the fourteenth century. But for the Infante Dom Henrique and his observatory at Sagres, Columbus would not have discovered America nor Vasco da Gama doubled the Cape of Storms to show the amazed nations the road to India." The discovery of the extreme southern point of Africa and of a

¹ Ferdinand Denis, "Portugal" (*L'Univers Histoire et Description de Tous les Peuples*) Paris, MDCCXLVI

way thence to India was looked upon as absurd and impossible. The Portuguese Prince was the victim of great opposition. But fearless, because despising the opinions of others he could plan and achieve his country's greatness, he laid the foundation of a movement that immortalised his name. "Had, therefore, that failure and that ridicule produced in Prince Henry the effect which they ordinarily produced on other men," to quote the words of his English biographer, R H Major, "it is impossible to say what delays would have occurred before these mighty events would have been realized: for it must be borne in mind that the ardour, not only of his own sailors but of surrounding nations, owed this impulse to this pertinacity of purpose in him"¹ Thus in the heritage the Portuguese Prince bequeathed to Portugal, he found a true claim to the gratitude of Europe. In Portugal, however, the movement—no longer national but universal—was not a reaction against the Middle Ages. Portugal had not to suffer the feudal domination which, moreover, never fully ruled in this westernmost state of Europe. Coming late on the scene of the world, at the beginning of the twelfth century, Portugal had, at the Cortes of Lamego, proclaimed the right of the nation in a spirit not inferior to that of Magna Charta, which came into existence seventy years later.

"That God has granted power to Kings with the consent of the people," was the principle formulated as a maxim of politics in the *Livro da Virtuosa Bemfectoria* written by a philosopher Prince, in the manner of Seneca. That Prince was Dom Pedro, the brave and learned brother of Prince Henry the Navigator. The Portuguese Prince, a renowned traveller, was the first foreign Prince to be made a Knight of the Order of the Garter. Unfortunately, however, it was in the encounter of Alfarrobeira that Affonso the Fifth, the "African," not satisfied with seeing his uncle, Dom Pedro, fall dead, had ordered the corpse of the Great Regent to be left on the battlefield to be trampled beneath mailed feet! "The battlefield of Alfarrobeira must be held as the last

¹ R H Major, *The Life of Prince Henry the Navigator* London, 1868

act of the chivalrous cycle among Portuguese," said an eminent Portuguese writer in the *Panorama*

"The new Monarchy," wrote Herculano, the great Portuguese historian, "had no native ally in the rest of Spain, save Aragon and Navarre. The powerful Empire of Leon and Castille to the north and east threatened to engulf it, while to the south its limits were bordered by the Saracens, who were irreconcilable enemies in race and creed, and it required energy and skill to withstand such dangerous neighbours. Affonso proved, through the course of a long reign, that he possessed these needful qualities."¹ The foundation of the Portuguese kingdom laid by Henry Count of Burgundy and consolidated by his widow, Dona Thereza, who promoted the unity of Portugal and its independence of Galicia, was definitely established by her son, Dom Affonso Henriques. The victory won by the Portuguese over the Moors on the field of Ourique, inflicted the severest blow on the Moorish dominion in the Peninsula, and proclaimed Dom Affonso Henriques King of Portugal. The first King of Portugal rendered feudatory to the Holy See the territories he inherited from his parents and those he conquered from the Moors so as to guard against covetousness of Castille and Leon. Sancho the First, the son of the founder of the Portuguese Monarchy, however, was the King of the people. He planted cities and towns which called into existence municipal life so vigorous that it was the pride of the Middle Ages. Affonso the Second, his son, though a zealous maintainer of the power and the prerogatives of the Crown, did his best to prevent the development of feudalism in Portugal. Affonso the Third, essentially a politician, covered the kingdom with municipalities. He organised and introduced them into the Cortes, thus marking a stage in the evolution of Portuguese monarchy. Priests and nobles, of course, changed sides without caring whether they were fighting for or against the Crown. Dom Diniz, the sixth King of Portugal, however, settled once and for all the quarrel which had, during the previous reigns, interfered seriously with the work of national reconstruction.

¹ Alexandre Herculano, *Historia de Portugal*, Liv II

to which he now devoted himself—a quarrel which had grieved the Portuguese Monarchs, dethroned Sancho the Second and embittered the last days of Affonso the Fourth. The attachment of Dom Diniz to the faith of his ancestors was peculiarly strong and ardent. With that faith, he knew, were inseparably bound up the independence and future of his country, and the King's spirit of conciliation enabled Portugal, centuries after, to realise in the wide evolution of the human race its mission. King Diniz had nothing to fear from the privileged classes. By frequently assembling at the Cortes the representatives of the people, and developing the establishment of councils, he annihilated in Portugal mediæval feudalism. Hence the diffusion in Portugal of Provençal poetry expelled from the South of France through the bigotry of the feudal classes—poetry whose example lifted the Portuguese songs into the realm of literature. After the work of Dom Affonso Henriques—a king of battles—that of Dom Diniz is, of course, the greatest we behold in the pages of Portuguese history. He favoured the development of agriculture and commerce, gave a decided impetus to the navy, and founded the University of Coimbra. The foundation, in 1300, of a University in Portugal, the methods of learning pursued there, the cultivation of Portuguese and the extension of the art of writing—these as factors in the social and intellectual life of Portugal can hardly be over-estimated. The ideal interests which they awakened permeated all classes of society; they united the nation in one great aim, that of Dom Diniz, who personifies this period of national development, and one might say, parodying a French writer, that the history of Portugal in its early stages is comprised in the history of its kings and princes.

“That this special calling should fall to the lot of Portugal,” wrote the brilliant historian, Freeman, discussing the historic calling which led Portugal to advance by sea, “was the natural result of her position and circumstances. Shut out from growth in her own peninsula, she still had a work on the coast of Africa that lay opposite to her southern face. Under a leader eager for knowledge as

well as for conquest, this grew into the career of Portugal in Africa and in the islands which, to say the least, are nearer to Africa than Europe or America. To no country did discovery by sea, dominion by sea, come so naturally as to Portugal. Other powers followed her lead as a matter of choice; they all might have stayed at home. On Portugal came the strongest pressure not to stay at home. Her work in Africa, India and America was but the continuation of the first effort by which she rose to life. She won a portion of the Spanish land back from the Saracen, she followed him into Africa, and once on African ground, her career in the world at large opened before her with an attraction which could not be withstood."¹

Portugal opened to modern Europe the wonders of another hemisphere, and was the herald of modern civilisation—the struggle between men and the forces of nature which finds expression in the *Lusiads*, where Camões celebrates the heroism of the Portuguese

Harassed with wars and dangers without name
Beyond what seemed of human prowess bore ²

Pressing forward and drawing the world after them, the Portuguese burst the narrow limits of their own nationality, and in dying to Portugal lived to mankind.

"Around and against the hero," was Samuel Brown's description of David Scott's famous picture of Vasco da Gama passing the Cape of Good Hope and there encountering the Spirit of the Storm, "are arrayed the treacherous night, the lightning with its angry roar, the enraged billows, the demon of that lonely zone, the distracted ship and her self-abandoned or mutinous crew and the impending ruin of the great undertaking, for which he had prayed and toiled his whole life long; but he is steadfast, self-contained and equal to them all. It is a heroic man filling his sphere, sufficient for his circumstances and a match for fate. It is a universal text. It stands for Homer, St. Paul, Dante, Michel Angelo, Luther, Shakespeare, Cromwell, Kepler,

¹ E. A. Freeman, *Historical Essays*, Fourth Series. London, 1892

² *The Lusiads*, Canto 1, Stanza 1. Translation by J. J. Aubertin

Luis de Camões or for Scott himself, as truly as for Da Gama. Nor is any man alive who may not, or ought not to, see the express image of himself in this self-sufficing Vasco, with his faith in the cross, his confidence in himself and his readyhanded use of means. This is one of the great and beautiful lessons of this noble epic"¹—The turbulent temperament of the crew had compelled the man who doubled the Cape of Good Hope to return to Portugal. Vasco da Gama, however, was the one man of action of his time, and did not blunder in thinking that he could succeed where Bartholomeu Dias had failed. Vasco da Gama, I may incidentally observe, had English blood in his veins. His mother, Isabel Sodre—the name Sodre was a corruption of Sudley—was, to quote an English writer, the grand-daughter of Frederick Sudley, of the family of the Earls of Hereford.

It is a strange vision, that of Adamastor, who personifies in him the forces opposing the advance of men who had left their land to penetrate the mysteries of the unknown world. The part the giant is made to play is to prevent the Portuguese breaking the barriers set up by Nature. The vision of the Cape is finest of all the passages in the *Lusads*. In original grandeur it stands almost alone within the range of modern poetry, and truly remarked a writer—the age capable of adding to the old mythology a myth like that of Adamastor—the genius of the unknown ocean foretelling the calamities that befell Portuguese navigators—deserves the name of Renaissance.

Portugal entered Africa after the long interval that had elapsed since the disappearance of the Roman Provinces in the old Barbary States. Ceuta, on the Moorish coast, which enabled Portugal to take command over the Atlantic, was captured by the Portuguese in 1415. Cape Bojador, then regarded as the world's end in that direction, was discovered by Gil Eannes in 1434—a discovery which proved that Aristotle and the Greeks were by no means infallible. Nuno Tristão doubled Cape Blanco seven years later. In 1448, under Prince Henry's directions,

¹ *Memoir of David Scott, R S A*, by William B. Scott. MDCCL

a fort was built on the Bay of Arguin and a Portuguese Company formed for carrying trade with the Guinea coast. In 1434 Cape Verde was reached by Diniz Dias, and two years later Cadamasto, the Venetian in the service of Portugal, discovered the Cape Verde Islands, and visited the rivers Senegal and Gambia. In 1462 Pedro da Cıntra had explored the coast as far as modern Liberia. Thus, during Prince Henry's lifetime the Portuguese had scanned some 1,800 miles on the west coast of Africa. In 1470 João de Santarem and Pedro Escobar sailed past Cape Palmas as far as St Thomé Islands. In 1471 the whole Guinea coast had been followed past the Niger delta as far south as the Ogowe. In 1482 Diogo Cam, sent by the King of Portugal to continue the discovery of Western Africa, sighted and entered the Congo, and reached Cape Cross in 1486. In 1488 Bartholomeu Dias doubled the Cape of Good Hope and opened the new route to the East Indies.

There is scarcely a part of Africa without memorials of the bygone days. The countries from the Senegal round the Cape of Good Hope and Mozambique still bear Portuguese names. Cape Verde is the "Green Cape", Sierra Leone or Serra Leoa is the "Lioness Mountain", Cape Palmas is "The Palm Trees Cape", Cape Coast is Cape Corso, "The Cruising Cape"; Lagos is "The Lakes"; Camerons is Camarões, "prawns"; Gaboon is Gabão, "the Hooded Cloak", Corisco is "Lightning"; Cape Frio is "The Cold Cape", Angra Pequena is "The Little Cove". Natal, "Christmas," was a name given by Vasco da Gama to the land he sighted on December 25, 1497, on his way to India. Africa, however, had no attraction for the Portuguese. It was a mere episode in the annals of Portugal, whose only ambition was to discover a new way to India. It was drawn into the life of Portugal because it happened to be on the way to India.

"Afeasting cheery all the guests enquired in Arab language
whence had come their hosts?"

Who were they? Where their land? What they desired?

What seas their keels had cut and conn'd what coasts?"

The valiant Lusians answered with required discretion and
 eschewing foolish boasts,—
 “We are the Occidental Portuguese,
 And seeking Orient lands we sail the seas.”

“And wend we seeking by his royal will where farthest Indus
 wat’reth Eastern plain
 For him through wild waves we hoist the sail where ugly
 seals and ores deform the Main,
 But Reason tells us what ye may not fail to answer an of
 Truth your souls be fain,
 Who are ye? What this land wherein ye wene? and signs of
 India is to you beknown?”¹

Sofala, the first proposed Portuguese settlement on the East Coast, entitled the captaincy of Sofala, was taken in 1505 from the Arabs, then carrying an extensive trade with India and Persia. But it was captured with no other object but to pour the gold collected by Bantu in the mines of Manika into the hands of Portugal, so that thereby new expeditions might be fitted to fight the so-called infidel in the East. Sofala was regarded by the Portuguese as the ancient Ophir of the Israelitish King, once sought in South Arabia, India, and the West Indies.

Portugal dreamed of nothing less than conquering the East. In taking upon herself this task she created a brief period of vivid and interesting history. The dream fascinated her mind, and in such a cause she seemed willing to exterminate others or to be exterminated herself. In little more than a century Portugal became a conquering Power. Her supremacy extended along the coast of Africa from Ceuta to the shores of the Red Sea, and her flag waved over the fortresses of Sofala, Mozambique, Quiloa, Pemba and Melinde. Her Asiatic dominions spread from Ormuz, in the Persian Gulf, to India, Ceylon, a great part of the Malay coast and Molucca Islands. She commanded the commerce of the Arabian and Persian Gulfs and the Sea of China, and in South America Brazil was included in her oversea dominions. The very title of “Lord of the navigation, conquest and commerce of Ethiopia, Persia,

¹ *The Lusads*, Canto I, Stanzas 50-52. Translation by R. F. Burton.

Arabia, and India" recalled the formation of the Empire over which the Portuguese kings reigned

With the consciousness of might and power came that fullness of life which at all periods is the condition of the highest artistic production. Gil Vicente was the lofty genius of the great epoch, and his *Autos* still exercise their power despite the lapse of time. At the time the founder of the Portuguese theatre commenced his career as a playwright hardly twenty years had elapsed since Bartholomeu Dias had doubled the Cape of Storms and less than six from the day when Vasco da Gama reached India.

The discoveries and conquests of the Portuguese were an abiding strong factor in Portuguese drama. It is always so. The drama in Greece flourished just after Salamis, in England about the time of the defeat of the Armada, and in France when Louis the Fourteenth was the foremost king of Europe. The Court of King Manuel of Portugal was then at the very climax of its splendour—splendour recorded in the *Miscellanea* of Garcia de Resende, the collector of the Portuguese *Cancioneiro* of 1516. It abounded in great men both national and foreign, the ambassadors of friendly States, the renowned explorers and travellers, and the wealthy merchants from the Baltic and the Low Countries. Gil Vicente's audiences were, therefore, the most brilliant and the most critical, abundantly capable of appreciating his plays. They represented the cultivated public, like the London and Paris audiences to which Shakespeare and Molière were to appeal.

"One little corner of Europe alone," wrote Dr. Garnett in his *History of Italian Literature*, "possessed in the early sixteenth century a drama at once indigenous and admirable in literature." "Nothing in literary history," said he, "is more surprising than the gap between his contemporaries, whether classical or romantic."¹ Gil Vicente raised the drama in his country to the dignity of literature entirely on his own initiative. Undoubtedly, he was the first deliberate and conscious dramatist of the Peninsula. He was the forerunner of Lope de Vega and Calderon, for the

¹ Dr. Garnett, *History of Italian Literature* London, 1898

Portuguese dramatist was the first to reduce his characters to human proportion, and so well did he succeed in the dramatic art, that his reputation induced Erasmus to learn a foreign language so that he might read some of Gil Vicente's *Autos*. Gil Vicente wrote not only in Portuguese but also in Spanish. Of the forty-two plays that have come down to us, about thirty were written entirely in Spanish. Mainly perhaps that was so because the Portuguese language was without syntax, without harmony, for the first Portuguese grammar only appeared in the year of Gil Vicente's death. Besides, the Portuguese Queens were princesses of Castile, and they honoured the gallant dramatist's performances. But though so large a number of Gil Vicente's plays were written in Spanish they were mostly national in subject.

As in Greece, the drama in Portugal was, in its beginning, a religious thing. The *Autos* were a development of the mystery and miracle plays of the Middle Ages, originated in the desire to bring into relief the great fact of life—the struggle between good and evil to which everyone is subjected. Beginning with works of devotion designed to enforce a religious or ethical lesson, the *Autos* of Gil Vicente dealt in allegorical and figurative personages. But they became more and more complex, and betrayed deeper and deeper knowledge of human passion.

It was, however, to the interest of some Portuguese that Gil Vicente should be put aside and forgotten. 'The man who supplies *Autos* to the King does not possess a farthing!'¹ The reason was not far to seek. The depraved always shun the ferrule of the moralist, and Gil Vicente was, indeed, a great moralist. He saw the standards in public and private life were shockingly low; and the shameful careers of the nobles and priests were visible in the light of his denunciation of them. In the *Fragoa de Amor*, the Forge of Love, and *Clerigo de Beira*, the Beira Priest, he satirized the lax morals of the clergy and their temporal ambitions.

¹ "Um Gil

Hum que não tem nem cêtil

Que faz os *Autos* a elrei "

Auto Pastoril Português (Christmas, 1523)

His attacks on clerics, which culminated in the *Auto da Feira*, the Auto of the Fair, with its twenty-two characters, were an attack on Rome itself. In the *Exhortação da Guerra*, or Exhortation to War, written four years before the Reformation, Gil Vicente made a plain-spoken attempt to drag the nation face to face with the acquisition of wealth by ecclesiastics. But to turn to other sections of the nation. In the *Almocregues*, the Farce of the Muleteers, he depicted with the sarcasm of Rabelais the failings of some types of high society. In the *Juz de Beira*, the Beira Judge, he exposed ignorant magistrates. In the farce *Os Physicos* he ridiculed with the wit of a Molière or a Bernard Shaw, stupid physicians and their ill-understood notions of medicine. A moralist with satire and ridicule as his main weapons, Gil Vicente attacked in the *Ignês Pereira*, usually held to be his masterpiece, and the *Auto de Lusitania*, the fanatical hatred of the Jews by the Portuguese. But though he dealt a severe blow at the clergy, Gil Vicente was by no means hostile to the Church. He merely pictured the age in its wantonness and folly. His attacks on the clergy and nobility, however, brought no new way of thinking with them, and gave no new direction to national affairs. On the contrary, his *Autos* were declared to be intolerable in a Christian community, and the man who mercilessly exposed the chicanery and hypocrisy of his age, to be a blasphemer. Thus in Portugal, the Drama died a sudden death, and it was long before it had second birth. The Drama was above all things else an emancipation of the human intelligence. But this gift of freedom the Portuguese had no wish to accept. Willingly they were about to welcome the guidance of the Inquisition; and the nation seemed to have preferred to the calm pleasures of the theatre the brutal delight of seeing bodies burnt at the stake.

The Inquisition destroyed the former manliness of the Portuguese. It fitted them for a despotism that spread round the world to the annihilation, often of remote and innocent races. "Portugal at this epoch," wrote Antonio Ennes, "had reached the apogee of her prosperity. The Portuguese flag fluttered over the most remote countries

of the wealthy East Her commerce sucked fabulous wealth from the abundant breasts of old Asia India resigned herself to the conquest Brazil beginning to be peopled, China and Japan discovered, Oceania subjected, Abyssinia explored, were rich harvests of glory and gold, of heroic deeds and vast fortunes for Portugal "But this glory instead of acting as a stimulus," said the Portuguese writer, "was suffocated by the tyrannies of absolutism, was crushed by the stupid fanaticism of men who paraded triumphant and strong under the sinister protection of the Inquisition " It was King Manuel, who in 1515, had first ordered his ambassador in Rome to obtain from Leo the Tenth the same privileges as enjoyed by Castile The Portuguese Monarch, however, abandoned the idea But his cruel expulsion of the Jews and New Christians—an iniquitous measure unwise and unpolitic, the price of the marriage of King Manuel with Dona Isabella of Castile—was not a happy augury. In 1536 the Inquisition began its work. King John the Third assented to its establishment, and its fires, which were lighted exclusively for those forcibly converted, but who secretly cherished their ancestral religions, were destined eventually to consume their former oppressors now offered up as victims in that holocaust of fanaticism.

It was Christianity, no doubt, that formed the earliest basis of national union; it gave the first idea of a united Portugal It was not merely cherished as a form of faith, but as a principle of honour. It was a part of national history. It was in the monastery of Santa Cruz that Dom Affonso Henriques, the founder of the kingdom, prepared his heroic enterprise under the guidance of the Abbot Dom Theotomo, his chief friend and counsellor. It was in the old Cathedral of Coimbra, known as the Sé Velha, that the Master of Aviz, who won the decisive and memorable battle of Aljubarrota, received his election It was not the quest of Cathay, the earthly paradise which through the Middle Ages was sought in the East, the main theme of the daring expeditions of the fifteenth century, that almost eclipsed the recollections of ancient triumphs in

wars against the Moors. The movement was, in its inception, spiritual. The Portuguese were first desirous not of material rights but of ideal rights "Finding no Christian King to aid him in his wars against the Infidels," writes Azurara, the chronicler of Prince Henry the Navigator, "he sought to know if there were in those parts any Christian Princes in whom the charity and love of Christ was so ingrained as they would aid against those enemies of the Faith." When Gil Eannes doubled the Cape Bojador to the south of the Morocco coast, on his return his words to Prince Henry were "And since, my Lord, I thought I ought to bring some token of the land, since I was in it, I gathered these herbs which I here present to your grace, such as we in this country call Roses of St Mary." It is impossible not to note the religious faith which shines in the greater number of the names given to lands discovered by the Portuguese navigators.

In visiting Portugal to-day, and asking to be directed to the greatest works of Art, the traveller is confronted with the monuments of this faith which are associated with a long and varied national life. To approach these monuments is to see built and carved in stone the heroic age of Portugal. Time has scarcely touched the solid masonry Alcobaca, whose cloisters, to quote a writer, "are cities, its sacristy, a church, and the church a basilica," was founded with the spoils gained by the first King of Portugal in his wars with the Moors. It commemorates the origin of Portugal. The Abbey of Batalha, of which Murphy, the distinguished architect, said, "the sight of the edifice would have amply repaid a longer journey,"¹ was built to commemorate the victory of the people and its chosen King; and here are still preserved the helmet and sword worn by the King at Aljubarrota. The Jeronimos, that historical monument that calls up the soul of Portugal to those who behold its corpse, was built in memory of the discovery of a new way to India. "Nor is it difficult to show," said Ruskin, speaking of Athens, Rome, Florence, Venice and London, "that the virtue and prosperity of these five great

¹ Murphy, *Travels in Portugal* London, 1795

cities have been always dependent on or at least contemporary with the unquestioning faith that a protecting Deity had its abode in their Acropolis, their Capitol and their Cathedral Churches of St. Mary, St Mark, and St. Peter, but that the whole range of history keeps no record of a city which has retained power after losing such conviction."

Obsessed by dreams of expansion and conquest, the Portuguese were, of course, convinced that they were a chosen people. Their chroniclers, like some modern journalists, presented the case for their imperialism, and urged the plea that God was on their particular side. There is a remarkable instance of this morbid vanity in an old Portuguese poem addressed to a Portuguese Queen. It is written upon the conceit that had she been living in the days of the Virgin Mary, Christ would have chosen her, in preference, to be his mother!

The Portuguese, however, desired two things, one of which rendered the other difficult of attainment to bear the gospel to the Indies and pour its treasures into the hands of Portugal. A century sufficed to reduce the Portuguese Empire—an empire which drew some of the best blood, and is still regarded with a certain reverence as an episode in the drama of Portuguese history—to a pile of rubbish. Dr. Russell, in his history of King Edward's tour in India as Prince of Wales, thought Goa was a place the Englishmen ought to visit "to turn our thoughts," to quote his words, "to the investigations of the causes which sap the foundations of mighty states and lay the work of statesmen and soldiers in the dust."

The Portuguese dominion in the East rested upon two ruinous bases, a navy which could easily be equalled, and men who became insensible to the calls of honour. Dom Francisco d'Almeida, the first Viceroy of India, sought to subordinate all else to sea-power. "Almeida," says Osorio, the chronicler of the reign of King Manuel I, "judged that there would be little security, if the Portuguese assailed the cities of India, from the danger of dividing their forces and so weakening them. Therefore his counsel was to hold the

sea, for he considered that the master of the sea was master of the whole of India.”¹ The Portuguese captains in India advocated it “in language,” said Morse Stephens, “which vividly recalls that used by the English East India Company two centuries and a half later.” These views, however, were not held by Albuquerque, who was despatched to the East with instructions to found an Empire. “Animated by the higher hopes which great minds are usually accustomed to conceive,” says Osorio, “he thought of the means not only of assuring the affairs of the Portuguese for a few years but also of gaining a firm footing for their domination, which he assured himself would be very widely extended in the future.” The great Viceroy within the short period of five years (1507-11) succeeded in establishing the Portuguese supremacy in the East. He took Goa, a flourishing place for commerce by reason of the excellence of its harbour, which he chose for the capital of the Eastern Empire, he made himself master of Ormuz, which commanded the narrows through which the trade with Persia and through Persia with Europe, had to pass, he captured Malacca, the key of the navigation of the Indian archipelago, which commanded the narrows between Sumatra and Malay Peninsula, and thus let Portugal appropriate all the trade which the Arabs had carried for nearly six centuries. Albuquerque even hoped to induce the famous Prester John to divert the Nile into the Red Sea and so to starve Egypt! “In your Majesty’s letter,” wrote Albuquerque, in a letter to the King dated Goa, 8th November, 1512, “you inform me that over twenty ships sailed last year from Mecca to Calicut with spices. I am not surprised that your Majesty should have been told this, but am indeed astonished that your Majesty should even believe that there exist even twenty ships along the whole coast of Malabar. Do not fear Calicut. There is nothing doing there. The trade with the whole gulf of Ceylon was the one which interfered with your Majesty’s interests, because

¹ Hieronimi Osorii, *De rebus Emanuelis Regis Lusitaniae virtute et auspicio gestis libri duodecim*. Olisippone, 1571. (Translated into English by F. Gibbs, London, 1752.)

fifty ships at least, laden with everything that can be imagined, sailed every year from Malacca and those parts to Mecca. This is not the case now I am thankful to say."

Albuquerque's conquests covered the extensive range of Ormuz, Aden, Goa and Malacca. His imperial policy, however, rested upon a principle of justice. He, no doubt, tortured prisoners surrendered at Goa, cut off the ears and noses of defenceless fishermen in the Red Sea, and planned the murder of Rais Ahmad. But, nevertheless, he took into account the different social conditions and political necessities of the Portuguese Empire. The co-operation of the Indians with European officials to conduct the affairs of India was a part of his policy; and it is interesting to note that the first magistrate and tax-collector in Goa—the union of judicial and revenue functions to-day adopted by the British in India, was devised by Albuquerque in his administrative scheme—was Timoja, a Hindu, but his harshness towards the Muhammadans, as remarks an English author, compelled the Portuguese Governor to divide his authority, and afterwards to transfer it to a Hindu. Albuquerque, likewise, saw the value of Indian troops to the Empire, and they were employed in his famous expedition to the Red Sea. But above all he maintained intact the constitution of the village communities into which Goa was divided. They had been autonomous for centuries. "Western historians," to quote Mrs. Annie Besant's words in her Presidential Address at the Indian National Congress, "trace the self-rule of the Saxon villages to their early prototypes in the East, and see the growth of the English liberty as upspringing from the Aryan root of the free and self-contained village communities." They remained the first unit of Albuquerque's liberal administration.

Albuquerque's policy, however, cost him his dismissal from the Governorship of India. "The sack of the East," writes Oliveira Martins, "such a name best fits the Portuguese dominion—was already ordained in Lisbon." Woe to the Viceroy or Governor who did not subordinate his political plans to the commercial objects of Portugal!

The events which degraded the days following the dismissal of Albuquerque accentuated the symptoms of the decadence of Portugal in the East. The decadence was just as great in the political sphere as in the social. Duarte Menezes (1521) Governor of India for three years, had to return under imprisonment, Lopo Vaz de Sampaio (1526) met with the same fate after being governor for over three years; Nuno da Cunha (1529), who was governor for more than nine years, died in his chains on his way home; Martim Affonso de Sousa (1542), governor for three and a half years, was incarcerated, Antonio Moniz Barreto (1573) had to return a prisoner after three years of governorship, the Count of Vidigueira (1596) was imprisoned and ordered home, Ayres Saldanha (1600) came home a captive, Jeronymo de Azevedo (1612) died in prison, the second Count of Vidigueira (1622), had to return under imprisonment. "What reigns here now," to quote the words of Albuquerque in his letter to the King of Portugal, dated 1st April, 1512, "is the wish to acquire authority before your Highness by the defeats of others, taking delight in the failure and discomfiture that occurs to each other." This tendency to intrigue showed itself from the first, and the sinister phenomenon in Portuguese colonial life had since only too many grounds for its support. Patriotism sacrificed to egotism, was no more than an empty word in the mouth of men who had come to India in search of a living. Indeed, the Portuguese officials in India left the impression that they cared little whether they served their King or went, and among them were men who may fairly be described as traitors. "Your factors at Cochin," wrote Albuquerque in his letter dated November 30, 1513, "reveal to the King of Calicut the secrets of Portugal, and they intrigue with him to cast discredit on your Government." These men acted their part with as much detriment to their own personal reputation as prejudice to the advancement of Albuquerque's Liberal policy.

"Evils increased and good things diminished," wrote the chronicler, Gaspar Correia, in his *Lendas da India*, which

embraces the events of the years 1496-1550, "so that almost the whole became a living evil and the historian of it would rather be called the imprecator than the writer of illustrious deeds."¹ The administration of the Eastern Empire became a hotbed of knavery and corruption. Money was extorted for safe conducts at sea, and trading licences, and this formed, indeed, a very important portion of the revenue, the Portuguese exacted a considerable contribution from the Indian States, and the Crown lands in India yielded an enormous income. All this wealth, however, was no longer regarded as national revenue. "This revenue," says Fariae Sousa, "should have been double, but it was reduced by frauds"—frauds which cannot be remembered now without shame and sorrow. Bent on enriching themselves as speedily as possible, the officers resembled a flock of vultures battling over a corpse. It was, indeed, disgraceful the state into which Portuguese rule fell when it began to be weak as well as wicked. "Do not allow any of your friends to be sent to India with the charge of looking after the finances and affairs of the King," were the words of Francis Xavier, writing to a brother Jesuit, on January 22, 1545. "There is here a power, which I may call irresistible, to thrust men headlong into the abyss, when beside the seductions of gain and the easy opportunities of plunder, their appetite for greed will have been sharpened by having tasted it, and there will be a whole torrent of bad example and evil customs to overwhelm and sweep them away. Robbery is so public and common that it hurts no one's character, and is hardly counted a fault, people scarcely hesitate to think that what is done with impunity, it cannot be bad to do. Everywhere, and at all times, it is rapine, hoarding and robbery. No one thinks of making restitution of what he has once taken, the devices by which men steal, the various pretexts under which it is done, who can count? I never cease wondering at the number of new inflections, which in addition to all the usual forms, have been added

¹ The three voyages to India of Vasco da Gama. From the *Lendas da India* of Gaspar Correia. Translated by Hon. Henry E. J. Stanley, Hakluyt Society, London.

to this new *lingo* of avarice, to the conjugation of that ill-omened verb 'to rob.' " The Apostle of the Indies, whose "Letters" enable us to form some idea of his missionary career, in an age of unblushing grossness and unrestrained debauchery, scented corruption everywhere, and he would not acquiesce in any hushing up.

But worse still. This unbridled rapacity went hand in hand with religious bigotry. The affection the Portuguese formerly entertained for their own municipal institutions and Cortes was transferred to the tribunal of the Inquisition, which destroyed the former chivalry of the Portuguese and fitted them for despotism. The severity which consumed in the same fire the heretical opponent of theological dogmas and the peaceful Indian who worshipped his God, stained the Portuguese history and ruined the last hope of Portugal in the East "I do not know," wrote the Viceroy João de Saldanha da Gama in a despatch of the 19th December, 1729, "under what law the Inquisition pretends to have the right to try men who were never Catholics, but what I see is that on account of the excessive number of prisoners of this description all the northern province is depopulated, the admirable factory of Thana is lost, and a corresponding one is commenced at Bombay from whence the English take silks, woollen goods and other merchandise which they introduce into Portugal."

The obligation first placed upon Portugal by the Papal Bull of Alexander VI to propagate the Catholic religion in these lands as a condition of being allowed to hold them on conquest with the sanction and benediction of the Pope, served now as the plea and justification of aggression upon unoffending races. The Portuguese sunk and stranded their ships, burned their temples, trampled on their books and threw them into flames. This truculent ruffianism pretended to be animated by the crusading spirit; and Barros, the chronicler of the Portuguese deeds in the East, maintained that "black men or heathen were outside the law of Christ." Martim Affonso de Sousa, Governor of India from 1542 to 1545—with whom Francis Xavier sailed from Lisbon, with no other provision than his breviary

—when informed that the Cojeveram temples of Vijayanagara contained a fabulous treasure, thought “it was not unchristian to spoil the heathen of their illgotten gains.”

Mme Adam, who wrote *La Patrie Portugaise*, thought the Portuguese comparable in some respects with the Greeks. The Greeks, of course, described all non-Hellenic nations as barbarians. But they, who claimed a glory whether it be Homeric or Doric, Athenian or Hellenistic, to which the Portuguese could not at all pretend, by no means regarded, like the Portuguese, the Eastern nations as less civilized than themselves. That the soul is immortal and that the fate of mankind will be determined by the life led upon earth were conceptions which came to the Portuguese by way of a great religion of Oriental origin—the Jewish religion. But this conception of the soul as distinct from the body was to be found in the Indian Scriptures—a fact which the Portuguese could only explain by the theory of a diabolical imitation. Ready to plead, as the hysterical empire builders to-day, the rights of higher civilization over a lower, the Portuguese thought all the races they were to dispossess of their dominion, uncivilized. The literal acceptance of the story of the tower of Babel and Shem, Ham and Japhet had undoubtedly produced a strong effect upon their minds. They little knew that India was the home of the sages of the Upanishads and the founders of the Vedanta and the Sankya philosophies.

“I assert that more souls of the Portuguese who come to India are lost than those saved from the Gentiles whom the Religious Preachers convert to our Holy Faith,” wrote Dom João de Castro to King John the Third on December 16, 1546. The fourth Portuguese Viceroy did more than any other Portuguese in India to uphold the ideals of Christianity. But he, too, was powerless; and his words fell on deaf ears. He whose fame rests upon the relief of Diu in consequence of whose victory the Portuguese possessions in India form still a part of Portugal, was allowed to die the death of a pauper, at Goa, in the hands of his friend, the Jesuit Francis Xavier. “The cause of his

death," according to a Portuguese historian, "was a disease which to-day kills no man . . . for diseases also die. It was a keen sense of the wretched state to which India had come, and his inability to repair it"

The Portuguese, who founded the Empire, exercised the most potent influence on the political and social action of the Portuguese. But their influence only lasted in Portugal while they were alive, and with their death the ill-consolidated Portuguese Empire collapsed. Once the Portuguese markets were filled with rich spices from the Molucca Islands, tapestries from Persia, diamonds from India and ivory from Guinea, Portugal immersed herself in material facts. She became a nation lost to all self-control, and her aberrations drove her to destruction. "The Portuguese," in the words of the great Viceroy Dom João de Castro, "entered India with the sword in one hand and the Crucifix in the other, finding much gold they laid aside the Crucifix to fill their pockets." Not less suggestive were the words of Francis Xavier, the Apostle of the Indies. "If these islands," said the great disciple of Ignatius Loyola, when implored by the Portuguese not to visit the islands of Del Moro, "abounded with precious stones, woods and mines of gold, Christians would have the courage to go thither, and all the dangers of the world would not be able to affright them, they are base and fearful because there are only souls to purchase." Inflamed to madness by the sudden acquisition of wealth, Portugal even forgot that there would arise from the pressure of commerce the necessity of wresting from her hand wealth and power which would otherwise have been her monopoly. Thus pupils became rivals, by an example frequently repeated and tolerably certain to recur, and the Portuguese Empire in the East was appropriated piecemeal by the Dutch and the English. Dom Francisco da Gama, the sixteenth Viceroy of India, received orders to levy 2% consular duties at certain ports "with a view of raising a fund for the equipment of a fleet" to turn out of India the Dutch whom the Indians favoured from the hatred of the Portuguese, and who had increased their forces in Asia—a danger which was foreseen from the first

by Dom Francisco d'Almeida Ormuz was lost to the combined Persian forces in 1622 Muscat was wrested from the Portuguese by the Arabs in 1650 Malacca was lost in 1641. Colombo fell in 1656 Ceylon was taken away in 1658. In 1673 the settlement of Hugli, in Bengal, was attacked by the forces of Mogul Sha Jehan, which was a blow to the Portuguese prestige in the East.

Meantime the Portuguese, with the pride and ignorance of the mediæval knight errant, abandoned Azamor, Arzila, Alcacer-Se-guir. The fate awaiting other towns held by Portugal in the north of Africa was equally mournful. Ceuta was taken over by Spain in 1580 and finally ceded by Portugal in 1661. Casablanca was occupied until 1515 Agadir or Santa Cruz remained a Portuguese stronghold till 1536 Tangier was ceded to England in 1662 Mazagon was lost in 1770

Portugal no doubt committed great errors which she dearly expiated. But very few realize that Portugal as a colonizing power displayed some qualities of moral and philanthropic earnestness "These wonderful old Conquistadores may have been relentless and cruel in imposing their rule on the African and in enslaving or in Christianizing him," said Sir Harry Johnston, "but they added enormously to his food supply and his comfort So early in the history of their African exploration that is almost the first step they took, they brought from China, India and Malacca the orange tree, the lemon and the lime, which besides introducing into Europe (and Europe had hitherto only known the sour, wild orange brought by the Arabs) they planted in every part of East and West Africa" "From their great possession of Brazil—over-run and organized with astounding rapidity"—wrote Sir Harry Johnston, "they brought to East and West Africa the Muscovy duck (which had penetrated far into the interior of Africa, if indeed it has not crossed the continent) chili, peppers, maize, now grown all over Africa, cultivated by many natives who have not even yet heard of the existence of white men, tobacco, the tomato, pineapple, sweet potato (a convolvulus tuber), manioc (from which tapioca is made), ginger and other less

known forms of vegetable food. The Portuguese also introduced the domestic pig into Africa and on the West Coast, the domestic cat, possibly also certain breeds of dogs." "The Englishman," added the ex-British Commissioner for Uganda Protectorate, "has brought with him the potato, and has introduced into most of the colonies the horse, and in places improved breeds of cattle, sheep and goats, a good many European vegetables and fruit trees, the tea plant, the coffee plant (which, however, has only been transferred from other parts of Africa), and many shrubs and trees of special economic value—but what are these introductions—almost entirely for his own use—compared in value to the vast bounty of Portugal? Take away from the African's dietary of to-day a few of these products that the Portuguese brought to him from Far East and Far West, and he will remain very insufficiently provided with necessities and simple luxuries."¹

The Portuguese were a small minority in the midst of a teeming population, composed of many conflicting races, tongues and religions. But they initiated an upward movement of mankind on the whole towards a higher level of excellence. In Ceylon, for instance, the Portuguese only acquired sovereign rights and succeeded in establishing their rule over some limited areas in the vicinity of their forts. But nevertheless this island could cherish a warmth of patriotism, an intensity of political feeling, beyond example in the records of wide spread empires. "It was in 1507," wrote Thomas Ribeiro, in the *Vesperas*, "in the time of the first Viceroy of India, D. Francisco d'Almeida, that his son, the intrepid navigator of eighteen years of age, who was fated to die so heroically in Chaul Bay, discovered Ceylon, and that we began to build up our dominion there. One hundred and forty-nine years after, in 1656, Ceylon was taken by the Dutch, who in their turn were ousted, in 1795, by the English, who succeeded in conquering the whole of the island in 1815. It must be remembered that we only possessed military and commercial institutions in

¹ Sir Harry Johnston, *A History of the Colonisation of Africa by Alien Races* Cambridge, 1905

Ceylon during a period of one hundred and forty-nine years, and these we lost two hundred and twenty years ago—for that is the difference between 1656 and 1879. But in spite of our ephemeral and limited dominion, in spite of the years which have passed since our expulsion, if you land at any port in the island you hear the natives speaking Portuguese, debased of course—I also am Portuguese—and they accompany you, eager to do the honours and show you a gateway which they saved from destruction, when the walls were destroyed, and pointing to the escutcheon of the Portuguese arms, they say with pride and affection “Our arms”¹

“There were never more than 40,000 Portuguese under arms,” wrote Abbé Raynal, “and they struck terror into the empire of Morocco, the barbarians of Africa, the Mamelukes, the Arabs, and all the East, from Ormuz to China. They were not one against a hundred, and they attacked troops which, as well armed as they were, fought for their lives and property to the last extremity”². Portugal had, therefore, like dissipated young gentlemen, to pay with premature decay for the feverish abuse of her vitality, and with the decline of years the mental powers of the nation were greatly affected. The geographical discoveries and conquests in the East deprived Portugal of her best part of population, which resulted in diminishing the influence of the classes to which former leaders belonged—leaders around whose names associations cluster and historic memories are entwined. Great was indeed the depopulation. In 1414 John the First equipped with no difficulty whatever, 50,000 men, who joined the expedition of Ceuta—an expedition that gave a forcible impulse to navigation and the foundation of a Portuguese Empire. But in 1644, when John the Fourth, in self-defence, was compelled to fight, the Spaniards could hardly muster an army of 1,200 men¹

But while Portugal “was drained of its best citizens, hordes of negro slaves were imported to fill the vacancies,

¹ Thomas Ribeiro, *Vesperas* Porto, 1880

² Abbe Raynal, *Histoire des Indes* Paris, 1778

especially in the South”¹ The Portuguese intermarried freely with the slaves, and this infusion of foreign blood² was one of the most remarkable phenomena of the period following the Age of the Heroes, and one of the most momentous in its results

Portugal, with all which that word suggests—her darkly-chequered and eventful annals, has nevertheless been haunted from time to time by heroic visions Whenever the evils of her condition have cried aloud for redress, there has kindled in the mind of the nation the desire of emulating the renown of her ancestors. Interested in past things because they happened, but not because they are still powerfully affecting the nation, she remembers her ancient exploits of valour, and makes the most of her annals—annals which attract the scholar and challenge the attention of the political inquirer, but nevertheless annals that portray at once the cradle and the grave of Portuguese greatness This contemplation of the past, without penetrating the recesses of bygone ages with intelligent skill, has given birth to serious evil It has, indeed, stood in the way of the development of a true and healthy national life

¹ *The Encyclopædia Britannica*, Vol XXII Eleventh Edition Cambridge

² Having recently visited Portugal, Mr H M Bernicot Moens, the eminent Dutch anthropologist, was kind enough to address the following interesting communication to the present writer —

“Having been in different parts of Portugal, I gladly communicate to you that from an anthropological point of view there is no such thing as a pure white Portuguese race or national type Of course, a nation is not an anthropological entity when we consider the enormous number of ancestors we have had Knowing the history of peoples who travelled and had colonies, it is quite natural that mixing with other nations and races took place—though I observed even among some of the men of science in Portugal a wish to be taken for a pure type of Portuguese, expressing to me the regret that so many foreigners, especially Frenchmen, were also recently naturalised I personally do not see any disadvantage in being mixed and continuing this race mixing, but it must be understood that human beings of quality should mix or propagate Until now our humanity unhappily is mostly composed nearly everywhere of quantity and not of quality of men A country is great when it has great men, not many men The value of men should not be considered by cranial formation, pigmentation and other anatomical characteristics, but by character, intelligence, self-control and altruism For that reason I have classified mankind into—(a) uncivilised man, (b) civilised man, (c) humanised man, (d) cultured man, (e) perfect man I sincerely hope that the representatives of the Portuguese nation will evolve to the highest degree in my anthropological classification ”

The doubling of the Cape of Good Hope, for instance, was a subject upon which Antonio Vieyra—the great preacher, the most brilliant of the seventeenth century, discoursed thus —“One man alone passed the Cape of Good Hope before the Portuguese. And who was he? and how? It was Jonah in the whale’s belly. The whale went out of the Mediterranean because he had no other course; he kept the coast of Africa on the left, scouted along Ethiopia, passed by Arabia, took port in the Euphrates on the shores of Nineveh, and, making his tongue serve as a plank, landed the prophet.” The Portuguese Jesuit’s fame rests chiefly on his eminence in the characters of orator and ecclesiastical statesman. In vigour and originality of thought, in argumentative power, in extensive and varied erudition, his two hundred sermons transcend all literature of the same kind. But with all his splendid intelligence and culture Vieyra’s temperament was essentially that of the enthusiast. His reason, though mighty, did whatever work his passion and his imagination might impose. He actually believed in the prophecies of Banderarra; and in the *Clavis Prophetarum* he endeavoured to prove the shoemaker’s prophecy from passages of Scripture. Indeed, his confidence in the Messiah who was coming to Portugal was unparalleled.

“Even to this day,” writes Fidelino de Figueiredo,” in the always excessive and ready glorification of persons, in projects always ambitious and proposing wholesale innovations, in the want of logic and in the simplicity with which to trivial personal matters are attributed the greatest social consequences, one can recognize the persistence of this epic spirit, with all its good qualities as well as its shortcomings, which are the want of reflection due to impulsiveness and an exaggeration that, though pleasing, is highly misleading”¹ And if history be rightly defined as teaching by examples there are not many instances such as Portugal affords of wilful disregard of its repeated lessons

¹ Fidelino de Figueiredo, *Caracteristicas da Luteratura Portuguesa*. (Translated into English by Constantino dos Santos, Barrister-at-law)

"What can be looked for from a people," asked a member of the British House of Lords as early as 1763, "one half of whom awaits the Messiah the other half Don Sebastian?" No Portuguese represents more perfectly the spirit of Portugal in her days of decadence and senility, chequered by some gleams of ancient virtue, than the posthumous son of Prince John, to whose frantic efforts to become a hero may be traced the calamities with which the country has since been afflicted. Born in 1554, on the 18th day of mourning for his father, King Sebastian was destined to leave a name of gloom and be the victim of his heart which, as the chronicler puts it, was "of wax"¹ to all impressions. The young king's unshaken belief that his visions were real, the voices he heard were trustworthy, and that he was the destined ruler of the fifth Monarchy, drove the kingdom to destruction. His countenance had such a feminine cast that Brantome, who met this would-be Christian Emperor of Morocco, thought "he was the living image of his mother's beauty."² But the age was credulous. The Portuguese were convinced that they were a chosen people, and the mystic and chaste young King, who had just sufficient droop in the underlip to betray that his mother, Joanna, was the daughter and his grandmother Catherine, was the sister of Charles V, was insane to believe that he would check the ambition of the Moor in Africa. Thus, with the ostensible object to restore Muley Ahmed to the throne of Morocco, the young King, who had once cherished the project of transporting a royal army to India and of rivalling the exploits of Alexander, now looked to Africa, which promised to his ambition a glory equal to that of the ancient heroes of Ceuta and Arzila; and he planned the African expedition from which the nation was to gain nothing but relics and wounds. He was deficient in tact and self-restraint. But he would listen to nobody. Dom João de Mascarenhas' warnings were met with the question. "How old are you?" "Ah, sire," replied the

¹ *Portugal cuidadoso e lastimado com a vida e perda do Senhor Rey D. Sebastião*, Pelo Padre Jose Pereira Bayão. Lisboa, 1737.

² Brantome, Tom II, (Pantheon Litteraire)

veteran defender of Diu, "to serve you in battlefield my years are twenty-five, but to give you counsel they are eighty" "What is the colour of fear?" the royal youth asked the martial Duke of Alva, whose remonstrances he deeply resented. Cardinal Henry marked his disapprobation by refusing to act as regent during his absence. But the King defied his grand-uncle by appointing in his stead the Archbishop of Lisbon. The Queen, as she lay tossing in her grief, entreated young Sebastian not to go. But even her dying appeals would not induce the Portuguese warrior to change his mind. He "ignored advices," says the chronicler, "as if they were reproaches"¹ Nothing seems to have stood in his way. He "borrowed money from Bishops, Gentlemen of the Realm and rich subjects"² The "most odious fiscal expedients were unscrupulously resorted to"³ Foreign mercenaries from Flanders, Spain, Germany and Italy flocked to his ranks, and so sure was the grandson of John III of his victory that he was taking along with him men armed with ropes to bind captive Saracens and a guard of honour that was to escort him on his victory. Even Fernão da Silva, the court preacher, had been ordered to have his sermon ready for the day!

King Sebastian's expedition was hailed with rejoicings and enthusiasm scarcely less insane than that of the young king. The poet Diogo Bernardes, who accompanied the Portuguese monarch, had composed the following sonnet, prophesying victory, and affirming that when such a king hoisted his standard with Christ crucified upon it, Africa must be inevitably subdued by him.

"Since, now that Lusitania's king benign
To wage thy battle, Christ, to arms resorts,
And high aloft—his guide—the standard sports
Bearing the picture of thy death divine
What, Afric, canst thou hope, but by such host
To see thyself o'erwhelmed, e'en could that chief,

¹ Fr Bernardo da Cruz, *Chronica de el-rei D Sebastião* Edição de 1837

² Fariae Sousa *Europa Portuguesa*

³ Barbosa Machado, *Memorias de el-rei D Sebastião*

Thy Hannibal and other warriors lost
 Come to thy succour and attempt relief
 Wouldst thou avert a desolation new
 Such as thy Carthage still in mem'ry bears,
 Then bow submission where no chance appears,
 Accept Sebastian's sway—God's ord'nance true—
 If Lusian valour ne'er was known to quail,
 With such King and God how must its force prevail!"¹

But an expedition so ill-considered, and led by one who had prepared himself for it by spearing wild boars and shooting wolves in the royal parks, ended as all such wild schemes might have been expected to end. The King and the remaining chivalry of Portugal that made its way to Alcacer-Quibir never returned. There, "where the sun rose red as if in sympathy with the torrents to be shed on that day",² King Sebastian's soldiers, who had already suffered much from long marches and above all from famine, found themselves surrounded with armies which they could neither avoid nor pursue. In vain they endeavoured to vindicate the ancient glories of Portugal, and prove that they were capable of defending them. "My lord and King," exclaimed Christovam de Tavora, witnessing the hecatomb that would have terrified a Tamerlane, "what remedy else remains to us?" "Heaven, if our actions deserve it,"³ replied the intrepid King, in whose veins ran some blood of those dying knights of Aviz who were never heard to sigh. "A King," cried Sebastian, seeing his third horse killed and mounting a fourth, "surrenders liberty only with life,"⁴ and he kept his word.

The distress and havoc produced by the disaster of Alcacer-Quibir sealed for ever the doom of a nationality. Diogo Bernardes, who had almost incited the ill-fated King Sebastian to undertake the African expedition, now lamented over the follies of the young King, and thought

¹ Translation by J. Adamson

² *Portugal cuidadoso e lastimado com a vida e perda do Senhor Rey D. Sebastião*, pelo Padre Jose Pereira Bayão. Lisboa, 1737.

³ Barboza Machado, *Memorias de el-rei D. Sebastião*

⁴ Barboza Machado, *Memorias de el-rei D. Sebastião*

of the account the slaughtered King had to render for such a waste of blood¹ A captive in Barbary he wrote the following elegy:

"I, who, while free to the soft murmuring sound
Of Lima's crystal stream of love, have told
First the delights and then heartrending tales,
Now to the clank of galling chains which wound
My naked feet, a captive, griefs unfold,
Where weeping soothes not, nor where love avails"²

But the best Portuguese blood was scarcely dry upon the field of Alcacer when Portugal found herself sold to a Spanish Monarch. The very men who, animated at first by an instinctive repulsion from a Castilian Monarch, "had gone mad with loyal excitement"³ when the young King was born, were now, no sooner than he was slaughtered on the plains of Alcacer, purchased with Castilian gold, to bring about the submission of the nation to a foreign monarch who was to reduce her colonies and for the time exhaust her naval resources. The intrigue which was carried on round the deathbed of King Sebastian's aged and childless grand-uncle Henry, who had, in an evil moment of his life, exchanged his cardinal's hat for a crown, was such that "Philip II had no other right to the inheritance of this kingdom but the agency of Moura".⁴ Treachery was so much the order of the day that Christovam de Moura and the aristocracy,⁴ with rare exceptions, accepting Philip II's bribe, looked forward to a permanent union of this country with that of Spain. While the nation was thus left to the mercy of some Portuguese, who stood

¹ Diogo Bernardes *Varias Rimas* (Translated by J. Adamson)

² Fr. Bernardo da Cruz, *Chronica de el-rei D. Sebastião*

³ Faria e Sousa, *Europa Portuguesa*

⁴ Suffice it to say that Philip II, on entering Portugal, granted the following titles: D. Manuel de Menezes was made Duke of Villa Real, the eldest sons of the house of Aveiro, Dukes of Torres Novas, D. Antonio de Castro, Duke of Monsanto, D. Francisco de Mascarenhas was now Count of Villa Horta, Ruy Gonçalves de Camara, Count of Villa Franca, D. Francisco Manuel, Count of Atalaya, D. Fernando de Noronha, Count of Linhares, D. Fernando de Castro, Count of Basto, D. Pedro de Alcaçova Carneiro, Count of Idanha, D. Duarte de Menezes, Count of Tarouca, and D. Christovam de Moura, Count of Castel Rodrigo

in no other relation to the nation at large than that of political outlaws, the half Jewish Dom Antonio put himself forward as the champion of national Portugal against the Castilian usurper. He was the illegitimate son, by a converted Jewess, of Luis Duke de Beja, the great uncle of Sebastian. He had entered the Order of St John of Malta and was Prior of the commandary of Crato. This grandson of Manuel I, however, did not fable when he claimed an heroic mission. He had fought at Alcacer-Quibir, he had performed heroic exploits, he had broken his Moorish fetters by the help of a Jew, and his daring escape had made him a favourite with the people. The masses, whom he had reminded that the founder of the House of Aviz was a bastard like himself, hailed him with an enthusiasm scarcely less insane than that of the Count of Vimioso, who at the time, thought himself a Nuno Alvarez Pereira, the hero of Aljubarrota. This delusion—for such we fear we must reckon it—did not last long. The disaster of Alcantara, where was routed the rabble which at Santarem had proclaimed the Prior de Crato, King of Portugal, proved how utterly frantic was Dom Antonio's plan; and the pretender, with a price set on his head, wandered in Europe from court to court.

Disappointed in the Prior de Crato—whose cause was actively supported by Queen Elizabeth of England—the Portuguese became overwhelmed with speculations as to whether the young Sebastian was alive as to what he would or would not do. No one had seen the King killed. The nation really believed Sebastian to be concealed, like Roderick the Goth and the English Arthur, in some mystic personage. Hence those endless manifestations of "Sebastianismo"¹. The facile credulity in the mission of the "King of Penamacor" who, in 1584, declared himself the survivor of Alcacer-Quibir, and in that of the "King of Ericeira" who, a year later, by his frequent self-inflictions led people to suppose he was expiating his African folly, were the first symptoms of the Portuguese disease. The "King of Penamacor" was the son of a potter at Alcobaça,

¹ Lucio d'Azevedo, *A Evolução do Sebastianismo*. Lisboa, 1918.

and if time were given him—who knows—he might have succeeded in being, for a few months, the King of Portugal. The people, whose imagination was open to every fantastic influence, regarded him as the heaven-sent king, and he played his part in this comedy with the gravity of an English butler. But he was arrested, paraded on an ass's back through the streets of Lisbon, and would have ended his days on the scaffold had he not faced the situation with relative composure. "Am I to be hanged," he asked, "because people choose to take off their hats to me?" The "King of Ericeira," on the other hand, moved by the calamities which had overtaken his people, formed a little kingdom of his own at the mouth of the Tagus. The supporters of this stone-mason's son of Terceira, metamorphosed into a King, became so buoyant and pushing that they proposed to enter Lisbon on the eve of St John. But to their great surprise, the "King of Ericeira," who longed for immortality as a prize, found it thrust upon him as a punishment. He entered Lisbon, escorted not as a king, but as a prisoner soon to be executed.

Whilst this comedy was acted in Portugal, the Portuguese emigrants in Paris, supporting the claims of Dom Antonio, the Prior of Crato, still entertained a firm belief in the coming of Dom Sebastian. Dom João de Castro, the "St Paul of the Portuguese religion"¹ as the historian, Oliveira Martins, calls him, was busy finding out the whereabouts of the dead King. Beneath him, behind him, and before him, lay all the plots and intrigues of the time to check the Castilian ambition in Europe. But proud and ignorant as the mediæval knight errant, the grandson of the famous Viceroy of India was too little of a politician to play the game to advantage. On the contrary, a desire of aggrandizement in the eyes of others, so characteristic of the Portuguese mind, impelled him to actions sublime, but ridiculous. This encouraged the imposture of the Venetian "Knight of the Cross," the most audacious rogue then strutting his way through Christendom, who was welcomed

¹ Oliveira Martins, *Histoire de Portugal* Tom II

by D João de Castro, imposture¹ all the more remarkable from the fact that the adventurer could not speak Portuguese. The Calabrian found numerous supporters whose confidence was indeed unparalleled and altogether of the heroic cast. Some saw "the freckles in his face and hands, the hurt that he had on the right eyebrow." Others "had touched the wound in his head with their fingers." So unsparing were these men in their efforts to identify their true King, that Pantaleão Pessoa da Neiva, when pulling off the impostor's shoes, "had felt the wart on the little toe." So seriously and deeply absorbed were they over this affair, that they had done their best to induce the Council of the Pregadi to release the bandit who, on the demand of the Spanish Monarch, had been incarcerated in a Venetian cell! These follies some Portuguese are naturally anxious to forget, but in great national crises it behoves the nation with a predisposition to insanity to meditate them and guard against all exciting causes of the disease.

It was too evident that Portugal had gone mad. But its energies were not wholly exhausted. The Portuguese spirit may have slumbered but was not entirely extinct. Under Philip the Second, who was a despot by position and by temperament, the Portuguese soon discovered the omens of a ghastly reign, and in the two Philips who came after him, the fatal heritage of a vicious blood. Philip's cruelty was such that from the number of the corpses of the victims of his fury, thrown into the sea, "people would not fish again." The sixty years of captivity present only one uniform tale of treachery and blood. The sequestra-

¹ "They say he tells very strange stories, how he with fourteen more escaped from the battle and got up into the mountains, and so by many adventures he went and he went till he came into Ethiopia, or Prester John's lands, meaning from thence to have gone into the East Indies, but understanding that they were welded and sworn to the King of Spain durst not proceed, but turned back again and *per tot discrimina* in this long pilgrimage (wherein he had been taken bought or sold twelve or thirteen times) got at last to Venice, where he tells them all that was negotiated 'twixt him and them, either by Letters or Ambassadors since he was of any good remembrance and that with so many particulars as are thought infallible testimonies."

Extract from a letter written January 17, 1599, by John Chamberlain to his friend Carleton, *Edinburgh Review* July, 1882

tion, in 1594, of the fifty Dutch ships at anchor in the Tagus, and at the same time the savage decree of his Catholic Majesty closing all Portuguese ports to the heretics of Netherlands, brought ruin and shame to Portugal, and while at home promises given at the Cortes of Thomar were flagrantly violated by the Spanish usurpers, the Portuguese possessions in the East fell into the hands of those whom Philip's intolerance had made enemies of Portugal. The revolution of 1640, under the leadership of João Pinto Ribeiro, though greatly encouraged by Richeieu, who had availed himself of a favourable circumstance to give his rival, Olivares, a blow, was certainly an effort of an injured people to overcome a tyrannical and perfidious domination. It was distinguished from any revolution in being the work neither of a military class nor yet of the mob of a capital. It brought the sixty years of vassalage to an end, and enthroned the house of Bragança, on which centred the most patriotic feelings of the Portuguese.

The Braganças were the descendants of Nuno Álvares Pereira, the hero of Aljubarrota. "They were really kings of the land because they owned it. They were Dukes of Bragança Barcellos and Guimarães; Marquises of Valença and Villa Viçosa, Counts of Ourem Arrayolos Neiva de Faro Faria Penafiel, Lords of Monforte Alegrete Villa do Conde, etc." "Their vessels numbered 100,000," and "they lived like kings."¹ There was, in fact, a strength in hereditary virtues of the Braganças which seemed proof against the influences which changes of external circumstances had produced. Philip the Second himself feared the Braganças because of the "*gana que el Pueblo muestra de querer roy natural*."² In the instructions Philip the Second had left his son, the Monarch wrote "that he should strictly watch the Duke of Bragança, closely examining into his actions, but always showing him every attention until the opportunity offered him of persecuting him and all his family. As for the rest of the nobility the only course was to remove them from this country, sending them to fill

¹ Oliveira Martins, *História de Portugal* Tom II

² Philip II's letter to the Duke de Medina Sidonia

honourable posts in Flanders, Germany and Italy" In this manner Philip the Second believed "the Kingdom of Portugal could be monopolised and reduced to a province, and the people rendered powerless to make any movement." These doctrines, however, roused the Portuguese sentiment, and hastened the movement of national resurrection that would otherwise have been inevitably postponed

The revolution of 1640 was a task worthy of patriotic Portugal But in the same way as an expiring lamp throws out a more vivid flame when about to expire so did Portugal at this time Thrilled with patriotic emotion and flushed by the decisive victory over Spain, the Portuguese began the work of reconstruction by evoking their glorious past Unfortunately, however, they were unable to see that all that was great and original in it, proceeded not only from the personal influence of sovereigns but also from a kind of general inspiration which revealed itself everywhere in new ideas and in a sagacious policy Instead of contributing to the restoration of those local liberties and franchises of mediæval Portugal, whose destruction was partly the work of Portuguese and partly of foreign hands, liberties and franchises from which the country still finds itself unnaturally debarred, they assumed towards the Crown the attitude of oriental servility. And the epoch was marked by a disheartening lack of constructive elements From that time Portugal rapidly decayed. The Portuguese gave over to distressfulness, until Brazil attracted them in the same way as the piled up riches of Incas and the inexhaustible mines of the Peruvian Andes attracted adventurers from Spain.

The East Indies were more valuable to the Portuguese than the lands of Santa Cruz or Holy Cross, which, as Southey puts it, "were discovered by chance"¹ by a scion of a noble house of Portugal. Martim Affonso de Sousa, who was to undertake the task of "colonizing, governing and civilizing" the Brazils, had abandoned it to occupy the coveted post of Governor-General of India Convicts alone were disembarked and left to take their chance and

¹ Robert Southey, *History of Brazil*, 3 parts London, 1810-19

uphold the dominion of Portugal, and the nearness of Brazil to the coast of Africa made it easy for the Portuguese to exploit the riches of Brazil by converting Angola and Mozambique into the chief marts for traffic in human flesh. Thus Brazil gradually became a country struggling under the oppression of colonial misrule—oppression so revolting that Father Vieira travelled on foot through the interior of the Northern Brazil for the sake of the Indians, harassed and brutalized by the odious traffic in slaves, and subjected to the tyranny of atrocious despots. In his defence of the oppressed Indian of Brazil Vieira stands forth conspicuous, a great apostle of humanity. The most significant evidence of his intense and passionate love of justice is to be found in his Sermon on Epiphany day, 1662, in the Royal Chapel. He denounced the outrages committed in Brazil by the Portuguese outcasts and adventurers, who had flocked there in search of a living. He had seen around him oppression and vice. This, he held, was due partly to the apathy of the nation, but mainly to the selfishness of the ruling classes who took whatever they could get from Brazil and gave nothing in return. In his sermon on behalf of the down-trodden Indian, the great Jesuit preacher analyzed powerfully the forces then at work to corrupt and undermine the influence of the Royal decrees which he had obtained from John the Fourth. Brazil proved to Portugal a second India. "The place," said Pyrard, recording his impressions of Brazil, "hardly appeared like earth, it seemed rather an image of Paradise as far as opulence and dissipation could make it so."¹ Devoid of capital and lacking a thriving industry and enterprising trade, Portugal looked to Brazil as a place for repairing her fortunes. So great was the excitement under the influence of mine frenzy that impecunious noblemen, bureaucrats in straitened circumstances, indebted, thriftless Portuguese, fled to the promising land from which one hundred millions sterling were to be drawn during the first half of the eighteenth century in diamonds.

¹ Pyrard, *Voyages de F. Pyrard de Laval contenant sa navigation aux Indes Orientales, Maldives, Molouques Brésil, etc.* Paris, 1679.

and precious stones alone King John the Fifth, though he found Portugal involved, through the Methuen treaty, in the war of Spanish Succession, was so misled by the appearances of the hour, as to devise all means to impress the world with Portugal's wealth. He lavished and squandered all the gold and diamonds, which came as regularly as the vintage and olive gathering, in palaces, churches and harlots. "When he took to building he built monasteries; and when he wanted a mistress he chose a nun," said Voltaire, and this observation is true. The luxury, the waste and the frivolity of the king, who in the convent of Odivellas had a copy of the *Parc aux Cerfs*, would have made any Eastern potentate envy the Portuguese monarch. This gross sensuality, however, so enervated the King that a new vision arose in his disordered brain. He had trembled in his palace before every stray pirate that chose in those days to insult the nation under the very walls of her capital. His orgies and debaucheries had had such an effect on the impulsive temperament of the nation that bands of Portuguese, under the guidance of "Duke of Cadaval, the Marquises of Marialva and Cascaes and of the Counts of Aveiras and Obides infested the streets of Lisbon. Even Dom Francisco, the King's brother, with Suppico and others, amused himself in these nightly brawls and assassinations."¹ But, nevertheless, John the Fifth was growing enthusiastic about the spirit of past ages. He wanted to "make the past live." King John the Fifth wished to imitate Louis the Fourteenth. His *Academia Real de Historia Portuguesa* was but an attempt to copy the French Academy. Its members did some work which may be seen in the fifteen volumes of the *Colecção dos Documentos e Memorias* published from 1721 to 1730. The Academy was to record the annals of bygone days of grandeur. But the hired historian, who had to move in his own appointed orbit, could give Portugal nothing better than the "Genealogical History of the Royal House."²

¹ Oliveira Martins, *Historia de Portugal*, Tom II

² *Historia Geneal da Casa Real port desde a sua origem até o presente com as familias illustres que procedem dos Reis e dos Serenissimos Duques de Bragança*. Lisboa, 1735-43 13 Tomos

The Brazilian mines were soon exhausted. Nine tenths of the Brazilian wealth had gone to England in exchange for merchandise. The Portuguese found themselves hopelessly insolvent, and there was no other way of cancelling their debts than by getting rid of the Jews, their creditors. The King, in exchange for the title of "Most Faithful Majesty," had forced on the Pope presents worth more than sixteen millions sterling, but the country was on the verge of bankruptcy. Having tried to find a little relief in the baths of Caldas da Rainha for diseases which vice and sensuality had bred, the Portuguese Mormon died in embarrassed circumstances leaving a debt of three millions sterling.

At this moment Marquis de Pombal appeared, and was hailed as the expected deliverer. The traditions of Sebastianismo formed the basis of the belief "I found," said Marquis de Pombal, "a monarchy destitute of money, weakened by many revolutions, disturbed by various secret sects and impoverished by its very riches. A people subject to the grossest superstition, a nation whose manners might be likened to those of barbarians, a State governed by almost Asiatic customs, European only in name, with but the form of kingly government and the shadow of power." The minister of John the Fifth's successor had, therefore, ample work before him calling for the exercise of the highest qualities of statesmanship. Pombal, no doubt, kept the nation busy repairing her shattered dwellings and her public monuments which the earthquake of 1755 had shaken to their foundations. To quote the words of an eye-witness of the catastrophe: "Almost the whole of Portugal has felt this scourge, the Kingdom of Algarve, Santarem, Setubal, Oporto, Mafra, Obidos, Castanheira—indeed all the towns within twenty leagues are destroyed. I write to you from the depth of the country, for there is not a habitable house left. Lisbon has vanished!"¹ The denunciation from Mount Sinai that "the sins of the fathers shall be visited upon the children to the third and

¹ Letter from Pedagache, quoted in Ferdinand Denis' "Portugal," in *L'Univers*

fourth generation" was remarkably exemplified in the history of this period. The rebuilding of Lisbon gave Pombal complete ascendancy over a pusillanimous King, whose prerogative he attempted to raise to an absolute Cæsarism, for he knew Cæsar, in return, would maintain him in power, and the minister of Joseph I did nothing towards reviving the spirit of ancient representative institution like the Cortes which, in the best days of Portugal¹ were a check upon all political degradation. To attain his object, Pombal harassed and vexed the downtrodden nation. For the sake of his Dulcinea, this prototype of the hero of Cervantes trampled over everybody and everything that he imagined stood in his way of ambition. "His Majesty," says Lord Mahon, "debauched besides the Marchioness of Tavora"². The intimacy of the King was deeply resented by the noble families to which the young and beautiful Marchioness belonged; and an attempt was made on the life of the King. But Pombal, conscious of the fact that the nobility, already deprived of great privileges by his Trade Company, bore him no love, found a pretext in the "Conspiracy of the Tavoras," to persecute the nobility. He erected scaffolds on the quay by the river at Belem and—who knows?—he perhaps envied the dogs the blood they drank of a Tavora or Aveiro who had their limbs broken alive. His merciless, stupid tyranny was such that he even cast into prison the son of the Duke of Aveiro, an infant, and the children of Marquis d'Alvina, three of them under ten years of age, to expiate their father's crime of marrying a Tavora¹. Fearing that the King might be made aware of his tyranny by the Jesuits, he dismissed the King's confessor, Father Moreira, and Jesuits were forbidden to approach the Court. The pretence was to prevent Portugal from being enslaved by the Jesuits.

¹ In the thirteenth century the general Cortes were six times assembled, in the fourteenth century twenty-six times, in the fifteenth century forty-five times, in the sixteenth century, before the Spanish usurpation, only seven times, during the domination of Spain thrice to recognise Philip and his heir apparent and nine times from the accession of John IV to the end of the seventeenth century when they were not consulted by the kings of Portugal.

² Lord Mahon, *History of England*,

"John V," to quote the words of Soriano, the historian, "had converted Portugal into a kind of monkish theocracy stained with all the vices and evils of fanaticism, hidden under the cloak of religion and sanctity" In times of political convulsions nothing of course is sacred which is opposed to the interests of the community, and nothing secure that is not founded on its good will. But neither in motive nor in practice was there a patriotic force behind the measures passed by Pombal, who had actually petitioned the Pope to erase the names of Ignatius Loyola and Francis Xavier from the calendar! One of Pombal's first acts was to curb the power of the Inquisitor He decreed that "all cases involving punishment ought to be referred to the decisions of secular tribunals" But by a curious irony of fate, his brother was the head of Inquisition, and the aged Jesuit, Malagrida, the confessor of the Marchioness of Tavora, was burnt alive as a heretic!

The all-powerful minister of Joseph the First also aimed at the equalization of all classes by doing away with the distinction between the old and new Christians The descendants of the converted Indians were given equal rights, and considered eligible for civil, military and ecclesiastical offices. The Royal *Alvaras* of April, 1761, and January, 1773, show the man certainly, but not the whole man He, who had asserted by his acts that the people, as a body politic, had been annulled by the Crown, cannot be said to have worked for the cause of liberty. He had actually published a law making it treason to speak ill of the Minister! Even the trade of the delator became respectable, and the 400,000 crusados which were assigned as salary gave a chance in Portugal to the professional delator

But to discuss Pombal's policy in India The most ancient institutions in Portuguese India were the village communities—institutions where we can trace the progress of Indian liberty. But their political and economic power was, unfortunately, restrained within narrow limits, and the exercise of a constant authority by the unworthy successors of Albuquerque was, and still is, annoying. We

cannot, therefore, but deplore Pombal's entire lack of imagination and of political foresight which was responsible for the establishment of senates, or municipalities, in Portuguese India. The municipalities, the keystone of Portuguese political organization, gave, no doubt, to Portugal the benefit of liberty and enlightenment. But it is hard to-day, as in the century before last, when Pombal granted senates or municipalities to India, to see any definite indication of constructive forces—political and economic—which Portuguese possessions in India need. Thus the village communities lost their vitality, and the people, sad to say, fell into the indifference which led to the death of their liberties.

"Divine Providence having placed the city of Goa in a situation by far the most advantageous and admirably fitted to make her the capital and mistress of the whole of Asia, and the incomparable Affonso Albuquerque, having raised her to that position which she maintained with unrivalled power and glory till the intrusion of the so-called Jesuits, she had been overtaken by such calamities that she is reduced to a heap of ruins, so that she is now a mere wreck of what she was in happier times, for those wicked men wished the city to be deserted that she might be left entirely in their hands, with none to oppose the gigantic schemes of their insatiable and restless ambition," wrote Pombal in the instructions he gave Dom José Pedro da Camara, the Captain-General of Goa. It was King John the Third who had welcomed the Jesuits months before Pope Paul III regularised their position. The Portuguese King knew that the Society of Jesus, formed under discipline more perfect than that of any other religious order, would perform duties which no other body could undertake. Indeed, had it not been for Francis Xavier, the greatest of all the Jesuits—who undertook and carried out the whole of the vast task of promoting that brotherhood and that solidarity of men which find their foundation in the Gospel of Christ—it is hard to say what would have been the fate of the Portuguese in the East in the general convulsion which attended the fall of the Portuguese

Empire The soldier of Christ, elsewhere a caricature, to put it in the words of a Protestant writer, became in the great Apostle of the Indies an embodied reality He was born in his ancestral castle at the foot of the Pyrenees He had resigned the glory of receiving the Doctor's Cap in the University of Paris Such was the man of noble origin and great learning, but humble and unworldly Nowhere did this contrast appeal with greater force to the mind than in the East, where the idea of sanctity is so closely associated with asceticism ¹ Say what one will, the missionaries of the Society of Jesus displayed great qualities of moral and philanthropic earnestness, and their ready adaptability to Eastern environment was, indeed, original Robert de Nobili, a Jesuit, was the first European to find in the study of Sanskrit an incentive to new paths of work Francisco Rodrigues translated into Portuguese the *Bhagavat Gita* long before Bournouf made it known to Europe The Jesuit, João de Brito, wrote a commentary on the Vedas to encourage theological inquiry The Jesuits held a high place in the estimate of their Eastern contemporaries Oriental historical works recorded the services they rendered at the Court of Akbar—where a Jesuit asked the Great Mogul Emperor not to annex the Portuguese possessions in India Portugal may remember this fact to the credit of a Jesuit who was a Portuguese

Having raised the royal prerogative, Pombal endeavoured to raise the nation to the French standard With that brainless habit of imitation which is playing so large a part in modern Portuguese politics, he tried to copy

¹ "His piety, obvious sincerity, simple life and overwhelming faith appealed to the ignorant folk among whom he worked" "Xavier's mission is of interest because he may be considered to be the first missionary, in our modern sense He came to preach the Gospel, to give the Indian world what he considered the true light His methods were crude, but he showed an appreciation of popular psychology, and his life, spent among foreign people in the service of his Church, not as a member of a powerful community, or as a Bishop, but as a preacher, is indeed a source of inspiration"

Malabar and the Portuguese Being a History of the Relations of the Portuguese with Malabar from 1500 to 1663 By K. M. Panikkar, B.A. (Oxon), Barrister-at-law Dixon Scholar of Christ Church, Oxford Sometime Professor of Modern History Muslim University, Aligarh, etc Bombay, 1929

anything and everything French. In commerce he aspired to be the Colbert, and in finance he hoped to be the Sully of Portugal, and he was wild enough to heap decrees upon decrees, which, he believed, would help the nation to recover her former prestige. Decrees were passed, some to "encourage fisheries, the manufacture of sugar and the cultivation of the silk worm," "to prohibit gold and precious stones that were annually imported from Brazil and other colonies, to be exported without his permission," others "to restrain the prevalent custom of taking private revenge," "making it treason to speak ill of the Ministers," etc. The Board of Common Weal,¹ a kind of commercial tribunal, protested against the decree constituting the General Company of Grand Pará and Maranhão. But Pombal, unwilling to be convinced that his decree would result in diminishing the commerce of Brazil and the trade of Pernambuco, abolished the Board and imprisoned its members; and a Junta de Commercio was established in its stead. Again, a decree was passed founding the Oporto Wine Company and putting under a monopoly the wine industry, that only source of wealth of Portugal. To enforce such a measure "thirteen men and four women were executed. Five and twenty persons were condemned to the galleys, some for life and others for a term of years. Eighty-six were banished to different parts, and fifty-eight condemned in a fine and six months' imprisonment."² "In order to re-establish a State it is necessary that it should be destroyed," were Pombal's words. But what remained of Pombal's rule . . .³ An edifice which it had taken twenty-seven years of bloodshed and treachery to erect, fell with a crash in little more than a year. The very schemes which drove the nation to absolute despair, but which were to create his political reputation, were dissolved before him. When the King's death brought about his fall, the all powerful minister of Joseph I only left eight hundred victims imprisoned in dungeons, most of them already driven mad by such confinement. The

¹ A mesa de Bem Commum

² Extract from a despatch of the British Minister to his Government

notorious Intendent of Police, Pina Manique, and the three Secretaries of the State, Martinho de Mello e Castro, Thomás Xavier de Lima Brito, and Viscount of Villa Nova de Cerveira, were eager to succeed the Dictator in power. But Pombal had no statesmanship or capacity to establish dictatorship on any basis. He knew that he was master, and master he remained till the death of the King.

Once more the Portuguese Messianic dream had not come true. There were no signs either of another Messiah arising in Portugal to undertake the duties of "saviour" in such desperate circumstances. Such was the state of affairs when Napoleon turned his eyes towards this westernmost state of Europe and attempted to reduce it to the same total dependence on himself as the confederation of the Rhine, Holland, Switzerland and Italy. The infamous treaty of Fontainebleau had decided the partition of Portugal, and Bonaparte had declared in the *Moniteur* that "the house of Bragança had ceased to reign." The aspiration of France after universal empire—*la grande pensée*—as it was presumptuously termed, was now on the point of being realised. But nevertheless, the enthusiasm of the Portuguese for the invasion, which laid the country open to the ravages of the murderous bands of the Corsican warrior, was such that they saw in their oppressors the heroes of Marengo, Austerlitz and Jena.

Junot, when he crossed the Portuguese frontier, had proclaimed the sole object of his invasion to be "the emancipation of the Portuguese Government from the yoke of England," and the Portuguese at once leaped to the conclusion that everything French was to be loved and everything English hated.

Junot, who hoped to succeed the Braganças, also posed as a patron of letters. "Public instruction," said the French General in his proclamation to the inhabitants on the 1st February, 1808, "that only source of civilisation of nations, shall be diffused through the different provinces, and *Algarve and Upper Beira shall also produce another Camões*." He was elected President of the *Academia Real das Sciencias* in the place of the Duke of Lafões. His agent, José Seabra,

a disreputable lawyer, had actually got up a deputation to visit Napoleon, headed by the Grand Inquisitor, the Bishop of Leiria, to ask for the nomination of Junot as King of Portugal¹

The invasion drove the nation upon strange actions. The Prince Regent had embarked for flight¹ on the very spot whence three centuries back the Portuguese had sailed upon their glorious enterprize. Once the Prince Regent led the Portuguese to believe that he had preferred being swept out of his kingdom with a broom stick to being driven from it by the sword—an action which we must in fairness, as well as in charity, admit was the result of foreign influence, and perhaps not so much of the Prince's own voluntary deliberation—the Portuguese offered no resistance to the French. The nobles who had not emigrated with the Court to Brazil, looked helplessly on and submitted to the French usurpation. The professional agitators, who had sucked in the poison from the vilest revolutionary literature smuggled from Paris, tried to profit as far as possible by the confusion into which the country was thrown, and a deputation of Freemasons of Portugal, in their democratic enthusiasm, welcomed Junot at Santarem. But very soon the truth dawned upon Portugal. "Whole families," writes an eye witness in *The Portuguese Observer*, "were suddenly reduced to poverty and absolute want. All who depended for employment and subsistence on foreign trade were now utterly destitute. Their trinkets went first, whatever else could find a buyer followed; these things were sold at half their value, while the price of food was every day going up

¹ "Finding that the troops of the Emperor of the French and the King of Italy, to whom I had united myself on the continent, in hope of being no more disturbed, are actually marching into the interior of my kingdom and are even on their way to this capital, and desiring to avoid the fatal consequences of a defence which would be far more dangerous than profitable, serving only to create an effusion of blood, dreadful to humanity and to inflame the animosity of the troops which have entered the kingdom with the declaration and promise of not committing the smallest hostility, and knowing also that they are most particularly destined against my royal person and that my faithful subjects would be less alarmed were I to absent from the kingdom, I have resolved for the benefit of my subjects to retire with the Queen and my mother and all my royal family, to my dominions in America, there to establish myself in the city of Rio de Janeiro until general peace"—Proclamation of the Prince Regent. Palace of the Ajuda. November 27, 1807.

Persons who had lived comfortably were seen begging in the streets. Women hitherto respectable offered themselves to prostitution that the mother might get enough to feed the starving little ones, the daughter for her starving parents." Meantime Junot had disbanded the Portuguese army, substituted French for Portuguese governors and hoisted the French flag in the Fortress of St George. But once Portugal was free to choose for herself it was towards England that every Portuguese heart instinctively turned. The whole of northern Portugal, led by the Bishop of Oporto, was first to rise in arms against the French. Regardless of the pastoral letter of the Inquisitor-General of all Kingdoms and dominions belonging to her Catholic Majesty, recommending submission to the French, the brave bishop organized the defence of Oporto, until Sir Arthur Wellesley, leaving Corunna, proceeded to that city. M Thiers speaks of this struggle in his *Histoire du Consulat et de l'Empire*, "as that long and terrible struggle, that great Peninsular war, which lasted more than six years, which exhausted more treasures and drained off a greater tide of human blood than the murderous campaign of Russia, and in which all the most renowned generals and marshals of France were severally defeated, to the surprise of Napoleon, and to the astonishment of the world, by an English General newly returned from India, whose name was, as yet, a stranger to every mouth." Portugal furnished England a favourable ground on which to meet the armies of Napoleon. British Generals considered her geographical position "very advantageous" for more than one line of offensive operations, and thought the topographical features of the country "presented peculiar facilities for defensive warfare." She was, according to Canning's words, "the fulcrum for the lever of England to wrench Napoleon from his power." But even then, when all was hope in Europe, the seemingly immitigable evil destiny of this land prevailed. "To a mind not steeled against the pleadings of humanity," wrote a distinguished British officer, who had fought at Bussaco, "the field of battle presented a less painful view when strewn with the mangled forms of dead and dying, than

did the rescued villages, where, in order to secure Portugal from the reflux of this desolating tide, we were necessitated to receive from her children almost their last mouthful of bread and to see them paid what in itself was a wretched compensation, though all we had to give ”¹

Portugal gave freely of her blood, and fought side by side with her ally to free Europe from the shadow of the French Empire. The chivalrous part she bore in the contest so bravely sustained and so gloriously concluded, added a brilliant page to the annals of Portugal. But the Peninsular war exhausted her resources and was the cause of bankruptcy. But worse still. The great development of military energy which ensued in the country upon the invasion of the French made revolution chronic in Portugal. “The army was disproportionately large for the size and revenue of the country; there was no foreign or colonial war to occupy its energies, and the soldiers would not return to the plough nor the officers retire into private life ”²

At last the King returned to Portugal. But once archives, treasures and jewels were shipped on board the fleet that carried the Royal Family to Brazil, and Rio de Janeiro became the seat of Portuguese sovereignty, the great transatlantic dominion claimed equality with the parent state, equality which was generously admitted by the Royal decree of 1815. The printing press, hitherto inhibited because of its “dangerous effects,” was introduced. Ports were opened to the commerce of all nations, strangers were permitted to settle, and encouragement given to education.

The Portuguese on the Continent, however, were indignant at the claim of Brazil. The South American colony was to be treated as a dependency, said the Portuguese Cortes. But the Brazilians denied the authority of the Cortes, on the ground that the American colony held charters not from Parliament but from the Crown. It seems almost incredible, that with warnings before their eyes which each despatch from Brazil brought them, there

¹ *An Historical View of the Revolutions of Portugal, since the Close of the Peninsular War*. By an Eye-witness. London, 1827.

² H. Morse Stephen, *Portugal*. The Story of the Nation Series. London, 1908.

should have been still Portuguese on the Continent who thought they could despise the Brazilian aspirations. An insulting decree was passed by the Portuguese Cortes ordering Prince Dom Pedro to come to Europe, abolishing the Royal Tribunals at Rio de Janeiro and dividing Brazil into provincial governments subordinate to the Government at Lisbon. The Brazilians, aggrieved, injured, and oppressed, declared their independence, investing a member of the House of Bragança with the title of Emperor of Brazil. "In the ardours of the indignation which the perfidy of her brother caused her to feel," so ran the Brazilian address presented to Dom Pedro by the council of representatives, "Brazil would have broken the moral ties of religion, blood and manners that connected her with the mother-country but for her attachment to your royal highness, the heir of a house she adores and serves still more from love and loyalty than from duty and obedience."¹ There is no offence which either communities or individuals are less likely to forgive than insult or contempt. A material injury may be forgiven; but contempt never.

"I have ploughed in the sea," were Bolivar's suggestive words, concluding his political testament. No wonder one of the clauses in the constitution of one of the South American republics delivered by the Liberator was "that insurgents taking up arms from political motives shall be accorded belligerent rights." Spain, of course, gave her South American Colonies none of the traditions of liberty, with the result that the Latin-American States found it hard to walk in the republican armour. Fortunately, however, it was a stable constitutional monarchy with which Brazil first commenced her independent career, and it is interesting to note that the British Minister in Lisbon was sent as Portuguese Plenipotentiary to Rio de Janeiro to sign the Treaty of Separation and Independence. This was one of the happy accidents of Portuguese history.²

¹ Brazilian Address presented to Dom Pedro, June 3, 1822

² "The Portuguese in America were wiser in their generation than the Spaniards, for when they separated from the mother-country they established an Empire under the Royal House of Bragança. The monarchy gave peace to Brazil for more than sixty years, during which her republican neighbours

It has been said that in the life of nations as in that of individuals, there is a moment which decides their fate for years. To use that moment is success, to lose it is ruin. Such a moment presented itself to Portugal in 1820, the occasion on which the door of opportunity was opened to the Portuguese Democracy and the Portuguese shut it on themselves. It was like the many opportunities Portugal has had of establishing a sound system of government, had she carried into action the aspirations suggested by the philosophy of the period. But unfortunately there was, both above and below, a fatal incapacity for moulding the institutions of the country.

To awake the spirit of liberty the Portuguese had to draw their inspiration from the past. They had to seek salvation in their own best traditions. The history of the ancient "Cortes" was the history of Portuguese liberty from its lowest ebb to the highest to which it attained. The virtue, spirit, and essence of this institution consisted in its being the very image of the feelings of the nation; and the Portuguese partook in all those principles of civil and rational freedom which marked the history of Leon and Castile.

"In surveying the monarchies of the Peninsula," wrote Lord Brougham, discoursing on the cause of the loss of liberty in Spain and Portugal, "we have only seen the same history which we had before been contemplating in other parts of Europe—of popular rights lost and limited government converted into absolute, but we have seen this process taking place in a more striking manner, because the former

were in a state of perpetual turmoil. Why, in these circumstances, it was overthrown in 1889 is one of the problems that the historian of Latin-America finds it impossible to answer. Perhaps the most pertinent comment on the events of 1889 is that of the well-known authority on Latin-American affairs, the late C. E. Akers, who wrote that the 'comparatively apathetic attitude in connection with the deposition of Dom Pedro received a severe shock when the true character of the men at the head of affairs became understood. Most Brazilians entertained an innate dislike to militarism, and for more than half a century, under the kindly rule of Dom Pedro, individual rights and civil liberty had been respected. A very different state of affairs now came to the fore.' The recent history of Brazil shows that these observations are as applicable to-day as when they were written." Sir Charles Petrie, *Monarchy*. London, 1933.

constitutions were more fixed and more free than elsewhere. The power of the Crown was restrained within more narrow limits, and the exercise of a controlling authority by the nation—or at least by the greater, and in those days, more important portion of the nation, the nobles and the towns—was more regular and indeed constant” “That those countries should have lost this invaluable blessing which we have preserved and improved,” said he, “is one of the most striking passages of history—one of the most singular phenomena in what we have termed the science of comparative anatomy—that science which teaches the internal structure of different governments, shows their adaptation of the unfitness of their parts to perform the functions intended for each and contrasts the various systems one with another”¹

In 1820 there were Portuguese who were desirous of adhering to ancient forms and principles in the Constitution. But they were thrust out of politics by those who, animated by a spirit of furious democracy, wished to go to as great lengths as the Spaniards. They were “shunted,” as it were, off the line, to make way for those who thought they were running the race of progress, but who were not slow to persuade the troops—whose credulity is so invaluable a treasure to Portuguese democrats—to assemble round the palace where the Junta were sitting and demand from it a decree that the Spanish Constitution of 1812 should be adopted *in toto*. This constitution established almost universal suffrage for one of the most ignorant countries of Europe. The King had no power either to prorogue or dissolve the Cortes, which reserved to themselves the privilege of altering the fundamental law without the consent of the Crown. The Cortes formed only one body elected every three years. When a law passed the Cortes, the King might reject it within a month. But if he took longer he was held to have assented. If the King rejected it, his reasons were submitted for the approval of the Cortes, and if the Cortes still adhered to it, the King was bound to sanction the Bill. The Cortes even reserved to themselves the right of naming

¹ Henry Lord Brougham, *Political Philosophy* London, 1842

all civil, military and naval officers whenever "the safety of the constitutional system should be in danger" But this Constitution, framed in 1820, decreed by the Cortes in 1821, and signed by King John the Sixth on September 22, 1822, when it left the hands of its authors, to quote Rebello de Silva "was already diseased with political consumption, of which it died in the following year" Be that as it may "Death to the Constitution and all its followers," was the war cry which marked the object of Count of Amarante, who in 1823 placed himself at the head of some troops to proclaim the merits of the ancient system The King accordingly declared the Constitution of 1822 abrogated But while the Count de Palmella was busy drawing up a new constitution, Dom Miguel de Bragança fled from his father's mansions and joined the 23rd regiment, "to serve his King and deliver the nation" This Messiah hoped "that heaven would aid him" and that "his father would give him his benediction"¹ But once John VI declared to the nation that the rowdy Prince acted contrary to the wishes of the nation, and that "he abandoned him as a father, and knew how to punish him as a King," Dom Miguel—a tool in the hands of his mother, Dona Carlota Joaquina, a woman of turbulent disposition and loose morals—appealed to the army "Soldiers," said he, "if the day of the 27th May, 1823, broke upon us with memorable lustre, the day of the 30th April, 1824, will not be less memorable Both of them will occupy a distinguished place in the pages of Lusitanian history" "Soldiers," he cried, "be worthy of me and Dom Miguel will be worthy of you" The revolt was sternly suppressed, the Prince was dismissed from the office of commander-in-chief of the army and banished from the kingdom But he soon returned, and the people, ignoring the possibility of being confronted with the worse, found a ruler in Dom Miguel whose treasonable usurpation was signalled by an outburst of lawlessness and violence—an usurpation which relied on the brutality of the Lisbon mob under the influence of the mendicant orders, and the fanaticism of a section of the clergy exasperated by the

¹ Dom Miguel's letter addressed to his father on May 27, 1823

cheap liberalism of the Constitutionalists "The Constitutionalists," said José Agostinho, a monk and Court preacher, "must be hung up by the feet" "May God," added this bloodthirsty author of *The Beast Flayed*, "send that the executions begin in these long days of May, which give full time for them As this year threatens scarcity, let the people be joyfully treated daily with fresh meat from the gallows." "Thousands were deported to Africa and hundreds mercilessly condemned to death by the special commission appointed by Dom Miguel to traverse the kingdom for the punishment of those Portuguese who would not shout *Long live the King Absolute* They were chained with most abandoned ruffians, robbers and assassins, doomed for the same punishment for their crimes. They were stowed away in the smallest compass possible in a vessel heavily laden with stores for the colony, and the best places were assigned to the malefactors, leaving the more deadly and pestilential berths to magistrates, members of the Cortes and other reputable persons, the victims of their own loyalty, or of their master's suspicions"¹ It was also decreed that the property of the Portuguese who had left the kingdom should be confiscated; and so deeply engrossed were the partisans of Dom Miguel in the exciting occupation of chasing conspirators, that English, American and French fleets entered the Tagus to protest against illegal arrests of peaceful foreign citizens, and demand reparation done to their trade. But imprisonments, executions, transportations, only acted like water upon burning oil, they spread the area of disaffection Moreover, the condition of finance was at its worst in Portugal, and matters came to a climax when Dom Miguel brought out a loan for 25,000,000 francs, to be paid in twenty-five years at the rate of 500,000 every six months.

The army had been the foundation of Dom Miguel's power in Portugal He was in a great measure left to depend on money for procuring obedience to his orders, and as the revenue scarcely sufficed for the ordinary expenses, he tried to raise money to meet eventualities in the political

¹ *Annual Register*, 1830

world But the nations mistrusted Dom Miguel and his securities, because he owed his rise to a revolution made in barracks Besides, the branches of revenue offered as securities for the loan were already otherwise appropriated or, like almost all other branches of revenue, anticipated for several years to come

This resulted in civil wars between the subjects of Queen Dona Maria the Second and the partisans of her uncle, Dom Miguel Passion ran high, private resentment and family feuds mingled with political principles, and the Constitutional Charter of 1826 was established

"The Charter," the Regency, to impress the nation how widely it differed from the Constitution of 1822, had already declared, "is not a forced concession; it is a voluntary and spontaneous gift of the legitimate power of His Majesty, and matured by his profound and royal wisdom This Charter tends to terminate the contest between two extreme principles which have agitated the universe It summons all Portuguese to reconciliation by the same means which have served other people, it maintains in all their vigour the religion of our fathers and the rights and dignity of the Monarchs, all the orders of the State are respected and all are alike interested in uniting the efforts to surround and strengthen the throne, to contribute to the common good and to secure the preservation and amelioration of the country to which they owe their existence, of the society of which they form a part " And finally that "this charter has prototypes amongst other nations who are esteemed, and the most civilized and the most happy " The framers of the Consitution prepared it after a study of British institutions, and the Portuguese charter, with its King, Peers, and Deputies was a near approach to the English model It may also be interesting to note that Sir C Stuart, afterwards Lord Stuart of Rothesay, the Plenipotentiary of Great Britain, was requested by Dom Pedro to be the bearer to Portugal of the new Constitutional Charter But "the traditions and unwritten codes, the half lights and compromises that direct its workings in England," said, eighty years after, a writer, condemning this plagiarism,

"are not things that can be manufactured" "They are," he wrote, "properties of the blood elements of a national character, the product of special conditions and distinctive experiences To formulate and define them, to incorporate them in a Constitution and to hope it will prove workable is to miss altogether their essential quality and to indulge in the vain dream that the slow processes of time can be eliminated, and centuries taken at a leap"¹

The Portuguese politicians, inspired by a mixture of philosophical theory, of French revolutionary sentiment and of ill-understood constitutional ideas borrowed from England, viewed the Constitution they had adopted as the standard, or, to use the phraseology of the times, as "the mirror of political liberty" It was pronounced as "the most liberal of Constitutions, one of which any modern nation might boast" But events by no means took the turn which the enthusiastic Portuguese anticipated The so-called constitutional movement only came to confuse and embitter the Portuguese political development with factious contentiousness, to fix resentment where there should only be generosity, and insolence where there should be gratitude "Difficulties," said the Count Taipa, a Peer of the realm, in a letter addressed in 1833 to Dom Pedro, the giver of the Charter, "increase every day, and the re-establishment of the kingdom is paralysed by the stupidity of the ministers and the total loss of credit in the Government The ministry has entirely lost the opinion of the public. The grossest ignorance is shown of its laws, and the greatest unskilfulness betrayed in all its precautionary measures, while the most scandalous immorality is practised in the nomination to public offices and every department of government The present ministry is not the representative of any one single interest in the country, it is nothing more than a faction of prosing fools, of anarchical cosmopolites without name, without property, without claim upon the public, without talent—a faction that in no other manner belongs to

¹ Sydney Brooks, "The Lesson of Portugal," *Harper's Weekly* New York, March 7, 1908

Portugal, but that its members happened to be born on its soil with no other propensity but to snatch up all the 'loaves and fish' of the State. They are without any principle, good or bad, they have been improperly accused of being 'ultra Liberals,' they are 'anything and nothing'—the *fox* of all parties—the *caput mortuum* of all factions, from which unhallowed mixture has sprung forth a strange and unnatural monster." The Portuguese Constitutionalism will appear best from the following extract from a proclamation issued in 1837 "Portuguese! you are going to combat the dilapidators of national property, the men of compensation and loans—a gang of thieves and miscreants who proclaim the abolition of tariffs and the burning down of your manufactories. Let your weapons be whatever comes to hand, daggers, knives, sticks, pikes, stones, all will serve to beat down the enemy, and if any miserable wretches in any public department should dare to utter cries of anarchy or terror, immolate them promptly and make barricades of their bodies." It is almost incredible that so ridiculous a composition should have emanated from Constitution-
alists, yet it is assuredly genuine.

The ruthless logic of events, notably the era of *pronunciamientos* turned to derision the arguments in favour of a highly developed constitutional system that was thrust upon a people unready to receive it. "Were it not for Saldanha," says Soriano, the historian, "the Constitutional Charter might have fallen to the ground." Saldanha was the man who announced to the Regency that if the new Constitution was not enforced by a certain date fixed by himself he would proceed to swear to it and "urge the army to do the same"—a request that could by no means pass unnoticed, coming as it did from a man whose caprice in an hour could for ever ruin the peace of the whole nation. Saldanha, the hero of the Peninsular campaigns and the Brazilian skirmishes, was the popular idol. "Maria," said Dom Pedro, when he went on board to receive his daughter, Queen Maria the Second, "I do not present Lieut-General Count de Saldanha, whom you already know, but the Marshal Saldanha, to whom you owe your being here to-day."

Saldanha was the lion in the country, and the surrounding politicians would fain hear him roar.

"More than once have I prevented by representing the possibility of ejecting that ill-omened man from the Ministry by legal means," wrote this noted upsetter of Cabinets to the Duke of Terceira, threatening to bring about a revolution if Queen Maria II would not dismiss the ministry of the Count of Thomar, his personal enemy, "but the proceedings of the majorities in both chambers convinced every one of its impossibilities. The only thing I could do was to accept the invitation of many of our brave companions in arms, who, horrified at the future which the presence of the Count of Tomar prepared for us, urged me to put myself at their head, and by a military demonstration obtained the result which the nation wishes, needs and will infallibly obtain"¹ Neither the army nor the people favoured at first the views of this Marshal of Ministerial warfare. But once Oporto declared in his favour, Saldanha, a fugitive rebel, was summoned by the Queen to the Capital, to be entrusted with the Premiership "as the good of the State required it." Again the bold *coup d'état* of May 19, 1870, when he surrounded the Royal Palace and compelled King Louis to dismiss the ministry of the Duke de Loulé, who was notoriously the bitterest enemy of Saldanha, revealed the temperament of the man. "If I were King, Marshal," were the words of the unhappy Queen Maria Pia on that occasion, "I would have you publicly shot to-morrow. Now that you know what I think of your conduct you can go." These words of the brave daughter of Victor Emanuel, of Italy, were welcome in Portugal, and sunk deep into the finer national consciousness. In after years the octogenarian Marshal, who was Portuguese Minister in London, where he died in 1876, often laughed bitterly at the recollection of the Queen's rebuke.

"I will put myself at the head of a revolution such as I know I shall be able to guide and control for your Majesty's advantage," had said Marshal Saldanha to King Louis, one of the best Constitutional Monarchs. But if military

¹ Duke of Saldanha's letter to the Duke de Terceira, dated April 11th, 1851

revolution is to settle affairs of Government rightly one day, it might settle them wrongly another "A good constitution," observes James Bryce, in *Studies in History and Jurisprudence*, "relieves the Government from the necessity of frequently resorting to military force by securing that those who govern shall be persons approved by the bulk of the citizens as well as by providing for the purposes of coercion, machinery so promptly and effectively applicable that the elements of disturbance either do not break forth or are quickly suppressed" Dom Pedro IV, however, wished "to constitutionalise the Portuguese by force"¹ But the Portuguese soon found it hard to walk in the democratic armour made in England Foreign intervention was invoked by the ministers of Maria the Second, and Spanish and British forces marched upon Oporto, and a British fleet blockaded the Douro The country suffered dearly for importing ready-made advantages which no nation is ever fitted to enjoy but by having struggled for them A Charter drawn after the British model could only work under influences that act decisively on a spirit already prepared for it by the puritan discipline of family life, which has been for generations the greatest force in English politics, and amongst the lessons which the eighty years taught perhaps the most important to Portugal was the vital necessity of a moral discipline² A past that glides from the grave tells its own story in plain language, and misgovernment could hardly have gone further under Parliamentary institutions The Portuguese mimicked the English Tories and Whigs. But the Portuguese party system never assumed cohesion and definiteness It was neither animated by a political principle nor followed a political object, and culminated in the notorious "Rotativist" system by which opposing political parties arranged to succeed each other in rotation to the spoils of office. The parties intent only on preserving privileges incompatible with either progress or morality degenerated into factions.

¹ Dom Pedro's letter to Marquis de Rezende

² My article on "Signs of the Times in Portugal," *The British Review*. London, January, 1914

Parliamentary Government was one of the unhappy accidents of an unhappy history. The majesty of the law was so incessantly violated by the tyranny of mobs or the tyranny of the rulers that a disrespect for its provisions became, and continues to be, an habitual feeling among the Portuguese. Moreover, the Constitutional Governments, by their frequent recourse to *coups d'état*, encouraged the people to a systematic disregard of all law. Oliveira Martins, who was, undoubtedly, a man of courage beyond that of the average writer of his days, analysed the condition of Portugal in his sensational *Portugal Contemporaneo*, where the Portuguese historian considered the question of the failure of the Parliamentary Government in Portugal.

In the first period of Constitutionalism there came, of course, to the front men who stepped forward by their wisdom and spirit to quell the turbulent and inspire the peaceful with security and confidence. They had worked out some of the practical aims of the Portuguese Constitutionalism. Day after day they hesitated and lingered, expecting that other counsels would take place. But their disappointment was so great that they turned away with benevolent disdain from Portuguese politics. Mousinho da Silveira, whose contempt was aroused by the imposture surrounding the Portuguese liberalism, longed to be buried in the distant island of Corvo or in the little village of Margem, that, when dead, "he might be amongst good and grateful people." Passos Manuel, the great Constitutionalist, confessed that whenever Portuguese politics irritated him, he took his daughter in his arms and embraced her "that he might forget the misfortunes that had befallen his country." Alexandre Herculano, once an ardent champion of the Portuguese Constitutionalism, retired disgusted from politics to cultivate the land as a farmer. The great historian analysed the condition of Portugal with a view of determining the laws by which democracy—and democracy to him meant a condition of society not a form of government—is governed, and he satisfied himself by a close study of Portuguese life and history that the destiny of the country was not to be worked out by a

Constitutional formula. He spoke strongly on the character and education of "the politicians who had no ideas except those imbibed in superficial and cheap French literature"; and Herculano perceived, indeed, quite clearly, the dangers and weaknesses which would beset Portugal under the Constitutional Charter.

"I know not," wrote Thierry, the French historian, concluding his *Histoire des Gaulois*, "but in tracing the narrative of this long work, more than once I have been stopped by a sudden emotion, more than once I fancied that I beheld the image of our own days pass before me; and I have thence inferred that our evil and good disposition were not born yesterday on this earth on which we shall leave them." Suggestive words, these last.

II

THE REVOLUTION

PORTUGAL was a dying nation. She had for four generations been rapidly sinking. The decay of her commerce, the gradual disappearance of her few industries and the fall of her liberties were facts too notorious to be palliated or disguised. "Portugal," wrote Leon Poinsard, who in 1909 was invited to Portugal by the University of Coimbra to investigate the country's condition, "was without economic activity, without capital and almost without men capable of carrying a movement of national reconstruction. Agriculture had fallen so low that the kingdom was obliged to import most of the wheat and the meat necessary for the consumption of the towns. Mechanical industry did not exist. But of all the bad symptoms the worst was certainly the lack of social organisation, resulting from the facts of the past. From the earliest time up to the middle of the last century everything had conspired to destroy the ancient social *cadres*, to impede work in its different branches, to disarrange the economic movement, and, in fine, to create a quite artificial situation based upon precarious resources and corrupt processes"¹

Portugal, however, had not seriously asked what she is and what she had been about. This apathy in the body of the nation encouraged the turbulence of factions with views and passions utterly irreconcilable who suffered their prejudices to run riot with their judgment, and converted the whole country into a region of strife and discord

To these discordant elements was added another not less dangerous. The dispute between Portugal and her

¹ Leon Poinsard, *Le Portugal Inconnu* Paris (Bureau de la Science Social), 1910

powerful ally over Manicaland and Shire Highlands, intensified the Portuguese difficulties. The *ultimatum* of 1890 sent by Lord Salisbury at the very beginning of King Carlos' reign, alarmed the well-wishers of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance, and emboldened the anarchical elements throughout the country. The terms of the *ultimatum* were undoubtedly humiliating, and hence arose the suspicion that the sovereignty of the country was in danger.¹ It was, indeed, a crisis to try a nation's soul. A painful, breathless discussion took place between Barros Gomes and Hintze Ribeiro, the Portuguese Foreign Ministers, and Lord Salisbury; and the evacuation of Shire Highlands, under the direct threat of a war declared by a powerful nation, was a palpable menace to Portuguese expansion, perhaps even to Portuguese independence. Unfortunately however, the patriotism of some Portuguese was of the kind which contented itself with movements of wild indignation. To their excited imagination it seemed as if the Ministers of the Crown were conceding all Portuguese rights to England in the overture of a humiliating peace, and there was no lack of writing or of speechifying on the subject. The conflict passed from the Chambers to the Press and public meetings, and it had an indirect result in the shape of an organized Republican revolt at Oporto, in January, 1891, when the Portuguese Republican party tried to seize the moment of this misunderstanding to attempt the establishment of a Republic in Portugal. In the *Patria*, where the ultimatum of 1890 supplied Guerra Junqueiro with a theme, the revolutionary poet disclaimed against

"Cynical England, shameless, drunken England"

A revolutionary singer, Guerra Junqueiro, did all he

¹ I do not enter so fully into this matter as I might. I have already been led into greater lengths than I intended in the chapter "A Friends' Quarrel" of *Eight Centuries of Portuguese Monarchy*.

"It is noteworthy," wrote the *Yorkshire Post*, "that he (the author) dates the collapse of the late dynasty from the British claim over parts of Mashonaland—claims which affected the Portuguese rights, and which Lord Salisbury enforced with an ultimatum. The author does not, however, blame Lord Salisbury overmuch, and he frankly admits the rottenness which had overtaken the political parties of his country"—*The Yorkshire Post* August 9, 1911

could to tear open old wounds and fill empty heads with foolish hopes. He poured the vilest abuse on the House of Bragança, and did his best to popularize the Republican conceptions of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity

Insulted nationality was now a pretence for attack on the Throne itself. Exulting to see at last the Monarchy helpless, the Portuguese Republicans excited the populace to fall upon those whom they considered the instigators of the *ultimatum*. King Carlos was accused of having wilfully suffered England to insult Portugal. He was made a traitor to his country. No plea was allowed, no extenuating circumstance admitted, the King was condemned—outlawed. But what increased the republican wrath was the order of the Garter offered to King Carlos by Queen Victoria when the question at issue had been settled.¹ Hence, perhaps, the well-known assertion of Professor Theophilo Braga that “the four great causes of the decadence of Portugal had been the Inquisition, the Jesuits, the Braganças, and the English alliance.” This quixotic campaign was, of course, the result of the excessive development of an imagination warmed by caprice, and the irritability of an intellect over whose impetuosity reason has but little control. But whilst the Republicans considered the *ultimatum* of 1890 a fitting opportunity to enlarge the wrongs of Portugal under Monarchical regime, the politicians who surrounded the Throne were still on the side of more liberty. They imagined that all the calamities of Portugal were occasioned by insufficient liberty, and that a Liberal Monarchy would roll away the old ills of a nationality. Liberal Monarchy was, therefore, invoked and adored with the same ignorance and fanaticism as a fetish is worshipped by an African savage. Incidentally, I may observe

¹ Mr Vizetelly, the author of *The Anarchists*, devotes some pages of his well-known work to the assassination of King Carlos. Investigating the causes that led to that ghastly crime, he writes “According to a recently published work, *Eight Centuries of Portuguese Monarchy*, by V de Bragança Cunha, the expansion of British interests in South Africa to the detriment of interests of Portugal contributed largely to the downfall of the royal house. We believe there is considerable truth in that statement. It is certain that King Carlos was repeatedly accused of sacrificing Portuguese interests to British ambition.” —*The Anarchists Their Faith and their Record*, by Ernest Alfred Vizetelly London, 1911

that Fontes Pereira de Mello, a statesman of large views and a man of inflexible integrity, had enjoyed a long tenure of power, having been in office, with the exception of three years, ever since 1872. He was eager to set the national finances on a sound footing. Knowing that the opposition was unwilling to contribute towards the solution of the financial crisis, the Regenerador leader had endeavoured to prevent the formation of any strong party of Monarchical opposition. But a great number of Portuguese politicians believed the Crown, in the event of a disaster overtaking Fontes Pereira de Mello's Government, might find itself without a strong party to appeal to for support. And a compact Liberal party was formed in 1887.

The epithet of "liberal" had hovered over many Portuguese politicians, but had not yet alighted upon any, until the distinguished lawyer, Dias Ferreira, himself a Liberal, used the personal prestige he had, in propagating a soulless Liberalism. Austere, reserved, upright, he was reputed to be incorruptible. It pleased, therefore, King Carlos in 1892 to choose Dias Ferreira and call him to his counsels. Dias Ferreira, who soon had to undertake also the portfolio of finance, firmly believed in his own Liberalism, and strove to induce his friends also to put faith in it. He imagined that the irregular effervescence would subside and the purest and clearest liberty would at length become uppermost. But to his utter dismay, his Government's financial policy soon brought him into collision with the Portuguese Parliament. The public coffers were quite empty, and in vain his predecessors had exhausted their resources in devising means for their replenishment. The debate on the Budget in the Cortes had led to the resignation of the previous Ministry, and a letter published in the *Official Gazette* had declared that "in view of the state of affairs and of the sacrifices imposed upon all" King Carlos had handed over to the national Treasury a fifth of his Civil List, about £26,000¹. But the financial problem appeared not to exercise much influence on the decisions of the politicians, and a coalition of

¹ Under similar circumstances Queen Maria II had already, in 1837, made a voluntary cession of £12,000 from her allowance—a sacrifice which the Cortes accepted with the proper acknowledgments.

Regeneradores and Progressistas threatened the existence of the Cabinet. So violent was their opposition that they absented themselves in a body from the House on the nomination of sessional officers.

Dias Ferreira, however, sought expedients by which to meet the needs of the Exchequer and check the violent oscillations of the exchange. But his efforts were in vain. The Finance Minister, Oliveira Martins, the historian, finding it impossible to meet the July coupon, had to resign. The negotiations with the International Committee of the Bondholders were stopped owing to the reluctance on the part of the International Committee to accept the terms offered by the Portuguese Government, and the Ministry, presided over by Dias Ferreira, had to tender its resignation to the King on February 20, 1892.

Soon after King Carlos called to power what was named again a Cabinet "extrapartidario," and it was a significant fact that the King, who had already shown, in an eminent degree, the talent of spotting politicians of Liberal stamp, should have chosen Fuschini and Bernardino Machado, afterwards a Republican leader, to be members of that Cabinet.

Nothing was discussed in the meetings of this famous Cabinet but the abuses to be abolished, the reforms to be effected. The programme of the Ministry included "liberty of the Press, Ministerial responsibility, administration honesty, liquidation of the public debt, and no taxes." But again the Government failed to put its programme into practice, and this time the consequences were much more disastrous. The Government had to take judical measures against tax-payers in default. It had proclaimed that Portugal would enjoy an exemption from new taxes. But it imposed a new tax on all the books kept by houses of business—a tax to which the Commercial Association of Lisbon refused to submit. Moreover, the Government was unable to revise the tariff and conclude treaties of commerce owing to the opposition of rich manufacturers in the House of Peers, where good sense and even sanity itself had taken leave of the minds of many of its members. Fuschini, however, who had taken seriously the imaginary mission of

implanting a Liberal Monarchy in Portugal, approached the Monarch for the purpose of informing him that he had a substantive policy to propose. He spoke about it in a more optimistic tone than the conditions of political life seemed to warrant. "But what about men?" said the King, hinting the uncertainty, to say no worse, of the proposal. "It is not my duty to name them," was Fuschini's evasive reply. The politician, whose name we find in the calendar of Portuguese democrats, was, however, acting as if he had to deal with an abstract man, instead of politicians disqualified by peculiar deficiencies—politicians who, to quote the words of Theophilo Braga, "belong to that class of dissolvent metaphysicians, graduates and doctors of the university, high functionaries of the bench and bureaucracy, journalists and dialecticians ready to sophisticate the clearest principles and falsify parliamentarianism, and who, through lack of ideas, fall in a state of wretched apathy with the well-known saying of Guizot as their motto—to govern is to establish yourself in power."¹ The political capacity of Fontes Pereira de Mello, the statesman of 1871, who established a Regenerador Administration which endured for no less than six years, the splendid intellect of Rodrigo Fonseca de Magalhaes to whose energy was due the passing of the *Acto Adicional* of 1852, the eloquence of José Estevão who called the attention of the nation to the humiliating affair of Charles and Georges, had left no successors. They were now replaced by the commonest and most vulgar type of intelligence. There were not a dozen men of eminence among these self-styled statesmen, who might just as well become astronomers.

"Liberal Monarchy," however, was the *nirvana* to which the Portuguese political aspirations tended. A number of empirics tried their experiment year after year, and all of them failed, until rotativism sprouted afresh like a foul weed. In place of Liberal Monarchy there sprang up the caste of politicians who made arrangements between themselves to share the spoils of office in rotation, and they were responsible for the bankruptcy and economic ruin of the

¹ Theophilo Braga, *Dissolução do Systema Monarchico Constitucional*

country The nation had twice to repudiate the full obligations of the public debt—in 1892, when the rate of interest was reduced from three to one per cent, and in 1902, when half the debt was cancelled, payment of three per cent being restored on the balance.

Receiving no impression from the rest of the world, and making no impression upon it, the Portuguese were wasting their time and energies in stormy disputes and declamatory nothings The Parliamentary debates to which the interrupters contributed the greatest part, the President the next, and the speaker by far the least, rendered the politicians abroad contemptible and at home violent, and a certain degree of favour still attended the politician who declared himself not to belong to either "Regeneradores," the Conservative right, or "Progressistas," the Constitutional left, as if he was clearing himself from the imputation of corruption and self-interest.

The existing conditions of things could not last; a crisis was inevitable. In 1904 the "Regeneradores," who were in power, found themselves face to face with the people on the important question of the tobacco monopoly, the rock on which the two party barges were to go to pieces The Cortes were dissolved and the two parties carried on the warfare of guerrillas to such an extent as to give the Republicans an opportunity to strengthen their position In the first election that followed Bernardino Machado, one of the Republican leaders, was elected member of Parliament, and his arrival at Lisbon gave rise to serious events, which caused some bloodshed These events intensified the situation, and Hintze Ribeiro, the "Regenerador" Premier, asked the King's permission to assume dictatorship But King Carlos refused to grant this request, and addressed to the "Regenerador" Premier the following letter which is to my mind the best tribute to his Kingship

"Necessidades Palace,
"16th May, 1905

"MY DEAR HINTZE,

"You came to see me yesterday afternoon in order to inform me of the opinion of your Government as to the best manner

of procedure in view of present circumstances. As I consider that the proposed plan—failing the adoption of which you declare yourself and your colleagues unable to continue in office—is a serious one and one requiring careful consideration, I told you that I preferred to think things well over, before giving any answer. I spent the whole night in reflection, and have postponed my reply until now as I was unwilling to give it without feeling myself absolutely justified, by certain information which I had still to receive, in answering you as my conscience prompts me.

“You and your Cabinet consider yourself unable to continue, in the present state of affairs, unless I postpone the opening of Parliament, due to take place at the beginning of next month. Further you wish me to do this by a simple Decree, without previously ascertaining the opinion of the Council of State. This postponement once granted, you said that you would take the responsibility of restoring a normal state of affairs in Lisbon, seeing that in the provinces this had undergone no change.

“I do not consider it advisable to postpone the opening of Parliament. Apart from other inconveniences it would cause an immediate revolt of public opinion not only amongst the Republicans—that would only be natural—but also amongst all the Monarchists who are not supporting you on the present occasion. This would unquestionably be the result, and it is quite useless to harbour any illusions about it. All we should effect would be to add to the number of malcontents—already large enough owing to errors of long standing—a mass of people who have hitherto not been discontented. This does not seem to me the right moment for such a venture, and the responsibility for the decree, although apparently it would be a mere act of executive power, would be thrust once more on the shoulders of the King who would be held by all to be answerable for his signature. Such a step would be more likely, in my opinion, to disintegrate the Monarchy than to consolidate it, and, once taken, the Government would afterwards only be able to keep together, by resorting to violence and intimidation. Woe betide those who can only rule in such a manner. I am convinced that there are still other methods to employ for the attainment of the end which we should all of us desire—the well-being of the country. Violent repression may legitimately be used when it is absolutely necessary for the public good, but never so long as any other means remain untried. And I do not believe that we have yet tried all.

“You see, therefore, that for these reasons I am conscientiously bound to refuse the postponement asked for by your Cabinet.

“My decision shows no lack of personal confidence either in you or in your colleagues, it merely shows that there is a radical

difference in our way of looking at the present state of affairs
You think in one way and I in another, which I conscientiously
believe to be the better

“Always yours sincerely,

“CARLOS R

“P S If you think it advisable you may read this letter in
the Cabinet meeting”

It was under these circumstances that João Franco assumed power. He had come out of the “Regenerador” party led by Hintze Ribeiro, and demanded a “Liberal Monarchy and straightforward Administration”

Franco was a wealthy man of apparently resolute character. In fact the most honest of a period so fertile in disreputable politicians, which, of course, raised him in the estimation of those who had refused to be bound to the chariot wheel of any faction, and gained him the increased enmity of those who lived fattening in favours and abuses. His first measures, which displayed courage and ability, produced a deep impression. Franco’s first step was to put an end to the system of unauthorized supplementary credits and the abolition of sinecures which yielded some £50,000 to the Treasury. In such circumstances it is easy to guess what course would be pursued by the “rotativist” politicians, who had divided between them the sovereignty of Portugal. Exasperated by the loss of their profits, they went hand in hand and laboured in concert. In the Parliament Franco was immediately attacked by the Opposition. Two full months were spent in political discussion of the most violent character, which resulted even in discussing the person of the King. This rendered it necessary that Franco should tender his resignation to the King, which was not accepted. King Carlos who had, of course, to choose between the adoption of his Ministers’ advice and the loss of his adviser, had no alternative but to give Franco a free hand in Portuguese affairs. Great as was King Carlos’ trust and confidence in the leader of the “Regenerador-Liberal” party—a party which exhibited a combination of sincerity, zeal, inex-

perience and prejudice, never perhaps equalled in the history of Portuguese politics—he thought Franco would render politicians of rhetorical type either impossible or comparatively harmless in the future. Like his dictator he was filled with hope and energy, like him, he also believed in success. “Senhor Franco is the man I have wanted,” were the King’s words to the Paris *Temps*. “For a long time I had my eye on him. His merit consists in his faith in himself, in his star; and in the hours of crisis such confidence is a great aid. We are completely in accord. He has my entire confidence. We shall hold the elections when it suits our own purpose. We are sure of a majority. The country will approve of Senhor Franco’s policy. We shall re-establish financial equilibrium and wipe out the deficit. I know my country.” There was, of course, some justice in what had happened, and undoubtedly the Portuguese Parliament deserved the fate which fell upon it. But what led Franco to assume dictatorship does not appear to have been so much the unreality of Parliamentary life as a feeling of betrayal at the hands of José Luciano de Castro. Franco had for electoral purposes been in alliance with this leader of the “Progressistas”—a politician who had always regarded an election as an occasion for political chantage. When in power, to weaken the Opposition, he had offered José Luciano de Castro three posts in his Ministry—an offer which was not accepted. Having called in aid of his political ambition the principal representative and the very incarnation of a political system utterly and foully corrupt, Franco could not, of course, easily assume the attitude of a man patronising his brother politicians from a distance. Moreover, he had all along promised that he would respect the constitutional rights which his predecessors had violated—a statement conjured up to enlarge the merits of the “Regenerator-Liberal” party.

At Oporto, where Franco delivered a speech, he had made use of the following language: “Nobody forced me to say what I said in the Opposition, nobody imposed upon me the attitude I assumed nor the compromises I

made spontaneously. I have, therefore, to fulfil them and no one will be able to say in future that I did not keep my word, *for I swear by all I hold most sacred that I will keep it*” “The Government has promised to rule in accordance with the Constitution *and therefore cannot create a Dictatorship* The Government has promised to make laws as to ministerial, electoral and financial responsibility, and such laws cannot be made except by Parliament I intend to keep Parliament open for one year or a year and a half, *although I know full well the strenuous fight which awaits me* This I do not fear How should I fear it seeing that the capital article of my programme is the return to the rules of the truly representative system? *And there can be no representative system without Parliament nor any Parliament without discussion*” Again, addressing the House of Peers on the subject of the Dictatorship of 1895, in which he had a large share, when Regenerador Minister, under Hintze Ribeiro, Franco had assured the country that he would never resort to Dictatorship “I profoundly regret that Dictatorship,” were his words, “for later on I became convinced that no advantages and results came to the country through that Dictatorship, either as regards the smooth working of the representative system or as regards economic and political administration I am frank enough to admit this, and manly enough to confess that my mistake was of such a nature as to make me thoroughly convinced that *no public man in the position in which I now find myself should have recourse to such a system*” That the Constitution had collapsed into a chaos of disorder and anarchy, was a fact which few Portuguese were bold enough to contradict But Franco had not had the courage to hint that the Constitutional Charter, imported from England, was incompatible with the character of the Portuguese people He had shrunk from the task of looking the evil boldly in the face, for thus only the nation could estimate the magnitude of the remedies required. “The people,” said John Bright, “are a good people on the whole, and if those who claim to be their leaders speak the truth to them, all will be well, but if they do not, God help them both”

Better things, however, were confidently expected of the dictator, because worse were held to be impossible. Franco certainly embarked on the Dictatorship with an earnest desire to correct the abuses which had undermined Portugal. But something more than strength of purpose was needed to carry on the Dictatorship to just and necessary ends, and control its excesses.

Franco, however, to use the very words he spoke in an interview he gave to a well-known French journalist, "was provoking quarrels in order to test the feelings of the people." These words delineate most correctly the disposition of Franco. Endowed with a violent imagination, and unable to distinguish noise from numbers, he lacked the cynicism of a statesman to treat with proper contempt the opinion led or misled by mere demagogic clamour or journalistic charlatanism. He vented himself in threats which seemed better suited to a knight-errant than to a statesman. Not content, therefore, with "provoking quarrels," he next extorted the King's unwilling assent to the famous decree published on the first of February, 1908, by which any political offender could be transported to Africa at a moment's notice!

Franco would certainly have acted wisely in profiting by the advice of his colleague, Vasconcelos Porto, the Minister of War, who, when summoned to discuss the situation, had said "There is but one course that will do us and our cause any good. Let the conspirators get up their Revolution and let us be on our guard to meet the rebels when they come into the streets." That view was worthy of a statesman, and that was, no doubt, fitting language in which to give it utterance. But earnest, impatient, desirous of seeing immediate results, Franco "wanted to ship the Revolutionary leaders off to Africa." The decree of the first of February came, therefore, most opportunely to make martyrs of men who had long felt the necessity of some sort of appeal to the frenzied imagination of the Lisbon masses. And there is nothing more dangerous, said a writer, than to make martyrs. "All we can beg of these gentlemen," wrote Ramalho Ortigão at

the time of the formation of the Portuguese Republican party, "is that they will have the kindness not to air their opinions in such a manner as to disturb society and render police interference a necessity. Above all, would we beg them not to be martyrs, not to offer themselves as victims ready to shed their precious blood for the great cause—not to cherish the old idea of expiring on the barricade biting the heroic cartridge to the strains of the 'Marseillaise' amid the shouts of Liberty and Equality, etc."¹ These were the words of the author of *Farpas*, who was once much in sympathy with the Republican cause but whose disappointment was so great that he turned away with disgust from Republican politics. The conspiracy of the 28th January, 1908, when the Republican movement was to break, was a serious event. The Republicans reckoned much upon Lisbon, a city with a population fanatically Republican. It had elected a Republican municipality and sent Republican Deputies to the Cortes. "Never before were so many elements collected in one single spot. A hundred pamphleteers whose sole livelihood is disorder, a multitude of foreigners subject to no control, who breathe sedition in every place—the enemies of Court—an enormous populace familiarized with successful crime—a crowd of rich men who dare not show their faces because they have too much to lose—a combination of the authors and agents of Revolution—in the lowest class the dregs of the nation, in the highest state of corruption." Such was the description of the French capital by Mirabeau, the leader of the Revolution. Such, too, would be no unfair description of Lisbon—"a city translated from the French into slang," to quote the sarcastic words of Eça de Queiroz.² It was time, therefore, that Portugal should resolve to subject herself to a severe ordeal whence she would perhaps emerge diminished in population but animated with the right spirit to work out her political salvation. Once the gauntlet was thrown down to the Monarchists, it had to be taken up, and had Franco upheld the view of his Minister of War resolutely,

¹ Theophilo Braga, "*História das Ideias Republicanas em Portugal*"

² Eça de Queiroz, "*A Correspondência de Fradique Mendes*"

the events that followed might have been different. Should the Republicans have won the day, they would have won it by successful Revolution at the point of the sword. But if the Revolution had proved disastrous, Franco would have drawn to himself a degree of prestige which he could never hope to derive from all his decrees. The opportunity, at all events, was lost. The *Diário do Governo* of Saturday, the first February, 1908, published the decree giving the dictator the power of transporting every person who was opposed to his policy. But in the afternoon of that same Saturday a ghastly tragedy stained for ever the history of Portugal. Political fanatics took advantage of a dictatorial decree to imbrue their hands in the blood of the victims whom the vicissitudes of politics subjected to bitter resentment and bitter obloquy, personal and political. And with the tragic event vanished eighteen years of experience. If in the entire Portuguese nation there was one man who after much political experience had studied the means of creating its welfare and was capable and anxious to practise them, King Carlos was the man. But he was among the worst *Acacios*—the Portuguese “*Conselheiros*” who have a parrot command of pompous phraseology but very little thinking power, whom Eça de Queiroz held up to the disdain of the intelligent—in whom the Portuguese Monarch placed his confidence; and his reputation as a ruler greatly suffered thereby. It is, however, impossible to over-rate the services King Carlos rendered his people. They were great and splendid. His intellect was certainly above the level of the country of which he had the singular misfortune to be King. The foreign policy of the Portuguese King contained the germs of prolific fruit, and anticipated in many respects the Triple Entente in the Mediterranean. He invited to Lisbon the Kings of England and Spain, and the President of the French Republic, and he influenced for long years the attitude of Portugal as to the place she should have had in the Triple Entente, which was steadily pursued by King Carlos of Portugal with tenacity unrivalled, with watchfulness unsleeping. A political alliance of Portugal

and Brazil was also the ideal which he kept in view, and King Carlos' announced visit to Rio de Janeiro in 1908, was welcomed by Barão do Rio Branco, the famous Brazilian Foreign Minister. It is impossible to examine these facts and not to feel that Portugal had reached a period when a great change was at hand. But the policy of King Carlos was frustrated by his assassination, in consequence of which Portugal enjoys to-day a sinister prominence. "King Carlos," wrote J. L. Garvin, "was murdered not for his faults but for his virtues, not for the follies and sins of his previous career, but for the gallant and resolute patriotism he showed at the last. We can now realise that the Monarchy was doomed by his assassination"¹

King Carlos was condemned to death because he spoke truths unpalatable to Portuguese politicians. In the interview he gave M. Galtier, representing *Le Temps*, of Paris, the King spoke of the want of character in Portugal—words which have been endorsed by subsequent events in Portugal. False principles of government, corrupt motives of action, must have exasperated the Portuguese Monarch and made him take a foreign journalist into his confidence regarding men who had taken an oath to serve a principle, but who really were at the service of their own interest "The evil that men do lives after them, the good is oft interred with their bones—so let it be with Cæsar."

It was, of course, only right that after the assassination of the King and the ill-fated Crown Prince, Franco should have retired from politics. His conduct on the occasion was indeed dignified. "*Moi je rentre dans l'ombre . . . Pousse t'on ne jamais plus, parler de moi, oublier mon nom! Je ne demande pas autre chose . . . Oh oui, oui qu'on m'oublie!*"² were his words to a French journalist who interviewed him at Bordeaux some days after the Lisbon tragedy. In the evening of life, however, he published the "Cartas D'El Rei Dom Carlos I"³ and the striking letters the murdered king addressed to his last Premier were read

¹ "Imperial and Foreign Affairs," *Fortnightly Review*, November 1910

² *Le Matin*, February 9, 1908

³ "Cartas D'El Rei D. Carlos I a João Franco Castello-Branco seu ultimo Presidente do Conselho" Lisboa, 1924

by the nation. The letters—those already published—of King Carlos—give proof, if proof were needed, of the murdered King's generous disposition. Not once in all the fearless and dignified letters is there a single vindictive expression!

The assassination of the King and the ill-fated Crown Prince, a tragedy which struck here in England an especially poignant note, was an event discreditable to any civilised country. The regicide turned the better elements of all countries against the Revolutionaries. But it did not modify the tendencies of Portuguese politicians. On the contrary, these men saw with secret exultation the gradual erection of a new sovereignty, the reins of which must, they foresaw, be ultimately transferred into their hands. "I invoke my father's terrible martyrdom at the first meeting of the Crown and Parliament as a sign of alliance which should rally all to the cause of peace and progress of our nation. This deed, the like of which has never been seen, has brought me to the throne for the accomplishment of a dynastic and national duty," were King Manuel's words at the first opening of the Cortes. Loyalty to the Crown and fury against the terrorists should have been the dominant feeling of the nation. Efforts would have been made anywhere else to ascertain who were the assassins of the King and the Crown Prince. But the Ministers of King Manuel, in their indecision arising not from imbecility but guilt, shrank from the task. The next day after the assassinations, their organs in the Press had had no words of sympathy for the murdered, or the royal family in mourning; and they dared not exhibit a decent affliction. One man alone, the late Count D'Arnoso, addressed the Government and demanded a judicial inquiry into the regicide, in support of which he was willing to offer evidence. In weighty and impressive words, the intrepid Peer of the Realm persistently called the attention of Admiral Ferreira d'Amaral, King Manuel's first Premier—afterwards a staunch Republican deputy—to the conspirators who were still at large. His noble attitude was not altogether comforting to those who were known to

have had their hands on the throats of the royal victims, and strange to say the young King soon found, to his amazement, that not only must he allow at the Royal Palace, politicians who openly boasted of the part they had in the conspiracy preceding the regicide, but must listen to denunciation of himself as reactionary¹ Five Cabinets fell in the two years that followed the crime They all promised an inquiry before they came into office. But once in power, they, like the Servian confrères, saw no sufficient reason for remedies which it becomes an orderly Government unflinchingly to apply

Meantime the Revolutionaries became bolder. They rejoiced in this formal and public degradation of the Monarchy. It was but too evident that the Revolution was recognised and in some measure sanctioned by Monarchists, who had encouraged the rabble to put their heel upon the neck of royalty and trample it under foot. The King silently looked on with a desperate hope that the Monarchists might yet be brought to a nobler policy. But it was in vain to hope that men who had dragged in the mire every emblem of Monarchy and the Monarchy itself, would aid a young and inexperienced King to fulfil the duties of a Constitutional Monarch The whole scene was most afflicting It exemplified the helplessness of a King appealing in vain to men who would neither cultivate their minds nor discipline their characters

It was under these circumstances that King Manuel called to power Teixeira de Sousa and gave the last Monarchical Premier a special dissolution of the Cortes which the King had wisely denied to his predecessors The conjuncture demanded a policy of directness and emphasis. But Teixeira de Sousa was neither a man of steadfast purpose nor possessed the prestige of a statesman His narrow views and his obstinacy had damaged his political reputation when, years ago, he was Minister for Colonies Unable to look beyond the back garden wall, he had hurt the feelings of the colonies by making an irritating and invidious

¹ My article on "The Last King of Portugal," *The Times of India* July 9, 1932.

distinction between colonial and home-grown citizens. The swarthy Minister, whose chief actuating motive seems to have been a conceit of his own racial superiority, believed that a new Portugal was growing up about him; and he had denied the Colonials the right to enter the Royal Navy. He was now leading the remnants of the historic "Regenerador" party once led by loyal Monarchists like Fontes Pereira de Mello and Hintze Ribeiro, a party which had now sunk down and degenerated into two factions. But though the faction Teixeira de Sousa led claimed the political inheritance of the "Regeneradores," or Conservatives, he had declared himself "a Philosophical Radical," and mainly for that reason he was chosen to be the grave digger of Monarchy "It is most unfortunate," wrote Quevedo, "that the King should err at all; but it is less shocking that he should do so on his own account rather than by the advice of others."¹

The Monarchical parties deplored the situation, but would not confess their faults. They imputed them, as usual, to the Government in power. The Monarchical bloc of Opposition—an alliance of "Progressistas," "Franquistas," "Henriquistas" and "Nacionalistas" was now led by José Luciano de Castro, the veteran Progressista leader who had the effrontery to accuse King Manuel of "selling" the Monarchy to the Republicans. Those who remember the loud professions of loyalty and the agony of shame and sorrow into which José Luciano de Castro had been thrown only two years before by the news of the assassination of the King could hardly believe the indecent language of his organ, the *Correio da Noite*, that broke forth into invective against the young King, and suggested his abdication. This put Teixeira de Sousa upon his overtures for an alliance with the Revolutionary element. He was without support in the country, and he had to lean on men who looked for direction to the Revolutionaries themselves. His Government had to be dependent on the good will of his intimate friend, Alpoim, for its existence. In other words, Teixeira de Sousa was in open alliance with

¹ Quevedo, *Politica de Dios*

a politician who boasted of the part he had had in the conspiracy preceding the regicide, who had escaped arrest by taking refuge in Spain, and who now chose to act the part of villain in the great Monarchical drama. The *Portugal*, a Lisbon paper, gave much information concerning this treacherous personage, that was interesting for the country to know, which drove Alpoim upon strange actions. He sent a friend to the Patriarch of Lisbon begging him to make the *Portugal* cease its attacks. But the editor of *Portugal* fortunately refused to submit to the opinion of the Portuguese Prelate in this matter. As a journalist who knew his business, he, backed up by his colleagues, maintained the dignity of the profession by not withdrawing a single accusation against the burly politician who was now busy deluding the Monarchical Simple Simons. Then Alpoim, in despair, sent a confidential message to the Provincial of the Jesuits, "If you make the *Portugal* to cease attacking me," so ran this message, "I shall not forget you when I am Premier. If you fail to do so, then you shall feel my vengeance."¹ Teixeira de Sousa, however, believed that a new basis was forming itself for political action, and he now talked loudly of "Liberal Monarchy," which had once more returned like the tune of a barrel organ. He flattered himself that his Liberal policy would win him the hearts of all Portuguese. But eventually "the pseudo-Liberalism of Teixeira de Sousa," to put it in the words of João Chagas, the Republican leader, "seconded the revolutionary efforts."²

Teixeira de Sousa has been held up to scorn for his "Liberalism." But without attempting to absolve him from the immense weight of ignominy which will for ever remain attached to his memory, it must be allowed that he was essentially the product of his time. He was a mere opportunist. To call to power Teixeira de Sousa was perhaps "the greatest blunder" committed in the last reign, wrote Julio de Vilhena in his *Antes da Republica*, where the author, who had once led the "Regenerador" party, speaks out against the creed of opportunism.

¹ Francis McCullagh, "Some Causes of the Portuguese Revolution" *Nineteenth Century Review* November, 1910

² *A Capital*, 13 de Outubro, 1910

"Portugal," said Teixeira de Sousa to Dr. Dillon, who interviewed him shortly before the Revolution, "is back again in calm waters. Normal conditions prevail. Material well-being is being extended as well as intensified. And the Cabinet is preparing a series of useful, cultured and political reforms such as one would look for under normal conditions."¹ Such was the language addressed by the last Monarchical Premier to the distinguished British journalist whom the Revolutionary leaders had already taken into confidence and who was, therefore, more or less cognizant of what was meditated by them.

Meantime warnings were not wanting to the self-important Portuguese Premier had he chosen to heed them. The Revolutionary plot had been maturing for months. The Republican meetings rang with declamations against the Royal House. The Republican Press was employed, not without a certain degree of success, in producing apologies and panegyrics of their heroes and martyrs. Afonso Costa, whose defiant harangues were the life and soul of Portuguese Republicanism, went about the country proclaiming that the Parliamentary elections, then finished, would prove the last under Monarchy. The Revolutionary Committee of the Navy, a committee organised as far back as 1907, and composed of five naval officers, with Admiral Cândido dos Reis, had carried on its propaganda with impunity; and the marines had been won over to Republicanism. It had drawn up the plan, fixed and postponed the dates of the approaching Revolution. Peripatetic Republicans had visited London with the object of informing the Foreign Office that the establishment of a Republican Government in Portugal would make no difference to the Anglo-Portuguese alliance.² A speech of Mr Asquith, in which stress seemed to have been laid on the alliance between England and Portugal as being one of peoples, not of

¹ *Daily Telegraph*, October 6, 1910

² Early in August, 1910, two prominent Republicans, Magalhães Lima, a proprietor of the *Vanguarda*, and José Relvas, a large landowner, came to London. They were not received by the Foreign Secretary himself, but a member of the Government, whom they managed to see, took note of their communication in his private capacity only.

dynasties, had been interpreted by the Republican Press as a direct encouragement to the Revolution. It was but too evident that a conflict must soon take place, and the chances of Teixeira de Sousa—who, years after, gave us a book entitled *Para a historia da revolução*, where we must take the Portuguese Premier as we find him, a pretentious politician recording his career of complete insignificance—proving himself a saviour of Monarchy were remote. The question now was not whether a rising was imminent but when it would actually take place. A Spanish Republican Deputy, who happened to be in Lisbon before the Revolution, had said to the Republican leaders, “Why don’t you begin? Your organization is complete.” Their reply was. “Yes we are ready but the time is unripe. We are awaiting the favourable moment.”¹ The peasantry at the Bussaco Centenary, celebrated nine days before the Revolution, had shown an enthusiasm for the Monarchy much greater than the Republicans had hoped. A few Republicans from Lisbon who had indulged in a cheer for the Republic had incurred the highest degree of popular rancour. They had

¹ “Some weeks ago,” wrote the London illustrated weekly, *PIP*, edited at the time by T. H. Crossland, “we published in these columns a statement by the well-known Royalist, Senhor V. de Bragança-Cunha, who claims that the people of Portugal are not likely to rest content under a Republican Government. The article we print below embodies the views of the Spanish Socialist leader, Señor Pablo Iglesias, which he has specially communicated to a representative of this journal. We take no responsibility for Señor Iglesias’ views, but coming as they do from the only Revolutionary member of the Spanish Parliament they are not without importance as indicating the trend of certain sections of thought.”

“The establishment of a Portuguese Republic,” said Pablo Iglesias, “will have the profoundest effect upon Spain—far more so than if a Spanish Republic had first been established. It will act as a tremendous inspiration, as a spark which will ultimately set fire to the explosive ingredients lying to-day under the apparently smooth surface of Spanish affairs.”

“If the Portuguese Republicans are really sincere and will combine with their Spanish confreres then the thing is as good as done. The Socialists in Spain have been instilling the Revolutionary spirit into the whole country—more especially in the towns. The work of the past decade or two has not been wasted. The Spaniards, who are so conservative, have learned their lesson and they do not forget. They have not forgotten Ferrer. They have not forgotten Maura and they will not forget when the day of reckoning comes. The signing of the death-warrant of Ferrer was the signing of the death warrant of the Spanish Monarchy. Remember—the Spaniards do not forget.”—*PIP*, July 8, 1911

been seized and badly beaten by the peasants. Regiments had defiled before the Royal flag and cheered the young King, and this was the most important point, as the fate of the Revolution depended upon it.

Captain Palla, on the other hand, "the old and fearless Revolutionist who devoted long years of his life to the work of impregnating the atmosphere of our barracks with a hatred of royalty,"¹ had learned "with great sorrow that the heads of the army and the officers in general of the Lisbon garrison were, from a Revolutionary point of view, quite hopeless", and he had turned his attention "to the sergeants, corporals and common soldiers." He had reckoned with the attachment of the Lisbon Municipal Guard to the Monarchy; and the *Carbonarios* were told off "to prevent them from leaving their barracks and from afterwards concentrating by throwing at them dynamite bombs and hand grenades. These were to be thrown from various windows along the streets through which these forces would necessarily have to pass."² It was, therefore, impossible for the Republicans to regard as without importance the enthusiasm for the Monarchy displayed by the Army on the occasion of the centenary celebrations of the historic victory of Bussaco.

But the situation was suddenly changed by the unexpected arrival of a madman on the scene, a lunatic who precipitated matters. The spark that fired the Revolution was the murder of the Republican leader, Dr. Bombarda—a medical officer attached to the Lisbon Asylum for the Insane—by a Lieutenant of the General Staff, named Rebello dos Santos, who had been an inmate of the asylum and was known to be insane. Dr. Bombarda had pronounced him to be incurable. But when discharged from the asylum, contrary to the advice of Dr. Bombarda, he had left Lisbon and gone to Paris, whence he returned as cured. Once in Lisbon he immediately sought Dr. Bombarda at the asylum. "Well, Rebello, what brings you here to-day?" asked Dr. Bombarda, surprised to see his former patient. A revolver shot was the answer, and the distinguished

¹ and ² *Seculo*, October 18, 1910

alienist was fatally wounded "Do not mal-treat the man, he is mad," were Dr. Bombarda's words when some of the attendants at the Asylum rushed at the assassin. But nevertheless Republican agitators used the murder as a weapon to excite the Lisbon populace and incite it to revolution. They declared that Bombarda had been done to death by the "reactionaries," who had murdered an "active propagandist of free thought." This fantastic report circulated without either being explained or understood, inflammatory placards exciting this agitation of mind and provoking the Lisbon mob to vengeance. The Republican leaders to whom Bombarda had confided his last wishes before dying, knew that the murder was not political. But they were alike victims of a movement which they could not stop, whose insidious force they were obliged to use.

The murder of Bombarda fired the imagination of the masses already stirred by the visit of Marshal Hermes de Fonseca, the President-elect of Brazil, on board the great battleship *S. Paulo*, a visit which gave a fatal impulse to circumstances, which under more fortunate influences might have issued very differently. This was the beginning of the Revolution which broke out early in the morning of the 4th October, 1910.

The standard of revolt was raised in Lisbon. The crews of the warships *S. Rafael*, *Adamastor* and *Dom Fernando* declared in favour of the Revolutionists, who were supported by the First Artillery Garrison and the Sixteenth Infantry Regiment, whose loyalty had been undermined. The Municipal Guard took the field with the loyal troops to await the Revolutionary forces. Personal valour, however, could avail nothing. The loyal troops showed a noble constancy under the difficulties. But they were without a leader. They were thrown into disorder, their best men fell, the others abandoned the victory when they had nearly won it.

"I hear the Republic is proclaimed. But I won't surrender. I could go on fighting," 'phoned a sergeant of the Municipal Guard to his commander, a Colonel. "You must. I have already surrendered," answered the Colonel,

who, for two days, was busy answering telephone calls. "But we could still resist," insisted the sergeant, who was fighting at Estrella. "Surrender, I say," shouted the colonel¹

Fear did its work on the 5th October. Teixeira de Sousa, the Premier, speaking on the telephone, had owned up that "he had no head for such things." The plain truth is, and it is the worst of injuries to the Loyalists to conceal it—that those who surrounded the King would not anticipate events and act accordingly. And ignorance which despises danger at a distance is always converted into panic at its approach. Rumours painted the Revolutionaries in full triumph. But their fortune was scarcely better. Admiral Candido dos Reis, repenting of the step taken, had shot himself. Matters had not turned out as he confidently anticipated, wrote Hermano Neves, describing the Admiral's last moments in his book *Como triumphou a Republica*; and the Revolutionary leader, unable to overcome his fear of a police cell, had abandoned the field. He realised that to fall now was never to rise again. He must have felt it the more keenly as it was through him that the Revolutionary movement had broken out. In his dying moments he perhaps beheld the Republican leaders dragged from the basements of shops, where they were hiding, driven into exile, thrown into prison, and all this for no other cause than to yield a reluctant assent to his wishes. A worse calamity could scarcely have befallen the Republicans than the loss of their Revolutionary leader. They thought, therefore, their cause was hopelessly lost. But at this juncture a new leader appeared among them in the person of Machado dos Santos, a naval officer, who threw himself into the midst of the affray. He took upon himself the whole responsibility of the affair, and with the meanest of his followers he succeeded in infusing his own spirit into the hearts of his followers. "All the officers," to quote the words of Captain Sá Cardoso, "were overcome by the same extreme despair as myself. Several sergeants whose names I need not mention counselled us, when we made the situation known

¹ *Correio da Manhã* December 22, 1910

to them, to return to barracks One of the sergeants," said the Captain, "came to me with tears in his eyes and said 'Then all is lost' I replied in the affirmative, and prepared to flee like the rest Then a Lieutenant Cabral brought us plain clothes which two of the *populares* had given him, and we tried to get away in a motor car In vain we tried to get Machado dos Santos to come with us, so as to save his life but, mad with enthusiasm, he refused to do so We left sadly, expecting that Rotunda would soon be a pool of blood We went towards Villa Franca, and it was there that we heard that the Republic had finally triumphed."¹ All fled Machado dos Santos, however, stood his ground, and fought till the Republican banner floating from the fortress of S Jorge, the old citadel, once deemed impregnable, proclaimed that the Republicans had won in Lisbon His audacity was not excessive, but it was sufficient to produce the desired result "I began to contemplate suicide," said Machado dos Santos, "but the thought of the poor soldiers of the 16th Infantry Regiment who had rebelled and caused the death of a colonel and a captain made me realise my responsibility" "I would resist," said the hero of Rotunda, "whilst there was somebody to stand by me I would repeat the last square of Waterloo. I ordered a faithful bugler, who had not deserted me, to blow his trumpet and summon the sergeants. There came only nine! It was all there was left to command!"² Thus Machado dos Santos, to quote the historic phrase of Theophilo Braga, "made the Republic and then handed it over as a shoemaker hands over a pair of shoes to the customer."³

Meanwhile the King, bombarded in his palace and abandoned by his Ministers, had left the country. All resistance was now at an end One man alone—one—Paiva Couceiro, made a bold stand for the Monarchy But the odds were too much for him and his brave little garrison.⁴

¹ *Diário de Notícias* October 15, 1910

² *Intransigente* February 11, 1911

³ *Matin* October 9, 1910

⁴ "When we passed out through the city gates I (Couceiro) called the officers together and told them that although the battery had done its duty loyally

Further efforts they deemed, therefore, a fruitless struggle against destiny.

The circumstances of the King's flight have been insisted on. "A King," said the Republican Press, parodying

and honourably it nevertheless seemed to me that there was still work for it to do 'In the Rocio,' I said, 'after what we have seen the Republic is going to be proclaimed In the "Terreiro do Paço" (Black Horse Square) there is no Government But our duty is to defend the institutions as long as they exist, as they do, in fact, exist as long as the King, their representative, is still living The King I believe to be in Cintra, and I propose, therefore, that we turn our steps in that direction'

"And the officers? What did they say?"

"All of them answered unanimously 'Let us go to Cintra' "

"And was the battery fit to go on the march?"

"Yes The evening before, two officers, three sergeants and a few of the men had been wounded Three mules had been killed and one of the ammunition waggons had been disabled and rendered useless for service But nevertheless although it meant some extra strain on the men the battery was fit to take the road'

"And then you went on to Cintra?"

"Yes, we went on with a halt at the barracks in Queluz, where some food was obtained After that we pushed on at once towards Cintra 'Paiva Couceiro paused a moment and then continued 'We went to the palace of Pena where there were only a few people in civilian dress I asked for the King, and was told that he was in Mafra We descended the hill meaning to go on to Mafra when a friend of mine, Dom Fernando de Almeida, came up and offered to go and call João d'Azevedo do Coutinho The latter appeared after a few minutes, and from him I learned that the King was no longer in Mafra but had embarked at Ericeira So our duty was finished at last'

"There was a moment of silence 'It was already night when we got back to Queluz 'I went on Paiva Couceiro when the silence had begun to grow oppressive 'The red and green flag was already floating over the barracks The following morning I was visited in Cascaes by a representative of the Provisional Government who wanted to know what attitude I wanted to take up'

"Then it was true—that notice in the papers that a representative of the Government had called on you! One of the Oporto papers denied it afterwards'

"Yes it was true I was visited by a man they sent and I told him the following—"I recognize all institutions recognized by the people But if the opinion of the people were divided, that is if the north were not to agree with the south, I should stay to the end on the side of those faithful to the country's traditions And if by any chance there were any foreign intervention in order to uphold the Monarchy then I should go over to the ranks of the Republicans "' 'Afterwards you sent in your papers, did you not?"

"Yes, I asked to resign as an officer And the reason I did so was that after so many years spent in work and sacrifice under the shade of the blue and white colours and the castles and arms of the Portuguese flag, I do not feel strong enough to abandon the symbol wherein I had grown accustomed to see written the glorious history of my country To make a symbol take root in the heart of the people—that is the work of generations And for my part, I feel too old to begin now the fresh efforts which a new flag implies "'
—Interview with Couceiro published in the *Correio da Manhã*

Alfieri, "ought not to fall from the throne except with the throne itself; under its ruins there alone he finds an honoured death and an honoured tomb" The flight to Ericeira was no doubt a painful and humiliating reverse, but humiliating rather to its authors than its victim.¹

"My departure must in no way be taken as an act of abdication," was the parting message of King Manuel, who was compelled to take refuge in Gibraltar, whence he was conveyed to England in the Royal Yacht of King George V. Thus the exiled King said nothing harsh to those who betrayed him, and did not commit himself as the sole representative of Portuguese Monarchy. He was proscribed as "a maleficent and wilful disturber of social peace"² But his conduct on the occasion was indeed dignified and generous.

"Alas, for many years an increasingly strong current of madness has been blowing over Portugal. Faith is diminished and confidence lost; individual profit is considered before the interest of the nation, there is no respect for authority—which in many cases does not exist—everyone commands and no one obeys; there are so many plans that none is followed, much less carried out, indifference rules, and Portugal is suffering from a moral lethargy that is numbing its energies. The country has not strength to

¹ "The Spanish Minister, the Count of Villalobar, is said to have urged the King strongly to go to Oporto, which had always been loyal. I have heard it said that the King was prepared to take the Spanish Minister's advice, and had already embarked for that purpose at Ericeira, a small port to the north of the estuary of the Tagus, but that a traitorous officer persuaded the royal family that they had not enough coal and must go to procure it at Gibraltar. This meant a flight from Portugal, and thus an *ipso facto* abdication, and it was hailed as such by the enemies of the dynasty. I believe the young King was brave and patriotic, but he allowed himself to be guided at the crisis of his life by those to whom he ought never to have listened"—Right Hon. Sir Arthur Hardinge, *A Diplomatist in Europe* London, 1927.

² "One of my principal duties was to endeavour to secure the restitution to King Manuel of what might be regarded as the personal property of the Portuguese royal family. On his flight from Portugal, it was, of course, impossible to rescue many of the jewels and valuable paintings which adorned the royal palaces. It was felt that the Republican Government ought to be prepared to make restitution to the young King, and my duty forced me to enter into a lengthy and tortuous negotiation to secure the object in view. After nearly two years, success attended my efforts, and I was also instrumental in recovering for King Manuel the possession of the royal cork forests in Alemtejo—a valuable monopoly of the Crown"—Right Hon. Sir Arthur Hardinge, *A Diplomatist in Europe*.

react, because it is weakened by internal struggles promoted by petty ambitions," wrote King Manuel, in his Introduction to the *Early Portuguese Books* "Let the knowledge of the past be extended by every possible means," said the exiled King of Portugal, "for it teaches us to emulate the greatness of our forefathers who devoted themselves to the interests of their country To realise what the love of one's country can be it is necessary to be compelled to live far away from it and deprived of its atmosphere!"¹ The exiled Monarch simply stated a fact, and there can be no two opinions about that He lived long enough to see his apprehensions justified.

An ancient Monarchy was violently overthrown, and a Republic erected upon the ruins of the State fabric Provisional Government was proclaimed at once, and it was presided over by Theophilo Braga, whose colleagues mostly consisted of the Republican deputies for Lisbon Bernardino Machado, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Afonso Costa, Minister of Justice, Antonio José d'Almeida, Minister of the Interior, and Xavier Barreto, Minister of War. The choice of Theophilo Braga was of no small importance to the new Republic His antecedents marked him out, as, in many ways, just the man whom the times demanded, and the one feature which was loudly advertised as being characteristic of the aged professor was indifference to the goad of ambition which drives on inferior men so madly.

Theophilo Braga was, undoubtedly, one of the prominent literary figures of contemporary Portugal A disciple of Comte and an author of an epic on humanity, entitled *Visão dos Tempos*, Braga, who was a native of the Azores Islands, had exercised for nearly fifty years some influence on Portuguese mentality "If he does not publish a volume weekly," said Ramalho Ortigão, "it is because there are not enough printing presses in Portugal to keep pace with his pen" He was the author of the *Historia da Litteratura Portugueza*, outlined in about thirty-two volumes—a work

¹ *Livros Antigos Portuguezes (1489-1600) Da Bibliotheca de Sua Magestade Fidelissima* Descriptos por S. M. El Rei D. Manuel em tres volumes Londres, 1929

which, as the author of *Características da Litteratura Portuguesa* rightly remarks would have been better styled "A collection of materials for the History of Portuguese Literature." His works, which amount to more than one hundred and fifty, though "marred by contradiction, but abounding in life,"¹ were read even by persons keenly alive to whatever inconsistencies they displayed. The arguments of Max Stirner, the pleadings of Prince Kropotkin, the doctrines of Herbert Spencer, only suitable in a Revolutionary manifesto, crept into Braga's works of literary criticism. These perhaps were not the faults of the Professor of Modern Literature at the *Curso Superior de Letras* in Lisbon—a chair Braga occupied for nearly forty years—but the faults of the wretched political cause to which he immolated his literary faculties.

Theophilo Braga belonged to the rising generation of poets and prose writers who, in 1865—when there arose the famous Coimbra controversy, which stands in direct relation with the Revolution of 1910—were mostly infected by secondhand free thought in religion, and violent socialism in politics. The emptiness and formalism of current literature exasperated the young writers, who greedily caught at any novelties from abroad. The leaders of this movement that would inaugurate a new phase in Portuguese letters,² were Anthero de Quental and Theophilo Braga.

Almeida Garrett and Alexandre Herculano, who owed much to their exile in England and France, which was an inspiration to both, were, of course, reckoned as the two great literary figures of the nineteenth century. Animated by a strong and genuine desire to promote intellectual culture, Garrett had revived the best traditions of his country. The literary movement he promoted had its excesses and extravagances, but it was fresh, indigenous, national. His *Romanceiro* presented an admirable collection of popular romances which he rendered permanent in a

¹ *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, Vol XXII, Year 1911

² Such an epoch affords much matter for reflection. The opportunity came in my way during the time I lectured on Portuguese Literature at the University of London. In pursuing this inquiry I remember I brought to the notice of the students who attended the course (University College Session 1913-1914 Second Term) many interesting facts

work of signal merit. Equally notable was his *Dona Branca* with its codes of chivalry, with all its traditions. His poem *Camões*, which destroyed the influence of the Arcadian rhymers, was an invaluable monument to the great epic. He had also revived the Portuguese theatre, which since the early efforts of Gil Vicente, the first and greatest of Portuguese dramatists, had been in a state of decadence. He "had laid the foundation of a national school," to quote his own words in his preface to his play *Auto de Gil Vicente*. Herculano, on the other hand, had produced his famous *Historia de Portugal*, a masterpiece of historical prose, in which is comprised the history of the country till the reign of Affonso III, and the *Historia de Origem e estabelecimento da Inquisição em Portugal*, a work which combined a great many facts with a great deal of thought. "Though more limited in scope and less famous than the work of Llarrente, it is a far more valuable and scholarly performance," wrote G. P. Gooch, in his *History and Historians in the Nineteenth Century*. Herculano was a real historian, his powers of research and judgment were of high order. His mind had been stimulated by Niebuhr and Ranke, and encouraged by Guizot and Thierry. The old Portuguese chronicles—more or less interesting, of kings, nobles and archbishops—recognized the supernatural element in Portuguese origins. But the tale that the Portuguese believed on the authority of the early chroniclers that they were the chosen people of God was shown by Herculano to be the invention of men who had consciously embellished history with well-told fables. "Patriotism," said he, "was a bad counsellor for historians." Herculano's theory that Moorish blood runs through the Portuguese veins wounded, of course, the pride of his countrymen, and the historian's work was assailed by little-minded critics who, too ignorant to criticize Herculano, hurled offensive epithets at him. "I have not shown," wrote the great historian, "every Portuguese to be worth three Spaniards and two Frenchmen." He knew a certain degree of favour still attended the historian who declared the Portuguese history to be a phenomenon of startling grandeur beyond all example.

Garrett was now dead. Herculano had retired to his *quinta* of Vale de Lobos, at Santarem. Antonio Feleciano de Castilho, who in spite of blindness was a fastidious writer, thought it, therefore, opportune to assume for the moment a kind of dictatorship over Portuguese literature. The Portuguese language, he believed, must still be refined and developed to become an instrument of culture and learning.

The young generation, however, protested against Castilho's leadership. In a letter addressed to Castilho, entitled *Bom senso e bom gosto* (Good sense and good taste) Anthero de Quental voiced the revolt from the influence of Castilho and the coterie of friends who praised one another's writings inordinately. It opened a long and fierce war of pamphlets where were quoted Goethe, Hegel, Heine, Michelet, Quinet, Renan, Hugo, Balzac, Prudhon

. . . The controversy was so violent that Quental himself became involved in a duel with Ramalho Ortigão. Anthero de Quental, undoubtedly a literary genius, was "a critic alternating with a mystic," to quote the words of Oliveira Martins. Man and his destiny, the spiritual function of thinkers and poets, inspired, of course, his revolutionary *Odes Modernas*. His own self, however, was the solitary theme of his famous *Sonetos*. Quental was a student of German philosophy. His mental attitude is well described by himself as "the effect of Germanism on the unprepared mind of a Southerner", which eventually drove him to commit suicide.

Anthero de Quental had travelled in France and Spain, and visited the United States of America. In 1871 he drew up a programme of lectures, the so-called *Conferencias Democraticas*, which, being too revolutionary, were suppressed by the Portuguese Minister, Marquis d'Avila e de Boloma; and it is interesting to note that Theophilo Braga, Manuel Arriaga, Oliveira Martins, Eça de Queiroz and Adolfo Coelho were among those who sought to give expression to his democratic ideals.

Theophilo Braga, of course, chose to think that Portuguese democracy and its attendant vulgarity furnished all the conditions under which the problems of art and literature

must necessarily be worked out. Hence his quixotic attitude towards Herculano when the centenary of the great historian's birth was celebrated as a national event. An ardent champion of liberty, Herculano had accepted the principles of Portuguese Constitutionalism, but eventually had to retire disgusted from politics to cultivate the land as a farmer. Theophilo Braga, however, could not forgive this. He thought that Herculano lacked the courage of his convictions¹. It is not too much to say that Herculano, a great scholar and a noble character, was nothing of a demagogue, and he seldom, or never, played to the gallery. He claimed the first place and held it. He never troubled himself about the popularity of other writers, dead or alive. He also had this precious gift for a scholar—a sense of proportion—which unfortunately his critic did not possess. When Braga became the President of the Revolutionary Government he officially announced the Revolution of October, 1910, to be the "rare and notable event, the expression of the pride of an indomitable race and the redemption of a race the bravery of which has rendered it legendary, which filled with joy and enthusiasm the heart of patriots."¹

The Republican leaders, however, distinctly felt that the appearance was delusive. "There was no fighting except in Lisbon," said the Republican leader, Brito Camacho, nineteen months later, "and here the fight was confined to three places—the Rotunda that sent bullets to the Rocio, the Rocio that fired back on the Rotunda, and the Tagus where our modest gunboats, ordered about by half

¹ "Now not long ago I was invited to a dinner at which representatives of several of the so-called Latin races were celebrating the overthrow of the Portuguese Monarchy and the establishment of a Republican form of Government in its stead," wrote Jean Finot, the editor of *La Revue*, of Paris. "As I sat observing the heads of my agreeable and distinguished fellow guests, I was struck by the divergence of the types they presented—a divergence doubtless due to the dissimilar surroundings amidst which they had been brought up. Characteristic features of almost all the human races, even those of negroid origin, could be traced among them. Then, it was, I first fully realized the absurdity of the hackneyed phrase *the Latin races*. Many of the after-dinner speakers, however, did not hesitate to proclaim aloud that all the Latin nations are one family because they are all related by blood." Jean Finot, *The Death Agony of the 'Science' of Race*. Translated from the French by Constance A. Grandle (with a preface by W. T. Stead), London, 1911.

a dozen revolutionary officers, were manœuvring and threatening with their guns the forces which had remained loyal to the old regime"¹ On these considerations, it is intelligible that Brito Camacho should have, at the very beginning of the Republic, taken the initiative in the name of the Provisional Government—of which he became a member—and proclaimed in the *Lucia* that the new regime was everywhere received with 'delirante entusiasmo' "The *Lucia*," wrote Dr. Dillon, the apologist of the Revolution, "deals largely in facts and figures, sparingly in commentaries, and not at all in abuse or rhodomontade" The British journalist imagined he understood the materials on which he had to work. But the *Lucia* had, only a few weeks before, described the people in the provinces as being "like cattle, like savage negroes, like dummies" "What progress can our propaganda make," asked Faustino Fonseca, an editorial writer in the *Lucia*, "among those millions of stagnant barbarians? They cannot read the names on the voting papers They know nothing of principles, of programmes, or of anything else." But these millions "living like animals and ignorant as animals," who had no notion whatever of Republican politics at the time of the last elections under the Monarchy, when they heard that a Republic had been proclaimed in Lisbon their joy was great! A man must be far gone in cynicism to hazard such a paradox Yet "when they set forth a statement," wrote Dr. Dillon, paying homage to the journalists of the *Lucia*, "it is generally believed, when they prefer a charge it is never refuted, when they attack an institution it is doomed."²

However deficient the simple, honest Portuguese who tills his plot of ground and cultivates the vineyard may be in understanding the frequent changes in the government of his country, he is free from the calculations and sordid vices of the Lisbon populace. "They are folk," wrote W. H. Koebel, the author of *Portugal, Its Land and People*, reviewing the *Eight Centuries of Portuguese Monarchy*, "of whom we hear remarkably little just now. The political

¹ *Lucia*, June 4, 1912.

² *Daily Telegraph* October 6, 1910

feuds, abstruse problems and the louder mouths of Lisbon and Oporto have drawn attention to themselves at the expense of all else. Yet the vitality of the great mass of the nation—the agricultural population—remains as unimpaired as ever. Just now the countrymen are asking for nothing beyond intelligent guidance and the firmness of a practical leader. Under such auspices they have come forward often enough to the rescue of their country in the past, and it is at their hands now that the ultimate salvation of Portugal is undoubtedly to be looked for. It is here that lies the brighter side of the Portuguese picture.”¹ The republican leaders in power spoke to the world of the prospects of the country and its institutions under Republican auspices. That attitude is very human when adopted by those who are responsible for the sudden change in the institutions of a country. “The way in which the nation had remade itself at the moment of the destruction of the Monarchy was even more astonishing than the suddenness with which the Monarchy had been destroyed,” were the words of Bernardino Machado, who favoured the special correspondent of *The Times* with his views. “He did not know,” added the Republican leader, “which most to admire—the heroic stroke, the dash which had made the revolution, or the spirit of tolerance, of social brotherhood by which the victors were animated towards the vanquished. There had been absolutely no reprisals.”² These utterances, which fell from the lips of the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government, gave pleasure to some ears. Very high rose also the tone of the Spaniards’ eloquence when Spain underwent, from February 11, 1873, to October 29, 1875, an experience of republicanism which endured four *coups d’états* and five presidents, the first of whom betook himself to what is the common resource of baffled Peninsular politicians—flight. “It is difficult to decide whether to admire most the valour, the enthusiasm or the prudence and self-control of the Spanish people,” were the words of Figueras

¹ W. H. Koebel, “The Plight of Portugal,” *Academy*, June 24, 1911

² *Times*, October 10, 1910

at the opening of the Spanish Constituent Cortes, before he fled the scene and took refuge in Paris. But such was "the prudence and self-control of the Spanish people" that Castellar, on becoming the head of the Cabinet, bluntly told the Cortes that "without absolute powers civil and military, he, too, would have to leave office, like his predecessor." It was progress not retrogression that the Spanish Republican also cried for. But he found out that the surest retrogression is an attempt at impossible progress. He aped and assumed certain republican habits, and believed that the instinctive wisdom of the Spanish Republican was unequal to the task of managing the State to the best advantage—expectations which were disappointed when Pavia Capt General of Madrid had to place himself at the head of troops and dictate to Salmeron, the President of the Cortes, "in order to put an end to a reign of anarchy." That the Portuguese Republicans achieved success few persons will deny, but what rendered it possible was the apathy of the non-revolutionary element. They owed the victory to the so-called Monarchists who, after having lived easily, had not the decency to die honourably. One of them, the notorious Alpoim, actually recounted the services he had rendered to the Republican cause as an ally of Teixeira de Sousa, and the *Mundo*, the organ of Afonso Costa, the Minister of Justice in the Provisional Government, welcomed the leader of the Dissident Progressistas. "The adherence of Alpoim and his friends," said the *Mundo*, "is logical." "They are elements that within the Monarchy rendered us great services. On the 28th January they were ready to co-operate with us in a Republican Revolution. There are, of course, dissident Progressistas," it added, "whom we regarded long ago as Republicans. We knew that they would never hesitate to make any sacrifices that might be asked for the Republic." But given the political character of the nation and the history of her last sixty years—when a great body of men public-spirited and independent was transformed into a mass of salaried officials, and popular liberty and civism gave way more and more to party wrangling—how could it have

been otherwise? "If they acquiesced so readily in the overthrow of Monarchy " to quote *The Times*, commenting on the words of Bernardino Machado, "we may therefore suspect that they distinguish between that and the overthrow of the conditions to which they are accustomed "

Europe had already seen the fall of Monarchies and the impeachment of Kings, but it never heard of such shameless facility which afforded contemptible clowns to turn a complete somersault It was an affront to morality be it Republican or Monarchical

"The advent of the Republic," said the eminent French Academician, Denys Cochin, "had been prepared for a long time Political leaders will be backed by the exasperated Portuguese nation, which has been ruined by the successive robberies of rival factions The Portuguese nation consists of five million honest barbarians and about 12,000 politicians. The former will accept what the latter may do just as they accepted the rotary party system " These truths are a trifle irritating, yet their sting lies only in their truth.

III

“STRANGLING THE LAST KING WITH THE ENTRAILS OF THE LAST PRIEST”

“WITHIN two generations after the passing of the Separation Law, Catholic religion will have been annihilated in Portugal,” were the words of the Portuguese Republican Minister who drafted the Separation Law of Church and State. These utterances need no comment. They recall, of course, the inordinate vanity of the knight-errant whose intolerance fevered the Moorish blood of the nation and exhausted her spirits.

The Church, far from being an institution on which once centred the loftiest aspirations and most patriotic feelings of the Portuguese, had abased itself to be the tool of Ministers in power. In order to arrive at a correct estimate of the situation we have not to go back a long way. It was in 1834, on the termination of the Civil wars, that the Church shrank to the narrowest proportions. These wars shed in torrents the blood of the whole nation, and inoculated the elements of Portuguese society with traditions of vindictiveness. “One of thy sons slew thee, another will avenge thee,” was the inscription Dom Pedro had ordered on his father’s tomb. Knowing that his brother, Dom Miguel, had derived enormous support from the clergy, he availed himself of a favourable circumstance to give the Church a blow. The Constitutionalists, once they defeated the Absolutists, relieved the Monastic Orders of their belongings and confiscated the whole property of the Church, episcopal as well as parochial. This wealth was applied to “the redemption of the National Debt,” which, curiously enough, steadily increased from less than £20,000,000 to more than

£100,000,000¹ The Constitutionalists, however, were honest enough to respect the Concordat, and come to an agreement with the Holy See, whereby Rome surrendered the nomination of Bishops and the appointment of ecclesiasties in exchange for their livelihood. The Constitutionalists, though they posed as Liberals, were by no means fanatical. Mousinho da Silveira, for instance, did his best, in 1834, to enforce an Obligatory Civil Register but his measure was soon brought to a standstill amidst protests from the nation. Even Religious Orders were allowed to come back. Their position was finally legalised in 1901 by the Regenerador Ministry, presided over by Hintze Ribeiro, the State recognising the Congregations as civil and juridical persons possessing establishments either for education, where parents voluntarily placed their children in preference to other schools, or for beneficence, where the Orders devoted their lives to the noble duty of caring for the sick, and looking after the poor; and ever since, these religious orders had the right to exist under legal conditions.

Good Catholics, however, had felt that religion was enslaved in its influence, fettered by the control of civil power. "I wish I could bring the Church of France to the state of slavery in which your Church lies in Portugal," were Gambetta's suggestive words to a deputation of Portuguese Freemasons that in 1880 had been to Paris, to congratulate him and at the same time express their indignation at the supposed influence of the Church in Portugal. The Portuguese Bishops had, of course, the right to a seat amongst the Peers of the Realm, but, being chosen by Government, their action always seemed exceedingly limited, as they were in great measure bound to the State. They could not receive Bulls from Rome, they could not leave their diocese, they could not appoint, change or dismiss their clergy, they could not even ordain to the priesthood without the permission of the Government, and the connection with the State made the Portuguese secular priests, and sometimes Bishops, electioneering agents for the *Rotativos*, who recognised them as the ruling influence in the management of elections in the Provinces. Priests

often flung themselves headlong in the worst election fights, so far forgetting their dignity as to bring humiliation to their calling. Moreover, the instances of indiscretions committed by some Portuguese clerics were exploited to their utmost value by their critics. The "married" priest was of all sacerdotal figures the one most familiar to the community, and where a priest was living otherwise a blameless life, his parishioners did not think the worse of him for rearing up a family, however much the Canon Law might give the wife a bad name¹ The clergy, necessarily taken from the body of the people, were inclined, in general, to espouse their cause. But they—as Cardinal Manning remarked of his clergy—"confined themselves too much to the Sacristy, leaving the great works of charity and social improvement to laymen and persons unfit for the task." Portugal recognised the Roman Catholic religion to be that of State. But the majority of Portuguese had no religion other than a vague spiritualism embroidered with all kinds of superstitions. The peasants in the north and elsewhere were sincere enough in their beliefs, but the so-called educated classes were nominally Catholics, and usually had recourse to the ceremonies of the Church on important occasions of life—birth, marriage and death. Unbelief had sapped morality in these classes, that, having rejected God, God rejected them. "Formerly," to put it in the words of M. Poincard, "the religious spirit and the moral training of the Church tended to a certain extent to preserve a high standard of morality. But for a long time past, infidelity has been rife in many well-to-do families. Easily acquired riches, idleness, slavery, have developed among the men a lightness of morals which have also contributed to the social disorganization."² Were, therefore,

¹ "The virgin Queen Elisabeth avowed her preference for priestly concubinage to priestly marriage, and in Portugal to-day many priests who have concubines and children, shrink from a public repudiation of their vows of celibacy by a marriage that would scandalise their flock. The whole question is one of great difficulty, which it would be unwise to try to solve otherwise than with the full consent of the religious authorities, and it must therefore long remain outside what the newspapers term 'the domain of practical politics'." Right Hon. Sir Arthur Hardinge, *A Diplomatist in Europe*

² Leon Poincard, *Le Portugal Inconnu*.

the principles of a Free Church in a Free State carried, things being as they were in Portugal, genuine Catholics had reason to rejoice if they saw the Church in Portugal independent of the State. And the profound saying "Render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's, and unto God the things that are God's," excluded any antagonism between the Church and State.

But so great a step could not be taken under circumstances open to suspicion. The five months extending from the proclamation of the Republic to the promulgation of the Separation Law, were marked by events too significant to be overlooked. Men who decreed the abolition of oath even on those who professed to be Catholics,¹ passed laws compelling the Catholics to work on days prescribed as festivals by the Catholic Church, prohibited the externals of worship, introduced a divorce system not much different from a licence for free love,² and even thought it of supreme moment to rechristen in the Republican baptismal font

¹ According to the official census, of 5,423,132 inhabitants of Portugal and the adjacent islands, 5,416,204 had stated that they professed the Catholic faith, and the remaining 6,928 had declared themselves to be non-Catholic or freethinkers.

² Here I may be allowed to refer to a discussion on the Portuguese Revolution carried in the columns of the *New Age*. My critic, the distinguished English Social Democrat, Mr. E. Belfort Bax, undertook to make himself the champion of the Portuguese Republican cause. It may therefore be interesting to reproduce here the periods relating to the Divorce Law.

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"The recent decree, for instance, authorising divorce in a form equivalent to free love, or better making of marriage a legalised prostitution, a decree that might have waited till the Constituent Assembly had met, was no doubt dictated by some petty desire to defy the Church. But the course taken by the Provisional Government was the very worst that lay before it. To assert their authority over what they call 'a civil contract' they have, notwithstanding the fact that the Portuguese Civil Code authorized divorce in four distinct cases, added to these a list of seven, affording every facility to dissolve marriage, clauses that run counter to the feelings of the whole country, except perhaps of the Don Juan type of citizen who will welcome the clause of 'mutual consent'. The members of the Provisional Government, therefore, could not have flung vitriol with deadlier aim on the morals of the nation. Time was, when Professor Theophilo Braga portrayed in eloquent and impassioned words the sanctity of marriage. It is recorded that he said that 'without the indissolubility of marriage we can have no social or family life'. But once it became necessary to destroy Christianity from the platform of Republicanism, the President of the Provisional Government allowed a member of the Government to push headlong into the pitfall he has dug, the moral interests of the nation. But this question of the morals of the nation appears

the streets of Lisbon called after saints, could hardly be trusted with the interests of the disestablished Church.

To imitate France, if ever France can be imitated, the Portuguese Republicans precipitated themselves into the policy of Jacobinism.

Tous les rois et tous les prêtres
Sont des fripons et des traîtres

"We shall make all essential liberties respected, and shall hunt out all monks and nuns in accordance with our free

likely, if not now, certainly in the near future, to be the rock on which the Republican barge will go to pieces" (My article on "Republicanism in Portugal" *The New Age* for February 2, 1911)

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"The writer in *The New Age* for February 2, is shocked beyond expression at the sane and (relatively) just divorce law recently enacted by the new Republican Government by which a dissolution of marriage is permitted by the mutual consent of parties. This divorce edict, which embodies a principle widely recognised in the present day among reasonable people, is too much for Senhor V de Braganza Cunha who apparently would abolish the right of divorce altogether. The law itself seems an extremely moderate instalment of justice in this respect. Many persons, by no means all of them Socialists or otherwise, suspect of 'extreme views' are prepared in the present day to admit the right of divorce on the formulated demand of one of the parties only. For the logically consistent Social Democrat the only true solution is free marriage, apart from all legal sanctions whatever, State or bureaucratic interference in the matter being exclusively confined to safeguarding the interests of offspring should there be any. The worthy senhor, like many others, seems oblivious of the truth that the claim of the State to compel the continuance of a marital relationship which the parties wish to dissolve is in point of fact a breach of the most elementary principles of personal liberty, and that custom alone masks this aspect of the case.

"Hard words break no bones as the saying is. But to call freedom of divorce 'legalised prostitution' is simply silly. The orthodox handcuff marriage, often enough for money, far more deserves the name than any free marriage. That Professor Braga should be honest enough in his mature years to abandon the conventional fustian he is alleged once to have talked on the subject of marriage and the family, is all to his credit" (Belfort Bax on "The Portuguese Republic," *The New Age* for February 23, 1911).

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"It is a sane and (relatively) just law," says Mr Belfort Bax, who is in the habit of asserting everything most confidently. This is followed by a vast amount of commonplacings in which there is nothing new or which seems much to advance the purpose of the article. Doctrines such as advanced by the distinguished English Social Democrat are not so modern as he seems to imagine. They were heard in later Greece and Rome. It may therefore interest Mr Belfort Bax to know that Gibbon, after reviewing the course of Roman marriages wrote, 'A specious theory is refuted by this free and perfect experiment which demonstrates that the liberty of divorce does not contribute

secular laws. . . We shall decree the separation of Church and State," said Afonso Costa, the Minister of Justice in the Provisional Government, in a telegram to *The Times*, outlining the policy of the Republic. Too ready to see Jesuitical conspiracy in everything religious, he charged the Religious Orders with high treason, and violently closed their schools which not a soul need have attended

to happiness and virtue.' These words of a great historian are very suggestive, specially when Mr Belfort Bax prides himself upon his advanced views.

"Mr Belfort Bax thinks that to call freedom of divorce (such as authorised in Portugal) legalised prostitution is 'simply silly'. But the case assumes a very different aspect when we bear in mind that Section IV of the new Act says that if one of the divorced persons becomes indigent or ill the other party must support him or her. This, in other words, is saying that the marriage contract does not cease with the divorce. I therefore leave Mr Belfort Bax to draw the right conclusion.

"Mr Belfort Bax admits with engaging candour the inconsistencies of Professor Braga, whom I said had once portrayed in eloquent and impassioned words the sanctity of marriage. . . But Mr Belfort Bax is so contemptuous of facts that ignoring that the declaration of Braga was made on March 28, 1908, he does not hesitate to tell the public 'that Professor Braga should be honest enough in his mature years (please note) to abandon the conventional fustian he is alleged once to have talked on the subject of marriage and the family is all to his credit'. It is seen now for once that Braga's judgment was at fault and his pluck deserted him" (My letter in the *New Age* for March 2, 1911

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"Senhor de Cunha kindly informs me that free views on the subject of divorce were prevalent in later classical antiquity. I can go him one better than this and recall to his mind the fact that primitive human society did not recognise monogamy at all, and even the later stages of barbaric society did so very imperfectly. But in this I see no reason why to-day we should wickedly and heartlessly bind men and women together with legal handcuffs. (So far as Socialists are concerned I might point out that Modern Socialism looks forward to a future social state in which more than one feature of earlier society shall reassert itself as modified by the higher complexity involved in such a social state). No, my worthy senhor, it does not in the least interest me (what for the rest I knew probably as long as my kind informant has known), to wit that Edward Gibbon held reactionary views on divorce, as on other matters. What on earth the opinions of an old eighteenth century Tory gentleman, who in his later years was prepared to back up any long established institution from Divine Right to the Inquisition, have to do with us to-day, I altogether fail to see. Certainly they do not impress me, neither do the somewhat limited facts on which he has based them even seem to lend them colour.

"Needless to say that I should not defend any continuance of the marriage contract after divorce such as implied by the Section IV (an undoubted flaw in the edict) now quoted by Senhor de Cunha. As for Professor Braga, even though the conventional utterances attributed to him are of more recent date than I was led to suppose, I can only say that a late repentance is better than none at all."

(Belfort Bax's letter in the *New Age* for March 9, 1911)

except by free choice—violence that only came to prove that the Congregations were able by their worth and merit to capture every sphere of education in legitimate competition with the Republicans, and that the Republic was not capable of protecting itself by legislation repressive of any abuses the Orders might commit. He sent them adrift but forgot that some of these Orders performed duties which no existing Republican bodies could undertake.

It would, perhaps, be ridiculous to represent the conditions of the times when Portugal was ready to enforce religious belief by the rack and the stake to be repeated in the twentieth century. But between the present situation and that of the fifteenth century there exists, as it seems to me, an analogy the points of resemblance of which I must not exaggerate, but which, nevertheless, it may be useful to consider. In former times, falsehoods that the Jews insulted the host and murdered Christian children, were greedily swallowed by the populace. No rumour was too absurd for the easy credulity of the people. King Affonso the Fifth had appointed a Jew, Isaac Abravanel, to be his minister of finance. Jewish physicians had prescribed for Kings John the First and John the Second. The discoverers, Pero de Covilham and Affonso de Paiva, were Jews. Abraham Zakut, the celebrated mathematician and astrologer, whom King Manuel the First consulted before resuming the maritime exploration, was a Jew of Beja. But the populace always complained of the treachery of Jews. The name Jew had become a synonym for rogue, and was associated, in the minds of the people, only with the Jew's propensity for gain, and his clique-like push and activity in commercial life. Hence, the savage massacres of Lisbon, the intolerant edicts and the *autos-da-fé*. 'However that was done,' wrote Osorio, the Bishop of Silves, in his chronicle of the reign of King Manuel, "neither with accordance with law nor with religion. How indeed would you compel rebellious hearts in nowise bound by having accepted a religion to believe those things which they despise and reject with the greatest aversion? Do you take

upon yourself to hinder the freedom of the will and to impose bonds upon unfettered minds? But that cannot be done, neither does the most holy spirit of Christ approve of it " But once the Jews, who were the backbone of commerce, were made to abandon the country and go northwards in search of Liberty, Portugal's commercial greatness vanished, and she lost her wealth because she recoiled from a duty that self-preservation imposed

History, however, repeats itself not in the events, of course, but in the psychology of the people. Like the Jews, the Jesuits were now looked upon as a caste apart, and regarded as a body of an objectionable kind "They are," said Theophilo Braga, "an anomaly in modern civilisation,"¹ and like convicts, they were sent to the anthropometric station to be measured and photographed for the benefit of the Republican Press that published their photographs with the number assigned to each Jesuit as a criminal of the worst description ² An English writer at the time of the Restoration of Charles II, divided into three classes those who neither love nor trust the Jesuits. "The first and worst of all," he wrote, "are some Catholics who have such a tooth against the Jesuits that they cannot afford them a good word" "A second sort," he observed, "are those whose watchword is 'root and branch', the king being for

¹ "The magnificent college of Campolide is—or rather was two weeks ago—a very large and concrete fact. It was the only educational and scientific institution in Portugal which was worthy of the name. It had three hundred boys, some of them the sons of Republican leaders. It turned out during the fifty years of its existence a long list of distinguished men. It published a scientific magazine called the *Broteria* which is favourably known to scientists all over the world.

"The correspondents who visited Campolide after its destruction saw a strange spectacle. The Republican apostles of progress and enlightenment were smashing the valuable microscopes and up-to-date scientific apparatus of the so-called obscurantist priests."

"Judging by the studies and library of Campolide, the Jesuits seemed to have been trying in a hard-headed, business-like way that would do credit to Glasgow, to direct the attention of young Portugal to concrete things like metallurgy, zoology, botany, modern languages, modern business methods, engineering, etc." Francis McCullagh "Some Causes of the Portuguese Revolution," *Nineteenth Century Review*, November, 1910

² My article on "The Spirit of Intolerance in Portugal," *Calcutta Review* (Published by the University of Calcutta) May-June, 1925

them a Papist, the Pope a monster, and Jesuits his horns." "The third sort," he added, "are adversaries not out of malice but prevented by a prejudicate opinion." To these latter belong the Portuguese, who still believed in the Crypto-Jesuit stealing about the country in disguise.¹ The famous underground passages of the Jesuit convents at Lisbon illustrated the lengths to which Portuguese credulity can go. The very description of these subterranean passages which appeared in a Republican daily was a literal translation taken from a story by Edgar Allan Poe! But the fact must be admitted and grasped that these quixotic campaigns have not resulted either now, or in the past, from any particular system but from the prevalence of ignorance and prejudice which are natural to the mind of untutored man.

Be that as it may, there was hardly need of using brute force to get the best of argument. Had Afonso Costa the foresight of a statesman, he would have availed himself of some elements of disintegration within the Church itself. He would have encouraged the quarrel then going on between the Franciscans and Jesuits. For some years the *Voice of St Anthony*, a review edited by the Franciscans, had been conducting a running fight with the *Messenger of the Sacred Heart*, the organ of the Portuguese Jesuits. When Teixeira de Sousa had proposed enforcing the decree of expulsion against the Jesuits, the *Correio de Norte*, a daily paper conducted by the Franciscans at Oporto, had actually supported the measure. This conflict within the Church

¹ "In October, 1910, the clean-shaven correspondents of *Le Matin* and *Le Journal* were arrested on the charge of being disguised Jesuits. Worse still, the Republican papers reported in last July, the extraordinary arrest at Lisbon of a poor woman whose short hair made it suspected that *she* also was a Jesuit. To escape the fury of the mob she was compelled to disclose her sex." Rev. C. Torrend, S. J. "Anti-clerical policy in Portugal," *Dublin Review* January, 1912.

"I remember an incident at the frontier when my baggage had been examined by the Custom House officers. They were disconcerted by my dressing-gown. They handled it doubtfully and held whispered conversations over it. Another passenger standing near explained with a laugh that they had mistaken this thing for a monk's habit and had suspected that I was a monk trying to get into Portugal." Philip Gibbs "Lisbon under the Republic," *Daily Chronicle*. December 15, 1913

would have roused the interest of the genuine statesman To a politician who could look before and after, and who was not deficient in that sagacious spirit which is never so much required as at a time when States change institutions, the situation was full of possibilities. But Afonso Costa felt but little disposed to appreciate its value He knew that the Lisbon mob regarded him as their "saviour," and he thought he achieved the greater part of his ambition in reviving the laws of the absolute regime under Pombal in a Republican decree of the twentieth century¹ "It was not legislation at all," said a writer in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, "but only simple decrees of a despotic minister, and no Cortes or National Assembly had anything to do with their existence It is a piece of touching but unintelligible respect for 'the musty laws' of despots, which is now evinced in this resuscitation of edicts made the century before last by an exceptionally worthless member of the Monarchy, which Senhores Braga and company have just deposed and professed to despise beyond words"² But even assuming what may well be believed, when Afonso Costa's *statesmanship* is under discussion, that Pombal was a statesman, Afonso Costa does not seem to have desired to emulate, even at a humble distance, the methods of Pombal, whose anti-Jesuitical policy he professed to pursue Pombal counted upon the support of the remaining Orders whilst attempting to crush a rival fraternity His first step was to publish the papal brief, *Immensa Pastorum Principis*, which ordered the Jesuits to desist from all banking and commercial pursuits He had asked the Portuguese Minister at Rome to lay before the Pope a detailed report of all the offences committed by the Jesuits in the Portuguese Colonies down to the month of October, 1757. Thus, the Portuguese representative at the Papal Court succeeded in persuading Pope Benedict XIV to listen to his complaints and issue

¹ The decree of the Provisional Government contained the following "Art 2 The law of the absolute regime of August 28, 1757, and that of September 3, 1759, amplifying and explaining it, under which the Jesuits were obliged to quit Portugal and her dependencies immediately, remain in force as the law of the Republic"

² *Pall Mall Gazette* October 15, 1910

a brief constituting a Cardinal, Visitor and Reformer-General of the Order of Jesuits in Portugal and its dominions. It was a blow to the Order that only the head of the Church could have given, and therefore it was all the more deadly

Afonso Costa, however, saw enemies to the Republic and foes to civilisation in men and women against whom no crime was alleged, who devoted their lives to the self-sacrificing duty of looking after the poor¹. "Men of stainless life," was the protest of Leo XIII, then Cardinal Archbishop of Perugia, to King Victor Emmanuel, regarding the dispersed monks of Monte Corona, "men of unbounded popularity among our country folk, whom solitude, silence, and prayer perpetually separated from all worldly pursuits¹—they were accused of mixing themselves up with politics. Men whom the world never saw coming down from the lonely peak of their inaccessible mountain, except when the duties of brotherly charity compelled them, and whose convent was the refuge of the pilgrim, the infirm and the needy—these were held up as persons who imperilled the interests of the nation!" This protest of Leo XIII, just as applicable in the case of some Portuguese congregations, did not, however, come home to the conscience of Afonso Costa, who once wrote commentaries on Pope Leo XIII's encyclicals, but who was now posing before English photographers in the act of handing a safe conduct to a helpless Irish Sister of Charity—an order which in England supplied ten nurses to the original mission of Miss Nightingale. "But exceptional laws," wrote Augusto Fuschini, in the *Imparcial*, "easily become instruments of persecution." "Pombal expelled the Jesuits Aguiar expelled the Friars," said the ex-Minister of Monarchy. But each adopted this course at different historical crises, and for different reasons. Aguiar wanted to save a liberty menaced by an army of 80,000 rich and disciplined monks, and the Government of the Republic cannot shelter itself behind these

¹ The religious Congregations gave 2,000 meals daily, and about 30,000 meals were given daily by the monasteries and nunneries throughout Portugal.

obsolete expulsion laws adopted as a temporary expedient. A true democracy like ours, conscious of its strength, and of its duties, ought not to feel itself called upon to prohibit the existence in this country of religious Orders "

But whatever danger Afonso Costa might have feared from all religious Orders, it would be impossible to give a satisfactory reason for the cruelty exercised towards the members of the various religious bodies, especially nuns "The treatment of the nuns," wrote the special correspondent of the *Westminster Gazette*, "was disgraceful and barbarous. Granting that they had no legal right to exist as Communities, the Government should have notified them of that fact, and given them ample time to make preparations for going to their homes or for embracing some other profession." "From Thursday to Sunday," said the correspondent, giving a vivid description of their ill-treatment, "the nuns were brought through the streets in open cars and carriages. These vehicles were filled with armed men, some of them displaying naked swords. The shouts of the crowd and the jeers of the soldiery frightened these unfortunate ladies nearly to death. To entrust them to the care of drunken—or at least very excited, blue-jackets, to drive them through howling mobs was a cruel and unmanly thing to do " "I have discussed the matter with foreigners," added the representative of the Liberal daily, "and they cannot find words strong enough to express their contempt for the 'Dagoes', who have treated helpless women in this disgraceful manner " ¹ This is not all. These women, to whom the sorrowful and the oppressed turned instinctively for consolation, and who never lacked a kindly thought for the distressed, were now outraged and insulted by charges slanderously made against them—charges that will not bear quoting in English "The Republican and atheistical newspapers," to use the words of the correspondent of the *Westminster Gazette*, "whose editors now rule Portugal, printed details of alleged immorality on the part of the nuns, details so revolting, so exaggerated and so contradictory that they overshot

¹ *Westminster Gazette* October 18, 1910

the mark and deceived nobody ”¹ When we reflect on these brutalities we find it difficult to convince the foreign critics that Portugal is not “a detached fragment of Africa ” But all this was done in the name of liberty. “Liberty,” Gambaetta proclaimed, “is one of the prerogatives of power,” and his words state correctly the conception of his mimics in Portugal.

But the very passing of the decree against the Religious Orders, which was conjured up for the purpose of enlarging the merits of the Revolution, brought to light the fact that the Republican leaders, in their eagerness to cater for the so-called public opinion of the moment, were limited in their action to the success of the day. Their hasty measures were an encumbrance rather than a blessing to the Republic; and the language of the Republican Deputy Mattos Cid left no room for doubt on this point

Mattos Cid Is it true the information given by a paper of the existence in Lisbon of religious congregations at Bom Successo, Corpo Santo and St Louis, King of France?

Afonso Costa No religious congregation is now working in Portugal

Mattos Cid May I speak again?

The Chairman Certainly you may

Mattos Cid May I ask the Minister of Justice whether there are in Portugal any schools under the management of foreign religious congregations?

Afonso Costa (excitedly) My reply evidently implied both questions The nature of the subject is such that Senhor Mattos ought to refrain from referring to it

Mattos Cid I am satisfied

Such was the plight of Afonso Costa, who had pledged himself in advance to enforce laws against all religious congregations, but who had to suffer the consequences which followed the exaggeration of his powers and prospects, during the first months of brigandage English, Irish, French, Germans and Italians brought every pressure to bear against his measures, and enlisted their Ministers and Consuls in support of their opposition The expulsion-at-

¹ *Westminster Gazette* October 17, 1910

any-price policy furnished the foreign representatives with just grounds for condemning the perfidious dealings of the budding Pombal. It was the folly and short-sightedness of a vulgar politician which supplied the Powers with a motive, and, in too many eyes, a justification, for an action which deeply wounded the pride of every Portuguese.

"Act Sire that none of high admired degrees,
Of French, Italian, English, German land,
Can venture to assert the Portuguese
Are more to be commanded than command "
(*The Lusads*, Canto X, Stanza 152)

"The Great Powers in Europe were averse to any recognition of the Republic," wrote Sir Arthur Hardinge, who was British Minister in Lisbon, "and soon after the promulgation of the Law of Separation a very long controversy arose as to its effect on the British, religious and educational institutions in the country, to which I have already indirectly alluded. Eventually, however, the Portuguese Government promised that the Law of Separation should not be applied to these institutions, and formal recognition of the Republic immediately followed. Very similar steps were taken on behalf of their respective religious institutions by the French, German and Italian Legations, who in this matter acted in complete harmony with our own Government and obtained identical results."¹

A Republican Minister for Foreign Affairs "displayed a certain pettiness on secondary questions, attempts, for example, to prevent English Catholic seminarists reading for the Church from wearing out of doors their priestly gowns and the conventional habits of nuns. But in this matter," wrote the ex-British Minister in Lisbon, quoted above, "I carried the day in the name of religious freedom."² Possibilities of this kind would have had weight with any intelligent politician. But vain, desirous of immediate results, Afonso Costa exasperated the downtrodden nation only to adopt towards the Foreign Congregations

¹ Right Hon. Sir Arthur Hardinge, *A Diplomatist in Europe*

² *Ibid*

an attitude which was justly regarded by all Portuguese as one of the most servile in the history of the country "According to you," said Machado dos Santos, in the *Intransigente*, "for the Portuguese clergy alone are insult and brutality to be reserved, as for the foreigners no generosity is too great for them. If your law was going to bring international complications why did you pass it?"

The decree was also met with unflinching opposition by the various foreign congregations scattered over the Portuguese possessions in Africa. Their rights were guaranteed by Article 6 of the General Act of the Berlin Conference of February 26, 1885, and by Article 2, Section 3, of the General Act of the Conference of Brussels of July 2, 1890; and in vain the Portuguese Government attempted to enforce the decree of October 8th, 1910. Thus even Jesuits, at whose establishments Afonso Costa's raid was aimed, contemptuously ignored the Republican decree. It was perfectly astounding that men who described themselves as statesmen should have undertaken to legislate for religious orders in Portuguese East and West Africa without consulting the signatory powers of international treaties whose provisions these legislators ignored! The Republican deputy, Eduardo Abreu, who was, for a considerable time, a silent Republican, denounced in the Constituent Assembly, on August 7, 1911, the whole imposture surrounding the decree against religious congregations. These censures, however, were not met by any decided contradiction from any of the Republican Ministers. On the contrary, Afonso Costa, in torrents of tempestuous eloquence, warned Eduardo Abreu not to betray diplomatic secrets—"secrets" that were already disclosed in the German colonial reports issued in March, 1911.

Whatever hesitation the Portuguese Bishops may have felt before as to the course they were to take, it was clear the time had now come for decisive action; and they attempted this by legal and moderate methods, not by violence. They addressed on December 23, 1910, a pastoral letter to the Clergy and Catholics. It was signed by the Patriarch of Lisbon, the Archbishops of Braga, Evora,

Guarda, and the Bishops of Vizeu Coimbra, Bragança Porto, Lamego, Portalegre, Algarve, Beja, and Martyropolis, and distributed throughout the country. It stated the doctrine of the Church on the principle of authority and the obligation of obedience to constituted powers, and advised the faithful to respect the Republican Government. The Bishops, to quote *The Times* correspondent, "recognised the benefits of some of the measures decreed by the Provisional Government, such as suppression of duelling, gambling and prostitution, but regretted to note in other measures an absence of religious sentiment, almost an antagonism to religious belief, and to the doctrines of the Catholic Church. This bias was detected in such measures as the expulsion of religious congregations, the divorce law, the abolition of the religious oath, the suppression of Saints' Days, and of religious teaching in the national schools and the projected separation of Church and State."¹ The pastoral caused a great sensation at Lisbon. Afonso Costa, who believed he was possessed of power to enforce obedience everywhere, called on his delegates in the provinces to hunt out and pursue the offenders. He instructed the Republican authorities to prevent the pastoral being read in the churches, and sent a telegraphic message to the Bishops ordering them to ask the clergy not to read it. The menacing attitude, the bustle and transitory ebullitions of Afonso Costa had, of course, the effect of frightening the Portuguese Bishops to death, and with one exception all the Bishops obeyed. This exception was the aged Bishop of Oporto, a man of austere morals and a most inflexible will. No noise of musketry would upset this Bishop, who was once a missionary in the wilds of Africa. His attitude was marked by natural dignity, and the respect which he imposed was such that the Republican *Intransigente*, edited by Machado dos Santos, wrote: "Dr Barroso may be a dangerous person, but in this atmosphere of subserviency when the other Prelates drew back in fear, he, in truth, showed himself a man who is not afraid to face his enemy in the hour of peril, a man able to suffer disgrace with

¹ *The Times* February 24, 1911

serenity" "We do not defend the Bishop," it added, "but his attitude was logical from the moment he signed the pastoral. It was an attitude worthy of the old African missionary who knows how to honour the word he has once given."

The situation of Afonso Costa, however, grew every hour more critical. His indefatigable activity, both of mind and body, formed a strong contrast to the coolness displayed by Dom Antonio Barroso, the Bishop of Oporto. He had only succeeded in creating a great deal of sympathy for the Bishop and his cause. But as dangers and difficulties multiplied, Afonso Costa multiplied resources to meet them. He summoned the offending Bishop to Lisbon and suspended him from the exercise of his episcopal functions. The plan was well designed, and the supporters of Afonso Costa faithfully executed their part of it, with the fanaticism of an *auto-de-fé*. The Bishop was exposed to every annoyance which the malice of his enemies could devise. But such was the decorum of the Bishop's manners, that when he made his entry into Lisbon, amid the jeers and shouts of the infuriated mob, his only remark was "And is all this on account of me?"

The charge strongly urged against the Bishop was that the pastoral letter was not submitted to the Provisional Government. The Attorney-General of the Republic, Dr Manuel Arriaga, afterwards President of the Republic had gone into the question and found the Bishop guilty. But the Bishop of Oporto argued, and rightly argued, that the *beneficium*, the right of the civil power, applied only to Papal Bulls. The situation would have been considered embarrassing in a country where public opinion counts for something, and vested interests are regarded as sacred. But in Portugal, the supporters of Afonso Costa actually based their arguments on the fact that a certain Bishop Count of Coimbra, who had issued, on December 9, 1768, a pastoral in which he protested against expulsion of the Jesuits under the absolute regime, "lay nine years in a damp and ill-lighted prison of the fortress of Pedroucos"¹ In

¹ *Oxford and Cambridge Review* July, 1911

other words, it was necessary to invoke the laws of the year 1768 to justify Afonso Costa's conduct towards the Bishop of Oporto¹ The whole Portuguese nation shared the moral triumph of Dom Antonio Barroso now deprived of his See and given a pension of £240 a year, because of his services to the State as a missionary in Africa All eyes had turned on the fearless Bishop as the only man at all capable of upholding the dignity of the Church The fate of the Church trembled in the balance, and it was the venerable prelate that had turned the scale, and by his intrepid conduct decided the fortune of the day. "Antonio Barroso you are a man, you are a Portuguese; and the Republic would be proud if you were a Republican," were the words of Afonso Costa—a noble sentiment, but falling with no particular grace from the lips of the Republican Minister

Incensed by the failure of his plans, and stung with mortification at being made a laughing stock in the eyes of the nation, Afonso Costa resumed his desperate trade with renewed activity; and the haughty tone of the Separation Law showed too plainly that it was framed throughout with a feeling of distrust and jealousy of the Church. The opening article of the Separation Law¹ guaranteed full liberty of conscience to all Portuguese citizens, its second article that the Roman Catholic religion shall cease to be that of the State, and recognized as equally authorized all Churches and religious confessions Its third article provided that no one could be questioned by any authority regarding his religious belief, and its fourth that all State payments for the maintenance and expenses of worship shall cease. Such was the phraseology about liberty of conscience. But alas, what was the reality? The Republic proclaimed the freedom of all religions without recognizing any particular one, interdicting, however, any exterior sign of religion which was placed under supervision of civil authorities (Art 58), but it claimed the right to dictate to the Church that it shall have to apply at least a third of Church endowments—which are the result of private gifts and not State provision, and, therefore, are as sacred as private property—

¹ Lei de Separação da Igreja do Estado decretada em 20 de Abril de 1911

to acts of beneficence and charity (Art 32). Further, in the name of "liberty" that it granted to all (Art 2), the Portuguese legislator, eager to limit the Church in its power of providing financially for the future, decreed that the Church could not acquire goods by donation or by testamentary dispositions (Art. 28). Again, in the name of the same "liberty" it allowed no minister of religion, who is a foreigner or a naturalized Portuguese, to take part in any act of public worship without due consent from the Republican authority (Art. 178) a provision which outraged the Catholic feeling, for even anarchists were in Portugal at liberty to hold meetings and listen to any foreign orator explaining his formulas not social but chemical. The Republic separated itself from the Church, but by a singular paradox this very Republic, with no definite ethical or religious position at all, retained the right of intervening in the working of seminaries now reduced from thirteen to five and directing the education of priests (Art. 184 & 186). It proclaimed that no one could be questioned by any authority regarding his religious belief (Art. 3), but it threatened with penalties any Portuguese who in future, being a graduate of any faculty of theology or canon law of the Pontifical Universities of Rome, should exercise his ministry in Portugal (Art. 177). Having trampled on the last wishes of testators who endowed the Church with pious gifts, forbidden the very cassock of the priest outside the place of worship,¹ when emblems and banners of secret societies were displayed in the streets of Lisbon, the Republican lawgiver did not hesitate to

¹ "Portugal, Republican, has not banished her clergy—she has only rendered them absurd. The soutane and the shovel-hat gave the priesthood a particular though sloppy distinction. The law has now decided that all priests must, like Hamlet under Noel Coward, wear ordinary dress. It is true that the British clergy contrive to wear ordinary dress and remain dignified, but the Portuguese priest has put himself into a frock-coat and a bowler hat. The old shovel-hat used to be worn small and high on the head. In making his change the priest took a bowler hat of similar dimensions. Again, unluckily for British eyes, the Portuguese priest often has thick, black eyebrows of semi-circular shape. These, combined with large, easy-fitting, flat-footed shoes, which did well enough under a soutane but now look oddly monstrous under the bottoms of well-kneed and tubular black trousers, remind the voyager of nothing less than our famous George in one of his more sanctimonious rôles"—Jane Cora Gordon, *Portuguese Somervault* London, 1934

encourage the violation of the law of celibacy. He promised the apostate not only a good pension but that he would be preferred by law before any other citizen for any civil post (Art 151). In his policy, Afonso Costa was perhaps inspired by the example of the Constitution Civile, the joint production of Jansenists and philosophers, that aimed at the creation of a National Church in Revolutionary France, and that sought to bribe the clergy by promising a substantial amelioration of their condition. But the pension scheme, which was intended to foment rebellion in Portugal against the Church, its hierarchy and its institutions, brought the whole clergy into a firm phalanx of opposition under those very leaders of whom it was intended to deprive them. And a majority of 6,000 priests to 800 refused to be bribed by the Republican legislator. The Portuguese Republicans broke the Concordat without any regard to the good faith due to treaties. They deliberately threw aside all Concordat agreements, which "like all international treaties constitute bilateral contracts that cannot be done away with by one of the parties concerned without the concurrence and consent of the other"¹. But jealous of their prerogative, they stooped to claim the rights of Patronage in the East granted to Portugal in view of Apostolic Bulls dating back to the days of Nicolas V, Alexander VI and Gregory XIII, and secured to the nation in conformity with the Canons of the Church. In other words Republican Portugal cut herself adrift as a nation from the Church, but by a singular paradox wished to enjoy the prestige and influence that came as a gift from Rome. She still clung to the Concordat signed in 1859 between Cardinal di Pietro representing the Pope and Rodrigo de Magalhães, fully accredited and commissioned by the Portuguese Crown—a Concordat which was slightly modified in 1886 by which it was agreed that the Portuguese rights of Patronage should be exercised, as regards India and China, over the Cathedrals of Goa, Cranganore, Cochin Mylapore and Macau.

The encyclical *Jamdudum* addressed in May, 1911, to the Roman Catholic Bishops throughout the world, declared

¹ Joint protest issued by the Portuguese Bishops

the Portuguese Separation Law "null and void" "The Portuguese Separation Law," said the Jewish Rabbi, Moise Netter, in *l'Univers Israelite*, "is a crude piece of work, which offends common-sense, decency, reason and tradition. Therefore the Roman Pontiff very rightly declares it to be unacceptable to the Portuguese Church. It is the work of a narrow-minded, obstinate sectarian, and shews an incredible lack of political foresight. It must provoke protest not only from the Catholic Church but from all impartial men who are desirous of safeguarding the imperceptible rights of conscience." Indeed the common conscience and the common interest of the world were too strong to tolerate so immoral a paradox. The supporters of the Law, however, expected the nation to bear the indignities without a murmur, and submit tamely to an empty demagogue. Threats and violence were as freely invoked by men who now posed as freethinkers when it was no longer fashionable to be inquisitors, and it may be added, were invoked with much the same effect as centuries ago, when the religion of the sovereign regulated that of the people, and those who refused to conform were speedily conveyed to the flames. Bishops and priests were forbidden to criticize or protest against the Separation Law, under pain of being liable to punishment. But this attitude only served to array against the Republic the uncontrolled power of an organization using spiritual weapons which it is difficult for material forces to resist. "It is worth recording that during the French Revolution," wrote the distinguished French Jesuit, Rev. Camille Torrend, "under circumstances slightly more critical, five French Bishops out of eighty-five, acted against their consciences at the bidding of the tyrants, while in Portugal there has not been a single case of weakness among thirteen prelates. It might perhaps be argued that their courage was not so conspicuous at the very beginning of the persecution. The Bishops have been accused of timidity in delaying their protest for so long, and because they did not all maintain it afterwards with the same courage as did Monsignor Barroso, the Bishop of Oporto. Be that as it

may, their final conduct deserves all our admiration”¹ The common interests of religion being paramount to every obligation towards the State which they served, the Portuguese Bishops saw the necessity of instant action. “Are we to remain silent under such a law?” they wrote, protesting against the law “In resignation and inaction are we to bend our neck to the brandished sword? Do they expect the Portuguese Bishops to imitate the miserable gladiators and join in their cry *Ave Cesar mortuum te salutant*! No one has the right to expect from us an attitude so unworthy. We have been accused of being timid because we have been respectful—perhaps too much so. We are, therefore, the more entitled now to speak with freedom. To the son of God each of us will say with equal earnestness, and we hope with greater firmness than did St. Peter, *Domine recum paratus sum et in carcerem et in mortem ire.*” The Bishops refused, therefore, to bend or deny their convictions at the bidding of the fourth-rate tyrant, who now represented the omnipotence of the Law. The Bishops’ eloquence was supported by that of several eminent Republicans, who viewed, with sincere regret, the situation, and did not hesitate to tell Afonso Costa that the sacrifice of liberty and justice was too dear a price to pay for a temporary notoriety. Antonio Claro, writing on the subject, made the following pertinent observation “Your reform, I repeat,” said the Republican journalist, “outraged the consciences of many, and caused horror and anger throughout the Catholic world.” “Such results,” added the outspoken writer, “shew the law with which you hoped to pass the limits of universal notoriety and of eternal fame, to be an abnormity. But the worst—by far the worst—is that which everyone feels and which may break out while your forces are yet insufficient to quell the rebellion of feelings wounded in their purity, the worst is that even were you predestined, even though had you a pinch of the energy and sagacity of Pombal—the voice of the entire Catholic world would be raised in malediction against you, even as was the

¹ Rev. C. Torrend, S.J., “The Anticlerical Policy in Portugal,” *Dublin Review* January, 1912

voice of the Archbishop of Westminster, who, speaking with dignity a few days ago, called the Portuguese law of separation a *law of Spoliation* " Again, "it is not natural," said the Republican deputy Eduardo Abreu, "that we should seek for ourselves the unenviable distinction of having utilized the country for making experiments which have either failed utterly in other countries or have given results far different from what were expected " "It is the duty of all to recognize and face the danger which is already sufficient for the reduced strength and resources of the country Why, therefore, should we go farther than so many other nations, rich, powerful, practical, solidly intellectual and progressive?"

The promulgation of the Separation Law was received everywhere, as had been anticipated, with general discontent, and the acts of aggression on the part of *Carbonarios*, unwise in themselves and useless to the Republic, excited the wrath of the whole Catholic population The situation, however, furnished Afonso Costa with an occasion to demand with greater fury than ever the employment of "repressive means." Sober-minded Republicans, zealous for ensuring the welfare of the Republic, expressed, of course, their dread of them, and declared themselves against them with some energy But Afonso Costa defied the most formidable obstacles, and his successor, Caetano Macieira, the Minister of Justice, whose appointment he had obtained unawares from the moderates, declared emphatically that he was resolved to obey Afonso Costa's commands and would act with his patron alone In a rambling address to the Republican Assembly, Macieira highly extolled the merits of the Separation Law, which he, too, like his master, believed to be "intangivel" (untouchable), and his wrath fell at once on Bishops It was they whom he had to fight and crush by fair or foul means. The Archbishop of the historic See of Guarda established in the twelfth century as "guard" against the fanatics of the Neo-Arab religion, was prosecuted on the charge of having criticized the Law and being an enemy of the Republic. To these accusations the Bishop made

a public reply. Obligated to relinquish all idea of regular trial, he addressed a letter to the President of the Republic—a resource which, in the Bishop's situation, was the only possible one. "It is true that I have protested against the Separation Law," he wrote, "but what of that? Many, even among the Republicans, have protested against this law, and yet nobody accused them of being anti-Republican. Is it now to be forbidden to a Bishop to protest, and if he does so, is he to be declared an enemy of the Republic and condemned to be thrown as prey to the wild beasts? Is everyone to be allowed freedom of speech except the Bishops? Landlords have protested against the Rent Law, the working classes against the Strike Law, the Socialists against arbitrary arrest. Are the Catholics alone to be forbidden to protest against laws wounding their sacred feelings? Are we then to be deprived of all the rights of citizens?" Such an argument as this was, indeed, going to the root of the matter. It was evident the Bishop's patience had borne a good deal but it was now beginning to give way. "I am no weak Bishop," he said, "if I yield it shall only be to force. I am independent, it is true, but not a rebel. Should any proceedings be taken against me, let everyone know that the Bishop of Guarda is prosecuted for having fulfilled his duty as a Bishop and for having advised Catholics to obey the laws of conscience, not for having been hostile to the Republic."

The Bishop appealed to his rights as a Portuguese, but he had to abide by the sentence of the grotesque Minister of Justice, who condemned him to two years' banishment from his diocese. But the want of foresight on the part of the Minister of Justice showed itself in the very decree of expulsion. Dictated by some petty desire to defy the Church, the Government expelled the Archbishop of Guarda from the "district" of Guarda. But it overlooked the fact that the diocese of Guarda was much larger than the district of Guarda. The expelled Bishop, who possessed some sense of humour, was pretty quick in grasping the situation. He went to Tortozendo and thence to Fundao, places still in his diocese, but in the district of Castello Branco. Any-

way, it compelled the Government to pass another decree expelling the Archbishop of Guarda from the district of Castello Branco. The Bishop of Coimbra was the next on the list. Appealing to his diocese for funds in order to help his poor clergy, the Bishop wrote "Whatever politics they cultivate or whatever form of Government they uphold, the faithful must regard as superior to them, fidelity in their profession of their Catholic faith, and in the fulfilment of its precepts." The absurd Minister of Justice sent at once a despatch to the harmless Bishop in which he said: "In that sentence your Excellency invites the Catholics of your diocese to respect the Catholic Church more than the State, a thing that is contrary not only to the laws of the Republic, but also to the modern rights of all civilised nations. Such an assertion in your Pastoral is absolutely inadmissible." The Bishop of Coimbra, however, courteously sent the Minister of Justice a copy of the circular he had sent to his people. The result was that the Government, anxiously awaiting for submission on the part of the Bishops, loudly proclaimed that the Bishop of Coimbra had accepted the Law of Separation. The Bishop was brought to bay by the Republican Press, the prey was in their hands, one more effort and the day was their own. But the Bishop proudly replied that the only way left to defend himself was to resign the See of Coimbra, which he did, to the utter dismay of those who were fruitlessly endeavouring to misrepresent the Bishop's intentions.

This splendid manifestation of solidarity added a brilliant page to the history of the Church in Portugal. It inspired even a Republican writer to some utterances of elevation. "The courage displayed by Mgr Barroso, the Archbishop of Guarda and the Bishop of Coimbra," wrote Antonio Claro, in the Oporto Republican daily, *Diario do Porto*, "came precisely at the time when Portugal seemed destitute of men with any strength of character." Thus the Church had gained by the sentences directed against the Portuguese Prelates. Their banishment was calculated to delight the Lisbon fanatics. But it called forth a movement of indignation in the very Portuguese capital—a movement that

manifested itself when the Patriarch of Lisbon was expelled on December 29, 1911. The Patriarch had forbidden his clergy to take part in the Cultural Associations organized by the Government, which recognized the Bishops and priests as belonging to or presiding over such associations. The Patriarch was accused of attempting "to determine by spiritual prerogative questions of the civil sphere," and he was, therefore, banished from his diocese. Such, likewise, was the fate of the Archbishops of Braga and Portalegre and the Bishop of Lamego. But nevertheless on the first day of the year 1912 the Catholics of Lisbon crowded to the Cathedral to support the Primate. So suggestive was the demonstration in honour of the Prelate, whose expulsion had been decreed, that Macieira, the Minister of Justice, replying to a question addressed to him on January 4, 1912, assured Parliament that "severe measures would be taken against the public functionaries who had marched in the procession."

The sole cause of the quarrel that arrayed the Portuguese in opposite and hostile camps was, it was industriously represented by the Republicans, that the Republic had tried to oppose Ultramontane influence and pretensions in Portugal. The Republic was, they said, fighting for liberty of conscience—the mother of political and personal liberty, the forerunner of equality and downfall of privilege. But the first thing, in every fight, is to know how and where to hit. Every random blow strengthens the position of the antagonist, especially when he has the advantage of the defensive.

But the greater the fanaticism the greater is the reaction. Gomes Leal, the revolutionary poet, was the banner bearer of the Portuguese Revolution, and the inspirer of its fanatical creed. He was, in his early days, the author of fierce political satires. *A Canalha*, *O Renegado*, *O Hereje* and *A Traição*. They were like a torch flung into the night with a fury of flame. A Russian Nihilist would gloat with savage joy over these poems. The most notorious of the poet's revolutionary tirades was, perhaps, the *Anti-Christo*, where Gomes Leal, evidently inspired by Hartmann's philosophy, and Zola's

naturalism, had displayed the fanaticism of a militant atheist. But the revolutionary author or the *Anti-Christo*—where nothing sacred was allowed to pass without a bitter sneer—now sought refuge within the walls of a Christian home from the revolutionary world which he openly confessed he detested, and the Portuguese revolutionaries hated the revolutionary bard with a hatred intense in proportion as it was impotent. The poet witnessed in his refuge the desecration of churches and chapels, the expulsion of the crucifixes from the schools¹ and even from the law courts. The revolutionary poet was now aged and reduced to poverty. The Republic granted him a meagre pension. But the poet contemptuously refused it, and preferred to subsist on what his new friends gave him. There was, indeed, something ironical in this.

¹ One of the recent reforms of the Portuguese Public Instruction Ministry which has been made law by the vote of the National Assembly, orders the Crucifix to be placed over the teacher's chair," as the symbol of Christian education determined by the Constitution "

IV

ROCKS AHEAD

"A REPUBLIC set up in the first instance by Constitutional parties at variance with one another and afterwards re-established by Jacobin parties who—unused to the reins of government and ignorant of its mechanism—look upon it as a career, would only lead to havoc and bloodshed in Portugal,"¹ were the words of Eça de Queiroz, words which I am unable to enlarge upon with advantage or to abridge without injury. The verdict is a sorrowful one, and it proceeded not from a reactionary who put the hands of the clock back but from the innovator who set it going. Eça de Queiroz indeed, like the *enfant terrible*, which he was in Portugal, caught a glimpse of the truth. The opportunities offered to this ironic writer by the life of the Portuguese of the higher and middle classes were many. He caught Portuguese life—social, intellectual and political—as it was lived under the Constitutional régime. He did more to expose cant and hypocrisy than any other man of whom there is a trace upon record, and many a page of political satire rests upon a saying of this most popular writer of modern Portugal. "Over the forceful nakedness of truth the diaphanous mantle of fantasy," is the inscription at the base on the monument, at Lisbon, raised to Eça de Queiroz by his admirers. This inscription sums up his ideal and achievements.

Eça de Queiroz passed away some years ago. He died before the Revolution which he had unwittingly forwarded. But his views were held, on the proclamation of the Portuguese Republic, by his friend, Ramalho Ortigão, who was

¹ Eça de Queiroz, *Notas Contemporaneas*

once much in sympathy with the Republican cause, but who threw the whole weight of his logic on the right side of things. Ramalho Ortigão was a man who had the courage to oppose the popular current and who possessed convictions shaped by experience. He was a reformer long before reform became a fashion. Having begun public life as a Republican, and not become a Monarchist in the sense that this word was understood in Portugal, he loathed the insincerities of the Republicans and the baseness of the so-called Monarchists. He was the author of the *Farças*, a work that, it is true, played a part in working out some of the aims of Portuguese Republicanism, but nevertheless a work that though tinged with the farcical one-sided exaggeration of the satirist, gibbets the Portuguese politician and scoffs at the self-advertisement of mediocrities. He was young, witty and eloquent, when his *Farças* were read by the nation. Now that he was old and broken his voice faltered, but he never wavered. He discussed in the *Gazeta de Noticias*, of Rio de Janeiro, the Portuguese political situation, and shrugged his shoulders scornfully at the mention of the Republic to whose mercy, he said, were delivered over four millions of illiterate people of a country with a population of five million inhabitants. He would not undertake to make himself the champion of a Republic launched forth into the political world with no compass but the opinions of a few men crammed with theories of man and the State, and no rudder except the instincts of those who had no opinion of their own, but merrily echoed opinion.

The Revolution, however, was acknowledged by its leaders as a new page turned in Portuguese history, as a fresh starting point for the Portuguese race. They counted, therefore, with certainty, and they had a right to count, if pledges were to go for anything, on the union of all Republicans. "Citizens," said Theophilo Braga on October 5, 1910, "let one interest alone—the interest of the fatherland—animate you, and let one desire—the desire to be great—unite us." "Let us in glorious communion of principles make our sacrifice for our country the basis of

our political programme and let generosity towards the conquered be the basis of our moral programme”¹ But while these words were flaunted everywhere, Machado dos Santos, the “hero of Rotunda” as he was called, elected to desert the Republican leaders, and founded a journal which he named *Intransigente*. He declared that he had emancipated from tutelage, and that he was going to look and judge for himself

“He must be a criminal if he is not a lunatic who raises under the Republican party the banner of a group which acclaims him as a leader,” wrote *A Lucta*, the semi-official organ of the Provisional Government, condemning the action of the “Hero of Rotunda.” But the secession of Machado dos Santos was a remarkable phenomenon, and one well worthy not of hysterical declamation but of grave reflection. He was the soul of Revolution, and had gone, it was stated, from a freak of temper or because he did not get his way upon some matter in the promotion of those soldiers and sailors who fought for the Republic. “The officer who abandoned his troops in the Rotunda,” said the Republican *Povo d’Aveiro*, “who abandoned his troops with the cry that all was lost, has been now named *Chefe do Gabinete* in the Ministry of War. When Machado dos Santos fought in the Rotunda and led his sailors at Alcantara, there was not a single one of those Republican chiefs who in the committees, clubs, and newspapers urged the people to go out and die, to stand shoulder to shoulder behind the barricades, who swore to die there themselves if necessary. Machado dos Santos was alone. He alone was the glorious founder of the Republic. And because he now exercises his right of free criticism; because he does not fall down on his face and cry ‘Wonderful, wonderful’ to everything the Government does or proposes to do, because he murmurs, criticises, discusses, he is treated to open abuse, to violent scurrility. He is described as being either a criminal or a lunatic.”²

History had once more repeated itself. In 1835 Saldanha,

¹ Theophilo Braga’s Presidential Proclamation

² *National Review* January, 1911

the "hero" of Constitutionalism, had also complained that all the most lucrative offices had been distributed among the creatures of the Government in power, and that "even Miguelites were employed to the exclusion of those who fought and bled for the Queen." The scene now had, of course, been shifted, the language was more or less changed, but the play was still the same.

There was cast upon the Republic a very heavy duty—the duty of bringing before the mind of the people an example of political and moral excellence. But the mountain had laboured and the public laughed at the result of so much fuss. "Does anyone see a Minister," asked the semi-official organ of the Provisional Government, *A Lucta*; "does anyone see a Minister for twenty minutes without talking about himself—i.e., about some lucrative post which he and he alone would be competent to fill?"¹ This, however, was by no means the only result of the Revolution. Whoever smelt powder in Lisbon or its suburbs was now a "hero," and the most promiscuous shooting became an act of heroism in the everyday language of the Republican Press. In any country these "heroes" would have furnished the subject for a comic opera. But so completely did their martial achievements seduce the morbid imagination of some Portuguese, that it was firmly believed that without the "heroes," Portugal would have no personal character, no original life; she would not have been Portugal. But the "heroes" did not content themselves with amusing the idle by tales obviously fictitious. The Ministerial Departments, indeed, were the grand object of their pilgrimages, and the Provisional Government attempted "to mollify the military heroes by rewarding their patriotic services with furloughs, offers in the National Guard, extra promotions, retirements, increased pensions and distinctions."² The Provisional Government knew well how much the Republic had to fear from the "heroes," as we may judge from the words of João de Menezes, a Republican leader, who, some months later, declared in Parliament: "It was very unfortunate for the Republic that it was first

¹ *A Lucta* November 18, 1910

² *Times* October 21, 1910

proclaimed by the army, because this led to a demoralisation which is now ruining the army." Anyway, the allegiance of the demoralised army to the Republic had to be maintained, and the Minister of War in the Provisional Government had to make a considerable increase in the Territorial forces "with the object of conciliating the military class by creating numerous opportunities for promotion."¹

Meantime the chief points of the Provisional Government's programme were declared to be. First, the development of public instruction and national defences on land and sea, second, administration decentralization; third, colonial autonomy, fourth, to guarantee fundamental liberties by judicial power; fifth, expulsion of monks and nuns, sixth, obligatory civil registration, seventh, lay institutions, eighth, separation of Church and State, and ninth, the strengthening of the credit and finance of the country

To reconstruct was the first necessity. There was a past to be redeemed as well as a future to be provided for. The Portuguese Revolution had the effect of sending to power the most prominent Republicans, men who, perhaps, in ordinary circumstances would hardly have found their way there. But "the Republican party," wrote Cunha e Costa, "assumed office without statesmen and plans. To say that they had enlisted the intellectual élite of the country is a wilful misrepresentation of the truth." "The circumstance," to put it in the words of this Republican writer, "that almost all the future heads of the administration turn Revolutionaries, precisely proves what we assert. History shews that with very few exceptions the temperaments of the Revolutionary and the statesman are incompatible. The good qualities of the former are the defects of the latter. A Revolutionary, as a rule, is intolerant, excitable and violent, he is constitutionally incapable of adapting himself to the trammels and limitations of social life. He bears them as an imposition laid upon him by circumstances, but not without a permanent reaction of his whole being. His specific function is to destroy, leaving the

¹ *Times*, September 28, 1911

work of re-organisation to the energy and judgment of statesmen" "The men who made the Republic," said the writer, "were not prepared to organize it Agitators of the first rank, eloquent and inspiring speakers, or conspirators of untiring and unshakable tenacity, their energies had been entirely absorbed by the propaganda and preparations for the Revolution, which also prevented them from studying the national problem and its solutions. When, after the first Government had been constituted, the members met for the first time in council, the question 'And now?' was on every lip"¹ Thus, there was what it is difficult to call anything else but an attempt at Government sharp practices There was a smuggling of measures before there was time to understand them or agitate against them. "And what has been the constructive policy of this latest form of Portuguese statesmanship?" asked W. H. Koebel, in the London *Academy* "It has curtailed the liberties of the citizens, it has retired in disorder before a sudden great outbreak of strikes strangely inappropriate to the millennium But in return it has framed a new code of Divorce law that throws open the alluring fields of free love In defence it may be urged with a certain amount of reason, that unrepressed political discontent is fatal to the welfare of the State, that to intervene in strike disorders might fan a larger flame of riot, and that the shuffling together and redealing of husbands and wives is an enlightened tribute to the rational spirit of the age But as remedies for the condition of Portugal," said the well-known writer, a recognized authority in England on South American Republics, "these do not suffice Political and social experiments, Utopian dreams are luxuries for none but the most stable moments of a stolid nation. Applied to a highly wrought race whose nerve is suffering from a vital shock, they are as effectual and as enduring as a coat of gaudy paint smeared on red-hot embers"²

The liberty of the Press had been one of the principles of the Revolution. The condition of Portuguese journalism

¹ Cunha e Costa, *Balanço Político* Dia December 31, 1912.

² W. H. Koebel, "The Plight of Portugal," *Academy* June 24, 1911

was unsatisfactory in the extreme. The Portuguese Press, with a few honourable exceptions, was libellous. Its unrestrained freedom was incompatible with order and stability. Indeed, I am not sure that the Monarchy was not unintentionally favourable to it. In 1881, an attempt was made to prosecute the newspapers that used offensive language towards the King. A "Regenerador" Ministry was in power and Rodrigues Sampaio was the Premier. But the task proved to be unexpectedly difficult. Sampaio's action was thought to be an attempt to gag the Press. This opinion was even more prevalent among the "Progressistas," who were in the Opposition, and whose organ in the Press, the *Diário Popular*, edited by Mariano de Carvalho, an astute intriguer, had insulted the King. "The King," had, said this paper, whose business was to attack the Monarchy whilst the party it supported was out of office, "was in the power of the favourite, Fontes, the leader of the Regeneradores by virtue of some hidden crime"—a statement conjured up by the journalist's vivid fancy and boundless egotism, but which later was cowardly explained as only alluding to a political crime. Moreover, Rodrigues Sampaio had no moral prestige to display firmness in the matter. He himself had been a journalist, and editors of Republican sheets, charged with having insulted the King, were not slow to remind the Prime Minister that in his *Revolução de Setembro*, and especially in the *Espectro*, he had poured forth the most vindictive slander against Dona Maria, the Queen of Portugal, and so vile was Rodrigues Sampaio's language that Dom Pedro the Fifth had refused to appoint him Minister of the Crown, for being his mother's traducer. Thus, for years, from so-called motives of prudence, nothing was done to protect the Monarchy by the enactment of law against libellers. writs were frequently issued, but trials seldom took place. The Press was officially recognized as a power above the law; and it did not rest till it had put all other powers under its feet.

Again, journalists—Monarchical as well as Republican—had outraged and insulted Queen Amelia of Portugal by

filthy charges, slanderously made against her—charges that will not bear quoting in English. Indeed, the Portuguese Queen endured every species of injury and insult to be offered to a woman. She—a child of old France—well might have imagined Africa to begin beyond the Pyrenees!

“What is civilization,” said Emerson, “but the influence of good women” It would not, therefore, be wrong to define barbarism as a state in which the influence of a woman is resented. No woman, however, more fully owned the obligations which her position gave her than the Consort of King Carlos of Portugal There is, of course, a benevolence which relieves the immediate necessities of the individual, and there is a benevolence which seeks to lift up the submerged masses of the community into a higher and purer state of being To the future of the person, or the State, the latter, said a writer, is of infinitely higher importance than mere almsgiving It was this form of philanthropy to which Queen Amelia dedicated her life It was her happy privilege to be the founder of the *Assistencia Nacional* for the consumptive—one of the greatest works of charity in Portugal—which went on successfully, for eleven years, under her personal guidance, nor has it ceased even to this day She founded the Royal Dispensary at Alcantara, where about thirty thousand children received yearly treatment and proper nourishment. She also founded the Royal Bacteriological Institute, and herself conveyed from Paris the first phials of anti-diphtheritic serum. To these institutions the Portuguese Queen gave her energies, and not without good fruit Indeed, her crown acquired a lustre from deeds of kindness which the most precious and glittering stones would fail to impart The Queen, however, was exposed to much discouragement. The difficulties which lay in her path must have been insuperable to any but a woman of the greatest energy. She addressed, for instance, earnest, personal appeals to the Ministers of Finance to procure the abolition of certain food taxes affecting the poor. But the pretentious Ministers of the Crown went about their business as if the cry from the

Queen's heart was but the whistle of the wintry wind. There was with Queen Amelia, as with Queen Elisabeth of Portugal—whose history presents some features parallel to her own—a sympathy with the poor and disinherited in the world. How the distressed and sorrowful turned instinctively to her for consolation, many stories testify. A poor Portuguese once lay dying in a Lisbon Hospital. His hours were almost numbered. In the agonies of death he tendered the Queen, his only visitor, his pestiferous hand. "Hold my hand and help me to die," implored the man. The Queen took his hand in her own, until the poor man passed away! Again, when the terrible scourge of plague visited Portugal, her lavished charity and personal attention to the plague-stricken, undoubtedly gave a silver lining to the blackness of the cloud that in 1900 hung over the land.

"I may repeat the famous saying. *tout est perdu fors l'honneur!* Life has been too hard for me. My heart is filled with grief, bitterness and indignation at the thought of so much baseness, ingratitude and treachery. But God's will be done. I have done what I could to fulfil my duty." Thus spoke Queen Amelia of Portugal to the Duke of Luynes, when the Royal British yacht landed at Plymouth the exiled members of the Portuguese Royal Family. These words certainly constitute a grave charge against those whose ungentlemanly conduct must have sunk deep into the heart of the unhappy Queen.

It was not freedom of thought, but the licence of the Press which the Republic had to discover to be inconsistent with the safety of any Government, for then as now, the Portuguese were feeling sensible how great was the evil of a licentious Press. The journalists should be freed from the shackles of special penal legislation. Such was the uncompromising verdict pronounced by the Republican Press when Portugal was a Monarchy, how little it was realized in practice may be illustrated by the following facts. The Provisional Government passed a Press Law which was said by the Republican Press to have conferred advantages

of an exceptionally high order. Yet the Government sanctioned, a few days after the Press Law was passed, the seizure of the newspaper *O Combate*, of Braga, suspended by an administrative order, because the paper spoke truths unpalatable to the men in power. The printing presses of the Lisbon newspapers *Liberal*, *Correio da Manhã* and the *Diario Illustrado*, were also destroyed by an infuriated mob. Antonio José d'Almeida, the eloquent Minister of the Interior, disapproved of this act of savagery as being contrary to "the good principles of social discipline and constituting an attack on the rights of property of the individual." But the destruction of the printing presses was followed by the Lisbon Civil Governor's refusal to permit the papers to continue to be published. The editor of the *Diario do Porto*, himself a Republican, denounced the dictatorship which was established on the fall of the Monarchy, and spoke against the sincerity and success of the new experiment. "In consequence," wrote *The Times*, "his office and his house were attacked and wrecked by the mob against which the authorities provided very inadequate protection"¹ "Your English papers are just as bad. Have you read this article?" were the words of Bernardino Machado, drawing the attention of an English writer to an article on Portugal which appeared in the *National Review*.² "Such things," said the Portuguese Foreign Minister, "should not be permitted. It professed to be the work of an Englishman in Portugal—who is he? Your Government, which proclaims its friendship and sympathy for Portugal, should not allow such pernicious falsehoods to be published"³ This was a strange confession to make. It would be hard to say whether Machado's statement was most conspicuous for its indiscretion or for its levity. The English writer, however, reminded the Republican diplomat, "that effete Monarchies do not enjoy the same powers of summary jurisdiction over the Press as those exercised by a new Republic"⁴

¹ *The Times* September 25, 1912

² *National Review* January, 1911

³ and ⁴ J O B Bland "A Portuguese Jacobin," *Nineteenth Century Review*. July, 1911

"With the new Press Law," said the *Daily News and Leader*, "newspapers are prohibited to use free speech, and the Royalist Press no longer exists. The Republican journals are nearly all semi-official, being the organ of some special faction of the Republican Party."¹ It is difficult to conceive that principles once laid down in plain and peremptory language by men who once boasted of their exemption from all the contrivances for repressing disaffection, could be transformed by a sudden apostasy. The Portuguese Republicans, however, reasoned thus: There are only two kinds of Portuguese—patriots and traitors. A Republican is a patriot. Conclusion: the Portuguese who are not Republicans are traitors, and therefore must be eliminated. Franco, for instance, whose dictatorship was a source of great annoyance to the Republicans, was arrested and released on bail. The ex-Dictator was accused of "having abused power" under the Monarchy. It seemed as if errors of the past against which the Revolution professed to be struggling were personified in this politician, who, let it be said, had assumed Dictatorship with no other object but to correct these same errors. It seemed, indeed, that the new régime of "austere morality and immaculate justice" depended for success a great deal on the humiliation of Franco. But the Republican Dictators reckoned without the Judicial Power—a power free from all petty jealousies. The Court of Appeal at Lisbon formally and unanimously annulled the prosecution instituted against the former Dictator. The judges, however, incurred the displeasure of the Provisional Government. They were severely punished, and the relegation to a distant colony in India of three judges, and the placing of the fourth upon the retired list, seemed a warning to all Portuguese to act only in accordance with the passions and desires of the dominant patriots.

This irrational attitude of mind exhibited itself in a frightful display of savagery. Hundreds were arrested upon any flimsy pretext and imprisoned on the simple order of the omnipotent *Carbonario*. "It is useless," wrote Carlos

¹ *Daily News and Leader* October 9, 1912

Malheiro Dias, the author of *Do Desafio a Debandade*, a writer by no means hostile to the Republic, "for the Civil Governor to publish in the Lisbon papers statements to the effect that he does not allow any but the regular police to effect arrest. Every day the zealous *Carbonario* arrests, searches, and shows, it is to be feared, in the exercise of those official functions, fanaticism and brutality." Minds less tinctured with fanaticism than that of the greater part of Republicans no doubt declared that a Republic properly constituted ought not to recognize officially the existence of a Revolutionary terrorist society. But "no Government, however strong," openly declared the chief of *Carbonarios*, "could dissolve the society of the *Carbonarios*," a statement which "caused a deep impression throughout the country."¹ Thus "the *Carbonario*," to quote the words of Carlos Malheiro Dias, "finally acquired unbounded influence over the Government, prejudicing and embarrassing the mental action of the Cabinet, imprinting on it a Jacobin intolerant and demagogic character which rendered it unsuitable for the rule of a composite State." The Republicanism of the *Carbonario*, indeed, manifested itself in a frightful display of intolerance which has, from time immemorial, had a peculiar charm for the Portuguese; and hundreds were detained on trumpery charges preferred by the so-called "Defenders of the Republic." "We learn from a trustworthy source," wrote the Republican *Seculo*,² when Miss Oram, an English lady, the correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, was released as innocent after being charged with conspiring against the Republic, "that in the search made in Miss Oram's house, nothing compromising was found, and it seems that the accusations made against her have little consistency owing to the slight moral worth of her accusers"³

¹ *Times* January 6, 1911

² *Seculo* August 5, 1912

³ "Among the victims of the campaign of panic and revenge which ensued was a British subject, Miss Oram, the correspondent of the *Daily Mail*, who was arrested early in August on a charge of political conspiracy. Her accusers were a *Carbonario* of bad character, himself awaiting trial for a theft from the War Office in which he had worked as a clerk, and a disreputable youth of good family, who after serving and deserting Coucciro, had endeavoured to obtain admission to the privileged Carbonaria, by tracking or inventing charges against suspected Royalists. My intervention on Miss Oram's behalf

Under the plea of defending the Republic, the *Carbonarios*¹ committed atrocities that would put Morocco to shame "I know a rascal," wrote a noted Republican, "who boasts of possessing a collection of hair pulled out from the beards of prisoners. He owns three varieties. dark, fair and grey. He rushes at the prisoners and tears handfuls of hair from their beards."

"These 'groups of defence,' to use the high-sounding name bestowed upon them by their chiefs, are content to do their sinister work for a consideration of 4s a head per day, and in order to justify their existence they are bound

secured to her an immediate and fair trial, which resulted in her acquittal after a few days' detention, as well as in the payment of a pecuniary indemnity. But there is little doubt that had she been a Portuguese she would have remained in prison for months"—Right Hon. Sir Arthur Hardinge, *A Diplomatist in Europe*

¹ "By the name 'Defensores da Republica' (defenders of the Republic) are the *Carbonarios* called in the Government papers. One of the Ministers assured me that the *Carbonarios* no longer existed. 'These friends of the Republic,' he said, 'are no longer needed now that we are so securely established.' But I heard a different story from one of the members of the secret society who introduced me to some of his fellows. pointed to gangs of them in the Rocio, the chief square of Lisbon and said 'We are the Republic'."

"They are entirely in the service of the Government, are paid about six shillings a day, and find the job to their liking, as it is made up of haunting cafes, spying on their fellow-citizens, searching private houses, keeping a sharp eye on the army (by surveillance in barracks), bullying the uniformed police and generally 'defending the Republic'."

"Their most formidable power is the 'busca,' or search. Hardly a day passes at Lisbon or Oporto without a 'busca' being made in the houses of suspected Royalists or disillusioned Republicans. No one is safe from this inquisition. There is a knock at the door, a little gang of men enters, papers are seized, drawers turned inside out, the house is ransacked, and the owner is lucky if he escapes arrest. Generally he is not so lucky."

"I met several people who had been the victims of this outrage. One of them was a distinguished lawyer, Doctor Domingo Pinto Coelho, whose offices were searched (at the time of the bogus Royalist rising of October last). He was arrested, taken to Oporto, imprisoned, and subsequently set free without apology. For defending Royalist prisoners, Senhor Arruela, another distinguished lawyer, had his papers seized, was arrested and imprisoned. In one case recently a young lady was forced to strip in the presence of one of these *Carbonario* gangs, who were searching for papers."

"During the political 'movements' in April and October, 1913, the *Carbonarios* massed in the streets of Lisbon and told the police whom to arrest. In July, 1912, a naval officer, Lieutenant Manuel Soares, after his acquittal by court-martial, was shot dead by the *Carbonarios* as he came out of the Hotel Frankfort, and his sweetheart, hearing the news, committed suicide. In August of last year a Republican working-man named Manuel de Azevedo, refusing to take off his hat to a band of these 'patriots' was set upon and beaten violently. Endeavouring to defend himself, he was accused of 'attempted

to manufacture crime if none can be discovered"¹ said Adeline, Duchess of Bedford, whose letters, based on first hand information, to the London Press² kindled a flame of indignation which resulted in the memorable British Protest Meeting of April, 1913, at the Aeolian Hall, London³ Dona Constança de Telles da Gama, a lady of high rank,

manslaughter' and has remained, without trial, for fifteen months in prison. One of the richest men in Portugal, commonly called 'Monteiro of the Millions,' was recently assaulted upon leaving his house, arrested and accused of having sheltered a Royalist conspirator.

"A few weeks ago a veteran officer, General Jaime de Castro, was attacked in the street by *Carbonarios*, severely mauled, and charged with having visited a Royalist conspirator. When I saw him in prison he had been forty-five days without trial, but no evidence had been found against him, and he was awaiting release. Another officer, named Colonel Seabra de l'Acerda, whom I also interviewed in his cell, had been forty-seven days in prison, without trial."

"These men are prepared to defend the Republic by bombs as well as by wanton attacks on defenceless citizens, and the contrast between the law for Royalists and that for *Carbonarios* may be seen in two paragraphs which appeared on the same day in one of the newspapers.

"On December 4, Francisco Julio de Carvalho and Alvaro Lopes de Oliveira were condemned to six years' solitary confinement and twelve years' deportation for being in the possession of explosives.

"Jose Henriques Dias de Almeida, similarly charged with being in the possession of bombs, was promptly set free, because he said he was a Defender of the Republic.

"A Republic is not in a good way when it needs such defenders" . . . Philip Gibbs, "The Rule of the *Carbonarios*," *Daily Chronicle* December 16, 1913

¹ Adeline, Duchess of Bedford, "Republican Tyranny in Portugal," *Nineteenth Century Review* May, 1913

² "The Duchess, who can speak with authority upon all matters affecting the welfare of prisoners at home, has recently returned from Lisbon, where by the courtesy of the authorities she was able to visit the three chief prisons, and to see with her own eyes the pitiable condition of the political prisoners. Her story, told with simplicity and restraint, confirms the worst suspicions that have been entertained here as to the methods adopted by the Government of the Republic in dealing with its political opponents." "Since the date of the Revolution of 1910, and especially since the so-called Royalist invasion of last July, the secret societies, to whom the establishment of the Republic was due, appear to have been seeking to consolidate their work by waging a war of extermination against all who could be suspected by any stretch of imagination of Royalist sympathies. Hundreds of such persons have been arrested on the most frivolous charges, often upon the hint of base informers, and thrown, without regard to age, rank or condition, into the common prisons, there to remain for weeks, months, or it may be years, herded together with the vilest criminals until it should please the authorities to try them"—"Political Prisoners in Portugal," *Times* April 7, 1913

³ *Portuguese Political Prisoners, A British National Protest* Compiled by the Honorary Secretary of the British Protest Committee With a preface by the Earl of Lytton, Adeline, Duchess of Bedford, and the Hon Aubrey Herbert, M P London, 1913

whose case aroused much indignation abroad, was arrested for merely indulging in acts of philanthropy. The *Carbonarios* raided her house and carried off a number of private letters, and seven months later the following comedy was acted before a martial tribunal

Question In a letter from the prisoner Fernandes, occurs the statement, "I do not forget the word you gave me." What is that word?

Dona Constança A promise not to forget him

Question Prisoner Nogueira writes he has "engraved on his soul" some of your words. Explain this

Dona Constança He alludes to my promise to pay expenses of his lawsuit

Question The same prisoner writes of the "constant working of his thoughts." What is this?

Dona Constança The natural lament of a poor man separated from his family and condemned to long imprisonment

Question A letter from a priest thanks you for money sent to prisoners in Guimarães. What was this for?

Dona Constança Charity for the poor among political prisoners

Question A letter ends "awaiting your orders." What is this?

Dona Constança A polite way of ending a letter to a lady ¹

Dona Constança was formally accused of having, with a servant and a private soldier, "conspired against the Republic without conspiring to give effect to the conspiracy." She was tried and set at liberty. The silent dignity, however, exhibited by Dona Constança during her seven months of imprisonment in the Ajube prison, hitherto reserved for female prisoners of the worst description, was that of a worthy descendant of Vasco da Gama. It may be ascribed to her pride. Pride she had, no doubt—it was in her blood—but it might, with more justice, be traced to that sense of duty which never deserted her.

The treatment of political prisoners awaiting trial in Lisbon and the provinces, who were, for several months, between black despair and faint hopes as to their fate, was outrageous. The treatment of political prisoners was indeed

¹ E. M. Tenison, "Royalist Prisoners in Portugal," *Spectator* March 22, 1913

a strange sight; for a parallel one must hark back to the days of Dom Miguel, the King Absolute. The most loathsome features of political intolerance under absolutism were not only reproduced but intensified under the new regime. The Committee of British Residents in Portugal—a committee formed to investigate the condition of political prisoners awaiting trial under the Republic—were unanimous in testifying this. “The prisoners of the Tower of St. Julien,” so ran the petition presented to Dom Miguel by the political prisoners confined in the dungeons of Lisbon under the tyranny and caprice of Telles Jordão, “have been lodged in the worst cells—subterranean, dark, exposed to rain and all weathers and so damp that it has frequently been necessary to strew the ground with furze to enable them to walk on it”¹. They have occupied Nos. 130, 131, 132, which being only nine yards long and three yards wide, are crowded with such a number as to raise the temperature to such a degree as to cause cutaneous eruptions and other complaints². Among these sufferers are the Spanish Bishop, Dr. Diego Munoz Torrero, Dom Ant. Pinho and J. Ant. Cansado, these latter being already declared innocent by the Commission. In one of these cells a complete inundation has occurred more than once, leaving a continued dampness, and causing a consequent deterioration of health³. Besides this dreadful state, sir, the governor has ordered the windows to be closed, to shut out the few spans of light of the heavens and the fresh air, the only remaining part of it being from the fissures of the door whereto the prisoners apply in turn their mouths to

¹ “The punishment cells are places of horror, without air or light, they have stone floors, and are kept in a filthy condition, overrun with rats and full of vermin” (Report of Committee of British Residents in Portugal)

² “The most loathsome forms of skin disease are prevalent and neglected” (*Morning Post* January 30, 1912) “The infirmary is composed of a single room in a dirty and insanitary condition, where patients suffering from every kind of disease, infectious or otherwise, are placed together, often cotton-wool and dressings are used a second time on a different patient, this having led in many cases to blood poisoning” (Report of Committee of British Residents)

³ All the inmates of the Alto Duque are incarcerated in damp, subterranean dungeons, often as much as 15 metres below the level of the ground. Some of these cells are flooded in heavy rain, none is ever reached by any ray of sunlight. (*Morning Post* January 30, 1912)

breathe particles of that air which the Almighty spreads so unsparingly to all animals and living beings.¹ Another cell, called the principal one from below, is also inhabited, and so dark that at ten o'clock, let the sun be as brilliant as possible, six lights will not suffice to lighten it, being twenty steps below the surface of the ground. Such, sir, has been the habitation of your petitioners, not for the space of a few days, but for eighteen, twenty and twenty-three months, several other better cells are only occupied by three or four prisoners "

This, of course, was not a tale of a very remote past, but it is sad to record that untried, indeed, unaccused prisoners should, eighty years after, be thrown into similar dungeons, and the Portuguese Republicans should dignify them with the name of prisons.² "In the terribly damp cells of the fort," said a Republican writer, "the prisoners will be forced to reflect that it is not with impunity that the will of the people is set at defiance³ The Lisbon journalist persuaded himself that he was a kind of prophet whose every word is inspired. There is no inspiration in gush.

"And the men behind the bars?" asked a distinguished British journalist "Were they taken and condemned, sword in hand, in the early days of the Republic, or found guilty, upon good evidence, as conspirators? If so, the Republic has a right to defend itself. But I found scores of men—lawyers, doctors, professors—who have been arrested during recent months by spies, acting independently of police, who have had no evidence produced against them, and who have not been brought to any trial. Although by the law of the Republic no man may be imprisoned for more than eight days without trial, I spoke with men who have been imprisoned for fifteen months without even being charged by a formal accusation. Although by another law

¹ These cells (the punishment cells at the Limoeiro) contain a kind of slop sink which serves sundry purposes for the prisoners and which is often choked, making the air of the cell foul and poisonous. In the smaller cells these conditions are aggravated by want of space, which obliges the prisoner to sleep with his head against the sink (Report of Committee of British Residents)

² My letter on *The Prisoners in Portugal* to the *Spectator*. March 22, 1913

³ *Mundo* October 25, 1911.

of the Republic no person may be kept 'incommunicavel' (isolated) for more than forty-eight hours before trial, and even during that time must be permitted to receive close relations, like parents, wife and children, I found prisoners who had been kept for trial for more than forty days in solitary confinement."¹

In this connection I can do no better than quote the words of a Portuguese lawyer, who held it his moral duty to call attention to the grave offence against the laws of Portugal "The whole treatment of the political prisoners," said José d'Arruela, "has been truly shameful I have visited clients in the Fort of Alto do Duque in the Castello de S Jorge, and Caxias In all these prisons they are crowded together in the most deplorable condition, both as regards hygiene and treatment Hundreds of men have been confined for hundreds of days, with no definite charge against them, without being heard in their own defence "² Arruela was the lawyer who, under Monarchy, had defended the Republican non-commissioned officers and men charged with mutiny, in January, 1908.

Several attempts, however, were made to represent the Portuguese prisons under the most smiling aspect. The best known of them was the publicity given to the visit of certain British journalists to Portugal The journalists were invited by the "Propaganda de Portugal," that most useful body, formed in the days of Monarchy to attract the foreign tourist to Portugal. This excursion trip was, however, turned into a sort of semi-official visit of British journalists to Portugal; and the Republican Press delighted in the fact that the guests of the "Propaganda de Portugal" saw one of the prisons, and that "their impressions could not have been more favourable." Motives of prudence might have prevented the Portuguese Republicans from making their new device known at full, for "several non-commissioned officers," wrote the special correspondent of *The Times*, "who were arrested some twenty-one months ago for conspiring against the Republic, are still waiting

¹ Philip Gibbs, "The Rule of the Carbonarios," *Daily Chronicle* December 16, 1913.

² *Dia.* December 4, 1911

for trial. They recently sent a letter to the Press asking that some foreign journalists who are about to visit Portugal should inspect their prison and investigate their case. As a punishment for this, the Government now refuses the prisoners to receive the usual visit from relatives and friends."¹

But there was a harder fate in store for political prisoners in Portugal. Over every one of these prisoners deportation was suspended. It was suspended, indeed, over the head of every Portuguese. The Government having perceived that the judges were rather well disposed towards political prisoners, they were tried under *ad hoc* legislation—that is, by people nominated specially for the purpose. The Republic began by proclaiming that all political offenders would be tried by jury. But soon a decree, signed in February, 1911, instituted special tribunals at Lisbon and Oporto to try cases of political conspiracy, outrages on the national flag, and insults to the Provisional President, and the abortive Royalist risings afforded the Republic an opportunity of trying the merely suspected Royalists by court-martial—a tribunal composed of men who never enjoyed any independence, who were more and more dependent upon the Minister of War, whose nominees they were. A prisoner accused of carrying two letters from Couceiro, the Royalist leader, was condemned to six years of cell confinement, followed by ten years' deportation, with the alternative of twenty years' deportation. "The penitentiary system," said *The Times*, "which was never enforced on political prisoners under the Monarchy, even in the case of those officers who rose in armed insurrection in January, 1891, is now being applied in all its vigour on those who, with or without reason, have been accused of conspiring against the Republic."² To render solitary confinement still more insupportable, these political prisoners were treated like convicts of the worst description. "Although it is only just the Republic should punish those bearing arms against it," wrote the *Daily News and Leader*, "it is not fair to treat them like criminals of the lowest type, and

¹ *The Times* February 13, 1913

² *The Times* September 25, 1912

subject them to close confinement in inadequate cells, dressed in hooded shrouds with two eye holes for the purpose of vision, debarred from all speech"¹ The horrors of solitary confinement were thus aggravated tenfold.

But to enforce submission by savagery is not statesmanship. The best way to disarm one's enemy is to disarm his mind. This is hard to teach to those who regard their political opponents as bondsmen, not as brethren, and send them to eat at the second table

To be without a Constitution was, of course, to remain liable to the extravagant outrages of the Republican leaders, without having an established rule of measure for their conduct. "For the first time," said Bernardino Machado, the Republican Foreign Minister, "elections are going to be seen in this country in which the Government will not intervene."

The directing committee of the Republican Consultative Junta, however, had secured the right of a weekly meeting with the Ministers in power, to make preparations for the coming elections to the Constituent Assembly. Unwilling to resign its power to the Provisional Government, the Revolutionary Committee had acquired the right to rank as the Republic's Privy Council, and, strange to say, from the Republican point of view there was nothing unusual or reprehensible in such methods. Thus, at a meeting of the Provisional Government, the Republican Directory and the Electoral Junta, it was decided that "all the forces of the party, without exception, must unite officially to prevent the enemies of the Republic from surreptitiously intruding into the politics of the nation", and the election, if such a word can be used of a process in which the Government had a larger share than the citizens, offered no contrast whatever to the gloom and torpor it exhibited in the latter days of Monarchy. In fact, the election, the first of the Republic, amounted only to a census of the Republican party.

The vile hoax, however, deceived nobody, certainly not the representatives of foreign nations. "It is probable that

¹ *Daily News and Leader* October 9, 1912

if the elections for the Constituent Assembly had been really free," wrote Sir Arthur Hardinge, the ex-British Minister in Lisbon, "certain districts in the north of Portugal, in which the Republican legislation against religion was resented, would have returned avowed Royalists, but the fear of the *Carbonarios*, and the complete disorganization of the old Monarchical parties ever since the proclamation of the Republic, was too great."¹ Incidentally, in that part of India known to-day as "Estado da India," the Republican Government, inspired by an anti-clerical fanaticism, had the power to upset the election, which the majority of electors, who were Catholics, had not. Thus at the very beginning were citizen-rights travestied and made into a mockery.

"The Constituent Assembly," wrote an English writer in the *Contemporary Review*, "was appointed by the Government exactly as former Parliaments had been appointed."²

It was upon such slovenly and objectionable grounds that the Republic was to stand. The Constituent Assembly, which was to establish the organic basis of the administration, became a veritable playhouse in which was now enacted the second act of the Republican comedy. With the possible exception of Lisbon and one or two other centres, the members of the Republican assembly could not, of course, seriously claim to represent the country. They owed their seats to the Ministry of the Interior, or rather to the Directory. Bearers of no mandates, but hopelessly divided by their parochial tendencies, they, however, were not wanting in arrogance. They were ignorant, but were noisy, and broke off into personalities. They apostrophized each other from bench to bench, and the meetings of the Constituent Assembly became scenes of excitement and recrimination. But noise and undiscipline, the Portuguese Republicans said, were signs of life. Unknown members—men who, a year ago, wandered unrecognized in a crowd, became dissatisfied with the office of stepping stones to their leaders' ambitions, and the nation was told

¹ Right Hon. Sir Arthur Hardinge, *A Diplomatist in Europe*

² Aubrey G. Bell, "The Portuguese Republic," *Contemporary Review* March, 1912

that it was a symptom of the spirit of independence coming over Portugal. Laughable, yet grievous, was the conduct of this motley assembly of deputies incapable of forming an idea of the task set them. Their illiteracy and incapacity was, daily and hourly, so broadly evident and apparent, that some of the wisest of their few wise men, who stood outside the ring of this circus,¹ looked upon the whole scene with sorrow and indignation. Antonio Claro even thought it necessary that a just comparison should be instituted between the first Republican Parliament and the Constitutional Assembly of 1820. "Who are now the scientists, the patriots and great lawyers, and the economists," asked the Republican journalist, who was wont to call a spade a spade, "that made the Assembly of 1820 so illustrious? Who are the Silvas Sanches, the Carlos Bentos, the Garrets, the Passos, the Agostinhos, Albanos and many others whose great orations are to be found in the Parliamentary Reports of the Constitutional Chambers?" "How is it possible," he added, emphasizing the obscurity and insignificance of the members of the Republican Constituent Assembly, "how is it possible to maintain this state of affairs till 1914?"²

There was indeed an all-pervading air of mediocrity about the Republican Constituent Assembly. Its tone was not high, and any utterance that now rose above the most commonplace, seemed to the members of the Assembly oratory worthy of Jose Estevão, the eminent Parliamentarian who, years ago, called the attention of the nation to the humiliating affair of *Charles et Georges*, in which triumphed the chicanery of Napoleon the Third. The manner, for

¹ "I went, through the courtesy of a friend, to the Camara dos Deputados on a number of occasions," wrote, some years after, a British Indian from the Malabar Coast, giving his "Impressions of Portugal" in the *Times of India* (January 4, 1926). "The first time I went there, there was a political crisis which led to the resignation of the Cabinet. But everything in the chamber was leisurely. When a speaker gets up to address the House there is a general movement towards his seat. A number of deputies interested in his speech gather round him, standing at their ease, and some quietly smoking cigarettes. Often enough, when the occasion is exciting, the members rush at each other's throats. Even the attendants stand in the middle of the House and listen attentively to the proceedings. It reminded me more of a music hall than of a Parliament."

² *Diário de Porto*, No. 10

instance, in which the speech of Alexandre Braga was received in the Assembly, was rather suggestive. The Republican orator's speech had, no doubt, redeemed Parliament from the illiteracy that became native to it under the new regime. But the members thought that speech alone would be sufficient to make the session conspicuous in the Parliamentary history of the country, and the occasion seemed to them particularly opportune for recalling public attention to the panegyric delivered by Alexandre Braga. They proposed, therefore, that the Government should print the speech for the benefit of the nation. But the President of the Assembly gravely remarked that though the speech had sent members home half delirious, he was convinced that the oration would make no impression if read in print—a very doubtful compliment, indeed, to be paid to the tribune of the Republic.

Common-sense ought to have taught the members to be discreet. But they imagined that by questioning and cross-examining the Ministers of the Provisional Government and the Foreign Minister especially, they were turning themselves into statesmen. The sudden transference, in the height of an exciting crisis, of Sir Villiers, the British Minister, to Brussels—an affair which concerned nobody but Sir Edward Grey, was an event which, in the eyes of some members of the Constituent Assembly, seemed tantamount to humiliation,¹ and rumours were spread that the indiscretions of the Portuguese Foreign Minister in the Provisional Government had seriously compromised the British Minister in Lisbon.

Fate had played an extraordinary part in the Republic's career, obliging her, among other things, to take as friend the representative of a nation the Republicans had accused of all the misfortunes and miseries of Portugal. When Portugal was a Monarchy it was England that was draining Portugal of power and money. The British policy, indeed, had not changed. But after twenty years of wiles and bluff, a sponge was gently pressed over insults once offered

¹ My letter on "Political Prisoners in Portugal," to the *Nation* August 9, 1913.

to England. Old ties of alliance and friendship were now invoked by Republican Ministers to defend themselves against members who were unable to view international questions from the more distant and more neutral point of view. This must have made the battered remains of King Carlos move with disgust in his coffin¹

The first act of the Constituent Assembly, which met on June 19, 1911, was to pass a law decreeing the perpetual banishment of the House of Bragança. The main business of the Assembly, however, was the drafting of a Constitution that would give Portugal a fresh lease of life. But the drafting of a successful Constitution required conditions with which Republican Portugal was unable or unwilling to comply. Unwilling because it was in a hysterical frame of mind, and unable because it scarcely perceived to what goal it was bound.

The Constitution of 1911, voted on August 18, established a Parliamentary Republic. The Republican legislators tried to copy the Constitution of France, which was regarded as the pattern to which it was desirable to approach the Portuguese Republican Constitution, and the executive power was vested, as in France, in a ministry selected by the President of the Republic from the members of the Parliamentary majority, for the time being. And yet, strange to say, the Constituent Assembly, having voted subsidy for its own members, converted itself on its own initiative into an ordinary Congress. "In contradistinction to the French Legislative Assembly, which decreed that its members were not eligible for the future Convention," wrote a Portuguese Constitutional lawyer, "our Constituent Assembly suppresses election and declares itself to be immortal until . . . 1915"¹

But those who were now entrusted with the work of Constitution, seemed to deny the guidance of history, and believe that Republicanism holds to no traditions of experience, and they could give Portugal nothing better than a paper constitution hurriedly prepared out of crude materials. "As for the Constitution," said the Constitutional lawyer

¹ Cunha Costa, "Balanço Politico" *Dia* December 31, 1912

quoted above, "planned under the suspicious eyes of the various partisans, each of whom distrusted the others and constantly saw a possible dictator appear on the horizon, we will merely say that no political loom in Europe has produced a worse sewn or more variegated example of patchwork."¹

There was yet another ground of uneasiness which must needs have confronted those who had taken upon themselves the task of reconstructing the political institutions of the country. Instead of a homogeneous body of fraternal patriots there had appeared a number of factions struggling for dominion over each other. Thus the provision in the Constitution (Art. 33, Clause C) that no one of the Ministers of the Republic should be capable of being elected President of the Republic, raised a tempest of protests from politicians who held self-interest and vanity to be the only springs of action. "You withdraw the motion or I appeal to the streets," were the words of Afonso Costa, who had proclaimed as a duty the principle of insurrection. The motion was introduced to moderate the party ambition, to repress the inordinate vanity of some leaders, and thus to secure neutrality in the affairs of the State. But Afonso Costa knew that the moderates who supported the candidature of Manuel Arriaga to the Presidency of the Republic, were the instigators of the motion. His suspicious mind instantly surmised sinister plots that he thought ought to be read through. The moderates, he believed, in proposing the exclusion of Ministers to the Presidency, had no other design than to exclude his supporter and colleague in the Provisional Government, Bernardino Machado, one of the candidates for the Presidency. Afonso Costa imagined, therefore, that to abandon the cause of Machado was to humble the faction he led, and the perfectly unscrupulous nature of his mind made him resort to his old, violent tactics. But his threat "to appeal to the street," while it conveyed a notion of the petty minds that were ruling Portugal, made it distressingly plain that the Minister of Justice in the Provisional Government, by his overbearing conduct wanted to keep the

¹ Cunha Costa, "Balanço Político" *Diá* December 31, 1912

deliberations of the Constituent Assembly under a control as indecent as it was pernicious. Here again was a clear proof that a Republican leader did not take the Assembly seriously, and hoped that the Lisbon populace over which he ruled would devise new expedients of blood to modify an article in the Republican Constitution—a Constitution that already regarded as traitors those who “endeavour to change by illegal means that which the nation has established.”

It was amidst these circumstances that the election for the Presidency of the Republic took place. It was a tumultuous affair. Three candidates came forward. They were Bernardino Machado, the Foreign Minister in the Provisional Government, Magalhães Lima, the Grand Master of Portuguese Freemasons and Manuel Arriaga, the Attorney-General.

The Republican parties, or factions, were in a state of the greatest agitation. There were in Portugal—in the capital rather than in the nation—the following factions that counted. The *Democraticos*, headed by Afonso Costa, a faction by no means formidable for their numbers, but whose underhand methods assured them great weight in a Revolutionary period. They claimed the inheritance of the original Republican party, and thus considered themselves the only legitimate Party, other Parties having no reason for existence. The *Evolucionistas*, under the leadership of Antonio Jose d’Almeida, whose policy intended to be moderate and conciliatory. They supported the candidature of Arriaga, and drew up a programme “in order to restore a feeling of tranquillity and confidence in the Republican regime.” The *Independentes*, led by Machado dos Santos, the “hero” of Rotunda, whose views—we cannot call them principles—were opposed to those who proposed the candidature of Bernardino Machado. The would-be *Unionistas*, under Brito Camacho, who represented the “intellectuals,” and presumed that no good could be expected from submitting further questions to an essentially ignorant Parliament. There were also the Syndicalists, Socialists, etc., who firmly believed that the economic

crisis through which Portugal was passing, "had been aggravated by the folly and incompetence of the Republican Government" They all talked of fighting and dying, and they added, for the sake of Republican dignity. But it was a war of tongues which, of course, averted the war of pomards.

Flattered with the vague prospect before him of becoming the President of the Republic, even the aged Professor Theophilo Braga was active enough to fight for Afonso Costa, and to this end made use of virulent language in pamphlets full of anecdotes illustrating notorious facts ¹ But he encountered an opposition which mortified him Sober-minded Republicans manifested some energy when his candidature was under discussion; and the *Republica*, edited by Almeida, the minister of the Provisional Government, hurled upon the unfortunate Professor the reproach of having through his indiscreet utterances provoked the hostile attitude of Spain towards Portugal The Republican daily then proceeded to other considerations of personal character—his clothes were the worst and his shoes the clumsiest in Lisbon, etc., and the ex-President of the Provisional Government was shown to be a false friend, a bad citizen and a treacherous colleague It was impossible, on the evidence which the *Republica* afforded the nation, not to regret with the editor, that Braga did not retire from public life at the zenith of his honours, i.e. soon after Provisional Government had resigned.

The Presidential contest closed with the election of

¹ "The appointment of Dr Manuel d'Arriaga to the position of Attorney-General constitutes an unpublished anecdote Dr Antonio Jose d'Almeida solicited this position for Dr Arriaga, his candidate for the Presidency The Minister of Justice refused to do as he asked, saying that for the post he needed a man who knew the law Antonio José d'Almeida insisted, and Afonso Costa replied that 'he would have no objection to appointing a thalassa' (being a slang term of contempt for Monarchist) provided that he knew the law, as he had serious questions to decide which had not yet been studied Antonio Jose d'Almeida, however, was not to be gainsaid 'Then choose Arriaga, he only wants to be appointed for a fortnight' 'For a fortnight,' exclaimed Afonso Costa 'Why does he want to be Attorney-General for a fortnight?' 'Well, he says he has received letters with "Attorney-General of the Republic" on the envelopes, and a few days ago at the Coliseum he was hailed as that personage, which put him in an uncomfortable position Do appoint him' 'Very well,' said Afonso Costa, with an air of jovial generosity, 'I don't mind for a fortnight' " Theophilo Braga, *Discursos Politicos*

Manuel Arriaga, whose choice was no doubt the result of a compromise among some sections of the moderate party. Arriaga was a non-party man. Until the contest for the Presidency he was little known as a politician.

The aged President of the Portuguese Republic was announced by a section of the Republican Press as claiming descent from King Affonso III of Portugal, and from the French dukedom of Orleans. The very men who diabolised tradition were now deifying it. *Quos Deus Vult perdere prius dementat*. This, however, had as a reply the crossing of Paiva Couceiro with his band of Royalists from Galicia into Douro and Bragança provinces in the north which were absolutely Monarchical in spirit. Every day he was being joined by new adherents to his cause, and his dauntless courage was quite sufficient to inspire thousands of Portuguese in Portugal and Brazil with honest confidence in his efforts.¹

The Powers recognized the Portuguese Republic, and the Republicans hailed with joy the attitude of the Powers towards them. But a recognition could not decide the future of Portugal. National destiny can only be decided by the genuine force and manhood of the nation.

In England, Mr Ramsay MacDonald undertook to make himself the champion of Republicanism in Portugal. I discussed his attitude in the well-known London Review, *The New Age*.² "No one doubted that Mr Ramsay MacDonald believed himself to be influenced only by the purest motives," I wrote at the time, "when he asked Sir

¹ "Divided Portugal" (Interview given by the present writer to the representative of the *Daily Graphic*, October 5, 1911.)

² Paradoxical though it may seem, it was in the Socialist Review, *The New Age*, edited by the late lamented A. R. Orage, whose early death was a serious loss to British journalism, that I wrote a series of articles on Republican Portugal. I have, assuredly, no pleasure in the fulfilment of my predictions, the speed with which they have been accomplished exceeds my expectations. The following articles appeared in *The New Age* —

"Portugal" (January 5, 1911), "Republicanism in Portugal" (February 2, 1911), "Republican Portugal" (May 18, 1911), "Mr Ramsay MacDonald and Portugal" (August 3, 1911), "Triumphant Republicanism" (November 16, 1911), "The Portuguese Republic and the Working Classes" (February 15, 1912), "An Englishman in Portugal" (April 11, 1912), "Portugal Next, I & II" (December 11 and 19, 1912), "Insane Portugal" I & II (May 22 and 29, 1913), "Portugal Her Fate" (November 27, 1913), "The Portuguese Amnesty" (March 12, 1914).

Edward Grey why the British Government had not yet recognised the Portuguese Republic. But the sudden retreat of the Labour member gave one the impression that he had introduced a subject with whose conditions and environment he was but imperfectly acquainted . . . We are not disposed to question the good faith with which any public man in England, in obedience to his creed of solidarity—which as a rule dissolves when translated from abstractions into realities—undertakes to use his influence, however small, in favour of a particular cause or country. But we have a right to inquire upon what careful investigation the attitude confidently taken in the affairs of foreign countries is based. Unhappily, however, for the British public, there are prominent men in this country who are in peculiar danger of talking at random when they move off their own ground into the politics of other countries . . . Portugal is not rich in friends. Far from us the idea of discouraging anybody who befriends her in her trials, and helps her to recover the ground she has lost in the arena of international politics”¹ But, years after, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the Labour M P, became the Prime Minister of Great Britain. Curious though it may seem, it was during his premiership that the British cruiser *Concord*, with the flag of the Royal House of Bragança at half mast and escorted by two Portuguese destroyers, brought back to Portugal, on August 2, 1932, the remains of King Manuel the Second to be placed beside the embalmed bodies of the Kings of the House of Bragança. On the quay at Lisbon, among others awaiting the British warship, was the British Ambassador. Eight blue-jackets came ashore carrying the coffin of the last King of Portugal, the “Unfortunate” as he was named, and as the British sailors placed it on a bier, British buglers sounded the “Last Post.” On the coffin was a bunch of flowers from the royal exile’s home at Fulwell Park, Twickenham. Thousands of people lined the route when the royal flag-draped coffin, on a gun-carriage, was taken from the quay to the historic

¹ My article on “Mr Ramsay MacDonald and Portugal,” *The New Age* August 3, 1911

Church of St. Vincent "My recollection of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald is of a fire-eating revolutionary Socialist," said Mr. George Bernard Shaw in a speech before the October Club, Oxford "You may ask me, 'Are you talking of the gentleman heard on Empire Day, who did not seem to have an idea in his head which he might not have had in the seventeenth century?'" It was in the seventeenth century, I may incidentally observe, that Catherine of Bragança, who married Charles the Second of England, brought as a part of her dowry, the island of Bombay, a gift that urged England to a great imperial career There was, indeed, something grimly ironical in the tragedy of Braganças in Portugal!

"The Republic found at its back and ready and willing to help it the elements which had been the cause of its triumph—the people of Lisbon and the Army and Navy," wrote Antonio José d'Almeida, the ex-Minister in the Provisional Government, afterwards President of the Republic "These elements are but few, if we have regard to the complex political conditions of the country. On the opposite side, filled either by hostile distrust or at the best by the most deplorable apathy, is the whole nation, the Portuguese people, who heard talk of a Republic set up in Lisbon no one knows by whom, nor for whom. The public reads the papers, follows the political debates, watches the attendant quarrels, and, shrugging its shoulders as it did in the bygone days of the Monarchy, repeats. 'They are no better than the others'" "It is not by prevaricating, by cloaking what is ugly, and by painting black white," he added, "that we shall succeed in securing for the unfortunate Portuguese nation that peace and progress which we so ardently wish her, and for which we are toiling He commits a crime who, watching a house on fire, tells the inmates to have no fear, and thus causes their ruin in the general downfall."¹ These words, uttered by a Republican leader, had their echo in the mind of the nation.

But no sooner was the Republic recognised by the Powers

¹ *Republica* November 12, 1911

than events of unexampled gravity occurred in Portugal Antonio José d'Almeida was brutally attacked by an infuriated mob, and had to take refuge in a shop until squadrons of cavalry had to be sent for to maintain order in Lisbon. Antonio José d'Almeida was known to be a Republican leader who held conciliatory and moderate views. He had perceived all along a demand for a higher standard of fitness in all public men, for greater efficiency in every direction. He thought, therefore, a "policy of attraction"—attraction of Monarchists who had remained faithful to the old regime—might perhaps improve matters. The "policy of attraction," however, provoked heated discussions in Parliament, and called forth scathing comments in the *Mundo*, the organ of Afonso Costa. There was indeed such a perversion of ideas on this question, that in the eyes of Afonso Costa's partisans in Lisbon, Antonio José d'Almeida represented the "reactionary." Moreover, the regular Government of the Republic being formed from the "Bloco," led by Brito Camacho and Antonio José d'Almeida, its attempt to establish a Constitutional Republicanism naturally annoyed the rowdy supporters of Afonso Costa, who were guided by a fanaticism which refused to take counsel from the signs of the times, in short, who were unable to see that to proclaim a Government is one thing and to put it in working order quite another.

The outrage, however, to which Almeida was subjected was the Republican first experience of the vanity of boasting. To judge by the exuberant utterances of the Republican leaders, it was the people of Lisbon who made the Revolution, but when, for their own purpose, they pandered to the vanity of the masses, little could they have suspected that the mob by which, they said, they had pulled down the throne, would, a year after, be equally ready to pull themselves to pieces. Brito Camacho, in a speech in Parliament condemning the outrage, laid great stress on the fact that the occurrence "was not a disconnected episode, but a natural outcome of a vile campaign of political hatred." He thought the passions and prejudices of "the people who are in that intellectual state of development when

they readily listen to appeals to their worst instincts," ought not to be encouraged. These were words spoken by a Republican leader who took a dispassionate view of a grave situation. The best correctors of history are, no doubt, those who have been engaged in making it. But while Brito Camacho assumed the attitude of a philosopher patronising the masses from a distance, the Republican Party Congress passed a motion in honour of the murderers of King Carlos. "The Congress sorrowfully salutes the memory of the great Portuguese Buiça and Costa" were the words of the motion which was passed unanimously. The Republican Party, had said Afonso Costa, after the Electoral Act of August, 1910—the first of the Republic—"was the only possible organ of public opinion for the defence of the Republic."

The action of the Congress was significant. It was a fact, from the day of King Carlos' assassination until the Powers recognised the Republic, that the Republican leaders had tried to clear themselves of the disgrace of profiting by a crime which they knew had turned the better elements of all countries against the murderers of the King and their accomplices. When the Revolution broke out, Theophilo Braga had declared that he was more convinced than ever that the Portuguese Revolutionary movement was the outcome of Positivism, and the senile visionary accounted for its success by the suggestion that the Turkish Revolution was also the outcome of such doctrines. But no person was more strong in his assertions and louder in his assurances than Bernardino Machado, who now presided at the sessions of the Congress. When the tragedy of February 1, 1908, discredited Portugal in the eyes of the civilised world, this fastidiously polished Republican leader had said that he believed in "Republicanism by evolution," though the graves of the regicides were strewn with flowers by Republicans. Again, when he became Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Provisional Government he discharged all the bile of indignation on the foreign Press for accusing him of being present in his official capacity at the opening ceremony of the Museum of Revolution—an exhibition of

the regicides' arms, the cloak worn by Buiça, the explosive bombs used by the Portuguese Revolutionaries, and the last pair of boots worn by Ferrer. Anxious to clear the Republic from the guilt of murder, and to erect a respectable Government, he declared to the writer, who gave the account of the interview in the *Nineteenth Century Review*,¹ that the Portuguese Republicans and their intentions had been grossly abused by the foreign Press. "It was a purely private exhibition organized for a worthy charity and in no manner connected with the Government," said Machado to his interviewer. "Is there a man in Portugal," he pleaded, philosophizing over distinctions between his official and private capacities, "who does not know that Bernardino Machado is devoted to children, two hundred of the poor little things. And I, Papa Machado, as they call me, was I to keep silent on such an occasion?" Such were the sophistries and diplomatic lies of the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, and a lie which is half the truth is ever the blackest of lies.

The motion of the Republican Party Congress, however, gave rise to unpleasant reflections. The Congress did, of course, homage to those who set in movement the Revolution by which the Republic lived. But the fact cannot be disguised that the words "great Portuguese Buiça and Costa" were peculiarly ill-chosen, and had much better be left unsaid. "The murders of Edward and Richard II, the death of Henry IV and his son, or the infant princes of York," wrote a bold English critic, "differ from the condemnation of Charles I. They show two different stages of civilisation. In one case they show the Englishmen unscrupulous as to the means to rid themselves of a sovereign, and in the other bespeaks a progress in the minds of the people." And if this be true of the ancestors of English people it is certainly true of some Portuguese to-day.

"You have rehabilitated the people, you have dignified it," was the extravagant language addressed by João Chagas to the assassin Buiça. These sentiments were

¹J. O. B. Bland "A Portuguese Jacobin," *Nineteenth Century Review*, July, 1911

expressed by João Chagas, in his *Cartas Politicas*, published before the Revolution had the effect of making him Portuguese Minister in Paris, a post which he had to vacate for the Premiership. João Chagas espoused the cause of Buíça because he believed it was the cause of the people. But the Lisbon tragedy of 1908 proved nothing, except that the man who bought the carabine for Buíça was then a notorious Monarchist and now an enthusiastic Republican. It only brought into strong relief the character of tangled politics in Portugal.

The Republic was eulogised by Republican orators as the protector of the working classes. Led astray by empty demagogues, the working classes lent ears very readily to the sounding watchwords of these agitators. They accepted prejudices for principles, hypotheses for facts, and dreams for oracles, and the pleasant prospect of an increase of income without working for it is a bait that never fails to appeal to the indolence of the Peninsular. But what of the results? The Republic was proclaimed, and after some weeks of idleness, drinking and oratory the workmen went back to work. But they soon discovered that the power that kept them as beasts of burden was not the tyranny of the king or priest or noble.

"Bacalhau," the dried codfish which is a staple diet in poorer Portugal, their clothing and their fuel were not obtainable for a lower price than they were before October 5, 1910. Petroleum, they said, had not given them a less costly light than they got in the days of Monarchy. Sick, therefore, of the rhetoric of politics which had succeeded only in lowering the scale of living, the working classes broke off entirely from the Republicans and determined to act on their own account. The Portuguese Penal Code, it is true, did not recognise the right to strike. But the Monarchy had practically appreciated the rights of free labour. It had created People's Banks. It had passed decrees providing for one day's rest in seven, and even regulating the hours of work for women and children; and the Republic had done nothing but confirm legislation already existing. Thus, on March 2, 1911, it created

agricultural banks worked on the German system, and on March 8 passed the law relating to a day's rest

This was but a poor beginning for an administration avowedly installed in power in order to correct all the errors of the past and ensure the happiness of all ages to come. "The benefits derived from the Republican Parliament by the working classes," said a member of the Executive Committee of the People, "have been a mere fiction." A Labour leader, condemning the installation of a despotism of demagogues, thought the times were not for temporising, for negotiation, but for fighting, and that the Socialist Party "ought to adopt Revolutionary methods," for, said another Labour leader, "the Republican leaders now in power have always preached Revolutionary methods."¹

"There is no doubt that the Republic," wrote the *Daily News and Leader*, "inherited heavy responsibilities from the old effete Monarchy, but no really practical measures have been adopted to institute reforms. Unfortunately this state of things is reflected on trade, which is heavily handicapped." "The cost of living," it added, "has risen to such an extent that Lisbon is now the dearest capital in Europe in which to live, the price of vegetables, meat, etc., having increased from 40 to 50 per cent in the last two years."² The Republic, of course, passed a new Rent Law, based on ill-understood foreign analogies and framed by an inexperienced theorist produced by the mediæval University of Coimbra. The Coimbra Doctor thought increased wages were to be got by screwing them out of rents and profits, with the sad result that many buildings formerly in progress were discontinued, and the employer, who looked for a reasonable profit on his investment of capital, skill and industry, left the country, which a trifling intelligence would have told was inevitable.

Before approaching, however, the labour problem, the Republic had to discipline the labourer, and this, as Cobden remarked, is the one necessary condition precedent to a rise of wages. "Constitutionalism, with its formula incomprehensible to the great majority of the people, did not diminish the indiscipline, it augmented it. And the

¹ *Seculo* August 7, 1911

² *Daily News and Leader* October 9, 1912

Republic, continuing the work of Constitution, will make that indiscipline degenerate into anarchy." These were the words of Homem Christo, words which stated the truth in frank and manly language. But these words did not obtain a fair hearing, and the Republican journalist had to leave the country, to be an exile in Spain.

The Republic advocated the right to strike—now conceded to working-men of every country—as a weapon in the hands of Labour for imposing its will. But it was soon struck with moral impotence to stem the rising tide of insubordination against authority, and the strikes at the very beginning of the new regime were risings of the most embarrassing kind. The Lisbon Gas & Electric Co., Lisbon Tramway Co., railways, weaving mills, flour mills, ferry boats, boot factories, silk weavers, saw-mills, cork workers, swine killers—to name only a few, struck for higher wages or shorter hours, or both; and such was the assertion of their rights that even partisans of the strike blamed it as harsh and ill-advised. "The present phase of the Republic's existence," said the *Seculo*, "contains many elements of unrest, uncertainty and danger. It is incumbent upon all classes to sacrifice aspirations—and even necessities until the country shall have established a regular Government."¹ The men eventually returned to their work without in any case obtaining an advance, and some of them even accepting a reduction on their wages. But the discontent, which appeared to be very general, culminated soon in an arrangement for a general strike to commence simultaneously in Lisbon and other large towns. It was brief but violent. More than one murder was committed, several factories were burnt. Bombs were thrown at the cavalry and Republican Guard in the Rocio square, and in the Alcantara quarter. Similar disturbances took place at Setubal and Moita, where the Mayor was assassinated. The Government were equal to the occasion, however. Soldiers were called out to guard property against attacks made by the strikers. A state of siege for a month was proclaimed, and Lisbon placed under the control of a military governor.

¹ *Seculo* January 13, 1911

invested with extraordinary powers. The strikers were arrested *en masse* and thrust into prison.¹ "Efficient police action," said the Republican *Mundo*, "should have sufficed without the suspension of Constitutional guarantees."² But it was clear that the Government had misconceived the situation, and was suffering under an illusion. The Government, to use the words of the Portuguese Premier on February 1, 1912, regarded the situation as serious, and considered it as an attack on the Republic, but believed "that the reactionaries were doing their best to take advantage of the existing unrest among the working classes" now acting, in the opinion of the Government, in close relation with international Syndicalists supported by money from the Royalists. But very soon the truth dawned upon the Government. At a meeting of the Federation of Trade Unions a resolution was passed challenging the Government to prove the statement that the workers who took part in the general strike had been influenced or had had any understanding with the Royalists, or reactionaries.

"Portugal," said the manifesto signed by the General Strike Committee of Lisbon, "is passing through a serious economic crisis which has been aggravated by the folly and incompetence of the Republican Government. The Government is busy with politics and has no time to look after the economic interests of the country. The ambition to attain power has been colossal, and the lowest intrigues have been resorted to in order to overthrow an adversary. In face of moral collapse of the Republican Party, the people, which for a long time regarded the Republic with fanaticism, have found out that the Republican politicians have no more dignity than Monarchist politicians." It would be unfair to blame too much the Republic that for reasons which are obvious had felt compelled to curtail exaggerated promises and had failed to bring about the millennium.

¹ "I found the prisons crowded not only with Royalists, but Republicans. The Government, which has a quick way with critics, arrested the Syndicalists—nearly 300. Many—133 of them—were sent to an underground prison, Forte da Graça, at Elvas, and others were shipped off, secretly one night, to the prison of Angra, in the Azores."—Philip Gibbs, "The Rule of the Carbinarios," *Daily Chronicle* December 16, 1913.

² *Mundo* February 14, 1912.

There was still the stage of passing from theory to action, from the conception of a vague ideal to putting it into practice. Besides, new earths are not created by changes of Government, much less new heavens. But an ignorant and fanatical creed, increased from the seeds sown by the Republicans in the days of the Monarchy, had to reach its full pitch in the saturnalia of anarchy and confusion under a regime founded upon irresponsible public opinion. "The violence of the Republican Guard must be answered by bombs and dynamite. Beneath every military uniform beats the heart of an assassin." These were the words of the Revolutionary proclamation seized in the Syndicalist Club, and read by the indignant Premier before the Republican Parliament. Bombs, however, played a very important part in the Portuguese Revolution. *The Illustração Portuguesa* had already published a series of illustrated articles entitled "The Bomb in the Service of the Republic"; a publication which bore the stamp of Republican approval, and from which one obtained some notion of the Revolutionary spirit which made Portugal a Republic. "The making and the using of bombs," wrote *The Times*, drawing the attention of England to this publication, "are evidently accepted by public opinion as a necessary and praiseworthy manifestation of patriotic activity, and a legitimate method of asserting political rights"¹ If anything more were wanting to justify the bomb policy the following paragraph from the *Lucta*, edited by a Minister in the Provisional Government, would furnish it. "Whoever happens to have bombs in his house," wrote the Republican daily a month and a half after the proclamation of the Republic, "should clearly understand that now they are no longer necessary. He should also feel certain that he will run no risk by declaring them. He has only to notify the police, and a carriage will be sent, accompanied by experts competent to remove the bombs in such a way that the general public will not be exposed to any danger."² The Republican leaders reaped, therefore, that which they had sown.

¹ *The Times* January 19, 1911

² *Lucta* November 20, 1910

V

THE REVOLUTIONARY CHAOS

"We are lost unless some immediate and firm action is taken against the conflagration which has long been smouldering among the factions," said Manuel d'Arriaga, the President of the Republic, in his famous letter dated January 29, 1915, to General Pimenta de Castro when he found himself compelled to intervene in the "accursed political confusion" into which turbulent passions and sinister plots had thrown Republican Portugal. The country had been in what was called a "Ministerial crisis." The aged President of the Republic had been employed, like a jobbing carpenter, in patching together makeshift Cabinets, and tucking up, just for the moment, temporary ministers to the official posts. But things had come, and by no fault of the President, to that pass when the extravagant outrages of pitiable nonentities made the political life of the nation unbearable.

The Constitution having come into force in 1911, the President of the Republic charged João Chagas with the constitutional task of forming the first Republican Ministry. The Portuguese Revolutionaries, however, arrogated to themselves the power which belonged to the State. They had brought about, they said, the Revolution of October, 1910; and how this was secretly attained had been told, in the first days of the Republic, by João Chagas, a Revolutionary pamphleteer, now made Republican Premier. The so-called Revolutionaries, of course, preferred living upon revolutions to earning a livelihood by honest industry.

Afonso Costa had to admit that "the amount of deficit was too large for the Republican Government to present

a Budget " These words, uttered by a representative of a spurious democracy as self-seeking in its aims as degrading in its influence, however, were significant. They revealed Afonso Costa's secret motives. Disagreements as regards Republican aims which existed when the Provisional Government was in power had been settled behind closed doors. But once Afonso Costa found himself Leader of the Opposition he instinctively attributed to those in power enormities of which the guilt lay upon himself alone. But the amusing feature of this quarrel over "the loaves and fishes" was that while Afonso Costa maliciously made a statement warning the people that they were being fried in their own fat, Duarte Leite, the new Finance Minister, dramatically announced that he found no way "to reconcile the decrees of the Provisional Government with the financial situation " He was unable, he told the Republican Parliament, "to pay the enormous salaries" assigned by Afonso Costa and his colleagues to the "heroes" and other State parasites "It is idle," wrote the Republican *Seculo*, a paper that did much to expose the scandal in connection with Batalha Reis, the "historic" Republican, formerly Portuguese Consul in London, who, under the new regime, was promoted to Minister abroad, but who had drawn his salary without ever leaving Lisbon for his supposed destination, "it is idle to repeat the eternal story of dishonesty under the old regime since there was more serious incompetence than immorality."¹ It was evident that the Government, presided over by João Chagas, would have to make the most strenuous effort to feed the many Revolutionaries who, to borrow a phrase from the Republican Press, "endangered the life of the Republic" more than the legions of Couceiro, the Royalist leader. But the people were paying to the State more than their due, and they hoped the Government, instead of regretting openly the abolition of taxes on articles of general consumption—abolition decreed by the Provisional Government—would lay bare the wounds of Portuguese parasitism with a view to their treatment and cure. The new Republican Premier,

¹ *Seculo* November 23, 1911

however, shrank from the task. The Government urged the Chambers, convoked for a special session, to assent to certain proposals which would give the Cabinet extraordinary powers; but the Senate flatly refused.

Having failed in his Constitutional task of shepherding Republican politicians into one fold, João Chagas resigned. The President of the Republic accepted his resignation and called, on November 7, 1911, on Augusto de Vasconcelos to form a new Ministry. The new "Ministry of Concentration" promised the revision of the dictatorial legislation of the Provisional Government. It is doubtful, however, if it knew its own mind. A motion was introduced in the Cortes, on June 4, 1912, calling on the Government to resign. Though rejected by a small majority, it compelled the Government to place its resignation in the President's hands, leaving him no alternative but to charge again the Premier, who had not been defeated by an actual vote of the Chamber on a question of confidence, to form a new Ministry.

Augusto de Vasconcelos, however, abandoned the task. The services of Duarte Leite were secured, and after many negotiations he undertook, on June 16, the difficult duties of Premier. He formed a new "Ministry of Concentration," including Augusto de Vasconcelos, a member of the preceding Government. The irresponsibility on the part of the legislature, however, interfered with his programme of Constitutional Republicanism. The Ministry he presided over was violently attacked in the Cortes, which provided the nation with an unedifying spectacle. Unable to defy the brickbats showered upon it by the so-called opposition, the new Ministry announced that it would retire, but "not until a new Cabinet should be formed." There was another factor, too, that aggravated the situation. The Republican Premier, who disclaimed membership of any Party, had been unable to secure the support of the various members of the Coalition Ministry, ostensibly formed to suppress the Royalist rising; and he had to announce to the two Chambers, in their sitting of January 6, 1913, the resignation of his Cabinet.

A Democratic Ministry was formed on January 10, its Premier and Minister of Finance being Afonso Costa. The new Premier, who led the *Democráticos*, had failed to reach an understanding with Brito Camacho, who was, undoubtedly, his superior in intellectual force, but who had not yet shown his hand. Afonso Costa regarded the leader of the *Unomistas* as an evil spirit hovering over the destiny of Republican Portugal. Naturally irritated with the *Unomistas*, but not sufficiently inclined to trust the *Evolucionistas* or moderate Republicans,¹ who had linked their fortunes with the *Unomistas* and the *Independentes*, Afonso Costa was nevertheless willing to support a Ministry presided over by Antonio José d'Almeida, the leader of the *Evolucionistas*. But being unable to come to an agreement as to his share in the distribution of offices, he resolved to form a "Democratic" Ministry.

The *Democráticos* declared the tolerant policy of the *Evolucionistas* to be utterly inadequate in its scope, and rejected it at Oporto—where Afonso Costa publicly set forth his radical programme. Indeed, they rejected it without ceremony. The new Cabinet, however, proceeded with much the same policy as the preceding Ministry, and complying with a request made by the President of the Republic, the Government passed the law on prison reform drawn up by the previous Cabinet.

Meantime events had moved apace. A plot was organized in April, 1913, by the so-called Radical Republican Federation, and led by Fausto Guedes, a retired General, and those involved in it were officers and sergeants in the Army, most of them promoted under the new regime to a higher rank, and some even attached to the courts-martial, where the Royalist prisoners were being tried. The conspirators

¹ The programme of the Republican Evolutionist Party proposed (A) Administration reform at the earliest possible date, (B) an electoral law based upon modern Liberal principles with proportional representation of minorities in other districts, (C) revision of the existing list of electors, (D) immediate revision of the laws of the Provisional Government, beginning with those of Separation of Church and State, public instruction, reorganization of the Army, rents, civil register and public charity, (E) an amnesty for strikers and political prisoners except those known to be ringleaders in conspiracies against the Republic.

attacked the barracks, but were repulsed and captured. Hundreds of bombs of the latest pattern were seized at the Revolutionary headquarters, and the Revolutionaries were conducted on board a steamer and transported to the Azores Islands, there to be tried

Afonso Costa, the Premier, in a speech in Parliament, condemning the attempt at a *coup d'état*, described it as "a movement of conspiracy and revolt" He assured the House that the Government would go on taking the measures—he had already closed the trade union building at Lisbon—required by the situation to maintain order and discipline in the country, for the unrest had spread to Coimbra and Vilaréal, provincial towns Coming from one who had found a place in his Cabinet for a leading member of the *Carbonaria*, these quixotic utterances must have provoked sardonic laughter in many quarters Moreover, his Government, at a demonstration held in Lisbon to do honour to the murderers of King Carlos, had eulogised these men as "heroes" "In our eyes these men," said the Minister of the Interior, in his speech delivered on February 13, "are worthy of admiration, and when the formalism which still prevails in Portuguese society is overthrown, it will recognise in them true heroes, worthy sons of Portugal" The Portuguese Parliament, however, seemed satisfied by the Premier's statement, and a motion of confidence in the Ministry was carried in the Chamber and in the Senate.

Be that as it may—

" . The time has been,
That, when the brains were out, the man would die,
And there an end, but now they rise again,
With twenty mortal murders on their crowns,
And push us from our stools this is more strange
Than such a murder is "

Macbeth Act III

The following dialogue, which took place in the Portuguese Parliament, will convey more to the reader than pages of comment It is psychologically interesting to read it

Machado dos Santos draws the attention of the House to the fact that the Premier (Afonso Costa) has declared the language

of his paper (*Intransigente* seized and suppressed by the Premier) to be vile and inciting to violence

Julio Martins He did say so, but has not proved it He is, therefore, guilty of enforcing arbitrary measures

Celerico Gil The Premier's talk is, of course, empty talk

Machado dos Santos I wish to defend myself against the accusations made by the Premier My attitude since the proclamation of the Republic has been that of a man who respects law and order On October 5, 1910, I invested General Gorjão with the high position of the commander-in-chief of the troops, an honour which the commander-in-chief under the Monarchy gratefully acknowledged with tears in his eyes

Leite Pereira Your services to the Republic were rewarded by the Constituent Assembly It is, therefore, quite unnecessary to speak on the subject

Machado dos Santos General Gorjão, however, would not accept the position I offered him and, for this reason, I made General Carvalhal, who was next in order, the commander-in-chief of troops I always respected law and order, so much so that I, Antonio José d'Almeida and Brito Camacho were insulted in the streets

Voices in the Centre The sovereignty of the people was then an acknowledged fact

Machado dos Santos A section of the Press (Republican) has carried on a vile and libellous campaign against me I was a political opponent of Afonso Costa, for I knew that once in power, he would afford us the spectacle we are witnessing I want the Parliament not to bow to his will My propaganda did not cause the recent events The men responsible for the attempt at a *coup d'état* are Afonso Costa's partisans.

These revelations, which threw a strong sidelight on Republican politics, caused, of course, an uproar in the House. But to resume the thread of the story.

Machado dos Santos then challenges the deputy, Manuel Alegre, to declare who was the person who tried to set free a man under arrest who was to assassinate him (*Machado dos Santos*)

Manuel Alegre, in reply, makes a statement to the effect that Machado dos Santos once visited him and invited him to go to Aveiro in order to influence the regiment stationed there to rebel, with the object of assassinating Afonso Costa ¹

¹ *Diário de Notícias* May 6, 1913

This was a fair example of political tactics in Republican Portugal, where politicians, to whose hands were now committed the destinies of the country, seemed still jealous of their right to slay, and, as they had nothing to fear, they meant to exercise it with impunity ¹

The Republic was travelling fast and far down the facile descent towards chaos. There was, however, a great campaign in the extremist Press to work up a Monarchist scare, and it was followed by conspiracies and risings. Even the police had attempted a rising at Lisbon.

"The Government wanted to win the Parliamentary majority necessary to live, and annihilate all the elements opposed to it," said a certain Homero de Lencastre in an interview published in the Monarchical daily *Nação* ². What wonder, therefore, that Afonso Costa should have proceeded, soon after the so-called Royalist rising of October, 1913, to arrest the political opponents by scores without caring whether they were guilty or innocent. "In the prisons of Oporto," wrote Philip Gibbs, in the *Daily Chronicle*, "most of those with whom I talked were the victims of one man's guile—the spy and traitor Lencastre who laid his snares for them." "It was this man to whom the Government agents turned in October last when articles appeared in the Republican newspaper *Intransigente*, accusing Dr. Afonso Costa and some of his Ministers of corrupt transactions in connection with San Thomé, and when attacks from various Republican leaders and the approaching elections threatened to emphasize the faults of the existing regime. It seemed expedient for the Government to discover a Royalist plot so that the Republicans should close their ranks in self-defence. It was Homero de Lencastre who was used for that purpose" ³. Such was the infamous history of the man once eulogised in the Republican Parliament by the Republican orator Alexandre Braga as "hero" and "friend of the Republic," but whose Republican associates were now for the most part objects of his hostility.

¹ My article on the "Signs of the Times in Portugal," *The British Review* London, January, 1914.

² *Nação* February 14, 1914.

³ *Daily Chronicle* December 17, 1913.

—some perhaps from old personal quarrels, some perhaps as successful rivals ¹

The whole game of the *Democraticos*, who were to enjoy under the Republic a long tenure of power, was obvious, and the facile credulity in the statesmanship of Afonso Costa was the most ridiculous feature of the situation. "The strange pæans of praise in *O Mundo*, poems to his *vulto immortal*, the resolve of an admirer to order a life-like silver statue of him, the arrest of persons for speaking ill of him, the arrest of others accused of wishing to assassinate him, as well as his extraordinary speeches in Parliament, as out of Parliament, showing an ignorance of the life in Portugal almost as profound as the ignorance of the conditions in foreign countries," wrote Aubrey F. G. Bell in his *Portugal and the Portuguese*, "might well have crushed him beneath a load of ridicule, but have merely served to keep him in the public eye" ²

Too fatuous to regard the level of the *Escudo* exchange as a serious matter, he had actually announced a superavit in the national Budget! The Budget surplus of 3,400 contos, of which 2,400 contos would be spent on national defence, thought his admirers, was a great feather in his cap. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the floating debt, which a month before the Revolution of October, 1910, stood at 82,000 contos, had advanced to 89,851 contos in January, 1914. This, of course, was the most distressing feature of the financial situation during his year of office as Premier and Finance Minister.

The majority of the Senate, however, felt that it could not support Afonso Costa in respect of his national schemes. On January 10, 1914, the Senator João de Freitas, an *Evolucionista*, made a bitter attack on the Premier, whom he charged with "having placed his influence as a Minister at the service of clients who consulted him as lawyer," and demanded the nomination of a Committee of Inquiry. But the supporters of Afonso Costa strongly disapproved of the Committee of Inquiry and left the House. The

¹ My article on "The Portuguese Amnesty," *The New Age* March 12, 1914

² Aubrey F. G. Bell, *Portugal and the Portuguese* London, 1915

Premier, who was supported by the Lower House—where the Democrat Left had the majority—treated the complaint as a mere factious clamour proceeding from the sinister motive of private interests or ambitions, and refused to appear in the Senate, where the Unionist and Evolutionist groups had acquired the right to rank as the Opposition. However, if the passions and views of the Republican legislators were fierce, the issues at stake were not less momentous. Unable to play the part which a Second Chamber should do, the Senate appealed to the President of the Republic and reminded him that to invite his Ministers to respect the Constitution was a task which the President ought to undertake. The President of the Republic, however, declared that he was unable to intervene. The solution of the legislative crisis, he thought, depended entirely on the attitude of the Deputies and Senators, whose duty was crystal clear. Eventually, the two Chambers met in a joint sitting, to vote the adjournment of the session, and a vote of confidence in the Ministry presided over by Afonso Costa was moved and adopted by 114 to 93. But the bitterness of political animosity was so intense that on January 24, Afonso Costa tendered his resignation, which was accepted by the President of the Republic.

The situation was now worse than ever. The tension between the two Chambers had increased; and each group, by leaving the House, prevented the other from taking a valid division. What appeared in the last days of the Monarchy, as the symptom of the dissolution of the Constitutional system, assumed now the form of a legitimate Parliamentary device. That, of course, rendered administration impossible.

The President of the Republic then called on Bernardino Machado, who had returned from Brazil, to form a Ministry, and on February 8, a Ministry presided over by the ex-Portuguese Ambassador was formed. The new Premier cordially invited all Republicans to rally to the Republican banner. The quarrel over the Senate's right of exercising a check on the appointment of Colonial Governors, which had become serious enough to give the preceding Cabinet

an anxious time, was settled, and settled to the advantage of the Senate. The Premier also pleaded for an amnesty for political prisoners; and both houses voted the proposed amnesty on February 23. This measure, however, came before the nation not as a policy of true statesmanship but as a mere makeshift, to struggle out of a series of self-made political blunders and difficulties. It was notorious that the majority of the Deputies disliked the Amnesty Bill, and if they had followed their natural impulses would have rejected it peremptorily, as indeed was their first intention. But a survey of the desperate position in which their reckless leader Afonso Costa was placed, and, let us not forget, the mighty and irresistible representations of foreign Powers, brought them to sudden reason.

Bernardino Machado proceeded, some time after, to obtain a new confirmation of his power, and he resigned on June 20. Being anxious to readjust the cogs and wheels of a machine which had been thrown out of gear, he formed an entirely non-party Ministry, and promised to hold free elections without discrimination against the so-called "enemies of the Republic." Indeed, he—the most optimistic of Republicans with regard to the Republic's political future—thought he was destined to undertake the great work of conciliation. An election campaign was opened, in fact, but interrupted by the declaration of war by Great Britain on Germany.

The future of Republican Portugal, however, did not depend entirely on the attitude of the multitude of groups in Parliament, but also, and possibly even more directly, on the attitude of the Revolutionary organisations. Such was the tranquillity that in the early days of the Great War reigned in Portugal—the tranquillity of the bombshell while the fuse was burning. In these circumstances, the Ministry presided over by Bernardino Machado had to make room for a new Ministry, formed on December 11, with Victor Hugo de Azevedo-Coutinho as Prime Minister and Minister of Marine, and Alexandre Braga, a political bed-fellow of Afonso Costa, as Minister of the Interior. The Ministerial declaration of December 14, contemplating

participation in the war in Europe in conformity with the alliance with Great Britain, was approved by the Chamber, which passed a vote of confidence in the Government by 63 to 39. The Senate, however, passed a vote of want of confidence by 27 to 26. But this Ministry, which had to be dependent on the goodwill of the *Democraticos* for its existence, did not sustain itself long in power.

A quarrel over the removal to another district of an army captain whom a non-commissioned officer disliked, had caused great discontent among the army officers. This had culminated in a "movement of swords" that circumstances developed into the dictatorship of General Pimenta de Castro.

The President of the Republic in his letter, quoted at the head of this chapter, hoped that Pimenta de Castro would abolish party intrigue and establish a stable system of government, and the Portuguese General, who only reluctantly assumed office, formed on January 28, 1915, a non-party Cabinet. The new Ministry governed without Parliament, and a Ministerial decree promulgated on February 24, fixed the date of the general election for June 6.

The Portuguese Dictator firmly believed that the interests and the welfare of the Army were wholly consistent and very closely connected with the welfare and interests of the Republic, and the new franchise was to include army officers and sergeants. He widened the franchise on the assumption that the new voters must necessarily be the staunchest supporters of the symbols of liberty, equality and fraternity. It seemed, indeed, that the new regime of party morality depended for success a great deal on vote-catching tactics.

The regime established in Portugal by Pimenta de Castro moved the *Democraticos* to defiance. They attempted to hold a meeting of Parliament on March 4, which, however, did not prove successful. This made them resort to other means, and, eager to regain their Parliamentary rights, they saw no other way but to hold a meeting in a private house, where the President of the Republic and the Ministry

were accused of having "abused power" under the Constitution. Eventually they found allies in *Carbonarios*, who worked secretly day and night, on the instruction of the revolutionary leaders, in an endeavour to shake off the dictatorship.

It was on the 14th May that the Revolution broke out. It spread like wild fire throughout the whole city. The Army had given the amplest assurance to General Pimenta de Castro that it would uphold the Government, but it failed to give its promised support, and this curious attitude gave an insight into the prevailing mentality among the rank and file of the military party. Thus, the *Carbonarios* and the Navy completed a successful *coup* for the purpose of making Portugal a "democratic republic." Many personal grudges against individuals were satisfied in this revolution. The casualty lists included about a hundred killed and three hundred wounded.

The blood that flowed during the Revolution of May 14, 1915, drowned this chapter of republican history. General Pimenta de Castro who, as the hours went on, had to follow a more and more lonely course, was taken prisoner, and João Chagas, the Portuguese Ambassador in Paris, was once more allowed the responsibility of presiding over the Government.

The situation of Manuel Arriaga, the President of the Republic, having become immensely complicated, he had to resign the office on the 27th May, which, of course, added distress to an already difficult period. The President had, however, ratified the appointment of the Revolutionary Government, and signed a decree convoking the Chambers in extraordinary session for May 26. Immediately after, this assembly, without taking into account the risks involved from the international point of view, elected Professor Theophilo Braga as President of the Republic for the remaining few months of office of the ex-President.

Theophilo Braga had repudiated in an interview published in the *Seculo*¹ all reliance on English alliance. Recognising the dangers which threatened the down-trodden Portuguese

¹ *Seculo* March 30, 1913

nationality he had confessed that the Republic was powerless to avert them. "The Ministers representing the Republic abroad," were his words, "cannot be taken seriously by any Government"; and the *Seculo*¹, in a leading article, asserted that "the Republic was served extremely badly by its diplomats" "The representatives of Portugal abroad," said this Republican daily, "have been almost always recruited from politics, and usually appointed either from a wish to remove rivals, or after they have failed as statesmen The Legations are not, therefore, considered as important posts to be entrusted to persons of high merit but as Party consolation prizes" Again, taking a representative of the Monarchical *Dia*² into confidence, the ex-President of the Provisional Government of October, 1910, had explicitly confirmed his charges against each of the Republican diplomats The interviews led to a discussion in Parliament Braga was called a "traitor" and "irresponsible", and on April 8, 1913, when he entered the House, many Deputies left their place³ However, this is by way of parenthesis.

"Portugal was almost the only country in Europe where internal affairs predominated over the compelling interest of the European War," wrote the *Annual Register* for 1915, reviewing public events abroad The *coup d'état* of May 14 was fresh in the minds of all The chances of João Chagas of proving himself saviour of the Constitution were, however, remote, and the Revolutionary Premier was eventually succeeded by José de Castro who was charged to form a new Cabinet The Congress opened on June 25, and Theophilo Braga, provisionally President of the Republic, counselled friendship with England—a price he paid for his presidential possibilities But nevertheless, Bernardino Machado—whose optimism was as unbounded as his ambition in handling State affairs—was elected President of the Republic. His election on August 6 seemed to indicate that the *Democraticos*—the General Election of

¹ *Seculo* April 1, 1913

² *Dia* April 2, 1913

³ My article on "Insane Portugal," *The New Age* May 29, 1913

June had resulted in a large Democratic majority—were for instant belligerency. It appeared to be assumed by their leaders that England was drawn into the Great War because Pan-Germanism meant the negation of freedom and the end of democracy. That attitude, as might be expected, was most pronounced in Republican quarters most out of touch with international politics. The Ministry, under José de Castro, had to resign, and make room for an entirely Democratic Ministry, with Afonso Costa as Prime Minister and Minister of Finance. Such was the aspect of internal politics under the influence of the *Democraticos* now in power, who had availed themselves of every opportunity to make capital out of the international situation. They, however, hoped to form a National Ministry.

The Unionists and Evolutionists, whose opinions naturally differed as to the precise degree of significance to be attributed to the Democrats' "national policy," of course declined to enter such a Coalition Ministry. But eventually a "National Coalition Ministry" was formed, under the Premiership of Antonio José d'Almeida, the leader of the Evolutionists, whose intentions were generally excellent, but whose acquaintance with world politics was usually superficial. The new Ministry, being a coalition, was constantly forced into compromise in order to maintain a semblance of unity. This so-called *União Sagrada* was short-lived, and was succeeded by a new Democratic era, when Afonso Costa came into power again.

The difficulties raised by the entry of Portugal in the Great War, led to the September riots and demonstrations, which, although unsuccessful, stimulated further Revolutionary activity. Events then moved with almost incredible rapidity. On December 5, 1917, a Revolution directed against the policy of the Democrats, broke out at Lisbon. Afonso Costa, the Premier, was compelled to lay down his office, and was arrested. Bernardino Machado, the President of the Republic, who had recently paid a presidential visit to England and France, was forcibly ejected from the Belem Palace and made to leave the country. A Provisional Government was formed, Major Sidonio

Pais, formerly Portuguese Minister in Berlin, becoming President and Minister for War and Foreign Affairs.

For a time Sidonio Pais stood forth as the capable leader of the majority of the Portuguese, and the country stood by him. The Revolutionary President declared that, though many of those who supported him in the Revolution were Monarchists, "nobody can have any doubt about the Republicanism of the Government." Although ostensibly a Republican, his policy constituted on the one hand the necessity for a centralised authority, and on the other, a reaction against all forms of left-extremism. Evidently the problems of the war period were beyond the scope of the turbulent democracy, whose brawlings disgraced Portugal. Hence, perhaps, his desire to leave them in the hands of an intelligent executive.

Though with a passion for new and ever more gorgeous uniforms, Major Sidonio Pais did not abolish the Constitution. At the Parliamentary General Election, in the House of Parliament, the Republicans secured 106 seats, the Monarchists 39 and the Catholics 3, which, of course, made it possible to regard his dictatorship as one of the turning points in the history of Republican Portugal.

Desirous of cleaning the Augean stables of the Portuguese Republic, Sidonio Pais held his own against the attacks of his political enemies, who exerted every effort to belittle the Dictator and his programme for the re-shaping of Portugal. He was obliged to face violent movements, which were successfully suppressed, however, the Revolutionary leader, Alvaro de Castro, formerly Governor-General of Mozambique, being arrested.

But the agitators appealed to the sanguinary instincts of the Lisbon mob; and they did it in a manner that was repugnant to the national sentiment and aspirations. A Revolutionary attempted to shoot Sidonio Pais, and was unsuccessful. But some days later the Dictator was fatally wounded at the Rocio railway station, his assassin being a certain José Julio da Costa, a sinister personage in the history of Republican Portugal. The President of the Portuguese Republic—he was elected President by 513,958

votes and proclaimed on May 9, 1917, the Powers recognising the new regime—was assassinated on December 14, 1918, and on December 16, Admiral João de Canto e Castro, who gave himself the airs of a “saviour,” assumed the office of President of the Republic.

Sidonio Pais was assassinated in the midst of the battle he had been waging for closer centralised authority over the powers both of individuals and of political factions. He had behind him a very substantial and intelligent body of opinion represented by the *Centrismo*, founded by Egas Moniz, that had only to be organised to create a great social and political crusade. Sidonio Pais will long be remembered as one of the Portuguese Dictators—indeed so far as Republican Portugal is concerned, as the honest Dictator. And it is well to note that the murdered President proved more than once that he was fully conscious of the political interests which linked Portugal with England. Unfortunately, however, Republican Portugal was an ally of England in name, but she was a long way from being such in fact.

The Anglo-Portuguese alliance, which dates back to the time of the Crusades, was an alliance that had been maintained by Portugal throughout the whole of her national career. It was, in fact, the most ancient defensive and offensive alliance in the British Archives, first confirmed by the treaty signed in 1373 between Edward III of England and Ferdinand I of Portugal, and the two nations had held together more than once against any combination of other Powers. England knew she could always rely on Lisbon, Horta and St Vincent “situated at the corner of that important triangle of naval strategic importance”¹. She could not disregard the Azores, and particularly the harbour of Horta, which is approximately equidistant from Europe, Africa and America, as a naval base or a place for sheltering her squadrons. “It has been the opinion,” said Lord Palmerston, in the House of Commons, “of the ablest Englishmen that it is important to the security of England that the Tagus should be in the hands of a friendly power.

¹ Moraes Sarmento, *The Anglo-Portuguese Alliance and Coast Defence* London, 1908

It has been thought by the most competent judges that with Gibraltar our own and with an ally at Lisbon we might face the combined hostility of any Powers." The Anglo-Portuguese alliance was renewed in the compact of modern Europe, the convention of Vienna, and in the subsequent treaties, the last of which dated from 1909, when the King of Portugal, afterwards an exile in England, visited London.

On the 15th March, 1912—a little more than two years before the Great War broke out—Augusto de Vasconcelos, then Republican Premier and Foreign Minister, when he found himself face to face with the Opposition in Parliament on the question of partition between England and Germany of the Portuguese possessions in Africa, had invoked the clauses of the treaties which for centuries bound Great Britain to Portugal. But was the Colonial peril illusory? The endless division of the Portuguese, their general lack of moral discipline and the turbulent temperament of the so-called leaders, were closely watched by those who were casting ambitious eyes upon the Portuguese possessions; we might almost say some were nibbling and others grasping them. "Portugal," wrote Sir Harry Johnston, "now lies on the surgeon's table of the European Aeropagus. She is being examined very minutely, more especially in regard to her outlying members, to see whether she possesses the necessary vitality to survive the present crisis in her affairs as a valid people really fitted to administer colonial possessions."¹ The future of the Colonies was, therefore, the point to which the thoughts of all Portuguese were naturally turned. "If the energy dissipated in personal and political rivalries," wrote the Republican *Seculo*, "were devoted to the administration of the Colonies, the aspect of the problem would change, as Europe would no longer see in Portugal a nation sinking under internal dissensions", and Colonial Empires have disappeared in the past because they ceased to cultivate qualities which engender a spirit of self-sacrifice and develop the idea of public duty.

Right at the beginning of the Republic a serious fight

¹ Sir Harry H. Johnston, "Portuguese Colonies," *Nineteenth Century Review* March, 1912

took place at Timor between Portuguese and Dutch. The result was that some Portuguese soldiers and officers were captured and a number of soldiers wounded on both sides. Bernardino Machado, the Portuguese Foreign Minister, being questioned in Parliament, declared that the "Dutch Government has recognised our rights and released the prisoners." But the Dutch Government viewed the matter from a different standpoint. In answer to a Deputy, the spokesman of the Dutch Foreign Office said "he did not hold himself responsible for the false statements made in the Portuguese Parliament," and to judge by the articles in the Dutch Press a cloud of complete distrust environed the assurances of the Portuguese Foreign Minister.

The dispute with Germany which arose over boundaries in West Africa was still more serious. How grave the situation was may be gathered from the following extract from the *Seculo*. "There is," said the Republican daily, "in the south of Angola a zone which was neutral some years ago, though it had originally been won for Portugal by the bravery and patriotism of João d'Almeida, the Governor of Huila. Not only is that occupied by the Germans. Those robbers, in their anxiety to develop their colonial empire at the expense of a small country which is unable to oppose them—those robbers have gone still further. They have crossed the river Cubanga, which has long been regarded as the frontier. They have occupied the military post of Mucuzzo, on the Portuguese side of the frontier, without the slightest opposition having been offered to them by our troops." Much of this language belonged, of course, to the category of things that had better be left unsaid. It was, however, too much to expect Portugal, Republican or Monarchical, to remain an impassive spectator of the scramble for her property while she still counted herself among the living. The Portuguese Press kept the German occupation steadily before the public. The Portuguese Governor-General in Africa announced the occupation to the Government at Lisbon and complained he had no troops wherewith to oppose the invaders. But things had reached an impasse, the knot

was tangled beyond possibility of loosening, and it was now cut in the manner which was once forbidden to the Ministers of the Crown. The Portuguese Governor was asked to evacuate the frontier, and the Government was powerless to steer through the waters of adversity. The dangers which threatened Portuguese interests in Africa were, indeed, serious.

The German Imperial Chancellor, addressing the Reichstag on November 9, 1911, recognised that the Congo acquisitions "had produced in many quarters a storm of indignation." But he was confident "there were great possibilities," and had instanced the success of Rhodesia. "France," wrote the *Die Post*, "has North Africa, Britain dominates South Africa, Germany must get Central Africa. We must strike out while the iron is hot. It may eventually be possible to induce England to cede Rhodesia and France the remainder of the mutilated Congo. If we in the meantime secure the Portuguese possessions, a mighty German Empire in Central Africa would then be assured."¹

Bismarck, like the modern German statesman, was also confronted with the urgent problem which still awaits solution, namely, to find fresh markets for German produce and some means to relieve the pressure of population in the mother country. The great ex-Chancellor, however, believed that greater advantage could be gained from the expansion of commerce and industry by private initiative. He had, therefore, only favoured the formation of chartered companies "in order to avoid the assumption of political control with colonisation,"² and it is but fair to add that from the days of "The Great Elector," in whose mind originated the idea of German settlement in Africa, i.e. from the foundation in 1681 of the "Brandenburg African Company," Germany did nothing that could give just cause of offence to any other Power. As a colonial Power Germany may indeed look back with a just pride to the acquisition of some thousands of square miles in Africa without having recourse to filibustering expeditions of any kind, or even

¹ *Die Post*, December 25, 1911.

² Paul S. Reinach, *World Politics at the end of the Nineteenth Century*. New York, 1900.

assuming an air of moral superiority over the smaller Powers. A great change, however, was now visible in the German colonial policy, probably the result of the writings of Mommsen, Sybel and Von Holst, which added much to the Pan-Germanism in Germany, and Germany turned her eyes to territories which she thought could be appropriated with comparatively small exertion. "In Africa alone," declared Professor Delbruck, "we see possibilities worth cultivating." "I am thinking," said the well-known German publicist, "of what seems to me the inevitable collapse of Portuguese power in Africa and a division of the Republic's possessions there between England and Germany." Angola, so restricted on the formation of the Congo State, with an area of about 480,000 square miles and a population estimated at 4,119,000, was just north of German South-West Africa, with a coast line extending continuously for 920 miles and an area of 320,000 square miles, Mozambique, with an area of about 291,750 square miles and a population amounting to 2,000,000, was south of German East Africa, with a coast line of over 600 miles and an area of 380,000 square miles. These two Portuguese possessions, with the Congo State, which has an area estimated at 900,000 square miles, could, therefore, help Germany to form a mighty Empire in Central Africa, stretching from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean.

The Republic, of course, consoled itself with the notion that England would help Portugal against any aggression. It appealed to the old alliance which is almost an essential element in the national security of Portugal. England, it is true, was the natural ally of Portugal. Her interests were wrapped up not only in the prosperity of her ancient ally but in a most special degree in the revival and welfare of Portugal. Unhappily, however, as far as Portuguese interests in Africa were concerned, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was no safeguard against the dangers threatening Portugal. The Portuguese could not reckon England as a friend and Germany as an enemy, and act as if there could be any room for friendship or amity in African affairs. England and Germany were great colonial Powers. They both

equally played parts assigned to them by their national interests, and there was no reason to believe that the expansive energy of the English was one whit less intense than that of the Germans. Moreover, the present relations of modern States are fortuitous, arbitrary or changeable at will. "In spite of polemics caused by the Germans installing themselves on various parts of the African coast," wrote a well-known French writer, "in spite even of diplomatic intervention which prevented Great Britain from ratifying her Congolese treaty with Portugal, there was a systematic effort of Wilhelmstrasse to preserve cordial relations with Downing Street. On the 14th June, 1890, an Anglo-German treaty was signed acknowledging Great Britain's supremacy over the basin of the Nile. A second treaty on the 15th November, 1893, marked a fresh English success by stipulating that the German Cameroons should not extend eastward beyond the basin of the Chari, and that the Darfour Kordofan and Bahr-el-Gazal regions should be excluded from the German sphere of influence. *Even the Emperor William's telegram to Mr. Kruger provoked only a temporary storm and did not hinder the conclusion of a secret treaty which in 1898, in conditions but little known, disposed of the future of Portuguese Colonies*"¹

The secret Anglo-German agreement of 1898—signed on behalf of England by Sir Arthur Balfour and on behalf of Germany by Count Hatzfeldt²—provided for the division, if

¹ Andre Tardieu, *La France et les Alliances* Paris, 1909

² 'As regards Britain, conditions in 1890 were different from those in France. There was no rankling sense of wrong. There was plenty of envy for us in Britain, and also mistrust and dislike, especially in high quarters. The Prince of Wales had no liking for the Germans, and hated his nephew, Kaiser William. On the other hand, there were large numbers of people in Britain, and among them many of the best and most honourable, in whose view a war between Britain and Germany would be a crime. In the summer of 1898 I had made an effort, in full agreement with our Ambassador in London, Count Paul Hatzfeldt, to come to an agreement with Britain in such a way as to avoid wounding the natural susceptibilities of others and, at the same time, to take account of the interests of the two contracting parties. In this I was concerned not only for the actual subject of negotiation, the Portuguese possessions in Africa, but also for the opportunity of establishing how far we could rely on British *bona fides*. The opportunity was a good one. Portugal, loaded with debts, was in a position of financial difficulty from which her creditors, Germany and Britain, had been suffering from years, as they were no longer receiving any interest at all. Portugal made to the two countries the offer to sell or pledge her possessions. Under our agreement Mozambique

necessary, of the Portuguese Colonies in Africa between England and Germany, as spheres of economic influence. It did not, of course (and as a matter of fact, could not) fix a date for action, but only stipulated that the contracting parties were to enjoy "equal privileges" should Portugal "renounce her sovereign rights" over her possessions or

was to fall into the British sphere—Britain had long held the right of pre-emption in regard to the port of Mozambique, Lourenço Marques—and the Portuguese possessions in the West Coast of Africa into the German sphere. The Portuguese possessions in the Sunda Archipelago were to be divided between the two Powers. The agreement was signed in October 1898. I was able at the end of August, to report to the Kaiser that in all substantial points the British Government had declared its agreement with our proposals, and His Majesty telegraphed me

"I am very glad of this turn, which is all the more important since the peace and disarmament proposals and all the chatter about them add not a little to the prospects of war. I thank you, dear Bulow, for your devoted and successful labours, and for the ability with which you have induced Britain at last to give way to us. This is one more great triumph of your diplomatic adroitness and far-sightedness."

"About the turn of the century I learned, through the indiscretion of a foreign diplomat, with whom I had been on terms of friendship since my youth, that Britain, a year after her agreement with Germany, had concluded a secret agreement with Portugal, this was confirmed by news which reached me from Paris banking circles. This agreement, the so-called Treaty of Windsor, expressly confirmed existing treaties, in which the powerful Britain and her client of many years past, the little Portugal, guaranteed one another's possessions, undertaking the reciprocal obligation to come in case of need to their defence. The conclusion of the Treaty of Windsor had largely been promoted by the then Prince of Wales, of whom the Marquis of Soveral, the Portuguese Minister in London, was a personal and intimate friend. The treaty of Windsor was, of course, in flagrant conflict with the spirit of the British-German agreement concerning the Portuguese colonies. It was not only a guarantee for Portugal, but actually an encouragement to that country not to mortgage her colonies. It increased the old tendency of the Portuguese to give preference to Britain in all economic questions. To say nothing of the fact that the Treaty of Windsor further substantially increased the political dependence of the Portuguese on Britain."

"None the less, this grain of seed which I planted in 1898 with the British-German treaty concerning the Portuguese colonies would have borne fruit but for the war. The time came when the House of Coburg-Braganza no longer sat on the throne in Lisbon, to be dealt with tenderly by British policy owing to its close affinity with the British royal house, and when the elegant Marquis of Soveral, King Edward's intimate, no longer represented Portugal in London, but some Portuguese radical or other who had no entrée into English society. Then Britain lost interest in Portugal."

The agreement of 1898 between us and Britain had been revived and was awaiting signature when the crisis which followed the ultimatum in Serbia destroyed this hope for the future along with many other good things held and in prospect"—Prince von Bulow, *Memoirs* (1897-1903). Translated from the German by F. A. Voigt

"lose the territories in any other manner"—to quote the provision in the secret convention of August 20, 1898.¹ It is interesting, however, to note that the supporters of this idea believed that Portugal would be unable to find the money to indemnify the British railway company which had constructed the line from Lourenço Marques to the Transvaal border. But the verdict of the Swiss tribunal regarding the Delagoa Bay Railway came as a surprise to many. The damage did not exceed a million sterling, and Portugal had very little difficulty in finding the money.²

¹ "Portugal had on the western coast a large colony of Angola, sterile enough near the shore but with valuable interior plateaux and forests and with four million negro inhabitants, thousands of whom were drafted as labourers for neighbouring colonies. As England was the recognised ally and patron of Portugal, English consent would be necessary for any German designs on Portuguese Angola. Such consent was obtained in 1898 by a secret Anglo-German treaty which divided the Portuguese colonies in Africa into economic spheres of influence, Germany's share being the southern part of Angola, adjacent to German South-West Africa, besides the northern part of Mozambique, on the eastern coast, the remainder being for England. At that time it was anticipated that financial difficulties might compel Portugal to sell her colonies, in which case Germany would be able to purchase her sphere of interest."—P. T. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics*. New York, 1926.

² "The time seems to have come for a decision as to the policy to be followed in regard to the African possessions of Portugal."

Portugal is in desperate straits for money to meet her ordinary engagements and will soon have to provide also for the Award in the matter of the Delagoa Bay Railway.

The Governor-General of Portuguese East Africa, Major Mousinho de Albuquerque, has been in Paris, London and Berlin to take soundings in regard to the disposition of France, England and Germany. Since then he has conferred with the Portuguese Government and M. de Soveral, and he is on his way back to Africa.

"He has stated to our Minister, Sir Hugh MacDonell, in private conversation, that he had been much struck by the militarism prevailing in every class in Germany, but that his visit to Berlin had opened his eyes to the danger to his country from that quarter. He said that he entirely concurred in M. de Soveral's opinion that no time should be lost in coming to an understanding on the basis proposed by Her Majesty's Government, viz. that a loan should be raised in England on the guarantee of the revenues of the Portuguese Colonies, including Lourenço Marques, coupled with a thorough understanding with Her Majesty's Government." (*Memorandum by Mr. Bertie, British Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs* (1894-1903) dated May 1, 1898, on England and Portugal in Africa.)

"England to guarantee the Kingdom of Portugal against foreign attack on its colonial possessions and spheres of influence, with a reservation to England of the right of pre-emption in the event of the Sovereign of Portugal desiring at any time to part with any of them, Her Majesty's Government to make direct to Portugal a loan secured on the revenues of all the Portuguese Colonial

The secret Anglo-German agreement of 1898 occupied the serious attention of the Government of His Most Faithful Majesty, and Great Britain signed the Anglo-Portuguese Secret Declaration of 1899, known as the Treaty of Windsor—signed by the Marquess of Salisbury and M. de Soveral—specially confirming Article 1 of the Treaty of 1642, and equally confirming the final Article of the Treaty of 1661.¹ The Anglo-German Agreement of 1898 was declared without effect and Great Britain guaranteed the integrity of the Portuguese Colonies. The treaty of Windsor “turns out to have been the offspring of Kruger’s ultimatum”² to quote G. P. Gooch, who, in his *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy*, refers to the important revelations in the *British Documents on the Origins of War 1898–1914*. “The Government of His Most Faithful Majesty undertakes not to permit after the declaration of war between Great Britain and the South African Republic, or during the continuance of the war, the importation and passage of arms and of

possessions inclusive of the railway and the port of Lourenço Marques. Such loans to be used under proper safeguards to pay off the floating debt of Portugal and the Berne Award and to provide for requisite improvements in the harbour and on the railway of Lourenço Marques, Portugal to undertake not to alienate in any way by cession, concession, lease or otherwise any part of Delagoa Bay or the approaches to the Transvaal from the sea, whether by railway, tramway or river communication, and not to confirm or grant without the concurrence of Her Majesty’s Government any concessions within a specified radius of Lourenço Marques

“If we give such a guarantee to the Kingdom of Portugal, we should, by an exchange of secret notes, provide that in the event of hostilities between ourselves and the Transvaal, we may temporarily occupy Lourenço Marques so as to prevent the supply to the Transvaal of arms and men from abroad and to secure to ourselves a road into that Republic if other approaches should be closed to us” (*Memorandum by Mr Berthe on England and Portugal in Africa, dated May 1, 1898*)

The Portuguese Minister informed the Marquess of Salisbury that “in view of all the difficulties with which the question of a loan was surrendered his Government had decided in favour of leaving matters *in statu quo*” (*Letter from the Marquess of Salisbury to Sir H. McDonell, British Minister at Lisbon, dated July 13, 1898*. “British Documents on the Origins of War,” 1898–1914. Edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, Vol. I London, 1927)

¹ “The King of Great Britain doth promise and oblige himself to defend and protect all conquests or Colonies belonging to the Crown of Portugal against all his enemies as well future as present,” were the words in the Secret Article of the Treaty of 1661

² G. P. Gooch, *Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy* London, 1930.

munitions of war destined for the latter," was the stipulation contained in the so-called Treaty of Windsor; and no wonder that during the South African War, when England had scarcely a friend in Europe, the passing of British troops through Portuguese territory in Africa—a violation of the law of nations condemned by Sir Thomas Barclay in his article "Neutrality" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*—should have raised a violent protest from the Continental Press in Europe. It may be mentioned, by the way, that there was an attempt to deprive Portugal of Delagoa Bay, which is fifty-two miles from the Transvaal border and less than three hundred from Pretoria. England claimed the southern part of Delagoa Bay, and based her claim on a treaty concluded by Captain Owen with an African king. But the contending parties having submitted their claims to the President of the French Republic, Portugal secured the complete possession of Delagoa Bay as the result of MacMahon's judgment of July, 1875. As a matter of fact, a treaty signed between Great Britain and Portugal had fixed the boundaries in East Africa of the two nations, which President MacMahon interpreted as defining the British and Portuguese spheres. Thus were confirmed the historic rights of Portugal over Delagoa Bay. Again, Cecil Rhodes, who was to play so great a part in South Africa, was anxious to make Delagoa Bay British. "Delagoa Bay would be British to-day but for the fears of revolution twenty-five years ago," wrote the London *Saturday Review* when the Republic was proclaimed in Portugal. "Cecil Rhodes and Lord Rothschild had carried negotiations for purchase to a point where confirmation and signatures only were wanted. At the last moment, the scheme was abandoned as the direct result of the action of the British Foreign Office. Pressure was brought to bear on England not to allow the purchase, because it was believed it would mean a revolution in Portugal, which would set alight all the revolutionary forces in Europe. That the story is true we know from Sir Thomas Fuller, who had it direct from the Foreign Office. A good many people in South Africa think if the purchase had taken place it would have averted

the Boer War.”¹ Portugal, however, survived the bargaining for her possessions in Africa

The future of the Portuguese Colonies, however, was a point upon which the thoughts of British and German statesmen converged before the Great War

“Portugal, we learn,” wrote Dr Dillon, in the *Contemporary Review*, “perpetuates a kind of slavery in her oversea possessions, and Germany would gladly introduce and maintain order there based on Christian principles Portugal is a little State, poor in money and in men and incapable of governing the natives or exploiting the wealth of the countries over which she still holds sway Nor is it only of her African possessions that these melancholy statements hold good Her territories in India and China are also like the talents of the Gospel parables which lay unprofitably hidden. They produce nothing to the world’s welfare, they make no contribution This lamentable state of stagnation can and should be changed between Great Britain and Germany, and a suitable arrangement on the subject of this change would, we are told, bring the two nations together as nothing else could Indeed, the well-known Dr Karl Peters, writing in the *Tag* states that England’s assent to the expansion of Germany at the cost of Portugal is almost a condition *sine quâ non* of an understanding And he wishes to know whether any diplomatic document exists which binds us to safeguard the interests of Portugal, because he explains if we are so bound Lord Haldane’s visit to Berlin and all the diplomatic conversations that followed upon it are but a mockery and a snare”² The British journalist quoted above was the apologist of the Portuguese Revolution of 1910 He gave courage to the Revolutionary leaders He was present—if I mistake not—at the birth of the Portuguese Republic His words in the *Contemporary Review* need no comment There is hardly a sentence which does not carry with it a suggestion of the kind most mischievous “The weak and the botched must perish that is the first principle of our humanity And they should be helped to perish. I

¹ *Saturday Review* October 8, 1910

² Dr Dillon, “Foreign Affairs,” *Contemporary Review* June, 1912

am writing for the lords of the earth " These were the utterances of Nietzsche, the prophet of the mailed fist. None can say they are not true, thought a cymc, in what we call a time of peace.

Unfortunately, however, the seeds of disorder were sown far too thickly upon Portuguese soil to need the fostering husbandry of foreign diplomatists and journalists. Portugal was demoralised and some of the manifestations of her weakness were extremely unpleasant ¹ The policy of the Government was made to depend on café intrigues, incapacity and folly stood in high places, while an indignant nation held sullenly aloof "Englishmen see with increasing regret the oldest of their allies, forgetful of a glorious tradition and of an immense heritage of rich Colonial possessions, sunk in a hopeless turmoil of mutual chicanery, jobbery and persecution at a time when other European countries, less favoured by fortune in every material respect, are winning their way by splendid self-sacrifice and patriotic effort towards the goal of a higher civilisation " ² These strong and painful words were uttered by the *London Times* It was plain that under the irritation produced by the events in Portugal, Englishmen had grown indifferent to the fate of their ancient ally They had, of course, decided that Portugal was no longer an instrument they could work with, and that she must suffer for her folly.

"In the case of events rendering European intervention necessary in Portugal, the geographical situation of Spain would be taken into account " Such was Clause VIII of the Franco-Spanish agreement, signed a year or two before the Great War, an agreement which was consonant with the Anglo-French agreement of 1904 Clause VIII, in

¹ "Dans un récent ouvrage consacré à son pays, Bragança-Cunha constate qu'au cours des huit derniers siècles le Portugal n'a pas traversé moins de six crises particulièrement graves, plus graves même que la perte de ses colonies "

"Chaque fois, sauf la dernière,—écrit notre auteur—la nation sortit de la crise à force d'énergie et parce-qu'elle obéissait à un idéal Aujourd'hui la situation matérielle du pays est moins précaire qu'elle ne l'était à la fin des cinq crises précédentes, mais où est l'idéal La plupart des Portugais cultivés vous diront leur hésitations sur ce point "—Angel Marvaud, "Le Portugal et ses Colonies" *Bibliothèque d'Histoire Contemporaine*, Paris, 1912

² *Times* January 2, 1913

the Franco-Spanish agreement was, of course, in direct contravention of the compact agreed to in ancient days by England and Portugal, and this seems the more sad when we remember in what spirit England encountered every previous attempt at intervention in Portugal ¹

In 1913, Sir Edward Grey, the Liberal Foreign Secretary, is stated to have agreed to a revision of the Anglo-German bargain, and a new secret treaty was drafted ²

"Organised nations," affirms Hobbes, "assume the personal character of men, and consequently there is no difference between the moral rules which ought to be observed by individuals" But this ideal of a philosophical visionary has long been refuted by the logic of experience, and the conditions the author of *De Cive* imagined to exist have long since passed away. The liberal ideas of the great founders of international law, Grotius

¹ In 1873, when the Spanish Minister accredited to the Court of St James called upon the British Foreign Secretary and desired to speak to him on a delicate matter, he is known to have said "*that there was a disposition on the part of the Republican party in Spain towards a union with Portugal, and there were some Republicans in Portugal who would be ready to assist in such a project If it was generally believed in Spain that such a project could be carried out without opposition from Europe the Spanish Government might not be able to stop some aggressive movement*" The answer that the Earl of Granville, the British Foreign Secretary, gave the Spanish Minister was "*that Great Britain had always disclaimed the wish to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries, but there were Treaty engagements between Portugal and Great Britain to defend Portugal against external aggression, and that the Spaniards could not count upon the indifference of England to an external attack upon Portugal*" (Dispatch from Earl of Granville to Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid also to Her Majesty's Minister at Lisbon Foreign Office, February 19, 1873)

² "As Germany's share of the new pact marked out most of Angola (except the part east of 20° E) besides the rich cocoa-producing island of Sao-Thome and its smaller neighbour, Prince's Island (Principe) both lying off the western coast of Central Africa, and also on the Eastern coast, the part of Mozambique, north of the river Licango This time it was agreed that it was unnecessary to wait upon Portugal's voluntary offer to sell, the Great Powers might step in ostensibly because of Portuguese mis-government, and as soon as either Germany or England took its share the other could occupy the rest Sir Edward Grey's willingness to conclude such a bargain, disposing of the property of a small and allied nation behind the latter's back, may be explained partly on the ground of his strong desire for a general agreement with Germany (he was at this time settling Anglo-German differences in the Near East) and partly on the ground that English publicists had given Portuguese colonial administration a reputation for corrupt and cruel inefficiency and for inhuman treatment of the natives The bargain, however, was never fulfilled, nor was it even ratified Germany opposed its immediate publication, whereas Grey insisted on publication as a condition of ratification, as a result the draft treaty initiated by the negotiators lay in a pigeon-hole awaiting signature until the outbreak of war in 1914 made signature impossible" P T Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* New York, 1926

and Suarez, the broad humanitarianism of philosophers like Saint Pierre and Kant no longer govern international affairs. The theory of international morality has yet to be defined when published treaties are supplemented and often rendered nugatory by secret understandings. Moreover, there is a certain energy in almost all Great Powers which, under favourable conditions, makes for territorial expansion. "The race of statesmen who authoritatively reprovéd it," said Gladstone, "are gone, or have passed in the shade, and a new race have succeeded of whom a large part either administer strong incentives or look on with indifference."¹

But true to the pledges voluntarily given in August, 1914, and renewed on November 23, and yet again renewed on December 8, 1917, Portugal entered into the conflict which involved the whole civilised world. At a special sitting of the Cortes on August 7, Portugal proclaimed her loyalty to her ancient alliance, "from which under no circumstances shall we shrink," to put it in the words of Bernardino Machado, then Prime Minister, a declaration which may perhaps be regarded as slightly academic. On November 23, 1914, the Government, presided over by Bernardino Machado, having convoked the Chambers in extraordinary session, proposed the following Bill—"The Executive Power is hereby authorized to make military intervention in the present international conflict of arms whenever and in whatever manner it may be deemed necessary in our higher interests as a free nation and as an ally of Great Britain." But though "Portugal spontaneously announced herself ready, as the ally of Great Britain, to give the latter every assistance"—to quote the note drafted in agreement between the Portuguese and British Governments, and read out in the Portuguese Parliament—"the British Government, heartily grateful for this clear proof of solidarity, invited the Portuguese Government to act conjointly in such manner as might be stipulated between them in military co-operation."² Great Britain, of course,

¹ *Nineteenth Century Review* August, 1877

² "A message from the Government to the citizens of the Republic of Portugal, conveyed in the hope that it may find an echo abroad." Published in the *Diário do Governo* No. 9 Series 1 of January 19th, 1917

sent a cruiser on a visit of courtesy to Lisbon in September, 1914, but did not call on Portugal for immediate assistance. Incidentally, it may be mentioned that in December, 1914, Portugal turned over to the Allied army two-thirds of her entirely new field artillery.

For active participation in the Great War, Portugal, no doubt, was not prepared. The Portuguese felt apprehension at the retreat of their troops in Africa after their first advance. As early as August 24, 1914, German forces had raided the northern frontier of Mozambique. On October 19, 1914, they had invaded Angola; and the invasion was followed by many aggressions. It was, therefore, the general opinion that as a consequence of military expeditions—the first African expedition of Portuguese troops had left in September, 1914—which sailed for Portuguese Africa, it was almost impossible to support the participation in the war in France. Besides, the Portuguese army, quite unaccustomed to warfare on a large scale, had yet to be organized. The Allies “knew that the Portuguese soldier is highly valued as a soldier. He is brave—he proved his mettle in the old days under Wellington. He has great staying power, and he is the only European soldier who can go about bareheaded at noonday under the Equator,” wrote a French Diplomat, who was in Portugal. “But modern warfare demands not military qualities alone; it demands full military preparation. It is as hazardous to place an untrained brigade in the midst of an army as to put in a football team a young man who, although agile and fearless, has never played football. There was nothing to justify the belief that Portugal was prepared. . . . The reports of 1913—the last which the military attachés had been able to make concerning the Portuguese army—were far from encouraging. They set forth that it comprised barely twenty thousand men, most of whom were on leave, that the departure of the Royalists had materially decreased the value of officers. They emphasized, also, the pacifist spirit of Portugal. . . .”¹ Hence the hesitation of the

¹ “Portugal’s Object Lesson to the United States,” by a French Diplomat *Harper’s Magazine* October, 1917

Quai d'Orsay and the Foreign Office to accept the offer made early in the summer of 1916, by the Portuguese representatives in Paris and London, to send a Portuguese army to France

The hostility between Germany and Portugal had been informal in spite of the violation of the juridic relations existing between the two countries. The British Government on February 17th, 1916, however, instructed its Minister at Lisbon "to urge upon the Government of the Republic in the name of the Alliance the requisition of all the enemy vessels lying in Portuguese ports which will be made use of for Portuguese trade navigation, and also between Lisbon and such other ports as may be determined by agreement between the two Governments"; and on February 23 the Portuguese Government seized all the German vessels anchored in Portuguese ports. The German Minister at Lisbon, Baron von Rosen, of course described the action of the Portuguese Government as "a singular breach of right and an act of force"¹. War with Germany was thus declared, and this, of course, also necessitated war between Portugal and Austria-Hungary. On the 9th March, 1916, the German Government formally declared war upon Portugal, and at a joint session of both Houses of Parliament, on the following day, Afonso Costa made a statement on the severance of relations with the Imperial Government. It is but fair to say that before taking overt action the German Minister at Lisbon attempted to present an apology for the German raids into Portuguese African territory.

King Manuel had already, without evincing any servile attitude, placed himself at the disposal of King George

¹ "But the requisition of ships responds to an incontestable right which appertains to every Government when exacted by its primordial interests. This right, known under the name of *Aryane*, was provided, moreover, in the Germano-Portuguese treaty of commerce of November 30, 1908. In exercising sovereignty of her ports, Portugal made use of this imperceptible right. The only reproach that Germany might address to her is of having waited too long, for all German properties, including the ships, should have been sequestered without indemnity following the invasion of Angola.

"Let us note likewise that Italy requisitioned thirty-seven German ships interned within her ports. Nine of these plied between Italy and England and eighteen between Italy and the United States. However, Germany accepted this fact, and on this occasion made no outcry about a violation of rights"—Jean Finot, *La Revue* Paris, April, 1916

the Fifth. The Portuguese Monarchists must first think of their country and the defence of its sacred soil, said the ex-King of Portugal in his letter dated August 20, 1914, to João Azevedo Coutinho, and the King's chief representative wrote to the President of the Portuguese Republic demanding permission to serve in the Army should Portugal enter the Great War. The royal exile, of course, "used his position at the Court of St. James for the service of his country, being a veritable Portuguese Ambassador to Britain during the war and in all difficult circumstances"—to quote the verdict which the oldest Lisbon non-political daily pronounced upon the tragic career of the last King of Portugal, who died at Fulwell Park on July 2, 1932. "Here rests in God King Manuel II, who in exile served his country well," was the epitaph engraved on the mausoleum built of black marble, quarried from the late King's estates at Villaviçosa, within which the remains of the exiled King now rest.

"In the surroundings of the expatriated King Dom Manuel, who is now sojourning on English soil, living in the most intimate intercourse with the royal family of England, feverish activity is displayed. The ex-King is desired to participate in this present war in order to re-enter Lisbon at the head of Loyalists. The young Republic would, therefore, commit suicide if, through joining in this war in consequence of the coaxing of France or bulldozing of England, this were to happen." wrote a prominent German writer in the Berlin *Vossische Zeitung*. The Portuguese Republicans, however, never shared the illusions of German Imperialists. Illusions they had, but of another kind. "The Miguelites," wrote George Young, in his *Portugal Old and New*, "made no concealment of their pro-Germanism."¹ Their sympathies were so strongly with Germany as to create an element of anxiety for the British Legation, already aware of the fact that German sympathies and German influence were noticeable in Portugal, particularly in commercial circles. But the Miguelite "programme of restoration under the German protection or

¹ George Young, *Portugal Old and New* Oxford, 1927

even under a German prince,"¹ showing, as it did, a complete misunderstanding of the position of Portugal, was, of course, repudiated by the majority of Monarchists, who were professedly pro-ally.

Be that as it may, further steps towards the active participation by Portugal in the Great War were taken by England at the instance of France. The attitude of France in the matter was, perhaps, prompted by motives of self-defence, for Germany was about to resume, at Verdun, her desperate assaults. An Anglo-French military commission, composed of three British and three French officers, was sent to Portugal to inspect the Portuguese Army. Their visit, in the latter part of August, 1916, brought them into touch with Portuguese army head-quarters, and gave them a close view of the state of affairs. "The Commission," wrote the French Diplomat already quoted, giving a cheerful account of its mission to Portugal, "inspected the barracks and the arsenals, and travelled all over the country; visited Oporto, Thomar, Coimbra and their garrisons, directed manœuvres on the very spots where Portuguese troops, in alliance with Wellington's, had fought the French in 1809; and sent in its report at the end of September. On the 15th October the offer to send a Portuguese army was accepted with much cordiality by England and France"² At the beginning of 1917 a Portuguese Division, preceding a second division commanded by General Teixeira d'Eça, was in France; and by a decree dated January 17, General Tamagnini Abreu was given the command of the Portuguese expeditionary force. By July there were over 40,000 Portuguese troops on the Western Front.

On the battlefields of France the English and the Portuguese fought side by side.³ On April 9, 1918, the Portuguese

¹ George Young, *Portugal Old and New* Oxford, 1927

² "Portugal's Object Lesson to the United States," by a French Diplomat, *Harper's Magazine* October, 1917

³ "On the night of 7th-8th April we arrive in the line south of Armentieres. On the right are the Portuguese. I don't like the feel of things—all is quiet—too quiet. I go down the Portuguese front with a colonel. We walk seven hundred yards and scarcely see a sentry. We examine rifles and ammunition lying about. All are rusty and useless. The bombs are the same. 'Where are the men?' I ask my companion. A snore gives me my answer. Practically

contingent met a terrific attack by the Germans, and the battle of the Lys¹ will long be remembered as a sad and cruel story, relieved only by the heroic resignation of the Portuguese soldier. It is interesting, in this connection, to note that it was on the third anniversary of the battle on the Lys river, that Portugal's unknown warrior from Flanders was buried in the historic abbey of Batalha. Portugal, it was officially stated, had mobilised 200,000 men, of whom 8,367 had been killed. The total cost of the Portuguese expeditionary force had been £28,000,000.

The Portuguese Republicans, of course, believed that a victorious Kaiser would restore monarchy in Portugal.²

all the front line sleeps heavily and bootless in cubby-holes covered with waterproof sheets, while the equipment hangs carelessly about 'This is a pretty mess,' I say, 'and on our flank. What would old Andrews say?' I add 'Well, you know what our new men are like!' says Colonel Brown, of the Welch 'Babies!' We walk back to our line "

"I go back to my headquarters in a farm, and report what I have seen. 'They are always like that' says a member of the British Mission attached to the Portuguese. 'They shouldn't be there,' I say, 'that's the crime' "

"Political considerations may necessitate certain lines of action which may be distasteful to the soldier, but the safety of the line is far above political considerations or expediency, and if first principles are threatened by the politician, the safety of the country thereby being endangered, all that is left for the chief soldier is resignation. Of course if it is maintained that G H Q did not know the Portuguese divisions were so inferior, there is nothing to be said—but in that case neither they nor their mission could have known the difference between a bad soldier and a good one"—Brig-General F P Crozier, *A Brass Hat in No Man's Land* London, 1930

¹ "After the Somme battle we were put into a 'quiet' part of the line south of Armentieres on 7th April. The fly in the ointment was the Portuguese division in our midst. It was a fly which the Germans encouraged and even fed by hand. G H Q was about to relieve that Portuguese Division as they knew the danger—it was so obvious. The tragedy was not that they failed to relieve the Portuguese in time but that they had ever put them into the line at all, or let them remain there for months well knowing their defects. They must have known that in the Peninsular War the Portuguese only fought well when led by British officers.

"And so the inevitable happened

"The Portuguese, being attacked early in the morning of 9th April, 1918, instantly took to their heels and ran, only, it is said, to be eventually stopped by the sea"—Brig-General F P Crozier, *Impressions and Recollections* London, 1930

² "In the course of my interview with the German Emperor the conversation turned on the overthrow of King Manuel, of whom he spoke with unmerited severity. I did my best to take up the cudgels on the young King's behalf, pointing out that he was a mere boy who had seen his father killed and his

Pan-Germanism must be destroyed, no matter at what cost, they said. And what a cost it was! They had sent an army to fight on the Continent whereby they fought the war for British policy, but faced with serious financial difficulties in the near future, they had to borrow from Great Britain. "The British Government had agreed with the Government of Portugal," according to the note communicated to Parliament, "to grant the latter such loans as may be required for the payment of all expenditure for purposes directly connected with the war which the two Governments shall agree to incur in Great Britain or exceptionally in other allied countries. The British Government will make these loans to the Portuguese Government on the same terms as it may raise money from time to time by means of Treasury Bills. The total sum lent to the Portuguese Government shall be repaid by the latter to the British Government within two years reckoned from the date of signature of the Treaty of Peace, out of the product of an external loan to be negotiated by Portugal, and for the emission of which the British Government will give every possible facility." This arrangement¹—an indication of the growing seriousness of Portugal's financial position—gave no ground for excessive idealism. A loan of £23,528,186 had to be raised in England, of which, some years after, the

brother mortally wounded by Revolutionary assassins, that he had not been educated with a view to immediate succession to the Throne, and that he was completely ignorant of what persons in the army and in politics could be trusted. The Kaiser, however, with much assurance, persisted in maintaining his point of view, little anticipating, no doubt, that he himself would be compelled to imitate the young Portuguese King's example under circumstances at least equally tragic for his dynasty and his country"—Right Hon. Sir Arthur Hardinge, *A Diplomatist in Europe*

¹ "With the Great War and Portugal's entry in the lists on the side of the Allies, the financial *débâcle*, which had long been looming on the horizon, was momentarily arrested. And since Portugal could hardly be expected to contribute an efficient quota to the fighting forces of the Allies if adequate loans were not forthcoming for their upkeep, arming and provisioning, it became necessary to sponsor her finances in order to increase the fighting value of her expeditionary forces. In this way a Government which was practically bankrupt in cash and credit, not only obtained a respite from its troubles, but was enabled to clear up the mess of certain outstanding financial obligations and so present to the world a very misleading appearance of prosperity."

"General Carmona and the New Portugal," by Dudley Heathcote *Fortnightly Review* April, 1927

Portuguese Government succeeded in paying a small part, at the same time setting the period of complete liquidation at sixty-two years by an annual payment of 5 per cent

The Great War was over Portugal secured three-fourths of one per cent of the total indemnity from Germany She also received Kionga, which Germany had seized in 1894 and the Portuguese troops occupied on April 11, 1916 The Portuguese and British Legations in London and Lisbon were raised to the status of embassies, in accordance with an agreement with the murdered President Sidonio Pais, in 1918, as officially announced in June, 1924 Republican Portugal, however, hardly realized the significance and implications of the Great War

Following the assassination of Sidonio Pais, the President of the Portuguese Republic, in December, 1918, Admiral João de Canto e Castro became the Provisional President, and a new Cabinet was formed, with Tamagnini Barbosa as Premier and Minister of the Interior The new Premier soon resigned, and José Relvas, one of the Ministers in the Provisional Government of 1910, became Prime Minister. The nation being now committed to hands manifestly incapable of wielding its powers, Paiva Couceiro, the Royalist leader, led a movement which gave him an undisputed control over the north of Portugal Thus not merely the city of Oporto—where on January 19, 1919, the restoration of the Monarchy was declared—but the towns of Braga, Vizeu, Coimbra and Aveiro passed rapidly under Monarchist control It was distinctly a Royalist triumph The northern provinces looked to Paiva Couceiro to put an end to the intermittent Republican anarchy; and they were prepared to give the restored regime a clean sheet The Royalist forces of several thousand men, absolutely Monarchical in spirit, were officered by a number of officers of the Regular army, who had deserted to the Monarchists. They marched south towards the capital But they were defeated at Monsanto Heavy artillery turned the scale The Government was granted special powers to deal with the uprising, which had swept the

provinces. The Royalist leaders were captured, but Paiva Couceiro himself escaped.

The Republican Premier, José Relvas, was superseded, however, by Domingos Pereira, who himself took the Ministry of the Interior.

Events now moved quickly. On June 1st, 1919, Admiral Canto Castro, the President of the Republic, resigned, and was succeeded by the Republican orator, Antonio José d'Almeida, who was elected on August 6, the other candidate being Teixeira Gomes, the Portuguese Minister in London. Portugal, now sick of heroes, orators and politicians, asked for one thing—one thing only—it asked for peace of mind. But the Republican orators, seeking themselves for means of fresh emotion and excitement, filled her head with foolish hopes.

But all the rhetoric could not obscure the fact that the Republican regime had got itself into a terrible tangle both at home and abroad. In January, 1920, there was a reconstruction of the Government in power, which, however, carried on a precarious existence under the fostering care of Domingos Pereira, the Premier, and Melo Barreto, the Foreign Minister. The Cabinet remained in power until the beginning of March, when the President of the Republic asked Antonio Maria da Silva to form a new Ministry, which he did. But the Republican Premier immediately resigned. He was followed by Alvaro de Castro, who stood out, at the time, as a dominant figure and force in Revolutionary politics. The Revolutionary leader remained in power for only about twenty-four hours. There was, therefore, only one course for the President of the Republic to take, while firebrands were again working overtime to attempt a *coup d'état*. That was to adopt a temporary expedient to stem the Revolutionary tide, and within a few days Alvaro de Castro was succeeded by Colonel A. M. Baptista. The new Premier died suddenly on June 6, and Dr. Preto, who had been Minister of Justice, then presided over the Government. But, within a month, the Cabinet, lacking in direction and in control, had to resign, and Antonio Maria da Silva was once more entrusted with the

formation of a new Ministry. The Government, whose future depended on the amount of support they could rely upon in the Parliament, presented their "programme," which was approved by the Chamber of Deputies but was defeated by the Senate. In an atmosphere that was tense with suspicion, Antonio Maria da Silva then resigned, and in July, Antonio Granjo became Premier, and Melo Barreto, Minister for Foreign Affairs. The new Premier was a sincere lover of peace. He proposed to issue a wide amnesty to include the Royalists arrested since the rising of January, 1919. For among those arrested since Monsanto there were hundreds of people incarcerated on false charges. Their only crime was that they held Monarchist views. The extremists, however, offered open resistance to the amnesty for Royalist political prisoners, and the Republican Premier, aware of the continued existence of the Revolutionary ferment, suddenly retired in November. The collapse of Parliamentary Governments had evidently become a settled fact. During the next few weeks there were frequent changes of Cabinets. Alvaro de Castro, General A. Hipolito and Liberato Pinto were Premiers in Cabinets which differed from one another in person but did not differ in purpose. Portugal in 1920, to quote the *Annual Register* for 1921, "had been ruled by nine Governments, one of which lasted for twenty-four hours, another for six days." "Liberato Pinto's Government, which came into power on November 20, 1920," it wrote, "was in crisis before the end of the year, and resigned on February 12, 1921. For the remainder of the month Portugal was without a Government, although the crisis had been expected."

In March, 1921, a new Coalition Ministry was formed under the premiership of Bernardino Machado, the Radical ex-President of the Republic. With such a ministry the Premier thought he would carry through his amnesty measures and then hold a General Election. He intended to carry out, he declared, a policy of conciliation that appeared to him as of benefit to the country's larger purposes. After an all-night sitting in the Chamber of Deputies, the Amnesty Bill was passed by 50 votes to 22. Radicalism

had once more tried to hide its head and to make believe that it did not exist. On May 4, however, a decree was promulgated, annulling that of December 9, 1917, by which Parliament had been dissolved. The curious position had thus arisen that all legislation subsequent to the dictatorship of Sidonio Pais became null and void. But the military *pronunciamento* of May 20 compelled the Premier, Bernardino Machado, to resign with the entire Cabinet, which went out of office through fears of the Lisbon garrison's threat to open fire. The President of the Republic also, very alarmed at the Revolutionaries' threat of bombardment—a contingency the aged President dared not face—accepted the humiliating terms.

The military movements of May, 1921 brought pressure upon the President of the Republic for a less radical administration, and paved the way for the formation of the Liberal Ministries presided over by Barros Queiroz, the leader of Liberal or Moderate Republicans, and Antonio Granjo, respectively. The Parliament was dissolved, and the July election returned seventy-four Government candidates and fifty-one Democrats, the majority of whom were, unfortunately, men accustomed to brook neither reasonable criticism nor free discussion. The situation was now extremely grave, since any attempt at financial and economic reforms would be furiously fought in Parliament. Barros Queiroz, had, therefore, to place his resignation in August in the hands of the President of the Republic. He was succeeded by Antonio Granjo, who presided over a new Liberal Ministry. But in October a *coup d'état* promoted by Colonel Manuel Maria Coelho, Major Cortez dos Santos, Captain Roza Matheus, Lieut.-Commanders Procopio de Freitas and Serrão Machado, caused the resignation of Antonio Granjo, who had not enough faithful troops, to quote his letter to the President of the Republic, to defend himself and his Government against the rebels. The measures claimed by the Revolutionary Junta were the dismissal of the Government in power and the dissolution of the July Parliament, and a deputation of the Junta waited upon the President of the Republic who, strange to

say, accepted the nominees of the Revolutionary group, which, although not numerically strong, was able to make itself loudly heard. A Cabinet was announced, headed by Col Coelho, who entered on a dictatorship—the election was postponed till January, 1922—with the camouflage of democratic Republicanism. Meanwhile the political fanatic—

“Laid schemes for death,
to slaughter turned his heart,
and fitted murder to the rules of Art”
(Tuckell—*On the Prospects of Peace*)

A group of marines—the warships in the Tagus *São Gabriel* and *Vasco da Gama* had joined the Revolutionary troops commanded by Colonel Coelho—and civil guards—the *Carbonarios* had been allowed to arm themselves at the Naval Arsenal, where Lieut-Commanders Procopio de Freitas and Serrão Machado had taken command of the Revolutionaries—paid domiciliary visits to moderate Republicans, the majority of whom, however, managed somehow to escape. But the Revolutionaries easily succeeded in capturing the ex-Prime Minister of the fallen Government. Antonio Granjo, who had sought asylum with a loyal detachment of the Republican Guard at Carmo—where he had decided to resign with his Cabinet—had motored from Carmo to his home and thence to the residence of Cunha Leal, his Finance Minister, where he was arrested. The unfortunate Republican ex-Minister, whose unrelenting attitude towards the sinister murderer of Sidonio Pais, now released by the Revolutionaries, was known to all, was taken to the Naval Arsenal and murdered. Carlos da Maia—ex-Minister of Marine, who had first become Minister under Sidonio Pais—was captured and assassinated. And by a curious irony of fate—fate, destiny or curse, call it what you will—Admiral Machado dos Santos, the founder of the Republic, now under arrest, was murdered by his guard while being taken to the Naval Arsenal. Indeed, it seemed incredible that such a murderous scheme as that of October 19, 1921, could be consummated, and helpless Ministers and politicians murdered in cold blood.

The promoters of the Revolution were now in power. Fortunately, however, the appearance of British, French and Spanish cruisers in the Tagus brought them to sudden reason. The idea of a foreign intervention occasioned some pretty hard thinking, and Colonel Coelho thought it best to resign on October 31. Whether responsibly guilty or not, the Revolutionary Premier had given no assurance of a disposition to punish the assassins whom the Revolution had given their sinister opportunity. His Ministry was reconstructed, and Maia Pinto then became Premier and Minister of the Interior. But the inability of the new Premier to meet the problems of law and order was such that the Ministry only lasted until December 13. These circumstances of a compelling character led Cunha Leal to undertake a task that the former Finance Minister, under Antonio Granjo, might have liked to shirk, and the courageous Minister, wounded on October 19, formed a short-lived Ministry. He ruled the storm with a strong hand. He never wavered in his determination to maintain order in the country. But on December 30, Cunha Leal had to place his resignation in the hands of the President of the Republic who, however, induced the Premier—who had the courage, the driving power and the brain—to continue in power.

The General Election was held in January, 1922, and the *Democraticos* were successful by a small majority. The total vote cast at Lisbon, showed, however, how great had been the response to Monarchist electoral appeal. Afonso Costa, the leader of *Democraticos*, polled rather less than in the preceding year, while the Monarchist candidate showed a considerable increase over the previous election.

Cunha Leal, however, refused to be manœuvred into the position of a Dictator. Constitutionally incapable of adopting the ideals of the drill sergeant, this young officer in the Engineers, who had played a bold and determined hand, would not repudiate democratic concepts and Parliamentary methods. In an interview given in Paris the ex-Premier declared "that it had been understood that his Cabinet was of a purely transitional nature, and that it

had merely handed over its powers to the Cabinet appointed by the new Parliament"¹ Cunha Leal tendered his resignation, and was succeeded on February 5 by Antonio Maria da Silva.

The Democrat Ministry, under the premiership of Antonio Maria da Silva, was now brought face to face with the situation in regard to the October murders. The indignation that the murders had aroused was world-wide, and the country demanded an orderly policy honestly and resolutely followed. But the task in the new field of law and order, into which the Republican Premier, a former leading member of the *Carbonaria*, was suddenly coerced, was not an easy one. Here, in passing, it may be stated that the ringleaders of the October movement—Naval-Captain Procopio Freitas, and the Chief of Staff of the National Guard, and Colonel Coelho, who became Premier—were arrested. The murderer of Sidonio Pais, released during the October Revolution, however, was not re-arrested; and the nation was shocked by such action. Moreover, the actual trials of privates and some officers of high rank were continuously postponed; and many regarded the whole thing as a cynical manoeuvre on the part of the Prime Minister, who had exhibited a state of mind which hopelessly unfitted him as a head of orderly Government. Indeed, Antonio Maria da Silva possessed no moral authority to occupy, at this juncture, his responsible post. This, of course, complicated the problem of law and order beyond all confusion hitherto experienced.

The clumsiness of which Antonio Maria da Silva had given repeated proof, since he was in power, led to a Revolutionary movement. The Government and the President of the Republic were placed in the unpleasant position of having first to take refuge in a fortress, and then retire to the citadel of Cascais, fifteen miles from Lisbon. From this moment, excitement and complications steadily grew. Troops were called up from the provinces. The Lisbon Revolutionaries were besieged, and they had to hand over their artillery. The President and Ministers were

¹ "Checking Revolution in Portugal," *Current History* July, 1922

able to return to the capital, and the Government now decided to take strong action to suppress all Revolutionary activities. Thus they managed to do temporarily, by reducing the National, or Republican, Guard to a total of 12,000, of which Lisbon was to have 3,500.

There was, however, another question to decide, and that was the reconstruction of the Cabinet in power. The first incident out of usual routine arose when a Speaker was elected by the Minority in the Chamber of Deputies. The obvious thing for the Premier to do was to substitute for two Democratic Ministers, two members of the Independent party. The Democrats, however, were still anxious to maintain that they alone were chosen to fulfil a Republican mission. As a matter of fact, Antonio Maria da Silva was subjected to bitter attack for hauling down his colours.

This was the state of affairs when, at the end of August, 1922, Antonio José d'Almeida, the President of the Republic, left Lisbon for Rio de Janeiro, in order to attend the celebration of the first anniversary of the independence of Brazil, which he called, perhaps with an excess of rhetoric "the sister nation." He was the Portuguese President about to complete his term of four years—a feat unparalleled in the history of the Republic—the others having been forcibly ejected from the Belem Palace, or assassinated.

To some Antonio José d'Almeida was once the most unselfish Republican in Portugal. They saw in him a champion of Republicanism, who dared to speak out against the sacrifice of principle to expediency. But now, for reasons best known to himself, he was the President of a Republic where government had been regularly carried on by insurrection and intrigue. He was still "sitting on bayonets."

Fortunately, however, the event of the year 1922 was the transatlantic flight of two Portuguese aviators, Sacadura Cabral and Gago Coutinho, from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro. Their choice of moment was good; their efforts were great, if excessive. The 4,000 mile flight, which began on March 30, and came to a successful conclusion on June 5, demonstrated, to quote the words of the Portuguese Minister at

Washington, "the practical efficiency of the new methods of air navigation"

In August, 1923, Teixeira Gomes was elected President of the Republic in succession to Antonio José d'Almeida. Teixeira Gomes, who arrived at Lisbon on October 3, on board H M S *Carysfort*, escorted by the Spanish cruiser, *Reina Victoria Eugenia*, was to mount a horse that had thrown six riders in thirteen years. The seventh President of the Republic, who was very much out of touch with the latest political developments, soon found it hard to fulfil his role in the difficult circumstances that had arisen on his arrival from London, where he was Portuguese Minister. The reconstructed Ministry, presided over by Antonio Maria da Silva, having carried a vote of confidence by a majority of one, had to resign. The President of the Republic, ready to negotiate the so-called "peace" on a basis acceptable to the Democrats, formally invited Afonso Costa, who was in Paris, to constitute a Ministry. But the Democratic leader, when he arrived, found that the party was not so easy to control as the one he led before. He was not the power that he used to be. He opened immediate negotiations with the Nationalist party—the party formed by the fusion of the *Reconstituente*, under the leadership of Alvaro de Castro, and the *Popular*, led by Julio Martins—for the solution of the difficulties which existed. But the Nationalists wisely refused to supply Ministers for a Cabinet to be formed by a man who was more than a symbol of political disorder, while promising the new Cabinet their loyal support. Afonso Costa, of course, preferred to return to Paris before the political storm had become utterly overwhelming. Following another unsuccessful attempt by the President of the Republic to entrust the task of forming a Ministry to another Democrat, Catanho de Menezes, Gnistel Machado, a Nationalist, formed a Cabinet including Cunha Leal—the ex-Premier, who had already done, excellent work, by no means without success—as Finance Minister.

On December 10 there was a renewed attempt at a radical *coup d'état*, such as had occurred in October, 1921,

but it failed to materialise. The Government, though it emerged from the ordeal with success, was defeated on a motion of confidence by eleven votes. A new Ministry was then formed under the Premiership of Alvaro de Castro, who had decided to form a Cabinet which would work closely with the Democratic majority, in Parliament. The Cabinet, partially reconstructed at the end of February, 1924, however, had to resign within the space of seven months. In the circumstances prevailing at the time, with Afonso Costa refusing to interest himself in the Republican quarrel—he had, once more, been summoned to Portugal, but refused to form a Ministry—Rodrigues Gaspar formed a Democratic Ministry. Radical and Communist riots were feared, and the Republican Guard patrolled the streets of Lisbon. The Revolutionaries seemed, however, to be the last persons to be aware of the fact that their Revolution had been announced for days. Their scare tactics were amusing, if unscrupulous. On November 22, José Domingos de Santos formed another Government from the Democrat Left. The Cabinet came to grief in the Chamber, because the army had fired on the crowd after the throwing of a bomb. This was the issue on which the Chamber and the Government finally parted company. A new Ministry was constituted by Victorino Guimarães, who succeeded Domingos dos Santos in February, 1925.

In the midst of the political crisis there arose a military conflict which afforded a serious warning of the dangers to which the nation was exposed. At the beginning of June, 1924, seventeen officers of the Air Force involved in a quarrel with the Minister of War, having put up a stiff resistance for nearly a week at their camp at Amadora, only surrendered when provincial reinforcements, estimated at 2,000 men, were rushed up. Unhappily, too, the conduct of various groups and classes of the population was destined to increase the Government difficulties. In July, the Lisbon police and soldiers of the Republican Guard were mixed up in a street fight which resulted in seven persons being killed and twenty injured. The two postal strikes, in February and May 1925, that of the civil servants in March

and that of café and hotel employées in September were events of the most embarrassing kind. But this was not all. The Agricultural, Commercial and Industrial Associations held violent protest meetings against the introduction of new Stamp Duties. Such was the stubborn and determined resistance put up by these associations that the Vice-President of the Commercial Association was arrested on a charge of sedition.

The Government, presided over by Victorino Guimarães, now in power, had to face in April a military revolt led by the Naval Captain Filomeno da Camara and Lieut-Colonel Raul Esteves. The Revolutionary leader, Filomeno da Camara, was a distinguished officer in the Navy, who, as Republican Governor of Timor—the fact deserves mention—had profoundly impressed all those who had come in contact with him or with his splendid work. The Revolutionary attack was launched with great vigour, but the resistance of the Government forces was tenacious. While heavy artillery crashed shells on Revolutionary quarters, the Government ordered the proclamation of martial law, and the revolt was rapidly quelled. Again, in June the Radicals attempted a Revolution, but their chances of a Revolutionary *coup d'état* were now regarded as very small indeed. At the end of June, however, a vote of no confidence was passed; and the Cabinet of Victorino Guimarães had to resign. The new Cabinet was presided over by Antonio Maria da Silva. It suppressed the rising of July 18—the third Revolutionary movement of the year—which was a renewed attempt at an army coup such as was threatened in April last. But the Cabinet fell a few days later. It had lasted about three weeks. A Ministerial crisis followed, and Domingos Pereira succeeded in constituting a Democrat Independent Ministry. The General Election, conducted in an atmosphere of the most violent bitterness, was held on November 8, 1925. It gave a clear majority to the Democrats, who numbered 82 against 66 of all other parties, or factions. A month later Teixeira Gomes, the President of the Republic, resigned. A typical product of his days, both in his qualities and in his defects,

Teixeira Gomes had always been anxious to avoid taking any responsibility or giving any lead

Bernardino Machado was elected President of the Republic in place of Teixeira Gomes. His presidential life—he was first elected President in August, 1915 for a term of four years, but was driven from office in December, 1917—had been a continuous string of comic incidents. But nevertheless he was extremely anxious, at the age of seventy, to become once more “the first citizen” in Republican Portugal. He would not miss this last opportunity of wresting personal honours, even from political disorder. Under him the Cabinet of Domingos Pereira would not serve, and a new Democratic Ministry was formed with Antonio Maria da Silva once more as Premier. But no sooner had Antonio Maria da Silva assumed power, than discontent with existing government arose, and this time the Revolutionary field of action seemed of considerably wide extent. In February, 1926, a military revolt broke out, its object eventually, being the establishment of a Radical Government. The movement, headed by a civilian, Martins Junior—one of the many unfamiliar Portuguese names that constitute the essence of Republican history—was suppressed, and the leaders deported. But worse still, a series of crimes—murder, bomb-throwing and destruction of property—characterised this period of Portuguese Republicanism. The officers of the Court and the Police were the victims of brutal murders. It was, indeed, an exciting, sanguinary tale in the best of the old *Carbonaria* tradition. By a curious paradox, the Premier, Antonio Maria da Silva, the Revolutionary who was, in the early days of the Portuguese Republic, privy to all the doings of secret societies, fought the so-called secret “Red Legion.” He spread his nets and caught a big haul of Portuguese terrorists, who were deported to some of the African Colonies.

There seemed, however, no sign that a more peaceful era was approaching. The vexed tobacco question, which was going to plunge the nation in despair, was the signal for a positive orgy of vituperation. The Parliament had

discussed the question; and the April session was the bitterest and dirtiest within memory. The Opposition had here a popular cause which they, like the Opposition in the last days of the Monarchy, thought would sweep the country. The Government suggestion for a regime, or Government monopoly, now dismissed as impracticable and immoral, was admirably suited to this end. This was demoralising; and it was only natural to expect the nation to show some signs of anxiety, and perhaps a contempt for a Parliament so disorderly that it had to be cleared by the military.

It was this state of affairs that temporarily made General Gomes da Costa the Messiah in Portugal, which everyone who heard about him on May 28, 1926, acclaimed him to be; and no doubt the Great War in which he, it was said, had taken a prominent part, helped to make his popularity. The Portuguese General, who was in Braga, at the head of a Division, made a *pronunciamento*¹—the eighteenth since the foundation of the Republic. His revolutionary action at this critical juncture—the Portuguese Republic had had in the fifteen years of its Parliamentary system eight Presidents and well over forty Cabinets—was endorsed by almost all the military units in the country with the exception of the Lisbon garrison. “The Parliamentary system has outlived its day,” said General Gomes da Costa. “What we need is a real National Government which will enable the State to fulfil its ideal mission on a

¹ “Goa, the most loyal of Portuguese possessions, had witnessed in 1895 the revolt of Mahratta troops. Unwilling to obey a Ministerial decree, passed regardless of the religious prejudices of this race, ordering them to leave for Africa, they had left their barracks and occupied the fort Nanuz. The revolted troops achieved a brief ascendancy, but eventually surrendered to a better policy that was to gain once more their loyalty to the Crown, and it fell to Dom Affonso, the King’s brother, under whose command troops were dispatched from Portugal, to achieve the task. This revolt, however, derived politically some importance from the circumstance of the special appointment of Dom Affonso as Viceroy of India. The measures of true impartiality and real conciliation, enforced by Dom Affonso, did much towards lessening the bad influences of those Portuguese who were endeavouring to use that revolt as an argument in favour of their narrow and selfish policy.” *Eight Centuries of Portuguese Monarchy*, page 207. What part exactly Gomes da Costa—then a captain—played in that revolt we do not know, but we do know that he, who always showed the utmost disregard for discipline, was one of “those Portuguese who were endeavouring to use that revolt as an argument in favour of their narrow and selfish policy.”

basis of justice and honour. But only the army can create such a Government, only the army can give the citizen liberty—safe and sane liberty of the kind he needs.” We are, of course, too well acquainted with the revolutionary side of Portuguese politics to believe that Government is an attribute of any man or class.¹ “It would be rash for anyone to explain this situation under a single formula,” wrote John Martin Vincent, Professor Emeritus of European History, John Hopkins University, discussing the causes of Portugal’s many revolutions. “The outsider looks on with pain or amusement until he happens to think of some of the faults of his own legislature. The Anglo-Saxon may assign it to the effervescence of the Latin-Mediterranean temperament, while others may call it lack of political experience, but in the midst of the welter one thing is evident, namely, that Portuguese politicians have already had too much experience of the wrong kind.”² This was precisely what had happened, and is happening in Portugal, to-day.

The march on Lisbon—an imitation of the Fascist march on Rome—was the beginning of the Portuguese military Dictatorship. A triumvirate consisting of General Gomes da Costa, Commander Mendes Cabeçadas, the leader of the revolt of July, 1925, and General Carmona was formed.

¹ “Almost the entire history of the nineteenth century in the Iberian Peninsula is a struggle, sometimes peaceful, sometimes violent, between the lawyers and the soldiers for the booty of political power. When the soldiers think that they are thrust in the background by the civilians, they make a *pronunciamiento*—that is, carry out a *coup d'état*—a typical Spanish word which has been adopted into almost every European language. But as a rule the men of law and the men of arms agree without having recourse to force, in the end, a simple threat from the army is enough. Even in the case of *pronunciamiento* it was rare for the military to eliminate the civilians completely. Since this is what the Portuguese dictatorship has now done—and it is its greatest novelty—it may be said that the soldiers have almost entirely monopolised the important political posts, drawing double salaries in many cases. The *coup d'état* of 1926 is a good example of the classical *pronunciamiento* very much in the nineteenth century Iberian manner, but this new edition is revised and enlarged. Almost half the budget for expenditure, including the numerous civilian offices discharged by soldiers, is absorbed by the army and navy. It is the triumph of militarism over ‘attorneyism,’ or as the soldiers say, a surprise attack.”—“Dictatorship in Portugal,” by Luis Araquistain, *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1928.

² “Causes of Portugal’s Twenty-One Revolutions,” by John Martin Vincent, *Current History*, April, 1927.

The military Dictatorship was acknowledged by the Revolutionaries as an expression of the supremacy of the State, which in practice meant the dominance of the army, and the military class invariably made their own interests the criteria by which to determine the national welfare.

General Gomes da Costa having held a review of troops and entered Lisbon—for eight days, the Portuguese General and his army had camped outside the city—devoted himself to the self-imposed task of persuading the people, “that part of the nation which did not know what it wanted”—to put it in the words of Hegel—that their main duty was to devote their lives to the formation of the Greater Portugal, and the Portuguese General, who was not known to have been a student of politics, or specially interested in the art of Government, flung himself into the “national government” crusade. His “delusive good intentions,” however, were—to quote the very appropriate words of Burke—“no sort of excuse for his presumption”

A number of Portuguese writers, inspired by the ill-understood ideas borrowed from writings of Maurice Barres, Leon Daudet and Charles Maurras, had been clearing the ground for a military Dictatorship, by a propaganda of the so-called Lusitanianism. The primitive Lusitanians, which the Portuguese poets of the Renaissance took to be their ancestors, however, had little in them to suggest national greatness. Professor Theophilo Braga, of course, treated the revolt of Viriathus, the Lusitanian shepherd, as an early manifestation of the Portuguese spirit of nationality, but the historical researches of Alexandre Herculano proved this to have no historical basis whatever. Even Theophilo Braga’s patriotic enthusiasm—keeping constantly in his own view and indicating to his readers the symbolic character both of the Lusitanian shepherd and his adventures—failed to convince anybody that the Lusitanians aspired to being anything beyond a collection of rival tribes devoted to the pursuit of booty. “They lived,” said Strabo, “principally upon goats, and they sacrificed a goat to Mars and also their prisoners and horses”

“One of the features which gives to nationalism its

danger is precisely the feature which is hidden," wrote Sir Norman Angell, discussing such principles as an absolute nationalism, "the quality most dangerous is developed. That quality is its one-sidedness, its astigmatism; the fact that it refuses to recognise in others the right that it claims for itself, refuses to regard those others as on the same plane as itself. We are different. Other nations may make of their patriotism a dangerous force; but *we* can never be too patriotic."¹ But as Dr. Johnson said, "Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel." The military Dictators, however, saw something divine in the principle of absolute nationalism, and the New State—the term was their own—was soon to be launched forth into the political world. But they had still a long way to travel before arriving at the establishment of the "New State"; and the very first step in the long road was that Portuguese politicians—be they lawyers or soldiers—must rid themselves of the "State-Providence."

Meantime events had moved apace. Having justified their revolutionary action to their countrymen by the lofty disinterestedness of its motive, the Dictators formed a Government which was to rule the country with a strong hand. "All these apostles of the new Dictatorship, whether they are Fascists or Communists," wrote the author of *Force*, "are so hypnotised by their crude nationalistic or economic creeds that they refuse to recognise a fact which is obvious to most people. It is this, that our present calamities—economic, financial and social—can be traced to the War, and the mentality which the War produced."²

But, by the irony of fate, Commander Mendes Cabeçadas was soon dismissed from the triumvirate of which Gomes da Costa and Carmona were members. Curious as it may seem, Bernardino Machado, the deposed President of the Republic, had transferred his powers to Mendes Cabeçadas, and the Commander, in turn, transferred them to General Gomes da Costa, who, early in the morning, of July 9, was to be arrested by Carmona's orders. Gomes da Costa,

¹ Sir Norman Angell, *The Unseen Assassins* London, 1932

² Lord Davies, *Force* London, 1934

who gave himself the airs of a saviour who had a duty to perform, would not, on one pretext or another, consult his colleagues, who grumbled at having been kept in the dark about his intentions. "I was at Evora, my military post," said General Carmona to a British writer, explaining how he came to be head of the Government "Officers came and told me that there had been a Revolution, and that there was need of me. I went at once to Lisbon and formed with General Gomes da Costa and Commandante Mendes Cabeçadas a new Government I was a soldier. The army had been my unique interest Indeed I am here because the army had to take control of the country I stand for the army . . . that is all"¹. General Carmona—a disciple of General Primo de Rivera—was shrewd, knew his own mind and judged quickly Gomes da Costa was almost immediately sent as a prisoner to Azores, where the General died a Field-Marshal Then, again, the intoxication of the military victory—a potent wine—was over, and only the headache remained.

¹ "General Carmona Dictatorship without a Dictator in Portugal," by William Leon Smyser, *The Contemporary Review* September, 1930

VI

THE "NEW STATE"

"PORTUGAL at this moment is under a dictatorship without a dictator," were the very first words of General Carmona, now invested with the functions of the Head of the State,¹ to the representatives of the Press. Nearly a quarter of a century had passed since the dramatic march of events in Portugal brought the political world, unexpectedly, into a situation of critical importance. Ever since the Revolution of October, 1910, Portugal had been a turmoil of rebellion from end to end. The nation still quivered in the throes of rebellion, she was plunged in political anarchy, was still governed by the right of insurrection. The Revolution of May, 1926, however, was proclaimed by the military Dictators now in power, as a renaissance of the Portuguese people. Dictatorship was considered a necessity for so unruly a commonwealth, and the military Dictators, of course, embarked upon their present regime with a desire to redress the wrongs which had undermined the country.

The Dictatorship having become established, the men in power feebly endeavoured to raise the nation to the Fascist standard, and they were wild enough to heap

¹ "The movement in favour of the establishment of a Dictatorship in Portugal was, as in Italy and Spain, the result of the incompetence of the Parliamentary regime which was threatening to bring the whole economic life of the country to a standstill, but it differed in being more purely revolutionary in view of the fact that there was no Monarch in existence at Lisbon to throw the cloak of legality over it once it had attained power. In fact, it was not until some weeks after the overthrow of the old system that General Carmona definitely assumed the rôle of Dictator, and there can be no disguising the fact that his position is considerably weaker than that of either Signor Mussolini or General Primo de Rivera, for the sole reason that he is obviously dependent upon force alone for support, indeed it is said that General Carmona has more than once contemplated a restoration of the Monarchy in order to regularise his position"—Sir Charles Petrie, Bart, *The History of Government* London, 1929

dictatorial decrees upon decrees—a system of government which followed closely along Italian lines—which they believed would help Portugal to recover her former prestige. It was industriously represented by them that they were anxious for the consummation of their plan of Greater Portugal, and the military Dictators were ready to undergo heroic sacrifices for the great mission which Republican Portugal was deemed to be providentially called upon to fulfil. Their watchword, "Cross and Sword," summed up all the mediæval idealism of Portuguese Dictatorship.

The Dictators were fervent advocates of "law and order," and it is interesting, in this connection, to note that the Government ordered the imprisonment of the assassin of Major Sidonio Pais, the Revolutionary President of the Portuguese Republic, whose dictatorial policy was frustrated by his assassination. The Dictators, however, were soon held up to scorn for acts incompatible with the rule of the law. In August, 1927, an Army Lieutenant, who had signed a political manifesto, forced an entrance into the residence of General Carmona at a time when a meeting of the Cabinet was being held. Lieutenant Moraes Sarmento—that was the name of the young officer—who was, it was said, a partisan of General Gomes da Costa, demanded the Government's resignation. A violent discussion between the intruder, the Head of the State, and some of the Ministers, immediately took place. It was full of accusations, abuse and recriminations. A struggle ensued, in the course of which the Portuguese Lieutenant drew his revolver and promiscuously fired shots at General Carmona and the Ministers of War and Finance, without, however, hurting them, and then managed to escape. But strange to say, the Lieutenant was neither arrested nor imprisoned. It seemed, indeed, that the dictatorship of law and order depended for success on the "word of honour" given to the officer. This clumsy attitude on the part of the Dictators, who compromised with the Revolutionary youth, must have caused sardonic laughter in many quarters.

The military Dictators, however, were fashioning events in their own way. They aped and assumed certain dicta-

torial habits, and believed that the sword—the only effective power in the Republic—was unequal to the task of managing the State to the best advantage—expectations which were disappointed when the Portuguese Generals had to depend for anything in the way of a policy or elaboration, or development of a policy, on men who were civilians. There were several political crises during the year 1928—the Prime Minister, Colonel José Vicente de Freitas, feebly maintaining his position throughout. But eventually the Dictatorship Premier had to place the collective resignation of the Cabinet in the hands of General Carmona. A disagreement between the Premier and the Minister of Finance, Professor Oliveira Salazar, it was stated, caused the Cabinet's downfall. Anyway, matters came to such a crisis that the Colonel, since made a General, was replaced by General Ivens Ferraz, who formed a new Government, in which Oliveira Salazar's name was included. Early in the year 1930 there was another Ministerial crisis. The Ministry presided over by General Ivens Ferraz—who met Primo de Rivera at Santo Luzia, in the north of Portugal, afterwards proceeding to Santiago de Compostella, in Spain—was forced to resign, and make room for a new Ministry, with General Domingos Oliveira as Premier and Oliveira Salazar—the Coimbra University Professor, who thought his financial policy was the only one that could bring salvation to Portugal—as Finance Minister. Evidently, circumstances were not such as to make the Portuguese Generals' position a very easy one.

The finances of Portugal were tottering on the verge of bankruptcy, and the country, in debt, was crushed by an ever-recurring deficit. The Dictators had, therefore, to devise means for lightening the national burden. But overwhelmed with trivialities on which an under-Secretary could decide, they left the finances in a state of chaos and followed a happy-go-lucky hand-to-mouth policy without any definite aim, and their supporters in the Press seemed to have no resource in a financial emergency but to raise a public subscription in order to pay the external debt!

Two army officers, whose reconstruction plans revealed nothing but muddle and confusion of thought, unsuccessfully tried to solve the problems of the exchequer, with the result that the amount of fiduciary currency was considerably increased. They were—to quote a simile—like children trying to fit together scattered pieces of several jig-saw puzzles with no notion of the picture they want to make. In such a strait Portugal applied to the League of Nations for a loan, and towards the end of the year 1927, the then Minister of Finance, General Sinel de Cordes, visited Geneva in order to obtain a loan of £12,000,000 for the purpose of carrying out in Portugal a general plan of financial reconstruction. A Financial Committee of Inquiry was sent to Portugal by the League of Nations in 1928, and its report was favourable. The conditions laid down by the League—ample guarantees for the creditor powers, and the eventual appointment of a foreign Controller—for the floating of an international loan, seemed, however, to the Portuguese mind, a humiliation, and on June 5, 1928, the Portuguese Government wrote to the President of the Council of the League “declining the loan,” and stating “that the clauses submitted were unacceptable.”

But there was something much more significant underlying the League's scheme to set the finances and currency of Portugal on a solid basis, than a mere control exercised by the League, which could not threaten the sovereignty of Portugal. The proposal made by the League—to balance the Budget, to stabilise the currency, to consolidate the State's debt to the Bank of Portugal, and to issue a foreign loan—was of some consequence, and such a proposal could not be received with suspicion provided the loan was made in the interests of national security, in other words, if the proposal was in harmony with the obligations under the Covenant of the League. The League's membership, of course, involved the renunciation of a certain amount of sovereignty, and Portugal, itself a member of the League, had to shape its acts in accordance with the general principles of the League. Besides, Portugal would, in the near future, find itself confronted with a colonial crisis

curiously similar in character and portent to that of the years before the Great War, and the chances of averting such a catastrophe were slender unless Portugal kept the ideal of collective security to the fore. Professor Oliveira Salazar, who, on April 27, 1928, became Minister of Finance, however, described the loan backed by the authority of the League of Nations as ' alms,' in a statement to the *Lisbon Seculo*. There was, unfortunately, too much of such loose talk in Fascist circles. Seemingly, the Professor of Finance at the University of Coimbra—where a thesis dealing with the evolution of Portuguese currency established his reputation—persuaded himself that Republican Portugal, by refusing to accept the League's terms, would one day ignore the League of Nations. Events, however, by no means took the turn which the Portuguese professor anticipated. Fascist Portugal had, some years later, to make clear her position with respect to the problems to which the Italo-Abyssinian dispute had given rise, and by the irony of fate, Portugal, as a member of the League of Nations, was compelled to prevent all intercourse, financial, commercial or personal, between its nationals and those of Fascist Italy.

To return, however, to the financial situation of Republican Portugal. I will not stop here to question the insincerity of the Budget of 1911-12 showing a revenue increased by £2,060,000 above that of the Budget of 1903-10—that is, on the fall of the Monarchy—and an expenditure decreased by £2,740,000, nor insist on the recklessness with which public money was spent in the early days of the Republic.

The Budget for 1913-14 prepared by the preceding Ministry, was so revised by the Ministry, whose Premier and Finance Minister was Afonso Costa, as to reduce the *deficit* from its former figure of £1,692,800 to £687,200. But in spite of curious surprises, like that when Afonso Costa months after announced a *superavit* in the Budget—the surplus on paper was merely the adjustment of entries—the Government had not succeeded in balancing the Budget. It had muddled through in its own way. Amidst these

financial difficulties, accompanied by scarcity of currency and derangement of domestic exchange, the Portuguese Parliament voted £17,000,000 for war purposes. Portugal was at a loss how to raise this enormous sum, especially when the ordinary Budget for 1916-17 estimated the revenue at £12,026,000, and the expenditure at £16,860,000. The Great War was over, and the total cost of the Portuguese Expeditionary Force had been £28,000,000. The country sank deeper and deeper into the bog of financial difficulties—the value of the *conto* had sunk from nearly £200 to about £25, and the Government had to make the most desperate efforts to raise money. "The amount of the country's floating debt, which is out of all proportion to its resources, gives serious cause for alarm. The note calculation is very high, and is not covered by corresponding metal reserves. Its continual increase will not meet the economic necessities of the country but only serves the Budget."¹ Obvious inference will be drawn from this simple statement of facts made, in the year 1921, by the then Minister of Finance, in the preamble to a Finance Bill. A financial situation of more dangerous possibilities could, therefore, hardly be imagined. In December, 1921, the Parliament, however, voted a further increase of 200,000 *contos* of paper money. At the end of November, 1922, the amount of paper money had risen to 930,000 *contos*. In 1923 the paper circulation had been increased to over 100,000 *contos* beyond the legal limit; and yet a further issue of 150,000 *contos* was voted. In 1924 the paper circulation increased at the average rate of 1,000 *contos* a day, and this increase went on unchecked. The financial strain, which was carried to a point at which an even more serious crisis appeared imminent, however, could not be relieved. The decree dated February 11, 1924—to pay in paper money the interest on the 6½ per cent Internal Loan floated on June 16, 1923—and the subsequent decree of June 3—to make the interest on the Portuguese External Debt payable in paper—were measures that the despair of Republican Finance Ministers injudiciously attempted to impose on

¹ *Annual Register*, 1921

the foreign holders which, of course brought into distressing prominence the real state of affairs. But this was not the only evil. A gold reserve had virtually ceased to exist; and the Government had decided to seize the reserve of silver, representing approximately £1,400,000, in the Bank of Portugal. This, in rough outline, was the exceptionally grave problem with which the Dictatorship Government was faced. Upon its financial plans hung, therefore, big national issues, and probably the fall of the Dictatorship itself.

In January, 1927, however, four of the political chiefs, representing the parties of the previous Republican regime, signed a curious document which was delivered at the principal Foreign Embassies and Legations at Lisbon. In their statement, drawing attention to future possible loans, they declared,—with that Portuguese illogicality which so many foreign and national critics have found as bewildering as irritating to watch or to follow—that should they ever return to power they would repudiate the War Debt arrangements made by the Dictators. For according to Article 26 of the Portuguese Constitution of 1911, “no loan made without the previous consent of Parliament was binding on the nation.” The statement was characteristic of the frame of mind prevailing in Portuguese quarters in Paris—where the “Republican League,” headed by Afonso Costa, had its own organ, *A Revolta*. The Constitution of 1911 had been abused to the full extent of all its powers by the very men, now living in Paris, who, directly or indirectly, stood responsible for the bankruptcy and economic ruin of the country. Constitution indeed! It was as much or as little safe with the men in power as with the conspirators abroad. Such was, evidently, the case, otherwise the Papal Nuncio in the name of the Diplomatic Corps would not have congratulated the Dictatorship Government on having suppressed the revolt of February, 1927.

The moment was for courage and honest effort. Every hope of a better future rested upon some ideal in financial reform, and Oliveira Salazar's reform, finally assured through control and co-ordination at the head, was accepted

by the Dictatorship as that which suited the political and national conditions the best. With the Decree of May, 1928¹ and that of March, 1929, and the Accountancy Act of May, 1930, he hoped to set the national finance on a sound footing. From 1928 onwards he secured "surpluses," and, among other things, used them to reduce the floating debt. The floating debt, which in 1929 amounted to £20,400,000 was, in 1930 reduced to £9,400,000, and in his report on the 1931-32 Budget the Portuguese Minister of Finance, who was virtually Economic Dictator of Portugal, announced that the floating debt would be wiped off. Every Budget now showed a surplus. The State Treasury was overflowing with money. The 1928-29 Budget surplus amounted to nearly £3,000,000. The surplus for the financial year 1929-30 was about £400,000. At the end of 1931 the surpluses had amounted to an equivalent of £4,000,000. For the financial year 1932-33 there was a surplus of about £740,000. The surpluses of the last five Budgets added up to almost £6,500,000. In 1934, the Budget showed a surplus of £18,000,000—a marvellous record, since 1928, which, to quote the *London Times*, "is not only without parallel anywhere else in the world but

¹ "A fortnight after taking over his duties Dr Salazar caused Decree No 15465, dated the 14th May, 1928, to be promulgated. The following principles were laid down therein:

(I) Budget unity, that is Budgets must show one total for all revenue, to be offset against one total of expenditure, the only possible means of ascertaining the real financial position. This principle of Budget unity was later incorporated in the Constitution (Article 63).

(II) Normal expenditure of the State must be met solely by normal revenues, on no account must it be covered by loans.

(III) Concise legal definition of what constitutes "extraordinary" expenditure, the only kind coverable by loans. In this way more items come under the heading of ordinary expenditure, and greater ingenuity must be exercised in finding the relative cover in the normal revenue. This new restriction was incorporated in the Constitution (Article 67).

(IV) Prohibition of financial assistance to private concerns.

(V) Civil and penal measures against heads of departments who allow Budget provisions to be exceeded.

(VI) Payment on account of previous financial years to be strictly regulated. This was a time-honoured source of trouble. It is now laid down that no such payments may be effected unless the item in question is included anew in the current Budget.

(VII) Budget protected against the consequences of unsound Colonial Finance."

The Financial Times, October 7, 1935. Supplement Series No 134.

is an achievement for which history can show but few precedents"¹

The developments in the financial field, however, had no pronounced effect on the foreign exchange. On June 9, 1931, the Decree No 19,869 stabilized the Portuguese currency on the basis of one pound to 110 escudos—a throwback to the year 1925 when a Radical Government was in power and British sterling was fixed at about 100 escudos. The re-organisation of the Bank of Portugal as legally determined and laid down in June, 1931, compelled the Bank "to exchange its own notes for gold or gold foreign exchange whenever the bearer of the notes might ask for it"² But in September, 1931, Great Britain having abandoned the gold standard, Portugal followed suit, and ever since the escudo has been closely tied to the pound sterling. Portugal was "off gold." "Great Britain has also benefited by the progress of Portugal," wrote Dr Ruy Ennes Ulrich, the Portuguese Ambassador in London, concluding his article on "Portugal's National Recovery," in the *Financial Times*. "I am indeed glad that not only do we, as ancient allies, have political solidarity, but that we also can help in economic relations. Our trade with Great Britain reveals an important balance in its favour, a balance which in 1933 was £2,755,000. We believe, therefore, that we deserve Great Britain's whole-hearted support, and the generous welcome which happily we have always found and which we reciprocate with equal sincerity"³ Portugal's trade balance had been on the wrong side. A Portuguese Under-Secretary of State for Finance, discussing the adverse trade balance—excess of imports over exports—in his "Review of the Economic Situation" which also appeared in the *Financial Times* wrote: "Under the new treaty the balance of trade with England has not shown any noticeable tendency to decrease. This unfavourable situation will have to be corrected. Portugal looks to England to buy more from her in the future. In return, Portugal's

¹ *The Times* March 13, 1935.

² "History and Operations of the Bank of Portugal," *The Financial Times* October 7, 1935.

³ *The Financial Times* October 7, 1935. Supplement Series No 134.

new warships are being built in Great Britain, and large orders for aeroplanes and military apparel of every description are to be placed with her. Moreover, Portuguese foreign trade is largely carried under the British flag. Not less than 700,000 tons annually are carried in her vessels—and this without counting the trade with our Colonies which would increase considerably this figure. England stands ahead of every other country as freight and passenger carrier for Portuguese seaborne traffic."¹ These were important economic problems affecting the future of Portugal, and pressing for immediate solution.

As matters now stand, the security of colonial powers is wholly dependent upon naval force. There was, however, no fleet in Portugal available for resistance, there were no materials of war. The whole of Portugal's new naval programme—its cost included armaments of over £3,000,000—was soon placed by the Dictatorship Government with British firms. That was the opening stage of the re-armament programme—a programme that would dominate the life of the nation for five years ahead.² It was strange, however, that in a period of depression of trade and industry in the country, the Dictatorship Government would not undertake the organisation of industrial activity in connection with the re-armament work. Not disposed to devise an industrial scheme which, of course, required much individual and some concentrated energy—the first requisites of any patriotic work—the Portuguese Dictators preferred to "build warships" and "place large orders for aeroplanes and military apparel of every description" abroad—a policy, the consequence perhaps of war anxiety neurosis, which is the curse of Europe to-day, but a policy which inevitably worsened Portugal's economic position. But worse than all, Portugal—the third colonial power in the world since the Great War—had no mercantile marine. For twelve years Portugal had had recourse to "flag

¹ *The Financial Times*, October 7, 1935. Supplement Series No. 134.

² The total cost of the five-year plan approved by the Government in 1935 was £5,000,000, of which £1,500,000 would be spent that year. For the navy £400,000 would be spent in 1936 on seaplanes and high-speed motor-launches.

discrimination" as regards foreign ships entering Portuguese ports, which, of course, greatly affected British shipping. But the discrimination made in favour of national ships—a patriotic action to remedy present evils and the consequence of past ones—was to be abolished on July 1, 1934 for the Continent, and two years later for the Colonies, a concession for which Portugal received no adequate return from her ally. The protection of the marks of port wine and Madeira until June 30, 1941, was no doubt guaranteed in return by Great Britain. But this protection, though superficially encouraging, was not wholly satisfactory, and Portugal having found it necessary to submit to unusual commercial arrangements, was indeed in an extremely subordinate position.

In his article on "Portugal's National Recovery" published in the *Financial Times*, the Portuguese Ambassador in London, who was appointed by the Dictatorship, wrote "It used to be frequently said that there were rich States in poor nations and poor States in rich nations. The experience of Portugal shows the fallacy of this contrast. The Government increased taxation and restricted profits, thus, as some ill-intentioned persons said, seeming to impoverish the nation in order to enrich the State." The Portuguese Ambassador, however, was of the opinion "that the considerable influence of the psychological factor in political economy has not yet been adequately examined and appreciated," and His Excellency held "that it not only alters but even sometimes completely annuls the effects of economic laws."¹ The overburdened taxpayer, of course, paid up and looked pleasant. It was anomalous, however, that when "the State became richer and showed larger balances on closing its accounts"—to put it in the words of the Portuguese Ambassador in London—this abundance which was described as "epoch making," was not reflected

¹ Dr. Ruy Ennes Ulrich, the Portuguese Ambassador in London, has since been compelled to resign for giving a private luncheon party, his guest being Dom Duarte Nuno de Bragança, claimant to the Portuguese throne, who, I may add, also lunched with King George and Queen Mary at Buckingham Palace. There was, indeed, something interestingly *psychological* in the whole story!

in the bank balances of the taxpayer. Moreover, the vast mass of people were denied the essential purchasing power, and there was, in the country, widespread malnutrition and under-payment of wages.

Increased taxation and piling up of armaments at the cost of social services could not but promote feelings of alarm and panic. The situation looked extremely serious when the movement of January, 1934—a symptom of widespread discontent creeping into the masses—suggested that it was evolving towards Revolution. The masses were fiercely agitated, and such was the assertion of labour rights, supported by the General Confederation of Labour, that troops were called out to suppress rioting.

The "New State" had promulgated in September, 1933, the National Statute of Labour, whose first section was pompously headed "The place of the People, the Nation and the State in the Economic and Social Order of things." Portugal, "though complying strictly with the obligations assumed at the conventions of the Bureau International de Travail in Geneva," said a Portuguese Under-Secretary of State, "was endeavouring to settle its own labour problems in accordance with the particular temperament of her people and her own economic and social conditions."¹ The "New State," where the Executive was all-powerful, had created the "National Syndicates," the "People's Houses," to which property owners belonged as "protectors," and "The Fishermen's Houses." But what hall-marked the National Statute of Labour as a Fascist measure was the prohibition of strikes and lock-outs. No wonder the working classes lost all interest in the work of National Reconstruction.

There had, however, been kindled in the minds of the Dictators now obsessed by imperialistic dreams the desire to emulate the fame if not the exploits of their ancestors. We heard much of "making the past live," and nothing short of an aggressive Colonial Act—"Acto Colonial"—seemed to them the agency equal to effecting that object. Their

¹ "Corporative Organisation as Economic and Social Basis," *The Financial Times* October 7, 1935.

scheme of Greater Portugal, however, had one weak point. It ignored the fact that patriotism will always and can only follow nationality. If you multiply one, thought a cynic, you will multiply the other. Besides, politics is the art of the possible.

The Colonial Act, promulgated in May, 1930, distinguished between Portugal and adjacent islands as the dominating power, and the overseas' dominions as subject possessions. "It is essential to the organisation of the Portuguese nation to fulfil its historic function by possessing and colonising overseas' dominions, and by civilising indigenous populations that inhabit them," said Article 2 of the dictatorial "Acto Colonial", afterwards incorporated in the Constitution of the Portuguese Republic. This Colonial Act, which lowered the status of the inhabitants of the overseas' dominions by describing them as essentially subject races, shattered the unity of the Portuguese nation, which had been proclaimed by the Constitution of 1822, the Constitutional Charter of 1826 and the Republican Constitution of 1911. Portuguese possessions heretofore known as provinces, were in future to be called Colonies, and all of them together the "Portuguese Colonial Empire"—as if the word "empire" could have meaning in a country where there is no emperor. The former Portuguese Constitutions had conceded to the inhabitants of the Colonies the same rights and privileges as to the inhabitants of Portugal, without any discrimination whatever. The situation would be considered embarrassing in a land where vested interests were regarded as sacred. But in Republican Portugal—where it is easier to withdraw political rights than to grant them—the rights of the inhabitants of the Colonies had no longer the character of constitutional rights. Their rights were now dependent "on the laws in force for the time being", and the Lisbon Government reserved to itself "the authority to publish decrees having the force of law"—a statute bad in itself, and worse by reason of its incompatibility with the character of rulers whose obvious parasitism poses in vain as imperialistic spirit.¹

¹ My article on "The Portuguese Empire," *The New English Weekly* December 20, 1934.

The military Dictatorship, no doubt, furnished Oliveira Salazar, the acting Minister for the Colonies, who drafted the "Acto Colonial," with an exceptional occasion to acquire some glory in the eyes of his admirers whose *sebastianismo* pretended to be animated by the fascist spirit. The Portuguese professor was acknowledged by Antonio Ferro to be the *Desejado*¹. The Portuguese writer who essayed Emil Ludwig's new experiment in the art of writing Mussolini's biography, revealed, however, Salazar not as King Sebastian the *Desejado* but as the Portuguese Duce.

But to what end could such a declaration as the Article 2 of the Colonial Act be meant?

Portugal has long been deprived of her colonial supremacy, but her flag still flies in Africa and Asia over nearly 2,090,000 square kilometres, with a population close upon 10,000,000. These remnants of an Empire which found itself reckoned in history as the "Empire of Lost Opportunities" still contribute something to her distinction. Reduced to the third colonial power, Portugal looks to the Dark Continent, where she to-day holds considerable stretches of land, as a place for repairing her fortunes.

It was said of old, "*Africa semper aliquid novi offert.*" This saying held good during the latter half of the nineteenth century, when African mines or dividends from African stocks induced the nations of Europe to attach to Africa a greater value as a field of commerce and colonisation. The eagerness to explore her mines and the desire to control sources of supply for raw materials and markets for finished products created a new situation, and the nations marched to a realization of their hopes with a plodding precision, each striving to realize, to the fullest, its aptitudes and characteristics. France, to regain her position lost in the Franco-Prussian War, strengthened her position in Algeria, and extended her influence along Senegal, which marked the beginning of a policy of expansion. In 1878 the "German African Society" and in 1882 the "German Colonial Society" were formed to seek new outlets for the energies

¹ Antonio Ferro, *Salazar - Le Portugal et son Chef* Traduit du Portugais par Fernanda de Castro Editions Bernard Grasset Paris, 1934

of a nation growing strong as the result of the war of 1870. In 1879 King Leopold of Belgium formed the "International African Association," with its headquarters at Brussels, for the exploration of Central Africa. From 1884 the imperial schemes of Cecil Rhodes, who was to play so great a part in South Africa, had become the dominant issue of British Colonial politics. This opened the eyes of Portugal to a fact she had hitherto ignored, that Portugal could no longer hold the heritage bequeathed her from a distant past, unless she expanded her dominion from historic settlements, and outlined a policy consistent with the laws of Colonial Government or of political economy. Portugal was thus confronted with a double problem, she must unite Angola to Mozambique and thus connect the Atlantic and Indian Ocean, she must occupy her territories effectively and define her boundary lines. To unite Angola to Mozambique was a project which had been entertained for a long time.

Gregorio Quadra was among the first to propose it, in 1520, to Manuel the First. The Portuguese explorer, after a stay at Abyssinia, where he had determined the course of the Blue Nile, entered ardently into the scheme. But when he sought help at the hands of his King he discovered that Portugal did not wish her sons to devote their energies to African travels and discovery. Again, in 1648, Salvador de Sá, who fought the Dutch at Angola, was willing to brave the perils of African exploration to "open the way by land from Cuama and Monomotoha to Angola." But a malign influence appeared again to have repressed in the Portuguese explorer his adventurous spirit. In 1798 the scientific journey of Dr. Lacerda, noted for his exploration of Brazil, however, raised Portugal from its torpor. It imparted to the nation a new and invigorating life. "The heart of the country thus flanked on both sides by our possessions will be more securely subjected to us, and the natives, knowing that Mozambique and Sena can aid Angola and Benguela and *vice versa*, will abstain from plundering and from ill-treating our now defenceless Sertanejos," said the explorer, addressing the Portuguese Government. "Thus commerce

will be free and life and property safe." Moreover, he had predicted in 1796 that the new possessors of Table Bay "require careful watching or our want of energy will enable them to extend themselves northwards," a prediction which, needless to say, was verified to the letter. But to Portugal's misfortune, Dr. Lacerda started from Mozambique and travelled up to Cazembe where he died in 1798. "The journey of Lacerda," wrote the British explorer Burton, "shows that the Portuguese never abandoned the idea of a 'viagem a contracosta,' and can hardly characterise their claims to having crossed Africa as hanging on a slender fibre,"¹ and posterity only can duly appreciate across the intervening years the Portuguese explorer's influence on succeeding times.

The real crossing of the Continent, however, was not accomplished till the natives Pombeiros, Pedro, João Baptista and Amaro José, under the guidance of the Portuguese Governor, Antonio Saldanha da Gama, and Colonel Honorato da Costa, who had set out from Angola, passed through the territories of Muata, Hienvo, the Cazembe and reached the river Zambesi between the years 1802-1811. Another successful attempt was made in the years 1838-1848 by Major Francisco Coimbra to cross the territories lying between Mozambique and Benguella. With the same object, in the years 1852-1856, Silva Porto, who had before Livingstone explored the Zambesi and visited the Nyassa Lake, crossed from Benguella to the mouth of the river Rovunna, the explorer having spent a year and two months on his journey, and he died on a fourth journey. "The political necessity of concealing discovery and perhaps a something of official incuriousness belonging to tropical climates," wrote Captain Burton, "have hidden many of the Portuguese discoveries from the world, and thus in this nineteenth century we have carried off part of a glory due to them. Dr. Livingstone's prodigious labours on the Upper Zambesi and about the Nyassa and Shirwa Lakes and in the country of Cazembe may well obscure the glory

¹ Captain Burton, *Lacerda's Journey to Cazembe in 1798* Published by the Royal Geographical Society London, 1873

of each foreign brave." "But it is too much to assert," said Captain Burton, "that his predecessors ignored the course of the Zambesi, the Shire and the Nyassa Lake, which under the name of Zafian (1623) was known centuries ago" The early Portuguese voyages, indeed, determined theories in vogue in the nineteenth century regarding the hydrographical system of Africa; and strange to say Bruce, the explorer, travelled in Africa in search of the sources of the Nile discovered three centuries before by the Portuguese Francisco Alvares and Duarte Lopes ¹

The effective occupation of Angola in 1848 by Joaquim Rodrigo Graça, the untiring efforts of the Marquis de Sá da Bandeira, the Wilberforce of Portugal, to abolish slavery, the settlement of a Portuguese colony at Mozambique in 1857, the exploration of Nyassaland—all this was an acknowledgment of the importance of Africa in the councils of the reduced Portuguese imperial domain. New explorers, however, were not slow in appearing. They were Serpa Pinto, Antonio Maria Cardoso, Brito Capello, Ivens, and Augusto Cardoso, whose successes were noteworthy. But to Portugal's misfortune, when an important part of her colonial programme was to be carried out—a programme which if successful, would have saved her from much undignified behaviour in the future, and also enabled her to take precautions against some indisputable dangers—the Portuguese attempt at expansion was frustrated by the British *ultimatum* of 1890.

But once the resentment was over, the Portuguese relapsed into immediate indifference. They consoled themselves with the shadowy might-have-beens of their history whilst their colonial rivals were running the race of progress and commercial competition. The Portuguese were now close neighbours of English and German Colonies in Africa. But they behaved as if they lived in times when they could afford to treat the experiences and efforts of these countries with disdain. These nations supplied the stream

¹ Relazione del Reame di Congo et delle circonvicine contrade tratta dalli Scrittis regionamente di Oduardo Lopes Portoghefe per Filippo Pigafetta. In Roma Apreffo Bartolomeo Graffi (1591)

of emigrants without which their possessions could not have achieved their rapid progress. They were continually seeking outlets for their trade and people in Africa. Yet Portugal, a country where the rate at which depopulation is proceeding is appalling, never thought of directing the movement towards her colonies. In 1891 the Government laid before the Parliament a Bill to prevent emigration to America and direct it towards the African colonies. It was submitted as an alternative to the proposal of certain deputies to sell a portion of Eastern Africa and apply the sum received by its sale to improving the possessions nearer to the Mother country. Things, however, remained as they were. On the census of 1909—the last under the Monarchy—the total number of Portuguese emigrants was 38,223, of which 30,285 belonged to the Continent alone—29,670 being men and 8,575 women. Of these 23,164 were illiterate, and only 15,598 knew how to read and write. The number of emigrants that went that year to Brazil was 30,580, to North America 5,023, to South America 692; to Oceania 851. And to Africa, where Portugal has vast territories accessible and well adapted for settlements, *none!* The cause of the continued depopulation was, and still is, poverty—sordid, grinding poverty of a national rather than individual type, and it takes a very hard necessity to drag a Portuguese from a land to which he is passionately attached. For the five years from 1901–1905 it averaged 25,000 a year, from 1906–1910, 40,600, and for 1911—the first year of the Republic—the figure given was 59,000, and every year since it has reached a figure far above that of the previous years. Emigration was the theme of the empty demagogue, but no efficient remedy had been devised. On the contrary, instead of turning the movement of emigration to good account, the Republican politicians, led by their Messianic dreams, were busy with schemes which had very little to recommend them. Not disposed to devise a national scheme of colonisation, they preferred living on the earnings of Jewish colonists whom they wished to settle in Portuguese West Africa—a scheme which might or might not lead to the most reproductive investment of

foreign capital but which could not increase the security of Portuguese possessions in Africa. Instead of leading their own countrymen forward with an encouraging hand, they abandoned this hope to cast the dominions to the winds, and did not hesitate to exchange the loyal devotion of willing subjects for the antipathy of involuntary aliens. Necessity is the mother of invention. No reason, however, could be assigned for an assumption so gratuitous. A vast body of the nation had no doubt been so corrupted by age-long habits as to be now incapable of regular industry. But nevertheless, there are to-day, in America—north and south—thousands of Portuguese struggling for existence, and least of all do these sons of Portugal look forward to returning to the Mother country with their fortunes.¹

It was very unfortunate for the Monarchy that the Naval and Colonial Departments were administered by the Minister of Marine, in most cases, a poet. That there rested upon Portugal as the predominant member of the Portuguese commonwealth great responsibility for colonial disorders, is a fact that was generously admitted by everyone. Ferreira d'Almeida, however, proposed in Parliament the sale of Portuguese possessions which he thought increased

¹ "We already possess some studies of the Italians, Greeks, Slavs, Poles, Jews, Chinese, Japanese and other recent immigrants to the United States. The Portuguese, however, have been a neglected group. Aside from a periodical article or two, few have thought it worth while to describe the lives of these simple folk. Their relatively small numbers and their high degree of concentration in two regions may in part account for this neglect. In part, too, their high degree of illiteracy and reputed low standard of living may make them relatively unattractive. If these characteristics of the Portuguese complicate our problems, however, the people themselves are more worthy of study for that very reason."

"The Portuguese are also interesting to study because of their peculiar racial composition. Not only are they Southern-Europeans, but also, as we shall show, some of them seem to be of a semi-negroid type. This is true not only of the Bravas who are recognised as 'coloured' by the United States Census, but in varying degrees of a part, though not all, of the so-called white Portuguese. This fact raises important sociological questions. What is the effect of this infusion of negro blood upon their own social welfare and upon the influence they exert in America? To what extent are they recognised as negroid, and therefore subjected to social ostracism? A study of the Portuguese of certain types may throw some light upon the study of the mulatto in the United States."

Two Portuguese Communities in New England, by Donald R. Taft, Ph D., Professor of Economics and Sociology, Wells College.

Studies in History, Economics and Public Law. Edited by the Faculty of Political Science of Columbia University, Vol. CVII, No. 1. New York, 1923.

Portugal's embarrassment rather than added to her prestige. But his proposal was no more than the casual effusion of a passing and thoughtless grumble, and the ex-Minister of Marine had no arguments to produce but that colonies "do not pay." It was the argument of a man who refused to make the humiliating admission that colonial problems were not to be entrusted to men whose knowledge did not extend beyond naval strategy.

Things were in this position when the implantation of the Portuguese Republic came to announce that the new movement of regeneration under Republican auspices would inspire the Portuguese on the Continent with an appreciation at once proud and fond of those kindred communities from which they are divided by oceans but no longer by sentiment. A new and better order of things was announced, and the colonies were promised colonial autonomy. But the disillusion which followed was sudden and complete, and empty declarations of abstract rights were not sufficient to allay discontent engendered by the sense of actual oppression.

In a lecture delivered some time before the Revolution of 1910, at the Centro Commercial in Oporto, José Relvas, a member of the Central Committee of the Republican Party, afterwards Minister of Finance in the Provisional Government of the Republic, resumed the complaints of the Colonies as follows: "The financial relations between Portugal and the Portuguese Colonies are unsatisfactory."¹ It was obvious that the administration of the Colonies was done very ill. One would have, therefore, expected the many Ministers of the Republic to enforce a better regime. But their colonial policy did not tend to the conviction that there was a desire among them to inaugurate a regime of decentralisation and financial autonomy for the Colonies, thus proving their denunciations in the days of the Monarchy to be rodomontade obviously intended for the gallery. "In the Colonies the ordinary budget had so many times to bear expenses of pure luxury and altogether out of proportion to their utility, and so, also, excessive high salaries, the

¹ *The Economist* September 3, 1910

cost of ill-studied works promising little advantage for the future, the extension of bureaucracy under various pretexts, purchase of large quantities of materials of no practical use, a liberal distribution of allowances and subsidies, and aids to undeserving causes. On all sides it was prodigality that flourished. An artificial life was created, a life on which the system of taxes was largely based," wrote, nearly twenty years after the proclamation of the Republic, a Minister for the Colonies in his rather suggestive introduction to the Colonial Budgets. "The burden of taxation which weighs on business men and agriculturists has not been lightened," he added. "The revenues fall because economic activities in general have lost their intensity. But the pressure of taxation continues to be at the highest point it had reached when it had become necessary to maintain a high level of expenditure. It is true that economies are made, but they do not help to mitigate the general plight of the taxpayer, and even if severe economy is enforced, we may not expect to do anything more than balance the Budget. Difficulties of the taxpayer seem to be still far removed from the preoccupations of most of the Colonial Governments." These were the principles on which the Republican rulers governed the Colonies, and such conduct could neither hold nor deserve the respect which the Colonies were only too ready to pay to Portugal.

"Among the chief causes of our characteristic colonial anarchy," wrote Alfredo de Magalhães, justifying himself for giving a public lecture on colonial affairs, "I appreciated in the first place, the well known, and unfortunately hallowed, incapacity of the Ministers. I spoke in general terms, of course, any others would have been impossible." "Who is not aware," asked he, "that in deciding the Ministerial appointments the most important portfolio, that of the Colonies, has generally been given to the weakest and most subordinate persons? Is it not in this position that our statesmen have made their apprenticeships, thus seriously compromising the nation? Am I not right in insisting upon eagles instead of bats? And is not our lack of principle terrible? Does it not explain,

for the greater part, the sad rôle we are playing in the world in comparison with stronger nations, who do not entrust their destinies to the first adventurer that offers?"¹ Alfredo Magalhães, who was the Governor-General of Mozambique, appointed by the Republic, spoke, no doubt, with the authoritative ease of a man conversant with facts. He was, however, dismissed for his indiscretions. The Republic "should have begun," said Marinha de Campos, a Revolutionary leader who was some time Governor in one of the Portuguese Colonies in Africa, "by not entrusting the complex portfolio of the Colonies to any but experienced and intelligent persons of undoubted ability, possessing either legal training or at least some acquaintance with the law, and with an adequate knowledge of economic science in general and of colonial economy in particular. It were profitable, moreover, that such persons should have resided in one or several of our Colonies, since this must be considered a necessary complement to the preparation indispensable for undertaking the difficult duties of a Minister for the Colonies." "Instead of this," he complained, "numerous decrees have been promulgated and some Acts have even been passed without any proper criticism, without practical sense or any real knowledge of the matter in hand, and, what is worse, sometimes thwarting the justifiable and legitimate moral and material aspirations cherished both by the European colonists and by the natives themselves." "My feelings as a Portuguese and a Republican," he added, "were shocked, during my recent journey, by the profound disappointment which is at present everywhere apparent in our Colonies in consequence of the crass errors committed in our colonial policy."² The Ministers to whose hands were committed the destinies of the Colonies were, perhaps, to be commiserated even more than they were to be blamed. For in deluding themselves they had failed to delude anybody else.

Financial autonomy was granted to Portuguese Colonies. But far from exercising a purely democratic influence, the new colonial regime came to exercise a profoundly auto-

¹ *Capital* March 6, 1913

² *Seculo* March 10, 1913

cratic influence, and soon the elected majority in the Government Councils was, abruptly, converted into a minority. Under the so-called fiscal autonomy, the salaries of the parasitic bureaucracy were increased by leaps and bounds by arbitrary Ministerial decrees issued by the Ministers, who reserved themselves the privilege of governing the Colonies without the consent of Parliament, where the Colonies had their elected representatives. The Legislative Councils in the Colonies had to seek expedients to meet the needs of the impoverished exchequer, and colonial Governors were held up to scorn for their attempt to wipe out the deficit.

A colonial policy capable of being pursued irrespective of whatever Government was in power, it was, however, thought would to some extent improve matters, and the first High Commissioners with extensive powers, Brito Camacho and Norton de Mattos, sailed for Mozambique and Angola respectively in February and April, 1921. The future of the Colonies had, evidently, become the main problem of Portugal. In 1924 a debate in the Chamber of Deputies, however, revealed that Angola had become indebted to the extent of four and a half millions sterling. In 1925, the foremost colonists of Mozambique had to protest indignantly against continual maladministration. Incidentally, the New High Commissioner for Mozambique, Admiral Azevedo Coutinho, was able to proceed to his post only after a loan of 31,500 gold contos was voted for the administration of Mozambique. But these were not the only symptoms of colonial disorder. General Norton de Mattos, the High Commissioner for Angola—who, having resigned the post of High Commissioner, became Portuguese Ambassador at the Court of St James—was shown in the Portuguese Parliament to be guilty of the gravest faults—political and administrative. The revelations made by the ex-Republican Premier, Cunha Leal, showed that the difficulties in Angola arose from the High Commissioner, who was the Revolutionary leader of May 14, 1915, not seeing his way clearly under circumstances where talents and habits of a different order from his were required.

The Portuguese Revolutions had, among other things, produced "heroes," and they had to be accommodated. Colonial posts were rapidly multiplied, that every fresh creation made those "heroes," who had formerly been rewarded, impatient for some new promotion. The Republican Government countenanced and indeed, as far as it depended on it, recognised "heroism" officially in all Portuguese dominions. The appointment of Captain Freitas Ribeiro, for instance, as Colonial Minister, provoked the following protest from the *Pretoria News*, the semi-official organ of the Transvaal Government "Senhor Ribeiro was notoriously the hero of the *Carbonarios*, whose disorderly proceedings caused some time ago the despatch of the *Hermes* for Lourenço Marques in order to protect British interests there. The nomination of this 'leader' for such a high post will lead to further acts of violence and illegality which will involve Portugal in trouble with the British authorities."¹

In Portuguese India—a possession that is a hundred years at least ahead in its political development—events by no means took the turn which the Republican propagandists anticipated. Imbued with sympathy for the people he governed, Couceiro da Costa, the first Republican Governor-General of Portuguese India, framed an autonomy scheme giving the people of Portuguese India a larger share in the administration of their affairs. His scheme, however, shocked the Colonial Office bureaucrats, whose presumption limited their horizon to their immediate and individual interests. The racial prejudice was an inevitable development, and Captain Freitas Ribeiro, who succeeded Couceiro da Costa as Governor-General of Portuguese India, sought to subordinate his policy to that prejudice. The first *Carta Organica* had recognised adequately the right of elected representation in the proposed Government Council, and elections had been held in the country. But the people's right was abruptly withdrawn during the regime of Freitas Ribeiro, the notorious Revolutionary leader of May 14, 1915, who held that

¹ *The Pretoria News* November 14, 1911

Portuguese India was "not ripe for autonomy" The Indians in Portuguese India, however, rose to the sense of their responsibility for the maintenance of political rights in the colony whose inhabitants had, for over a century, obtained equal opportunities in education and had been received on equal terms in most of the activities of Portuguese life. They organised in December, 1918, a protest movement known as the *abstencionismo*, calling upon the people not to take part in any elections. The movement of non-co-operation resulted in the dismissal of Freitas Ribeiro from the post he held in Portuguese India and the appointment of an acting Governor.

The political development that had, in some measure, been restored, however, seemed on the point of disappearing. The *Cartas Organicas* were baptised anew, but the programme went no further than the colonial governors were prepared to advance. The voice of Jacob and the hands of Esau effected, for some years, a successful imposture, and there was a contraction of self-government. The Republican propagandists in the Colonies, of course, talked about it in the tone of the man who has suddenly found arsenic in the stomach at an inquest. Their disappointment was so great that they had to break off entirely from the apostles of liberty, equality and fraternity. "The authority of a class government is always tempered by the fact that the subject classes in the State greatly outnumber the ruling element, and, therefore possess the potential power to overthrow the established Government. Moreover, rulers and subjects are of the same race, have the same language, literature and religion, and enjoy a common social inheritance. This conscious community of interests restrains to some extent the natural tendency of the ruling class to use its power for its own advantage," wrote J. Allen-Smith, discoursing on governmental supremacy. "When, however, the subject classes live, not in the same community with those by whom they are controlled, but in a remote colony, there is far greater danger of ruthless exploitation. In such a case the State is dealing not with its own citizens but with an alien and supposedly inferior population. It

is not likely therefore," added the learned American professor, "that public opinion will insist upon the same standards of governmental conduct which it demands at home. Moreover, even if public opinion within an imperialistic country were definitely in favour of the view that a colonial venture is in the nature of a trust to be administered for the benefit of those controlled, there is no assurance and little likelihood that this purpose would be consistently reflected in the colonial policies of the Government."¹ Wise words these last

Manifestly the Portuguese colonial problem was a serious one. Unfortunately, however, the Military Dictators of May, 1926, were men whose political education and narrow surroundings unfitted them to cope with complex political questions. Moreover, their Fascist mentality prevented them from possessing a clear grasp of the realities of the international situation.

"Portugal entered into the War on account of her overseas possessions," said the preamble to the Colonial Act. Portugal, no doubt, entered into the conflict which involved the whole civilised world, but she went to war with Germany because of her alliance with England, and in order to enter into the War she had to borrow from her ancient ally.

And yet—strange to say—some years after Portugal joined in the Great War, an Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, replying to a question in the British House of Commons, said that the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty by which England promised to defend the Portuguese colonial possessions in case of aggression "still continued to be in force," but "that the British Government reserved to itself the right to determine the circumstances in which its help should be given or refused." The reply—an exact repetition of a reply given in 1913 to an identical question—was at the time discussed in the Portuguese Chamber of Deputies; and the ex-Republican Premier, Cunha Leal, thought the representatives of Portugal abroad should be fore-

¹ J. Allen Smith, *The Growth and Decadence of Constitutional Government*, London, 1930

warned against any assaults on Portuguese Colonies, whether from Germany or from the South African Union.

"Our Colonies can be retrieved only through the power of the sword," declared Hitler, in his *Mein Kampf*, which of course revived the interest of some millions of Germans in the question of overseas possessions "How we shall acquire Colonies again remains to be seen We may lease them We shall certainly not attempt to take them by force,"¹ observed, however, Dr. Schacht, President of the Reichsbank and Minister of Economics, who did not believe "in acquiring Colonies in the old flag-waving Imperialistic manner." Lease first What next?

They say that coming events cast their shadows before Sir Samuel Hoare, the British Foreign Secretary, speaking to the world from the rostrum of the League of Nations at Geneva, said "As regards colonial raw materials, it is not unnatural for the existing state of affairs to arouse fears of exclusive monopolies, at the expense of countries not possessing colonial empires It may be the problem has been exaggerated, but we will be foolish to ignore it Britain should be ready to participate in the investigation of these matters" Such agreement, if concluded, may, of course, give rise to international complications

"The question of raw materials is one not so much of political possession of the sources of such products, as of the possibility of their distribution on an economic basis," wrote a Dictatorship Minister for the Colonies "The total yearly output of African products from Portuguese Colonies is reckoned at something like £5,200,000 Of this some £3,000,000 (about 57 per cent of the total) comes to the Mother Country, and Portugal would be glad indeed to dispose of its surplus, at a moderate rate, to any countries whose well-being depends on the possession of an abundance of raw materials"² This suggestion was well-intentioned, no doubt, but curious in the circumstances

On this delicate matter the Portuguese sentiment was very well expressed by Paiva Couceiro, the famous Royalist,

¹ *The Daily Mail* (Continental Edition) October 5, 1934

² "Portuguese the Pioneers of European Trade," by Jose Bacellar Bibiano, *The Daily Telegraph* August 10, 1936

who made his voice clearly and unmistakably heard through a letter regarding Angola and the Portuguese Government's policy. But he earned the usual reward of those prophets of Israel who uttered unwelcome warnings to the people. The Government, presided over by Oliveira Salazar, took severe notice of Couceiro's letter, and "more as a protest than as a punishment," the distinguished officer, who disowned all connection with the present army, was prohibited from residing in Portuguese territory for six months.

The annual report of the German Colonial Society for 1934 stated that the co-operation between the Nazi Party and the society was "a preparation for greater and more far-reaching tasks in the future." And—strange coincidence—the Nazi Party organised the monster meeting in Hanover celebrating the unveiling of a memorial to Dr. Karl Peters, the German colonial propagandist, who, writing in the *Tag*, a year or two before the Great War, had stated that "England's assent to the expansion of Germany at the cost of Portugal was a *sine quo non* of an understanding."¹ This had its importance, of course, as straws that show how the wind is blowing.

But the Convention between Mozambique and the Union of South Africa was more than a straw in the wind. The Transvaal-Mozambique Convention of 1909—that is, the year before the proclamation of the Portuguese Republic—which superseded various treaties existing between the two countries, had expired in March, 1923. Though the delegates of the two contracting parties met in conference at Cape Town, the negotiations had broken off, and Admiral Leote do Rego raised the question of immediate danger threatening Mozambique. In March, 1923, at Lisbon, Brito Camacho, the High Commissioner for Mozambique, and the Hon. Sir Lancelot Carnegie, signed the renewal of the agreement concerning the employment of Mozambique labour—about 70,000 hands working the gold mines, and 15,000 the coal mines—for the Rand mines. The negotiations concerning the railways and port of

¹ *The Contemporary Review* June, 1912

Lourenço Marques, however, continued at Lisbon and London; and the frontier problems in South Africa, now under close consideration at the British Foreign Office, were not solved. They occupied for months the attention of the Portuguese Parliament to the exclusion of everything else. The Republican Nationalist leader, Alvaro de Castro—a former Governor-General of Mozambique—vehemently opposed the proposals made by General Smuts, and the Portuguese Press found it impossible to conceal its indignation. The South African Union demanded that the administration of the Portuguese port and railways of Lourenço Marques should be entrusted to a committee consisting of five members, one for each province of the Union, and a representative of Mozambique—a selfish proposal which Portugal rightly thought was a palpable menace to her sovereignty. The South Africa Union Government threatened, in case Portugal did not agree to the above proposal, to starve out the port of Lourenço Marques. But a very effective reply to this threat was made by a decree of the Lisbon Government declaring that Mozambique needed all its available labour for its development—a decree which if enforced to the letter, would find South Africa with her mining industry in a critical condition. It was no use, therefore, for the South African politicians to shut their eyes to the reality. In November, 1926, on his way to South Africa, after attending the Imperial Conference in London, General Hertzog arrived in Lisbon, and discussed matters with the Portuguese Government, whose invitation he had gladly accepted. In 1927 Portugal abrogated the Convention between Mozambique and the Union of South Africa. In May, 1928, Mr C W Malan, the South African Minister for Railways and Harbours, arrived in Lisbon to talk over the basis for a new Convention; and the result of his visit was that the contracting parties, which met in conference at Pretoria, arrived at a satisfactory agreement. In 1933 the Union of South Africa gave notice that it wished the Convention regarding the recruitment of Mozambique labour for the Rand to be revised. The Dictatorship Government, somewhat perturbed over the

revision, insisted that it should be discussed at Lourenço Marques

"Efforts have very rightly been made to abolish all kinds of slavery everywhere," said Portugal, replying to the League of Nation's recommendation of its *Draft Convention on Slavery*, "but it has frequently been forgotten that race prejudices place their victims in a far worse moral position than forced labour can do. It is cruel and inhuman to teach a man, and raise him through education to a higher level, if possible, than that of most other men, if afterwards he is always, or at times, to be ostracised and perhaps subjected to every sort of humiliation. It is for this reason that Portuguese law and custom have established equality in practice among all who are born under the same flag, no matter where it lies. This policy has enabled Portugal to keep her Colonies with the support of their natives, and has spared her such insurrections as we hear of from every other quarter." Thus Portugal was thrown on her own resources, and refused to be a party to accepting "a proposal which was obviously designed, as far as concerned native labour, to apply to the Portuguese Colonies the system of colonial mandates to which the former German Colonies were subject."

Unfortunately, however, the Dictatorship Government denied the colonials the right to share as equals in shaping the Portuguese destinies. The Colonies, which were directly represented in the Portuguese Parliament—it was immediately decreed—were to be heard only through the Colonial Council. The numerous dictatorial and, we may add, unexpected decrees passed since May, 1926, undoubtedly created bad blood between Portugal and the Colonies. Indeed, there was what it was difficult to call anything else than a smuggling of colonial legislation unworthy of Portugal's old chivalrous tradition. "Foolery, sir, does walk about the orb like the sun. It shines everywhere," Shakespeare made the Clown say in *Twelfth Night*.

The idea of racial policy originated years ago in the mind of Major Mousinho de Albuquerque, the Portuguese hero, who had bravely marched into the camp of Gungun-

yama, and taken the Zulu King prisoner. Gungunyama, who ruled over the Gaza country, had played great havoc among the Portuguese until Mousinho de Albuquerque inflicted on his hordes a crushing victory. Eventually the Portuguese victory was followed by an attempt to close Portuguese Africa, in narrow jealousy, to the Indians from Portuguese India who, however, by their tenacity weathered the racial storm. Though probably a Celt—an inferior branch of the Aryans—Mousinho de Albuquerque, who was the Governor-General of Portuguese East Africa¹, believed himself to be the torch-bearer of civilisation; and pleaded for the rights of Portuguese imperialism over subject races. This feeling of false pride—I may incidentally remark—eventually drove the Portuguese hero to commit suicide. The military Directors, now in power, however, had drawn their inspiration on the colonial question from the Mousinho school of thought.²

¹ "Major Mousinho, who is a strong supporter of the King, charges the Monarchical parties with having undermined the Throne and with having played into the hands of the Republicans

"Sir H. MacDonell thinks that Major Mousinho has in view a dictatorship as the sole means of salvation for his country" (Memorandum by Mr. Bertie, British Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1894-1903), dated May 1, 1898)—*British Documents on the Origin of War* (1898-1914) Edited by G. P. Gooch, and Harold Temperley, Vol. I. London, 1927.

² The "Goan Union," the representative organisation of Goans in British Territory, in the course of a statement issued to the Press, said,

"The principles of the Colonial Act were applied in the recent legislation known as the Military Recruitment Bill, which differentiated between Europeans and their descendants in Goa on the one hand and the natives on the other. *Assimilados* are natives who know how to read and write Portuguese, and have assimilated Portuguese habits and customs. *Indigenas* are natives who do not know how to read and write Portuguese, though they be great scholars in other languages. An M.A. of the Bombay University, for instance, who cannot read or write Portuguese, would be described as *Indigena*.

"The Military Recruitment Bill was framed by the Governor-General of Portuguese India, General Craveiro Lopes, in 1932. It is in abeyance, but only until such time as the whole question can be reconsidered. It may be enforced at any time. Under the Military Recruitment Bill, the Goans who render service in the Army are eligible for Government service only in Portuguese India, while Europeans and their descendants in Goa, in similar circumstances, are eligible for Government service both in Portugal and the Colonies.

"The Military Regulations, though ostensibly meant to introduce compulsory military service in Portuguese India, are in reality another method of taxing the people, as one can be released from the obligations of this service by paying a tax. The Portuguese legislation creates, therefore, distinctions based on

Readers would not believe—would they?—that the Portuguese Colonial Minister who drafted the *Acto Colonial* of 1930 said. "Certain international currents tend to establish ideas more or less unfavourable to the traditional dogmas of the colonial sovereignty of the European Powers, with the result that imperialist designs have had to be pursued under the cloak of humanitarian motives" No wonder the Portuguese delegate voted against Russia's recent entry into the League of Nations "The Soviet system," he said, "was the negation of every ideal on which European civilization was based Admission to the League would aid its propaganda for the destruction of Society," and so on.¹ The entry of Russia was bound to meet with opposition, but "the advocates of the policy of ignoring and isolating the Soviet Union," to quote the words of M. Litvinov, the Russian Commissar, "are no longer to be found among broad-minded statesmen or the representatives of the more important States, but must be searched for among narrow-minded politicians unable to rise above their petty political passions and strong prejudices, and deriving their knowledge of countries and people from muddled sources." M Litvinov might also have cited Republican Portugal as a country which, some years ago, was represented at the League of Nations by an ex-Premier whose Government, at a demonstration held in Lisbon to do honour to the murderers of King Carlos and the Crown Prince, eulogised those men as "heroes" and "worthy sons of Portugal."²

But while Oliveira Salazar, the Professor of Finance at the Mediæval University of Coimbra—on the anvil of which the Portuguese are hammered into statesmen—assumed the attitude of an imperial crusader, in a frock-coat and a straw hat, patronising the Portuguese overseas

colour The purpose appears to be to hold the colonies in perpetual subjection, and, incidentally, to reserve the higher posts to Europeans and to restrict Goan emigration to the Portuguese Colonies in Africa"—*The Bombay Chronicle* June 28, 1933

¹ *Daily Herald* September 18, 1934

² My article on "The Portuguese 'Empire,'" II, *The New English Weekly* December 27, 1934

dominions from a distance, Harold Laski, the eminent Professor of Political Science in the University of London, wrote. "The Western way of life is in the melting-pot Science, whether in physics or in biology, has dissolved into metaphysics; and, on one side, if it has become, as with Eddington and Jeans, part of the half-conscious technique of reaction, it seems so void of purpose as to represent nothing so much as the omnipresent anarchy of values. It is able to offer material comfort, it seems unable to discover the formulae of spiritual satisfaction. And it is part of this scepticism of foundations that the ancient East—so long content with passive acquiescence in the ascendancy of the West—should now have issued definite challenge to those who seek to preserve the conditions of tutelage. In the nineteenth century we could dominate India and China because we believed ourselves to be the torch-bearers of civilization. Now, when they challenge our mission, we have no answer but the clamant and dubious insistence upon our power to force their acceptance of our exploitation"¹ Lacking, however, the political capacity for up-to-date imperialism, the Portuguese professor flung himself in the "cross and sword" crusade. Unfortunately the early education he had received was of the most bigoted character, that turned him out narrow and intolerant, and, drunk with power, the author of the Colonial Act was unscrupulous in using it. "Those who use violence usually weaken before their task is done, and themselves become victims of their misplaced zeal. Our past revolutions are witness to that," were, however, Oliveira Salazar's words to Antonio Ferro, his reporter-biographer. It would not be easy, I think, to sum up the indictment against the Portuguese *empire-builders* more aptly than is done in these suggestive words.

"It is essential to the organisation of the Portuguese nation to fulfil its historic function by possessing and colonising overseas dominions," and "to exercise the moral influence which is bound up with the *Padroado*," said the Colonial Act. The author of the Colonial Act, holding,

¹ Harold J. Laski, *Democracy in Crisis* London, 1933

perhaps, the doctrine as outlined by Ernest Seilliere—the author of *Philosophy of Imperialism*, who considered mysticism as a sort of corollary of imperialism—evoked religious sentiment for justifying the aggressive *Acto Colonial*. The Kings were also duped by assurances that the main object of the traders in human flesh “was to facilitate the conversion of slaves to Christianity,” to quote an ancient writer.

The rights of Patronage in the East were solemnly granted and secured to Portugal in virtue of the Apostolic Bulls dating back to the famous brief “*Romanus Pontifex*,” addressed by Pope Nicolas V to Prince Henry the Navigator; and the history of Catholicism in the East once justified Portugal’s claim to those rights acquired by the legitimate titles of foundation. Till the beginning of the seventeenth century the *Padroado* extended from the See of Ceuta to the See of Peking. The troubles of the Patronage, however, began on the day Portugal lost her political supremacy in the East. The conflict between the Priests of the Propaganda Fide and the Portuguese Missionaries—as was only natural, became extraordinarily vivid and acute. The difficulty in the adjustment of the conflicting rights was fortunately solved by the ratification of the Concordat signed on February 6, 1857, and by its stipulations it was agreed that the rights of Patronage of the Portuguese Crown should be exercised as regards India and China over the dioceses of Goa, Cranganore, Cochin Mylapore, Malay and Macau. But the end was not yet. Issues were raised in the next few years which were not visible at the moment. A new Concordat had to be signed in the year 1886. The Archbishop of Goa was raised by the Bull “*Humanae Salutis Auctor*,” issued by Leo XIII on September 1, 1886, to the title of Patriarch of the East Indies, in virtue of which he holds to-day the highest place in the Catholic hierarchy of the East Indies. He exercised his jurisdiction over the Bishops of Damaun, with the title of Archbishop *ad honorem* of Cranganore Cochin and Mylapore, in India, and Macau, in China, his area of jurisdiction extending also to Mozambique, in virtue of the Constitution “*In eminenti*” of 1612

The Concordats of 1857 and 1886, although they restricted such rights of Patronage as existed before—the Portuguese *Padroado* once extended from the Cape of Good Hope to India and from India to China—nevertheless paved the way for peace between the conflicting parties “The exercise of the right of Patronage” wrote Fortunato de Almeida, “was restricted each time to more and more narrow limits in proportion as the Portuguese State neglected the religious affairs of its overseas possessions, abandoning the nucleus of the faithful in various places, and forgetting completely populations which the right of *Padroado* had placed within its sphere of action”

“It was not legitimate,” added the historian of the Church in Portugal, “to let the spread of the Christian faith and of civilisation be dependent on the incapacity so often and so long revealed and proved, nor can the Holy See be accused of having adopted restrictive measures precipitately, for the latter displayed the greatest magnanimity and at times the most condescending benevolence” The pompous phraseology of the *Acto Colonial* about “the moral influence which is bound up with the *Padroado*” could not, therefore, blind us to plain facts

But a still more striking manifestation of the great and severe crisis through which the *Padroado* was passing was afforded by the fact of Portugal being forced to negotiate the Accord of April 15, 1928—a protocol to the Concordat of 1886—eliminating, as far as possible, all instances of double jurisdiction within the same territory, which, of course, brought into distressing prominence the real state of affairs The *faux pas* of a diplomat, new to his task—a former editor-in-chief of the Lisbon *Diário de Notícias*—accredited and commissioned by the Portuguese Dictatorship, made it easier for the representatives of the *Propaganda Fide*, with her See in Rome, to have everything their own way¹ The Diocese of Damaun, with prescriptive rights over the City of Bombay, and with nearly four times as

¹ The negotiations between Portugal and the Vatican regarding *Padroado* difficulties in India give rise to some unpleasant reflections So much secrecy surrounded the negotiations, that the late lamented Dom Mateus Oliveira Xavier, Patriarch of the East Indies, bitterly complained to the present writer of having been kept in the dark about the future of *Padroado*

many subjects as the Archdiocese of Bombay, was abolished, one of the points of the agreement between Portugal and the Vatican being that the Archbishop of Bombay should be alternately Portuguese and British. The remaining rights of *Padroado* in Calcutta, Dacca and the Fishery Coast were abandoned; and outside Portuguese possessions in India the *Padroado* now survived only in the districts of Savantwadi and North Canara, which remained under the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of Goa, and in the Dioceses of St. Thomas of Mylapore and Cochin. "With the exchange of numerous Grand Crosses was signed recently the agreement with the Holy See registering what it has suited the latter to leave us of what was formerly the Portuguese *Padroado*," wrote Aires de Ornelas in the *Correio da Manhã*. The verdict was a sorrowful one, and it proceeded from a statesman who was a Catholic long before Catholicism became a fashion.

"We do not hesitate to admit," said Aires de Ornelas, "that the Government achieved as much as was possible at the present moment, especially if we take into consideration that the Law of Separation has ever since authorized the Holy See to abolish once for all what had been left of the *Padroado*." The encyclical *Jamdudum* addressed to the Roman Catholic Bishops throughout the world had condemned the Portuguese Law of Separation of 1911, which, —strange to say—affirmed that the *Padroado* in the East would remain unaffected.

Afonso Costa, who was the Republic's first Minister of Justice, was the author of the Law of Separation. His ambition was to bring about the realisation of his prediction that "within two generations after the passing of the Separation Law, Catholic religion will have been annihilated in Portugal." The frantic efforts of the Coimbra University professor, however came to nothing. In that lies a lesson. "It is our duty to create Christendoms in the East," said the Republican Governor-General of Portuguese India, Jaime de Moraes, formerly a partisan of Afonso Costa, addressing a gathering at one of the *Padroado* seminaries, where Indian candidates are trained for the priesthood. There was, indeed, something ironical in this.

"One of the reasons assigned by the Portuguese Foreign Minister for agreeing to the abolition of the Diocese of Damaun was the fact that the British Government no longer looked upon the religious activities of a foreign power in its dominions, with indifference. If any proof were required of the utter failure of Portuguese diplomacy in dealing with the *Padroado* problem it would be found in this statement," wrote the local organ of *Padroado*, an opinion expressing strong dissatisfaction with the humiliating settlement of the *Padroado* claims. "It is the height of absurdity to suggest that the missionary zeal of a friendly nation which so readily and chivalrously rushed to the assistance of England during the Great War, would disturb the peace of mind of the British Cabinet, when even the missionaries of the enemy Powers are permitted to enter the country freely. The enemies of the *Padroado* have always laid stress upon the fact that the existence of the *Padroado* in British India involved the interference of a foreign power in the religious administration of the country, but the argument never carried much weight. The Portuguese patronage has in recent years been limited to the appointment of a Portuguese as Bishop, and what diocese is there in India that is not governed by a foreigner? If the British Government has no objection to German, French and Italian Bishops, still less is it likely to have any objection to Portuguese Bishops."¹ The double jurisdiction in Bombay—first introduced in 1794—was, of course, brought about by the interference of the British Government. It was a direct infringement of the terms of the treaty of the cession of Bombay to the British Crown. The interference, however, took place in the days of the East India Company, before the proclamation of Queen Victoria; and now British policy on the *Padroado* question would, 'as in other religious matters, be based on the principles of neutrality and tolerance."²

¹ *The Anglo-Lusitano* June 9, 1928

² The Bombay nationalist daily, *The Voice of India*, having published an article specially contributed by me on the question of *Padroado* v. *Propaganda*, wrote "This controversy has been raging for some time in the columns of the local Press, and as we ourselves received a number of letters on the subject from numerous correspondents belonging to both the wings, we deemed it

"I confess at the feet of your Majesty that only the obedience I owe as a vassal, could have forced me to this deed, because I foresee the great trouble which from this neighbourhood will result to the Portuguese, as that India is finished the same day in which the English are seated in Bombay," wrote the Portuguese Viceroy, Dom Antonio de Melo e Castro, to King Affonso the Sixth when compelled to adopt a policy which was a palpable menace to Portuguese sovereignty in India. Indeed, the island of Bombay—a part of the dowry of Catherine of Bragança, who married Charles the Second of England—was a gift that urged England to a great imperial career "And when the King of Great Britain shall send his fleet to take possession of the port and island of Bombay, the English shall carry instruction to treat the subjects of the King of Portugal in the East Indies in the most friendly manner and to help assist and protect them" was, however, one of the clauses of the treaty signed between England and Portugal relating to the transfer of Bombay to the British. It is interesting, in this connection, to note that Bombay's claim to direct representation in the House of Commons was based on the Charter of Charles the Second.¹

our duty to present to our readers an impartial and authoritative historical survey of the whole question, so that the people who have not yet made up their minds on the subject, and those who have made up their minds already but on insufficient data, will have an authoritative basis to help them to come to the right conclusion. In our opinion this is a question that involves other issues besides the religious one, as this is a matter in which the Indian Christians, the Portuguese Government as protectors of Portuguese interests in the East, and the Vatican as guardian of the Catholic Church throughout the world are all concerned. It, therefore, assumes international importance. We wish to assure to our Christian fellow-subjects and our Portuguese friends that after the attainment of complete Swaraj, India will be as tolerant of other religions and creeds as she is, and has always been in the past. We trust the publication of this article will be appreciated by our Christian friends, who will be enabled to see that the *Voice of India* is as alive to the interests of their community as it is and has been in the past to the interests of other Communities"—*The Voice of India* October 25, 1923

¹ "That all and every the persons being our subjects which do or shall inhabit within the said port and island (of Bombay) and every of their children and posterity, which shall happen to be born within the precincts and limits thereof shall have and enjoy the liberties, franchises, immunities, capacities and abilities of free denizens and natural subjects within any of our dominions, to all intents and purposes, as if they had been abiding and born within this our Kingdom of England"—(Charter of Charles II)

But since the transfer of Bombay to the British, thousands of subjects of Portugal, with their yearly remittances from British India, have helped Portuguese India to disguise its enormous deficit

"As an instrument of political expression," said the Government of Portuguese India, sanctioning a loan of Rs. 5,000,000 to meet the cost of a *Portugal House* in the city of Bombay, "it will exercise an essentially national action, strengthening the ties which unite their emigrants to their country and stimulating in them respect for and pride in their nationality." The emigrants, however, were not willing to accept a brick in the hope that they could transform it into a loaf. Their united opposition to the projected *Portugal House*, fortunately, secured the attention of the Portuguese Dictators, who had to ignore their delegates' fantastic proposals.

Cares and necessities had conspired to make the Goan emigrants the men they were. They had risen to their opportunities and evinced qualities with which they were admittedly gifted. No wonder that, having considered the "Emigrants' Bill," approved later by the Portuguese Minister for Colonies, they took note of the fact that the Portuguese Government was not as keenly alive to the necessity "for rendering assistance to Goans in British India who find themselves in difficult circumstances," as to "strengthening the bonds which link the emigrants to the Mother Country and developing their love for their nationality." But worse still. The emigrants whose co-operation the so-called "Emigration Fund Committee" sought, included not only those directly concerned, but men whose livelihoods depended upon their loyalty to British nationality.¹ A committee in British India appointed by

¹ The British daily, *Evening News of India*, for February 25, 1933, wrote —

"A special clause in the treaty by which Portugal handed over the Island of Bombay as part of Catherine's dowry to Charles II gives a privileged position in a manner of speaking to Goans as Portuguese subjects in Bombay and British India generally, as pointed out by Mr. de Bragança Cunha, whose article is published on this page. The point is of particular interest at the present time when the position of Goans in British India is occupying the attention of both the Portuguese and our own Governments. Sir Henry Gidney raised it in the Assembly the other day when he is reported to have

the Governor-General of Portuguese India with its fund of Rs 70,000 alone to support it, was bound to produce such disastrous results

To return, however to the *Acto Colonial* The Colonial Act gave rise to grave anxiety in the minds of Goan emigrants in British India regarding their constitutional position in a Greater India In the atmosphere of freedom which was steadily gaining strength in British India—where political reforms were accompanied by a curtailment of the control exercised over the Indian administration by the India Office—the emigrants saw clearly that the aggressive Colonial Act meant for them complete destruction of their liberties, and this seemed the more sad when they recognised the destiny that awaits India in the British Commonwealth of Free Nations This was by itself of grave importance to warrant dropping the *Acto Colonial*.

But worse still The principles of the Colonial Act were applied in the Regulations governing compulsory military service in Portuguese India, which bracketed the natives of Portugal and their descendants in Goa together, and labelled the Indians of Portuguese India as *indigenas assimilados*, and *indigenas* pure and simple. "Get these people married at once," were Albuquerque's orders to the Dominican friar, who thought that the religious sanction granted to mixed marriages was against Canon Law. "Those who desired to marry were so numerous that Albuquerque could hardly grant their requests." His

contended that the Goans, having declared themselves Portuguese subjects, should be debarred from entering the Auxiliary Force

"The argument is apparently based upon a misconception By Portuguese law a Portuguese subject who accepts service, civil or military, under a foreign Government, automatically loses his status as a Portuguese subject In British India, too, this principle is regularly applied to-day, though it was not so formerly None but British subjects can enter the Auxiliary Force, and Goans who are Portuguese subjects have to naturalise themselves before they can be admitted Perhaps Sir Henry Gidney was afraid that the inclusion of a foreign element in the Force might affect its loyalty, a fear, we fancy, hardly justified considering the number of Goans in Government service throughout British India, many holding responsible posts, and the thousands of others who regard British India as their home, and have passed through the most troubled times without giving the authorities a qualm of uneasiness "

successors, however, "extended the permission far beyond what Albuquerque was authorised to do," say the *Commentaries*, compiled by the natural son of the very author of the imperialist scheme, which first suggested assimilation. And yet, strange to say, apes and boobies now chattered of the possibility of establishing the new Portuguese Empire with half-caste ideal as the banner in their grasp¹

For two generations, the *Carta Constitucional* of 1826—generously granted by a scion of the Portuguese Royal House—had been the accepted symbol of Portuguese liberties. The subject races were fully admitted to Portuguese citizenship in which were fused all differences, all inequalities, and the fact that the House of Peers, the Diplomatic Service, the Army, the Navy and the Law Courts were thrown open to merit apart from race had influenced the political development of Portuguese Colonies to the present time. The military dictators could not, therefore, make out all the geese in Portugal to be swans and ignore all the swans outside the Continent¹. Burke once warned politicians "to endeavour to be patriots and not to forget they were gentlemen"; words which bear very aptly on the point.

Dom Pedro the Fourth, the giver of the Constitutional Charter, not only outlined a liberal policy, but filled in the details to the extent of appointing an Indian to the important post of Prefect of Portuguese India, with full vice-regal powers; and—the fact deserves mention—the Plenipotentiary of Great Britain was requested by the Emperor of Brazil to be the bearer to Portugal of the new Charter.

The appointment of the Prefect of Portuguese India—he was one of the first Indian representatives Portuguese India sent to Parliament, who was a victim of Dom Miguel's absolute rule, but had obeyed Dom Pedro's proclamation urging the Portuguese to stand by their Constitutional rights—shocked the great body of sensitive officials who thought the old equilibrium was seriously disturbed, if

¹ My article on "Portugal and her Colonies. Putting the Clock Back" *The Times of India* June 24, 1933

not destroyed. They grumbled at having put a native of Goa at the head of Indian administration, and the troops in India, quite as little restrained by law as by honour, revolted against their Sovereign. The military revolt of 1835 resulted in the deposal of the Indian Prefect. It was followed by other military risings of the worst kind. In 1846 the army officers in Portuguese India combined with Portuguese agitators in Portugal, against their own Governor-General José Ferreira Pestana, a Portuguese of inflexible integrity. These movements of insubordination were followed by those of 1854, 1870 and 1871. They made it clearer than ever to the Portuguese Ministers of the Crown that the latter could not entrust the fate of Goa to a demoralized army. Hence the Decree of November, 1871, issued by the Portuguese Minister, Jaime Moniz, who addressed himself with energy to the task of reforming the army in Goa.

Curiously enough the last military revolt was that of 1926 when, impatient under the military dictatorship, some Portuguese officers in India were desirous of immediate monetary advantages. Fortunately, however, the Minister for the Colonies ordered the ringleaders of the revolt to be sent back to Portugal, and the revolt ended in abortion.

Goa, once one of the parts of Greater India included in the Empire of Asoka, is a country where the time-honoured Indian legends evoke periods that suggest a remote antiquity. "Europeans, and first of all the Portuguese, found themselves there face to face with a complete civilisation," to quote the words of a cultured Portuguese, the late Count of Ficalho, the author of *Garcia da Orta e o seu tempo*—"a civilisation different from theirs, inferior in many respects, superior in some." Indeed Goa—to-day a tiny Portuguese possession surrounded by the Arabian Sea on one side and the vast British territory on all others, and, therefore, allowed to exist under British supremacy in India—is a country where the shadow of the past still envelops the artificial life of to-day.

"Portuguese India does not renounce the right which every nation has of attaining the fullness of its individuality

and of forming itself into a unit capable of directing its own destinies," was the resolution passed on the 4th July, 1930, by the elected members of the Council of Government of Portuguese India protesting against the Colonial Act. The recent political developments in British India had created an unusual interest in civic progress; and it was inevitable that this interest would increase day by day, and as a result there would be a fuller consciousness of political rights. A British Viceroy addressing the Indian Legislative Assembly had said. "But I tell this Assembly again, and through them India, that the declaration of 1917 stands, and will stand, for all time, as the solemn pledge of the British people to do all that can be done by one people to assist another to attain full national political stature, the pledge so given will never be dishonoured." And the Viceroy, referring to the resolution adopted by the Indian National Congress, on the Nehru Report, had given a personal pledge of his honour to the same effect. "I should not be standing before you here to-day as Governor-General if I believed that the British people had withdrawn their hand from that solemn covenant," were his words. Unfortunately, however, the Government of Portuguese India, unable to take a correct perspective of the events that were moving rapidly in British India, had found it necessary to institute a censorship of nationalist Press messages. Even reports of the proceedings of the Indian National Congress, translated from the well-known British daily, the *Times of India*—a paper which is the guiding spirit in the daily life of Lilliputian Goan dailies—had been suppressed by the zealous censor!

Contrary to the declared policy of British Parliament "to provide for the increased association of Indians in every branch of the Indian administration and for the gradual development of self-governing institutions"—to quote the preamble to the Government of India Act of 1919—the dictatorial "Acto-Colonial" was incorporated in the Constitution of the "New State" which the Portuguese dictators proposed to constitute. The Goan emigrants protested against it, and the resolution passed at a memor-

able meeting held in Bombay, was a warning to the Portuguese Imperialists to modify their aggressive policy

"National aspirations must be respected, peoples may now be dominated and governed only by their own consent. 'Self-determination' is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of action which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril," said President Wilson in a notable address. The principle of self-determination was incorporated in the Covenant of the League of Nations; and Article XXII of the Covenant guarantees that the trustees shall perform their duties honourably and efficiently. "The prime purpose of every such exercise of controlling power should, however, be to promote the welfare of the peoples who are given no option but to obey. The second of the obligations resting upon the dominant State is that it should seek in every way, by education, by commercial and industrial development and by the grant as rapidly as possible of autonomous powers of administration, to prepare the subject peoples for self-government and for independence should they continue to desire it,"¹ wrote Professor W. W. Willoughby, discussing the claim of right upon the part of a people to compel other peoples to accept its political rule.

The Republican principle first formulated as a political maxim in the statement of the American Declaration of Independence that "Government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed," was, of course, adopted by the Portuguese Dictators, who decreed the responsibility of the people; and the new Constitution was submitted for ratification by a national plebiscite. "The voters there went to the polls," said a writer in the *New York Times*, on the plebiscite held in Portugal, "in response to a strange request from their Government—strange in these times, at least. Portugal's Dictators had asked for less power!" It was doubtful, however, whether the Portuguese Dictators had any notion of what their proposal to refer the new Constitution to a national plebiscite before it was adopted,

¹ *The Ethical Basis of Political Authority*, by Westel W. Willoughby, Professor of Political Science, John Hopkins University, New York, 1930

really implied. For, in the meantime, the nation was asked to recognise the present President, General Carmona, who, in March, 1928, was elected President of the Portuguese Republic, "as President for the first three years." Moreover, Oliveira Salazar, who framed the Constitution, "had decided that silence would give consent, and that people who were too lazy to vote against him should be counted as voting for him"¹—to quote the ironical words of a British journalist in Portugal. In such circumstances, no wonder the result of the plebiscite taken in Portugal and the Colonies in March, 1933, was an overwhelming vote in favour of the new Constitution. The Portuguese were to elect the President, who was the active head of the State and appointed the Cabinet members. The Presidential election—partly inspired by the American system—of a Republic based on a population seventy-five per cent of which is still illiterate, made, of course, the onlooker doubt of a sane future for the "New State."

One of the clauses in the Constitution was that the President of the Republic, with the term of office of seven years, shall not succeed himself, nor shall any of his nearer relatives. A National Assembly, consisting of ninety members, was to be convened for three months at the beginning of each year. The National Assembly, as a sovereign legislative body, was to be assisted by the Corporative Chamber—composed of various groups each representing a different sphere of activity—whose business was to report on legislation submitted to the National Assembly. The Press, muzzled though it was, and the Printing Arts, for instance, were represented by a group of four members elected by the printing industry, the newspaper proprietors, the Syndicate of Journalists, and the National Syndicate of Printing Workers, respectively. "The new Constitution certainly has nothing democratic about it," wrote a British journalist who was touring Portugal. "Only heads of family have the right to vote, and they elect only half the members of a Chamber which has no power to turn a

¹ Vernon Bartlett, "Professor who Keeps his Country in Order," *The Evening News of India* April 21, 1933

Government out of office. The other members represent different corporations organised along the lines of the corporations in Italy. There is also a separate Chamber of Corporations which has to report on proposed legislation. There is even a Council of State, which rather resembles our own Privy Council in its earlier days, and which exists to advise the President of the Republic. Everything, in fact, is advisory, the Government alone has the power to act, treating advice as most of us treat it."¹ The Constitution, of course, deceived nobody, certainly not those who expected the old and brainless habit of imitation cropping up in new and more subtle forms. "We wish to build up a Corporative State, quite distinct in its character from the former ideals of government," said Professor Oliveira Salazar, writing on "Bold Fifteen Years' Programme" in the *Daily Telegraph*. "Let our British critics, who are accustomed, by their social virtues, to make up for any deficiencies of their own political systems," added the Prime Minister of Portugal, "realise that we are striving for the same ideals as they hold by means more suited to our ways. The greatest merit which we wish for our institutions is that they shall become as thoroughly Portuguese as possible."²

"The masses by themselves alone are incapable of forming spontaneously a collective will of their own, and even less capable of proceeding spontaneously to a selection of men to represent them. The problem of government, therefore, is never solved by relying on the illusory will of the masses; it is solved by a wise choice of the directing minds," said Mussolini in the report on the new electoral law laid before the Italian Chamber of Deputies in March, 1928. Again, the Italian Duce had said "The electoral body is not, according to the usual fiction of the old electoral systems, called upon to choose the Deputies, but rather to approve the choice made by the organ which sums up in itself all the forces of the Nation. This approval does not and cannot

¹ Vernon Bartlett, "Professor who Keeps his Country in Order," *The Evening News of India* April 21, 1933

² *Daily Telegraph* August 10, 1936

apply to the individual names, it concerns the list as a whole, in which names are only the expression of a political trend. It is then essentially this trend which the electors are called upon to approve." In other words, the choice of Italian deputies to be elected had to be made by the National Grand Council of the Fascist Government. According to Oliveira Salazar, who did not wish to be behind the Italian dictator, the "União Nacional" was a call to action, and the professor explained in his rather obscure Ministerial speech, delivered on June 30, 1928, the features of Portugal's "New State." But while the Portuguese professor was engaged in elaborating the new Constitution, the Dictatorship Government, through the municipal bodies—they had since 1927 been supplanted by Administrative Councils nominated by the Government in power—established in 1931 a register of voters which included the supporters of the military Dictatorship and was called the National Union—"União Nacional." It was this body which submitted a list of ninety candidates for election to the National Assembly. The Constitution of the "New State" stipulated that only those who approved of the new Constitution would be permitted to stand for election. Moreover, the electors had not the right to select their representatives from the list, but had to vote for or against the whole list.

For the National Assembly—it held its first sitting on January 10, 1935—which was to vote amounts equivalent to £60,000,000 for the National Reconstruction Plan, recourse was had to "intellectual" selection. Obvious, however, as the Portuguese professor's intention was, it was not less obvious that such a task required men capable of acting with a scrupulous sense of political dignity. But the ignominious politeness of the members of the National Assembly ruined for ever their chances of independence. Softness of heart is an admirable quality, but when it extends its area until it becomes softness of head, its results are disastrous. "A Parliament is not a collection of distinguished experts; if it were, it would be even more unsuccessful in its performances than it is. For because a man is eminent in business or engineering or economics,

or medicine, that is no ground for believing that his eminence is relevant to the peculiar tasks of a Parliament. Because a man can successfully build a bridge, or penetrate the mysteries of the atom, or direct a great enterprise, that does not mean that he thereby offers proof of his talent for the art of statesmanship. That art, in its essence, seems to consist of four things. It involves a knowledge of how to handle men, an ability to see the issues which need handling, a judgment upon their priority in importance, and the power and the courage to carry their proposed solutions to a successful issue. A legislative assembly is neither a collection of specialists nor a body of statesmen. It is an average sample of ordinary men, deflected now this way, now that, by the drift of public opinion, and organised by its leaders to accept a policy which those leaders regard as desirable,"¹ wrote the distinguished Professor of Political Science in the University of London, Harold Laski, who modestly admitted that "he knew of no tests for Parliamentary competence which were capable of practical application."

The Portuguese professor, who was, no doubt, upright, and reputed to be austere and incorruptible, mourned the impotence that had overtaken Parliamentary Government in Portugal. But the programme of a Corporative State which he outlined on May 26, 1934, did nothing to correct a dangerous lethargy in regard to the duties of citizenship in his own country. The consequences, from the point of view of civic education, were disastrous. Another thing happened, not without bad consequence in the future. Most of the Portuguese workers bluntly refused to take part in the working of the new Corporative Syndical system, and the Dictatorship Government had to nominate several women as members of the Corporative Chamber, to which the Government appointed the members.

Comedy was, moreover, mingled with tragedy. The Blue Shirt Fascism, commonly known as National Syndicalism, was a new movement, led by Rolão Preto, a personal friend of Oliveira Salazar, who had endorsed Preto's bellicose programme. The Blue Shirt leader had promised

¹ Harold J. Laski, *Democracy in Crisis*

the Government to place at the disposal of the Portuguese Premier 5,000 blue-shirted champions who would "erect a strong dam against Communism, Socialism and other influences subversive of the present social order" The Portuguese Blue Shirt movement, "based on the traditional Christianity of the Portuguese people, has worked out a formula," said the Blue Shirts' organ, *Revolução*, "which permits us to harmonise the sovereignty of the State with the moral dignity of free and spiritual entities,"¹ whatever that may mean In June, 1934, however, Rolão Preto took a definite stand against any support for Dictatorship Government, and addressed a letter to the President of the Republic—a not unusual happening in Revolutionary Portugal—strongly criticising the Government His letter, which was bound to create peculiar interest, was suppressed by the Press Censor Soon after, the Blue Shirt leader, with another prominent Blue Shirt, was arrested and imprisoned on charges of subversive activities The Blue Shirts' attitude compelled Oliveira Salazar to issue an official statement, in which the Portuguese Premier tried to recapture the old spirit just for the moment—a curious development, indeed, in view of the quixotic character of the Blue Shirt movement in Portugal The Blue Shirts, however, did not hesitate between submission and resistance to the existing regime They joined forces with the Revolutionaries²

¹ "Portugal's Blue Shirt Fascism," *The Literary Digest* June 3, 1933

² "Early in February serious fighting occurred in the streets of Oporto The Minister of War, Colonel Passos e Sousa, hurried to Oporto and the rebels had very soon to capitulate Many prisoners were taken, but the ringleaders managed to escape, and many are living in Paris and form part of the Republican League

"No sooner had the revolt been suppressed in Oporto than it broke out with still greater force in Lisbon For three days and nights without a moment's cessation there was heard the roar of guns, the rattle of machine guns, the crack of rifles and the dull explosions of the bomb Barricades were erected in the streets, and intense firing took place from house tops and street corners The rebels were ultimately driven to the Arsenal, of which they had previously gained possession, where, after being bombed by aeroplanes, they surrendered

"The Partisans of the Government demanded the introduction of capital punishment, but the Minister of Justice firmly opposed such a measure The prisoners were gradually tried, the Government showing great clemency"—*The Annual Register* for 1927

"On Friday evening, July 20, a revolution commenced by the insubordination of the troops quartered at St George's Castle The government surrounded

"The Government," stated the official communiqué published on the 10th September, 1935, when the Revolution was to break out, "was aware of the understanding arrived at between members of former political parties, dismissed military officers who had participated in previous Revolutions, and members of the so-called Right, some of whom had rendered service to the existing régime and were sympathisers of the political processes of the national syndicalists whose dissolution had already been effected."

"The Council of Ministers," said the same communiqué, "will meet to-morrow to consider a detailed report of the

the Castle, stopped all traffic into the city from the suburbs and on the 21st the rebels hoisted the white flag and surrendered "

"On the 18th anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic, the Government amnestied over 1,000 army officers and civilians who had taken part in the revolt of February 7, 1927, reinstating some of them in their previous situations on condition that each should serve for two years in the Colonies " —*The Annual Register* for 1928

"In July all preparations for a Revolution to place the democrats in power had been made, but was discovered just in time by the secret police. As a result, army officers and civilians were arrested and deported. Quantities of bombs and war material were discovered in Lisbon and in the country, and even machine guns and gas bombs, which had been introduced from abroad with the connivance of some custom-house officials "—*The Annual Register* for 1930

"On April 4 a revolt of the Madeira garrison occurred, followed shortly after by revolts in two of the islands of the Azores. The rising had been prepared by the political exiles in France and Spain, assisted by political prisoners, who were in forced residence in Funchal. The rebels seized the three Portuguese merchant ships which were in the harbour, and in a very short time were in complete possession of the island. The Government hurried troops and warships to the islands and at once commenced a blockade in preference to an attack. In the meantime, and as showing how widespread was the movement, insubordinations occurred in Angola, Sam Tome, Guinea and the Cape Verde Islands, all of which were immediately suppressed. The rebels surrendered unconditionally on May 2. The expedition cost the Government over £300,000 "

"In the early morning of August 26, another Revolution was attempted against the Dictatorship. The rising was headed by a number of ex-officers of the Army who had been dismissed their posts because they had taken part in previous disturbances. The revolt was completely suppressed by nightfall, though it had been accompanied by loss of life "—*The Annual Register* for 1931

"On the night of November 19, an insubordination occurred in the garrison stationed at Bragança, where a few soldiers endeavoured to create a rising, and murdered an officer. The rebels were quickly overpowered by the rest of the garrison "—*The Annual Register* for 1933

incidents and to take such measures as may seem necessary for the maintenance of public order, which is now more than ever necessary in the public interest " Thus a remedy, distasteful enough in happier circumstances, had to be applied for the suppression of revolt. But a suppressed revolution, thought Machiavelli, always contains the germ of another which follows it, and this observation is profound.

VII

DON QUIXOTE AND SANCHO PANZA

It is the tenth year of Fascist rule in Portugal. General Carmona has been re-elected President of the Republic by an overwhelming majority. There was, of course, no other candidate. Salazar, the Prime Minister, has resigned, but immediately resumed office with a Cabinet containing only three of his former colleagues. The Portuguese Premier, whose ruthlessness is almost too much even for Machiavelli, firmly believes that the efficiency of the New State is incompatible with the freedom of the individual citizen. Anyone who disagrees with him is labelled *mau português*, or "evil Portuguese," and as such is ruthlessly exterminated. Repression is still the first instrument of government; and an iron censorship is applied to the Portuguese Press. Among the dictators Salazar's place is unique—he is the shy dictator though he indulges in some boastful reflections on Portugal's "civilising mission" to rule the "essentially subject races" of the Portuguese Colonial Empire. He is also anti-Communist, for Portugal is, he thinks, in a better position than any other nation to deal with red peril. Believing that Portugal's future is in the hands of its youth, the Government is about to start a Portuguese Youth Movement in obvious imitation of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany. As the Portuguese Dictatorship grows in power, however, it grows in fear.

Fascist Portugal's economic position is becoming increasingly precarious. The Budget surplus for 1936 shows a surplus of over £19,000 and provision is made for the frantic expenditure, during the next five years, of £5,000,000 for military re-armament, £1,500,000 of which will be

expended during the first year—an expenditure creating shortage of commodities and impoverishing the standard of living of the people. Incidentally, the Budget for 1937 published in December 1936, shows a surplus of over £3,000,000!¹

Economic imperialism was to take the place of military imperialism. The Portuguese Dictatorship had loudly proclaimed as its aim the pursuit of a policy of self-sufficiency. The “wheat campaign,” however, proved a task beyond its capacity. Portugal had to face enormous economic difficulties; and the surplus, due in part to exceptional harvests, had to be sold abroad, at a heavy loss. This was an incidental revelation of the Portuguese programme of self-sufficiency—a programme based not on statistics but on sentiment. There was no possibility of a self-sufficient Portugal then. There has never been the faintest possibility since. Nor was that all. In a distant part of the Portuguese Colonial Empire the imposition of a surcharge on imported rice—the staple food of the inhabitants—had the effect of raising the price, and there was a vile

¹ “The propaganda services of Dr. Salazar continuously boast of the present great financial prosperity of Portugal, more or less represented by his Budget surpluses. However, very few know that only through the raising of taxes was the revenue increased by more than thirty-five per cent. The tax on some commodities such as petrol, sugar and beer has been doubled. Though the value of the £ (gold) was 95 *escudos* in 1925 and 178 *escudos* to-day, the unfavourable balance of trade has increased from 1,222,140 *contos* in 1925 to 1,622,562 *contos* in 1934, a clear index of decreasing prosperity. Nevertheless Dr. Salazar's Budgets always close with a miraculous surplus. How can he succeed? He invented a new technique contrary to all the rules of finance. Unable to obtain enough revenue to balance expenses, he includes loans, which are accounted as ordinary revenue. For instance, in the Budget of 1934-5 he includes 280,000 *contos* of loans in order to obtain a surplus of 1,504 *contos*. By the same procedure, in 1932-3 and in 1933-4 a surplus of 1,673 *contos* and 1,723 *contos* respectively was obtained. The experts of the League of Nations, however, did not agree with this science, and did not consider loans as ordinary revenue. Thus we can see in the *Annuaire statistique de la Société des Nations*, 1934-5, page 280, that the Portuguese Budget closed with deficits of 4,000 *contos*, 71,900 *contos* and 280,000 *contos* respectively in 1932-3, 1933-4 and 1934-5. The misery of the Portuguese people reaches the limits of tragedy. Their wages are ridiculous, usually under and very seldom over two shillings per day. In many parts of the country, during the winter, the head of the family cannot obtain more than one or two days' work, with wages amounting to one shilling or less. Those who visit the country are deeply impressed by the sadness and suffering stamped upon the faces of the people.”—“Portugal and the Spanish Civil War,” by Spectator, *The Contemporary Review* October, 1936.

conspiracy to exploit the unfortunate consumer. The conspiracy, widespread as it was, involved a good many Government officials—a state of affairs which revealed a low standard of “imperial” morality. The accused in the rice frauds—about two hundred and fifty suspects were arrested—marched from the police stations to the Courts of Law. But the charges framed against them were—strange to say—based on the Government Rice Bill, an abstract-minded measure that mentioned crimes without sanctions.

This was the state of affairs when the Spanish election of February, 1936, gave power to the *Frente Popular*, the twin brother of the French *Front Populaire*. Fearing that the Spanish movement might have repercussions and consequences in Portugal, Salazar felt it would be best for him that the Italian Duce and the German Fuhrer should combat “bolchevism” in Spain; and no doubt from the German and Italian point of view it was very comforting to be able to kill two birds in the Peninsula—where Portugal and Spain occupy those strategic positions on which the security of the British Empire still depends—with one stone. Thus an international interest was suddenly imparted to the Portuguese home and foreign policy.

Separated geographically from Spain by no natural boundary, in race and language fundamentally the same, Portugal owed her separate existence to an historical accident. Throughout the centuries which preceded the foundation of the Portuguese Monarchy, the Iberian Peninsula was one country, where first the Celts, the Phoenicians and later the Carthaginians, Romans, Goths and Arabs were the moulders of its civilisation. The racial ties between the Spaniards and the Portuguese are secular, the affinities in folk song and bull-fighting are almost alike. The Portuguese, like the Basque, the Catalan and the Galician, of course, preserve their local customs and traditions.

But to return to our political muttons. The Spanish *pronunciamento* had as its motive the salvation of Spain “the land of hidalgos and nobles”—to quote General Franco. “We are defending the heritage of our ancestors,” said the

Spanish General when invested with the title of "Chief of State" and "Commander-in-Chief" of the Spanish Army "You are about to revive the Spanish Empire, itself a legacy of the past," and so on. The Generals now fighting for the "land of hidalgos and nobles," however, were Franco, the Republican Governor-General of the Canary Islands, Queipo de Llano, who had fled to Paris in open revolt against the Monarchy, and Mola, the Republican Governor of Burgos. Be that as it may. When the Civil War—a struggle recalling the savagery of the Carlist wars—broke out, it was easy to see on which side the sympathies of the Portuguese Dictatorship would be.

Professor Salazar rose up "to tell Europe of the dangers of Communism." He apocalyptically exhorted the Powers to fight against red peril and to establish law and order. He assured the world that the Civil War in Spain was as much his war as the Spanish Generals'. Europe, however, was not disposed to act on the warning, though it came from somebody who had once been described in the Portuguese Press as "the greatest statesman of Europe." The utterances of the Portuguese Dictator were, of course, those of a Coimbra professor with the Sebastian touch, who never quite understood international politics. Perhaps, indeed, a shade too foolish. The professor's mind was not sufficiently alert to grasp the bearings of the Italo-German economic imperialism, and it was not improbable that the political complications which accumulate on Europe's head might result, among other things, in endangering the position of Portugal as third colonial power in the world.

"There must be no crusade of ideals in Europe," said M. Delbos, French Foreign Minister—an axiom which was taken for granted by Great Britain. In August, 1936, France appealed to the interested European Governments "for the rapid adoption and rigid observance of an agreed arrangement for non-intervention," and Great Britain promptly replied with the suggestion that the agreement should include England, France, Italy, Germany and Portugal. Portugal, however, accepted in principle the French suggestion of non-intervention, while reserving

itself the right to "safeguard its territory" and "defend against any regime of social subversion", and quite unaware that if the Non-Intervention scheme collapsed, the Council of the League of Nations would take charge of the international situation, Portugal did not attend the diplomatic Non-Intervention Committee, which met, in the early days of September, 1936, in London

"Everyone can see how easy it is for a Government to be claimed to be legitimate by invoking the national will even if that will represents not the will of a majority of a people but barely amounts to a certain organisation of political forces," said the Foreign Minister of Portugal, at the League Assembly, challenging the legal position of the Spanish Government and blaming Communism for the Civil War in Spain. The British representative at the League Assembly, however, persuaded the Portuguese delegate to abate the fury of the anti-Communist crusade; and Portugal joined the London Non-Intervention Committee.

It would serve no purpose now to describe the phases of the Non-Intervention Committee which has been struggling to get its control scheme into operation—a scheme which was linked with issues as great as that called for decisive action.

Definite and documented charges of intervention in the Spanish Civil War by Germany, Italy and Portugal were made in Notes published at Geneva by the Spanish Delegate; and copies of the Notes addressed to the Powers whose Fascist Governments favoured the Spanish Insurgents, were sent to the Non-Intervention Committee. The Note to Portugal, among other things, declared that "contrary to international law the handing over of Spanish political refugees to the rebel Generals has been permitted." For after the Badajoz massacre, the Portuguese authorities had returned some Spaniards, who had fled into Portugal as refugees, to the insurgents. The Spanish rebels, ever since the Civil War started, had used Portugal as one of their chief bases; and it is interesting to note that General Sanjurjo, leader of the 1932 rising, was killed in an aeroplane crash at Cascais on July 20, while taking off in Portugal

to join the rebels. Incidentally, General Sanjurjo was invited to Berlin in March, 1936, and there concluded the secret convention between the rebel Generals and Germany. There had been reports in the British Press of all parties that lorries had been seen crossing Portugal on their way to Spain, until General Franco took Cadiz which, of course, enabled him to dispense with Portugal as a route. The Portuguese Fascists' effort to help the Spanish Fascists had gone to such surprising lengths that King Carol of Roumania had to instruct his Prime Minister to demand the recall of the Portuguese Minister in Bucharest, who, together with the German and Italian Ministers, had attended the funeral of two members of the Fascist and anti-Semitic Iron Guard killed while fighting for Franco in Spain. The ridiculous Portuguese Minister, perhaps, did not wish to be a nuisance abroad, but nevertheless a whole string of consequences remained to be faced.

"We know that actually there no longer exists a frontier between Portugal and rebel Spain," said a member of the Spanish Government in a British Press interview. In the early days of the Portuguese Republic, the Portuguese Government had actually charged the Spanish Government with showing indulgence to the Royalists led by Captain Paiva Couceiro. The Spanish Government at the time, however, thought it was essential that the Portuguese Republic should not encourage Spanish Republicans to come and conspire at Lisbon against the Monarchy of Alfonso XIII.

But to return to the present. The past can look after itself.

The Non-Intervention Committee held a meeting to discuss the Soviet Government's Note and its proposal for a committee of investigation on the Portuguese-Spanish frontiers. The Portuguese Delegate protested against the Committee discussing the Note from a Government with which Portugal was not even in diplomatic relations. He would not, he said, transmit it to his Government, he would not discuss it, and he walked out. The Committee, however, decided that the Soviet complaint must be communicated to the Government of Portugal, with a request

for an explanation. The very same day the Portuguese Delegate sent a message that his personal action did not imply any intention on the part of his Government not to collaborate with the Non-Intervention Committee. The Portuguese Delegate showed, anyway, on that occasion, that he was a philosopher of the old Portuguese school, though he lacked coolness and fresh thinking.

"Moscow wishes to create a grave international incident in order to furnish an excuse to withdraw from the Non-Intervention Committee," declared a Portuguese paper, protesting against the Soviet Government's allegations. Russia, of course, insisted on her point of view, and the Soviet Government's proposal that the British and French fleets should patrol Portuguese ports was now under consideration. Portugal replied to Russia's charge with an academic note accusing the Soviet Government, among other things, of "promoting revolution in Portugal." The answer which the Portuguese Government made was certainly designed, if not inspired, to underline the perfect team-work of Germany and Italy. In many respects the Portuguese Chefe was a sort of imitation of Italian Duce and German Fuhrer. In January, 1937, when there was a series of bomb explosions in Lisbon at the Ministries of War and Education and at two radio stations—the Burgos Junta had used a Portuguese radio station for its political propaganda—the Portuguese Chefe announced that the partly successful attempt at sabotage and wrecking "bore the mark of Moscow." The reason of all this is not far to seek. The Portuguese Dictator's energies were entirely absorbed by local conspiracies, and this prevented him from gaining a clear grasp of the realities of the international situation. The Comintern, under the Stalin Dictatorship, had long since abandoned the hope for a "world revolution." The world Labour movements had openly rejected the Moscow road to Socialism. Their policies were no longer revolutionary but social democratic. But nevertheless, the Portuguese Dictator lived and delighted in perpetual illusion, and considered all his visions as realities.

Be that as it may. Great Britain proposed that there

should be supervision at the points of entry; and France supported her. The plan was discussed despite the delays and obstruction, before the scheme of land and sea control could be put into operation in December, 1936 Portugal of course, objected to the control of her frontier For her national dignity, she declared, would be offended by the existence of international control which was incompatible with the rights of sovereignty. But eventually she had to agree to British supervisors along her frontier It was a surrender and a climb-down There was good reason to believe that Portugal had received a gentle warning from Great Britain that her ancient ally was not disposed to accept in the Peninsula a break with the past Besides, she was quite aware that Great Britain at the moment showed distinct signs of ignoring Franco's note received on December 22nd, where the Spanish General regretted that the British Government did not "seem to have grasped the greatness of the national Spanish movement" Incidentally it may be mentioned that the British Press, writing during the Great War, took Republican Portugal to task for her friendly attitude towards the Iberian Entente, and in this connection the London *Times* told the curious story of the Portuguese Republican Premier, then in power, who succumbed before the temptation and consented to be a Knight Commander of the Spanish Kingdom

The "tragic mockery of non-intervention," as Mr Lloyd George pointed out in the British House of Commons, however, had helped the massive intervention by Italy and Germany under cover of what was an international agreement The blunt refusal of Great Britain and France to bully the Spanish Republic after the alleged torpedoing of the *Leipzig* had annoyed the Fascist Powers, and they declared that they had no confidence in the "absolute impartiality" of the Powers which had not yet recognised the Spanish Fascist Government They decided to withdraw from the naval control scheme, and declined to accept any control in which they were not represented At the same time the Portuguese Ambassador in London informed

the Foreign Office that Portugal had "temporarily suspended the facilities" afforded to the British observers on the Portuguese-Spanish frontier. The observers, though they remained where they were, had no right to control the frontier. The Portuguese Government, it was now pretty obvious, had allowed itself to be influenced by the Italo-German policy in the Peninsula.

"It is in war that a people's soul is forged," had said General Mola, once the high-handed chief of the Madrid police, who was killed in an air crash on the Basque Front; and it is psychologically interesting to note that immediately after the merciless and bestial bombardment of Guernica, the ancient capital of the liberty-loving Basques, the Portuguese delegate at the Non-Intervention Committee should have joined Herr Hitler's London ambassador, who cynically justified horrors of the Guernica kind as a military necessity!

Salazar's attitude towards England is too complicated to be dealt with here. It was Cunha Leal, the author of *Portugal e Inglaterra*, who, in 1932, startled all Portugal by telling about the fall of British Power. By a curious irony of fate, the Portuguese Dictator now seemed to listen to the voice of the ex-Republican Premier, his bitterest enemy, whom he had gone so far as to exile.

It is but fair to say that, stressing the value to Portuguese security of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, the Portuguese Dictator declared "The most valuable item of our external policy is the age-old alliance with Great Britain, much of what we have done and intend to do still aims at tightening that bond." The Chefe was reported as having uttered these words in a speech to the representatives of the nation's defence forces who had assembled to congratulate him on his narrow escape from an attempt on his life. Eventually, a British Mission visited Portugal, and units of the British Home Fleet entered Lisbon harbour in February, 1938.

Great Britain was bound by certain treaty obligations "to defend Portugal, Irak and Egypt"—treaty obligations which would entail upon Great Britain the necessity of fighting if occasion arose. This was one of the main points

of Mr. Neville Chamberlain's famous declaration on foreign policy in the House of Commons on March 24, 1938. Great Britain, said the realistic British Premier, would fight for the defence of her territories and the communications which are vital to her national existence.

As this work is being written the fate of the Peninsula hangs in the balance. Will Portugal get out of the tangle in which she has found herself? The answer to this question will be the history of the next ten or twenty years of Portugal.

These are the times that try men's intelligences. Unfortunately, however, Portuguese intelligence has not stood the test. But "we have no other Portuguese," said years ago, a Portuguese King who possessed, in an eminent degree, all the virtues of the best Constitutional monarchs, --a verdict which might just as well have come from the man-in-the-street.

